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MILITAEY MEMOIRS OF A CONFEDEEATB 




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MILITARY MEMOIRS OF A 
COI^FEDERATE 

A CRITICAL NARRATIVE 



BY 

E. P. ALEXANDER 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY, CHIEF OF 
ARTILLERY, LONGSTREET'S CORPS 



WITH SKETCH-MAPS BY THE 
AUTHOR 



NEW YOEK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1907 



■A3f 



UORARY "' CONGRESSJ 

Vwf u-..,;i. - htoceived 



COPYRIGHT, 1907, BY 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS. 



Published, Afbil, 1907. 



Norfaootf i^teaa 

J. 8. Gushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



M 



.\> 



^\ 



TO 

Wi)t ^emor^ of tlie 2r>eati 

WHOSE BRAVERY WON THE GLORY 
WHICH THE LIVING ENJOY 

THE BAND IN THE PINES 

Oh, band in the pine-wood, cease ! 

Cease with your splendid call ; 
The living are brave and noble, 

But the dead were bravest of all ! 

They throng to the martial summons. 

To the loud triumphant strain ; 
And the dear, bright eyes of long dead friends 

Come to the heart again. 

They come with the ringing bugle, 

And the deep drum's mellow roar. 
Till the soul is faint with longing 

For the hands we clasp no more. 

Oh, band in the pine-wood, cease, 

Or the heart will melt in tears 
For the gallant eyes and the smiling lips 

And the voices of old years. 

John Esten Cookb, 

Ordnance Officer, Stuart's Cavalry. 



THE POINT OF VIEW 

The raison d'etre of tlie following pages is not at all to set 
forth the valor of Confederate arms nor the skill of Confederate 
generals. These are as they may be, and must here take their 
chances in an unpartisan narrative, written with an entirely 
different object. That object is the criticism of each campaign 
as one would criticise a game of chess, only to point out the 
good and bad plays on each side, and the moves which have 
influenced the result. It is far from being a grateful task, 
and the writer is, moreover, painfully conscious of his limita- 
tions in his effort to perform it adequately. 

But it is of great importance that it should be attempted 
even approximately not only for the benefit of general history, 
but more particularly for that of military students and staff- 
officers. These will find much of value and interest in the 
details, pointing out how and why the scale of battle was 
turned upon each occasion. It is only of recent years — since 
the publication by the War Department of the full Official 
Reports of both armies, in 135 large volumes — that it has be- 
come possible to write this story, even approximately. History, 
meanwhile, has been following the incomplete reports of the 
earlier days which, sometimes, as at Seven Pines (or Fair 
Oaks), have deliberately concealed the facts, and has always 
felt the need of the personal accounts covering the incidents 
of every march, skirmish, and battle. 

Only among these can be traced the beginnings, often obscure 
and accidental, of the most important events ; and these must 
ever form an inexhaustible mine for the study by the staff- 
officer of the practical working and details in every department 
of an army. 

As to the causes of the war, it will, of course, be understood 
that every former Confederate repudiates all accusations of 



viii THE POINT OF VIEW 

treason or rebellion in the war, and even of fighting to preserve 
the institution of slavery. The effort of the enemy to destroy 
it without compensation was practical robbery, which, of course, 
we resisted. The unanimity and the desperation of our resist- 
ance — even to the refusal of Lincoln's suggested compensation 
at Fortress Monroe, after the destruction had already occurred 

— clearly show our struggle to have been for that right of 
self-government which the Englishman has claimed, and fought 
for, as for nothing else, since the days of King John. 

It has taken many years for these truths to gain acceptance 
against the prejudices left by the war, even though it has been 
notorious from the first that no legal accusation could be brought 
against any one, even Mr. Davis. With the adoption of this 
view by leading English authorities, not to mention distin- 
guished Northern and Republican authors, the South may be 
content to leave all such questions to the final verdict of history, 
admitting itself too close to the event to claim impartiality. 

One thing remains to be said. The world has not stood still 
in the years since we took up arms for what we deemed our 
most invaluable right — that of self-government. We now 
enjoy the rare privilege of seeing what we fought for in the 
retrospect. It no longer seems so desirable. It would now 
prove only a curse. We have good cause to thank God for our 
escape from it, not alone for our sake, but for that of the whole 
country and even of the world. 

Had our cause succeeded, divergent interests must soon have 
further separated the States into groups, and this continent 
would have been given over to divided nationalities, each weak 
and unable to command foreign credit. Since the days of 
Greece, Confederacies have only held together against foreign 
enemies, and in times of peace have soon disintegrated. It 
is surely not necessary to contrast what would have been our 
prospects as citizens of such States with our condition now as 
citizens of the strongest, richest, and — strange for us to say 
who once called ourselves "conquered" and our cause "lost" 

— the freest nation on earth. 

The statistics of our commerce, our manufactures, and our 



THE POINT OF VIEW ix 

internal improvements are an object-lesson of the truth of old 
JEsop's fable, pointing out the increased strength of the sepa- 
rate sticks when bound together into a fagot. That the whole 
civilized world shares with us in the far-reaching blessings and 
benefits of our civilization, wealth, and political power is mani- 
fest in our building the Panama Canal, and again, in the Treaty 
of Peace between Russia and Japan, negotiated through the 
influence of our President. These are but the first-fruits of 
what the future will develop, for our Union is not built to 
perish. Its bonds were not formed by peaceable agreements 
in conventions, but were forged in the white heat of battles, 
in a war fought out to the bitter end, and are for eternity. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

From the U.S.A. into the C.S.A. 

Mormon War. Return to West Point. The Plains in 1858. The 
Signal System. Fort Steilacoom, 1860. Leaving Steilacoom. At 
San Francisco. Interview with McPherson. Resign from U. S 
Army. New York to Georgia. Captain of Engineers, C.S.A 
Impressions of Travel. The First Blow. Instructions to Maj 
Anderson, Anderson's Second Excuse. Third Excuse. Bu 



chanan's Excuse 



PAGE 



CHAPTER II 

The Battle of Bull Run (July, 1861) 

At Richmond. Gen. Robert S. Garnett. Orders Received. At 
Manassas. Installing Signal Stations. Strategic Opportunities. 
Beauregard's Suggestions. McDowell's Moves. Orders sent 
Johnston. Johnston Marches. Patterson remains Ignorant. The 
Odds against Us. Masked Batteries, etc. Blackburn's Ford. 
An Infantry Skirmish. An Artillery Duel. New Plan Needed. 
Plan Adopted. McDowell Overpersuaded. In the Confederate 
Lines. McDowell's New Plan. Beauregard's Plan. How it 
Failed. Tyler at Stone Bridge. At the Signal Station. Beaure- 
gard Informed. A Pause. The Dust Cloud. The Action Begun. 
Bee and Bartow come in. The Generals go to the Left, Watch- 
ing the Battle. Johnston and Beauregard Arrive. Reenf orcenient 
sent for. McDowell's Four Idle Brigades. Two Hours' Fighting. 
The Henry House Hill. Cummings's Brilliant Coup. The 
Federal Collapse. Leaving Signal Station. Stragglers in the 
Rear. Davis and Jackson. Lost Opportunities. Order checking 
Kershaw. Order stopping Pursuit. Affairs on the Right. Jones 
and Longstreet. Bonham takes the Lead. Bonham Halts. Over- 
caution in New Commanders. The Final Scene. Return from 
the Field. Hill's Report. Inaction of Council .... 13 



xii CONTENTS 

CHAPTER III 
Fall and Winter of 1861 

PAGE 

Ordnance Service. Breech-loading Small-Arms. Confederate Arma- 
ments. Richmond Ordnance Bureau. Secret Service. McClel- 
lan's Secret Service. Military Situation. A Council of War. 
Ball's Bluff. Occoquan Battery. Winter. Army Organization. 
Federal Organization. Lines of Advance on Richmond. Retreat 
from Manassas. The Valley. Kernstown 52 

CHAPTER IV 

YORKTOWN AND WiLLIAMSBURG 

McClellan at Fortress Monroe. Johnston goes to Yorktown. Reor- 
ganization. Dam No. 1. Yorktown Evacuated. Retreat from 
Yorktown. Battle of Williamsburg. Early's Attack. Hancock's 
Report. Casualties. Eltham's Landing 63 

CHAPTER V 

Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 

Drury's Bluff. The Situation. Attack Planned. Johnston's Plan 
Changed. Johnston's Problem. Battle of Seven Pines or Fair 
Oaks. A Misunderstanding. Longstreet's Mistake. Huger 
Delayed. Huger unjustly Blamed. Signal Given. HiU's Battle 
in Brief. Losses. Reenforcements. Reports. Wilcox's Re- 
port. Couch's Position. Johnston's Battle. Whiting's Advance. 
A Second Attack. Johnston Wounded. G. W. Smith in Com- 
mand. Smith's Battle, June. The Confederates Withdraw. Lee 
placed in Command. Resume. Staff and Organization. Artil- 
lery Service. Davis and Johnston 71 

CHAPTER VI 

Jackson's Valley Campaign 

The Valley. Jackson's Plan. Battle of McDowell. Shields joins 
McDowell. Jackson attacks Front Royal. Banks Retreats. 
Winchester Captured. Cavalry not at Hand. Steuart's Faux 
Pas. Jackson's Report. McDowell's Delay. Lincoln keeps 
Sunday. Panic in Washington. Jackson keeps Sunday. Jack- 
son's Retreat. Race down the Valley. Death of Ashby. Port 
Republic, June 8. Cross Keys, June 8. Port Republic, June 9. 
Winder Repulsed. Taylor's Charge. After Effects ... 94 



CONTENTS xiii 

CHAPTEE VII 
Seven Days' Campaign. The Attack 

PAGB 

Lee in Command. Ives predicts Lee's Audacity. Lee's Plan. 
McClellan's Delay. Lee's Opportunity. Lee's Order. Stuart's 
E.aid. Intimations to the Enemy. Conference of Officers. Jack- 
son's First Failure. Jackson's March. Stuart and Trimble. 
Branch Moves. A P. Hill Moves. Battle of Mechanicsville. 
Porter's Retreat. A. P. Hill's Advance. Gaines Mill Position. 
The Chances. Jackson at Cold Harbor. Porter's Account. Hill's 
Account. Lee's Account. Jackson ordered in. General Advance. 
Enemy's Escape. Casualties. Remarks 109 

CHAPTER VIII 

Seven Days' Campaign. The Pursuit 

June 28. June 29. Magruder's Report. Jackson's Report. Lee's 
Report. Lee to Magruder. Savage Station. June 30. Waiting 
in vain for the Signal. Holmes's Division. Huger's Division. 
Wright meets Jackson. Huger's Report. Jackson, June 29. Lee 
to Magruder. Jackson, June 30. White Oak Swamp. Frank- 
lin's Report. Jackson's Account. The Cannonade. Munford's 
Letter. Hampton's Crossing. Franklin's Comments. D. H. 
Hill's Explanation. Battle of Frazier Farm. Bayonet Fighting. 
A Successful Ruse. Lee's Report 133 

CHAPTER IX 

The Escape. Battle of Malvern Hill 

Enemy's N"ew Position. Line Formed. Pendleton's Artillery. Artil- 
lery Combats. Whiting's Report. Sumner seeks Cover. Lee's 
Reconnoissance. Lee Misled. Attack Begun. Wright's Report. 
Semmes and Kershaw. D. H. Hill's Report. Toombs's Report. 
Casualties. Lee's Report. Stuart shells a Camp. McClellan 
Writes. Stuart's Report. Attack Abandoned. Casualties. An 
Artillery Raid. The South Side. Our Balloon . . . .156 

CHAPTER X 
Cedar Mountain 

Recuperation. Gen. Pope Arrives. Gen. Halleck Arrives. McClellan 
Recalled. Lee Moves. Jackson Moves. Cedar Mountain. The 
Night Action. Jackson's Ruse. Casualties 175 



xiv CONTENTS 

CHAPTEE XI 

Second Manassas 

PAGE 

The Situation, Aug. 15. Lee's Plan. How it Failed. A Federal 
Scouting Party. Pope Escapes. Stuart's Raid. Storm frustrates 
Efforts. Lee plans his Move. Ropes's Criticism. Jackson's 
March. Aug. 26. Manassas Captured. Destruction of Stores. 
Pope's Move. Lee and Longstreet's March. Pope Blunders. 
Jackson's Move. Orders Captured. Johnson's Skirmish. Pope 
at a Loss. Ewell attacks King. Hard Fighting. Losses. Thor- 
oughfare Gap. Flanking the Gap. The Opposing Forces. Sigel's 
Attack. Reno's and Kearny's Attack. Hooker's and Reno's 
Attack. Grover's Brigade. Porter's Corps. Pope versus Porter. 
Kearny and Reno Attack. Longstreet takes Position. Longstreet 
meets King. Pope is Misled. Lee awaits Attack. The Forces. 
The Lines. A Surprise. Longstreet comes in. The Henry 
House Hill. Night and Rain. No Pursuit. Centreville Turned. 
Affair at Ox Hill. Stevens and Kearny. Casualties. The Am- 
munition Supply 185 

CHAPTER XII 

BOONSBORO OR SoUTH MOUNTAIN, AND HarPER'S FeRRY 

Choice of Moves. Interior Lines. Policy of Invasion. Across the 
Potomac. Affairs in Washington. McClellan succeeds Pope. 
Lee's Proclamation. Organizations and Strength. Harper's 
Ferry Garrison. Orders No. 191. The Army Scatters. The 
Lost Order. Lee Warned. Battle of Boonsboro or South Moun- 
tain. Longstreet Arrives. The Retreat. Crampton's Gap. 
Franklin Attacks. Jackson before Harper's Ferry. Preparations 
for Assault. Bombardment and Surrender. Borrowed Wagons. 
Paroles and Colors. Casualties 220 

CHAPTER XIII 

Sharpsburg OR Antietam 

McLaws and Jackson Recalled. The Ordnance Train. The Question 
of giving Battle. Confederate Straggling. Ropes's Comments. 
McClellan 's Pursuit. Lee's Line of Battle. Battle of Hooker's 
Corps. Hood's Counter-stroke. On Jackson's Left. Battle of 
Mansfield's Corps. Battle of Sumner's Corps. Sedgwick Ambus- 
caded. The Artillery Fighting. Fourth Attack Prepared. 
French's Advance. Swinton's Account. The Bloody Lane. 
Franklin is Halted. Both Sides Exhausted. Pleasanton and 
Porter. Burnside Advances. Toombs's Good Defence. The 



CONTENTS XV 

PAGE 

Bridge Carried. The Advance upon Sharpsburg. A. P. Hill's 
Counter-stroke. Lee in Council. Sept. 18. Faulty Position of 
Federal Cavalry. The Pursuit. The Counter-stroke. Captured 
Ordnance Stores. Casualties 241 

CHAPTER XIV 

Fall of 1862 

Political Situation. Lincoln orders Advance. A Confederate Raid. 
Lincoln Dissatisfied. Condition of Confederates. Reorganization. 
Lee moves to Culpeper. McClellan succeeded by Burnside. Plan 
of Campaign Changed. Burnside's Strength. Lee's Strength. 
Sumner at Falmouth. Non-arrival of Pontoons. Surrender De- 
manded. Earthworks Erected. Jackson Arrives. Burnside's 
Plan. Marye's Hill. Building the Bridges. The Bombardment. 
The Crossing Made. Dec. 12. The Plan Changed. Jackson's 
Line. Franklin Advances. Gibbon supports Meade. Meade 
strikes Gregg. The Counter-stroke. Jackson's Proposed Attack. 
Casualties. On the Federal Right. The Formations. French 
and Hancock Charge. Howard Charges. Sturgis Charges. 
Sunken Road Reenforced. Griffin's Charge. Humphreys's 
First Charge. Humphreys's Second Charge. Humphreys's Report. 
Tyler's Report. Getty's Charge. Hawkins's Account. A Federal 
Conference. Dec. 14, Sharpshooting. Dec. 15, Burnside Retreats. 
Flag of Truce. Casualties. New Plans. The Mud March. Burn- 
side Relieved 276 

CHAPTER XV 

Chancellorsville 

Winter Quarters. Rations Reduced. Hays's Louisiana Brigade. 
Officers' Servants. Hooker's Reorganization. Confederate Organi- 
zation. Hooker's Plan of Attack. Lee's Proposed Aggressive. 
Hooker Crosses. Hooker's Fatal Mistake. Lee's Prompt Action. 
The Wilderness. Hooker Advances. Lee's Advance. Hooker 
Retreats. Hooker Intrenches. Lee Reconnoitres. Lee's Plan of 
Attack. Jackson's March. The Movement Discovered. Sickles 
Advances. Jackson Deploys. Jackson Attacks. Colquitt's 
Blunder. Dowdall's Tavern. Casualties. At Hooker's Head- 
quarters. Defensive Measures. Jackson Pauses. A Cannonade. 
Wounding of Jackson. Stuart in Command. Formation for 
Attack. Sickles's Midnight Attack. Hooker's Interior Line. 
Hooker abandons Hazel Grove. Stuart Attacks. Assaults Re- 
pulsed. Hazel Grove Guns. Federals Withdraw. Lee and 
Stuart Meet. Sedgwick's Advance. Wilcox on Taylor's Hill. 
Assaults Renewed. Early falls Back. Salem Church. Casual- 
ties. Early's Division. Lee organizes an Attack. Sedgwick 
driven Across 317 



xvi CONTENTS 

CHAPTER XVI 
Gettysburg : The First Day 

PAGE 

Higli Tide. Opportunity Open. Suggestion Made. Invasion. Spe- 
cial Feature. Feature Impossible. Reorganization. Armament. 
Lee Moves. Brandy Station. Ewell in Valley. Captured Prop- 
erty. Hooker Moves. Lincoln Suggests. Lee in Valley. Stuart 
proposes Raid. Conditional Consent. Stuart's Raid. Carlisle. 
Results of Raid. Across the Potomac. Hooker Relieved. Cham- 
bersburg. Return of Scout. Orders. Chance Encounter. Hill 
to Gettysburg. Meade's Movement. Reynolds to Gettysburg. 
Battle Opens. Archer Captured. Rodes Arrives. Early Arrives. 
Lee Orders Pursuit. Ewell stops Pursuit. Lee Confers. The 
Enemy's Line. Best Point of Attack. Longstreet's Arrival. 
Federal Arrivals 363 

CHAPTER XVII 

Gettysburg : Second Day 

The Situation. Lee decides to Attack. The Attack to be on our 
Right. Longstreet's Flank March. Sickles's Advance. Meade 
foresees Sickles's Defeat. Progressive Type of Battle. Hood pro- 
poses Flank Movement. Formation and Opening. Hood's Front 
Line. Fight on Little Round Top. Hood's Second Line. McLaws 
badly Needed. Kershaw and Semmes. Artillery Fighting. 
Barksdale and Wofford. Anderson's Division. Wilcox's Brigade. 
Wilcox asks Help. Why No Help was Given. Lang's Brigade. 
Wright's Brigade. Wright carries the Stone Wall. Wright's 
Retreat. Reenforcements for Sickles. Ayres's Division. Con- 
federate Situation. The Artillery Engaged. Ten More Brigades 
in Sight. Crawford's Advance. Ewell's Cooperation. The 
Afternoon Cannonade. Johnson's Assault. Early's Attack. 
Federal Account. Rodes's Failure to Advance. Rodes's New 
Position. Rodes's Summary, Second Day 390 

CHAPTER XVIII 
Gettysburg : Third Day 

The Plan of the Day. Johnson Reenforced. Johnson's Battle. Lee 
joins Longstreet. A Discussion. The Decision. The Neglected 
Opportunity. Posting the Guns. Artillery of Other Corps. In- 
fantry Formation. Hill's Cannonade. The Nine Howitzers. 
Note from Longstreet. Talk with Wright. Cannonade Opens. 
Pickett called For. Pickett and Longstreet. Pickett Appears. 
The Repulse. Lee on the Field. The Afternoon. Nelson's En- 
filade. Advances from Peach Orchard 414 



CONTENTS svii 

CHAPTEE XIX 

Battle op Chickamauga 

PAGB 

Position of the Confederacy after Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Reen- 
forcements of Bragg. The Armies before the Battle of Chicka- 
mauga. The Order of Battle. Engagement of the 19th. Battle 
of the 20th. Rosecrans's Order to Wood. Longstreet's Advance. 
The Casualties. Thomas at Chattanooga. The Battle of Wau- 
hatchie. Bragg's Position. Battle of Chattanooga or Missionary 
Ridge. Positions of the Armies. The Attack on the Ridge. 
Bragg's Retreat. The Knoxville Campaign. Longstreet's Expe- 
dition. Fort Sanders and its Garrison. Storming the Fort. The 
Retreat. Casualties of the Campaign 447 

CHAPTER XX 

Battle of the Wilderness 

Review. Lee's Force. Situation. Longstreet's Position. Longstreet's 

March. Ewell's Advance. Ewell's Fight 493 

CHAPTER XXI 
The Motement against Petersburg 

The Crisis of the War. High Price of Gold. Difficulty of Recruiting 
in the North. Grant crosses the James and moves on Petersburg. 
Hancock's Corps Delayed. Movements of Lee. Beauregard's 
Defence. Fighting of June 16 and 18. Success of Grant's 
Strategy 545 

CHAPTER XXII 

The Mine 

The Petersburg Trenches. Wilson and Kautz's Cavalry Raid. Their 
Rout on the 29th. Early's Demonstration toward Washington. 
The Mine at the Elliott Salient. Extent of the Tunnel and 
Galleries. Its Ventilation. Countermines. Plans for a Federal 
Charge to follow the Explosion. Movements of Hancock. The 
Explosion on the 30th. The Crater. Failure of the Federal 
Assault 560 



XVUl 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTEE XXIII 



The Fall of 1864 



The Situation in August. Hood appointed to succeed Johnston. 
Evacuation of Atlanta. Capture of Mobile. Reelection of Lin- 
coln. Battle of Franklin. Sherman's March. Fort Fisher. 
Conference at Fortress Monroe. Fort Stedman. Movements of 
Grant. Five Forks. Fort Whitworth and Fort Gregg. Evacua- 
tion of Petersburg. Appomattox. Correspondence between Lee 
and Grant. Conversations with Lee. The Meeting at Appomat- 
tox. The Surrender. Visit to Washington. Conversations with 
Mr. Washbnrne. Return Home. Record of the Army of Northern 
Virginia 574 



GENERAL ALEXANDER 

from a photograph taken in 1866 



MILITARY MEMOIRS OP A 
CONFEDERATE 

CHAPTER I 

From the U.S.A. into the C.S.A. 

Mormon War. Return to West Point. The Plains in 1858. The Signal 
System. Fort Steilacoom, 1860. Leaving Steilacoom. At San Fran- 
cisco. Interview with McPherson. Resign from U. S. Army. New 
York to Georgia. Captain of Engineers, C.S.A. Impressions of 
Travel. The First Blow. Instructions to Maj. Anderson. Ander- 
son's Second Excuse. Third Excuse. Buchanan's Excuse. 

The year 1861 found me a second lieutenant of Engineers, 
U.S.A., on duty with Co. A, Engineer troops, at Fort Steilacoom, 
Washington Territory. I had entered West Point from Georgia 
in 1853, and graduated in 1857. For three years after my 
graduation I served, generally at the MiUtary Academy, as an 
assistant instructor, but on two occasions was absent for six 
month at a time upon special details. 

On the first, with Capt. James C. Duane and 64 men of the 
Engineer Company, we were sent out to Utah for duty with 
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston in what was then called the Mor- 
mon War. In 1857 the Mormons had refused to receive a gov- 
ernor of the territory, appointed by President Buchanan, and as- 
sumed a hostile attitude. Johnston was sent with about 2000 
men to install the new governor, Alfred Cumming of Georgia. 
The Mormons took arms, fortified the passes of the Wasatch Moun- 
tains, and captured and burned trains of supplies for the troops. 

The near approach of winter decided the War Department to 
halt Johnston and put him in winter quarters at Fort Bridger, 
east of the Wasatch, until he could be heavily reenforced in 
the spring. Six columns of reinforcements were ordered from 

1 



2 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Fort Leavenworth, and, of these, our detachment and the 6th 
Infantry composed column No. 1, and marched on May 6, 1858. 

The only travelled route at that time passed by Fort Kearney, 
Fort Laramie, and the Great South Pass. Our column was 
ordered to open a new route, following the South Platte to Lodge 
Pole Creek, and up that stream to its headwaters in the Southern 
Black Hills, and thence, via Bridger's Pass, to join the old road a 
short distance east of Fort Bridger. Only Fremont, some years 
before, had ever gone through by that route, and it was thought 
to be materially shorter. When we got into the mountains we 
found it necessary to leave the 6th Infantry in camp, and to go 
ahead with our company to .make a practicable road. We also 
had to ferry, using iron wagon bodies as boats, the Laramie, 
the North Platte, and Green rivers. Fort Bridger was reached 
on Aug. 1 — 86 days, 970 miles. The new route proved to be 
49 miles shorter than the South Pass road. 

Without mails for six weeks, it was only on arrival at Fort 
Bridger we learned that the " Mormon War " was over. Brigham 
Young, on seeing the large force prepared to install his rival. 
Gov. Gumming, had wisely concluded to submit and forego 
his dream of independence. Perhaps he was the wisest leader 
of a people seeking freedom, of all his generation. At first, the 
Mormons deserted their homes, and proposed to burn them and 
migrate to Mexico. Neither Confederate nor Boer was more de- 
voted to his cause than the Mormons to their own. But Brig- 
ham Young knew when the time to surrender had come, and he 
deserves a monument for knowing it and acting upon the knowl- 
edge; even though by doing so he greatly disappointed many 
young officers, myself among them, anxious to see active service. 

Meanwhile an important Indian war had broken out in Oregon, 
and the detachment of our company which had been left at 
West Point was now on its way there via the Isthmus under 
Lts. Casey and Robert. Orders had, therefore, been issued 
recalling our detachment to West Point, and directing the 6th 
Infantry to march on by land to Oregon. 

On Aug. 9 we set out via the South Pass and Fort Laramie 
route and reached Leavenworth, 1019 miles, on Oct. 3, 56 days. 
We laid over eight Sundays and one' day at Laramie, and made 



FROM THE U.S.A. INTO THE C.S.A. 3 

47 marches averaging 22 miles each. The longest march was 
27 miles. These figures are of interest for comparison with 
marches made on special occasions in the war. The conditions 
of the march were the most favorable possible, being over good 
roads, in good weather, by a small body, with all ammunition 
and knapsacks carried in a train of nearly empty wagons, and 
officers and men all anxious to make a quick trip. Distances 
were carefully measured by an odometer. Rests during the 
march were about 10 minutes in each hour, and the average rate 
of movement on good ground was a mile in 20 minutes. 
From Leavenworth we took a boat to St. Louis, and thence 
rail to New York and West Point, arriving Oct. 13. 

The Plains at this period were in their pristine wildness, and 
I had enjoyed the march greatly. Buffalo and antelope were 
abundant, and I was fond of hunting. The Indians were armed 
but with bows and arrows, and dressed only in breech clouts, 
blankets, feathers, and paint. Gold was first discovered on 
Cherry Creek, near what is now Denver, during this summer, 
and on our return we met the earhest emigrants going out to 
that section. Within two years there was a considerable city 
there, with theatres and daily papers. 

I remained at West Point a year as Assistant Instructor in 
Engineering, and during the summer of 1859 was put in charge 
of the Department of Fencing and Target Practice. In Oct., 

1859, I was assigned to special duty with Assistant-Surgeon 
A. J. Myer to experiment with a system of military signals 
which he had devised and offered to the War Department. It 
was based upon the use of Baine's telegraphic alphabet, which 
formed the letters by the use of only two elements — dot and 
dash. The Morse alphabet uses four — dot, short dash, long dash, 
and interval between dashes. Myer had originally suggested its 
use as a language for the deaf and dumb, when he was a medical 
student. By the waving of anything to the left for dot, and to 
the right for dash, any letter could be indicated by a few waves. 

For three months we experimented with flags, torches, and 
glasses between Fort Hamilton and Sandy Hook, and, in Jan., 

1860, we reported to the War Department in Washington 
with what has been since known as the "Wig-wag" Signal 



4 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

System. A bill was introduced into Congress to adopt the 
system and Myer and I were directed to exhibit it to the Military 
Committees. I was also assigned to temporary duty on a board 
of officers experimenting with breech-loading rifles, of which 
there were several models being offered to the War Department. 

By April, 1860, the Signal Bill having been favorably reported, 
I was relieved from special duty and ordered back to West Point, 
but was given a leave of absence for 60 days. During this leave 
I married Miss Bettie Mason of King George Co., Va. Soon 
after returning to West Point I was ordered to relieve Lt. 
Robert at Fort Steilacoom in Washington Territory with the 
detachment of our company. With my wife I sailed on the 
steamer Northern Light for Aspinwall on Aug. 10 ; by the John 
L. Stephens from Panama on the 19th ; and by the Cortes from 
San Francisco on Sept. 8; landing at Steilacoom City on Sept. 
20. All steamers of those days were side wheelers. 

The post was commanded by Col. Silas Casey of the 9th In- 
fantry, and garrisoned by two companies of the 9th Infantry 
and our detachment of 36 Engineer troops under Lt. Thomas 
L. Casey. There were no duties but those of company routine. 
The post was a very pleasant one, the woods and waters abounded 
in game and fish, the climate was mild and open, and the fall and 
winter passed rapidly. But it was a period of great anxiety to 
Southern officers whose native states, after debating the 
question of secession, began one after another to take the 
step. 

There was generally httle active interest taken by army officers 
in political questions, but, with few exceptions, the creed was 
held that, as a matter of course, in case war should result from 
secession, each officer would go with his state. In Feb. we 
received news of the secession of Georgia. There seemed then, 
however, strong probability of a peaceful separation. In March 
came orders for the return of our detachment to West Point. 

No vessel was then running to any port in Puget Sound, and 
we had to wait until special arrangements for our transportation 
could be made. Our Quartermaster Department, however, 
maintained an armed vessel, the Massachusetts, upon the Sound 
to keep off invasions of the Stikane Indians, who made raids 



FROM THE U.S.A. INTO THE C.S.A. 5 

from Alaska in their immense war canoes. This vessel was 
directed to take us to Port Townsend, and there the Cortes, 
which ran between San Francisco and Vancouver's Island, would 
call and get us. 

We sailed from Steilacoom City in the afternoon of April 9, 
1861. Four years later, to an hour, I saw Gen. Lee ride back 
to his hnes from Appomattox Court House, where he had just 
surrendered his army. On April 12 we took the Cortes, and, 
after touching at Squimault and Portland, we reached San 
Francisco on the 20 th. We were too late to catch the Panama 
steamer of that date, as we had hoped, and the next boat was 
May 1. 

As our steamer made fast to the wharf all my personal plans 
were upset. A special messenger, waiting on the wharf, came 
aboard and handed me an order by telegraph and Pony Express 
relieving me from duty with my company, and ordering me to 
report to Lt. McPherson in charge of Alcatraz Island, San 
Francisco harbor. 

I was very sorry to receive this order, as it deprived me of 
transportation, leaving me, with my wife, over 6000 miles from 
home by the only available route, and it precipitated my own 
resignation, which I might have reasonably delayed until I was 
back in the East. 

But there was now no longer any doubt that war was inevi- 
table, and, indeed, within a day or two the Pony Express and 
telegraph line brought news of the fall of Fort Sumter. 

So when I reported to McPherson, in obedience to my orders, 
I told him that I must resign and go with my state, and I begged 
that he would forward my resignation, and at the same time 
give me a leave' of absence, which would allow me to go home 
and await the acceptance of my resignation there. He had 
authority to give such leave, and, unless he gave it, I would be 
compelled to remain in San Francisco, which would detain me 
at least two months. 

While McPherson proved himself afterward to be a great 
soldier, he was also one of the most attractive and universally 
beloved and admired men whom I have ever met. His reply to 
my request was like a prophecy in its foresight, and its affec- 



6 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

tionate kindness appealed to me very deeply. I have always 
remembered the conversation vividly. He said : — 

"If you must go, I will give the leave of absence, and do all in my 
power to facilitate your going. But don't go. These urgent orders to 
stop you here are meant to say that, if you are willing to keep out of the 
war on either side, you can do so. They mean that you will not be asked 
to go into the field against your own people, but that you will be kept on 
this coast, upon fortification duty, as long as the war lasts. Gen. Tot- 
ten likes you and wants to keep you in the Corps. That is what these 
orders mean. This war is not going to be the ninety days affair that 
papers and politicians are predicting. Both sides are in deadly earnest, 
and it is going to be fought out to the bitter end. If you go, as an educated 
soldier, you will be put in the front rank. God only knows what may 
happen to you individually, but for your cause there can be but one 
result. It must he lost. Your whole population is only about eight mil- 
lions, while the North has twenty millions. Of your eight millions, three 
miUions are slaves who may become an element of danger. You have no 
army, no navy, no treasury, and practically none of the manufactures 
and machine shops necessary for the support of armies, and for war on a 
large scale. You are but scattered agricultural communities, and you 
will be cut off from the rest of the world by blockade. Your cause must 
end in defeat, and the individual risks to you must be great. On the 
other hand, if you stay out here, you will soon be left the ranking engineer 
officer on this whole coast. Every one of the older officers will soon be 
called East for active service, and there will be casualties and promotion, 
and probably increase of the Corps. Meanwhile you will have every 
chance to make a reputation for yourself as an engineer, and you will 
have charge of this big Lime Point reservation, about 10,000 acres, all 
covered with wild oats. Buy a flock of sheep and put on it, hire a Mexican 
to herd them, and in four years you will be a rich man. The city of San 
Francisco, too, is filling in water lots, and the Engineer officers are con- 
sulted in fixing the harbor lines. This will give you information and 
opportunities in making good investments. Briefly, remaining here you 
have every opportunity for professional reputation, for promotion, and 
for wealth. Going home you have every personal risk to run, and in a 
cause foredoomed to failure." 

I could not but be greatly impressed by this appeal. It made 
me reahze, as I had never done before, the gravity of the decision 
which I had to make. But one consideration was inexorable : 
/ must go with my 'people. So I answered : — 

"What you say is probably all true. But my situation is just this. 
My people are going to war. They are in deadly earnest, beUeving it to 



FROM THE U.S.A. INTO THE C.S.A. 7 

be for their liberty. If I don't come and bear my part, they will believe 
me to be a coward. And I shall not know whether I am or not. I have 
just got to go and stand my chances." 

His reply was, "In your situation I would probably feel the 
same way about it." So I wrote my resignation, dating it 
May 1, and McPherson gave me leave of absence, and did every- 
thing possible to make my going easy and comfortable. I never 
saw him again after our sad parting on the dock, for, as he had 
foreseen, he was ordered East, and, having been made a major- 
general and won high distinction, was killed at Atlanta in July, 
1864. 

My resignation was duly accepted, and notice reached me in 
August, before the mails to the South through Kentucky were 
entirely discontinued. We sailed on May 1 in the Golden Age, 
crossed the Isthmus on the 14th, and arrived in New York on 
steamer Champion on the 24th, having lost two days in a severe 
gale. We landed early, and had intended remaining in New 
York for a day or two, but while we had been upon our journey, 
events had been in progress. 

President Lincoln had called for 75,000 troops. All of the 
border states had refused to furnish troops, and had taken part 
with those which had seceded, and a small Federal army had been 
collected at Washington. On the night before our arrival a part 
of this force was marched across into Virginia, and occupied 
Alexandria. 

Col. Ellsworth, commanding the leading regiment, had entered 
a hotel and torn down a secession flag from its roof. The pro- 
prietor, Jackson, had shot Ellsworth dead as he came down- 
stairs, and had been killed himself. 

My wife and I were shopping in Canal Street about noon, when 
a man rushed into the store and shouted out this news. The 
excitement which this caused, and the hostility to all Confeder- 
ates evident in general conversation, warned me that if I were 
known to be a resigned officer on my way to enter the Con- 
federate army I might encounter trouble. 

We cut short our shopping and decided to leave for Louisville 
by the first train. Kentucky was endeavoring to take a position 
of neutrafity in the conflict, and through that state we could 



8 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

make our way to Georgia. We left at 5 p.m. on 26th by the 
Erie road, and going through Cleveland, Cincinnati, Seymour, 
and Jefferson, we reached Louisville on the 27th and Chat- 
tanooga on May 28. Here I met the Confederate Secretary of 
War, Hon. L. P. Walker, on his way to Richmond, Va., now 
the capital of the Confederacy. 

I called on him and was told that a commission as captain of 
Engineers was awaiting my acceptance. Of course I accepted, 
and promised to report in Richmond as soon as I could leave 
my wife in Washington, Ga., at my father's home. We spent 
that night in Atlanta, and reached Washington, Thursday, May 
30. The next day I left for Richmond and arrived there Satur- 
day night, June 1. 

One feature of this eight days' journey, which I recall very 
distinctly, was the comparative impressions made upon me by 
the camps, and the preparations for war, which I saw every- 
where, both at the North and in the South. They recalled 
McPherson's comparison of the military strength of the two 
sections, and did not discredit his predictions. 

The camps near the principal Northern towns were all of regi- 
ments. Those in the South were mostly of a company each. 
The arms of the Northern troops were generally the long-range 
rifled muskets. Those of the Southern troops were almost uni- 
versally the old-fashioned smooth-bore muskets. The Northern 
troops were always neatly uniformed in blue, their camps seemed 
well equipped, and there was generally some visible show of mili- 
tary discipline about them. The Confederate uniforms were 
blue, gray, or brown, and sometimes uniforms were lacking. 
There was, too, a noticeable contrast in the physical appearance 
of the men, the Northern and Western men having more flesh 
and better color. As physical machines, to withstand hardships, 
a casual observer would have pronounced them superior to their 
antagonists. But I lived to see that appearances may deceive. 
Indeed, it became a never-ceasing wonder, to the very end at 
Appomattox, to see how our lean, ill-equipped ranks would fight, 
all the harder, it seemed, as the men grew thinner and more 
ragged and hungry looking. 

Here it is in order to speak briefly of one of the incidents lead- 



FROM THE U.S.A. INTO THE C.S.A. 9 

ing up to the attack upon Fort Sumter, the history of which is 
instructive. 

This attack is often spoken of as the first hostile act of the war. 
Really the first hostile act was the transfer of the garrison of 
Fort Moultrie into Fort Sumter, stealthily accomphshed during 
the night of Dec. 26, 1860, the guns of Moultrie being spiked, 
and their ammunition destroyed. It was a mihtary measure 
which utterly changed the status quo. 

Both the S.C. authorities and President Buchanan were 
earnestly anxious to maintain this status, and the War De- 
partment, in its anxiety, had sent a specially detailed officer^ 
Maj. Don Carlos Buell (afterward Maj.-Gen.) to impress the 
importance of it upon Maj. Anderson in command. His in- 
structions were to be delivered verbally, which is, surely, always 
a mistake in a matter of grave importance. Conversations are 
too often and too easily misunderstood, and exact words 
forgotten. In this case, it is hard to believe that Maj. Anderson 
could have so forgotten, not to say deliberately disobeyed, his 
instructions as he did, had they been given in writing. In that 
view of the matter, it may be said that the war was precipitated 
by giving important orders verbally. Another example will be 
found in the story of the battle of Seven Pines which Gen. Joseph 
E. Johnston lost by trusting to instructions given verbally. 

Maj. BuelFs memorandum of the verbal instructions given 
is a paper of over 300 words, and is a fair sample of expUcit 
language. Here is the sentence especially referring to any 
change of position of the garrison of Fort Moultrie : — 

" You are to carefully avoid every act which would needlessly tend to pro- 
voke aggression, and for that reason you are not, without evident and immi- 
nent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the 
assumption of a hostile attitude." 

These instructions were given Dec. 11. The Carolina author- 
ities were entirely satisfied with the assurances given that the 
status would be preserved. 

Both sides were, therefore, taken completely by surprise when 
the morning of Dec. 27 dawned, and disclosed what Anderson 
had done. The Secretary of War telegraphed him as follows : 



10 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

" Intelligence has reached here this morning that you have abandoned 
Fort Moultrie, spiked your guns, burned the carriages, and gone to Fort 
Sumter. It is not believed, because there is no order for any such move- 
ment. Explain the meaning of this report." 

Anderson made in all three explanations. One had been 
written before being called for, at 8 p.m. the night before, when 
his movement was barely completed. It was as follows: 
"The step which I have taken was in my opinion necessary to 
prevent the effusion of blood." Next, on receipt of the tele- 
graphic demand for explanation, he replied : — 

"I abandoned Fort Moultrie because I was certain that if attacked 
my men must have been sacrificed and the command of the harbor lost." 

As the entire garrison numbered but 75, including officers, 
this was probably true. But he had instructions from the 
Secretary of War reading : — 

"It is neither expected nor desired that you should expose your 
own life, or that of the men under your command, in a hopeless conflict 
in defence of these forts. If they are invested or attacked by a force so 
superior that resistance would in your judgment be a useless waste of 
life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity and make the best terms in 
your power." 

Anderson had been selected for the command, as a native of 
a neutral state, Kentucky, and as one who, it was hoped, would 
not be stampeded by imaginary danger. But his correspondence 
had indicated nervousness, and this had probably inspired the 
instructions here quoted. They evidently, however, failed of 
their intended effect. 

After sending the telegram, Maj. Anderson, for the first time 
apparently, recalled that he had been strictly cautioned against 
a needless stampede, and that he would be expected to show 
some more pressing necessity for his action. He accordingly 
wrote a third explanation as follows : — 

" In addition to my reasons given in my telegram, and in my letter of 
last night, I will add, as my opinion, that many things convinced me that 
the authorities of the state designed to proceed to a hostile act." 

A weaker defence of such gross disobedience of orders cannot 
be conceived. In all the acrimony of the times, no one ever 
alleged the existence of any design to violate the status. 



FROM THE U.S.A. INTO THE C.S.A. 11 

President Buchanan felt himself pledged, and decided to order 
Anderson back to Fort Moultrie, and acquainted the Secretary 
of War, Stanton, with his decision. The Secretary immediately 
set to work to defeat this intention. He summoned Dan Sickles, 
and planned with him to have at once salutes of 100 guns fired 
in New York and Philadelphia in honor of Anderson's act, and to 
have telegrams in hundreds showered on the President, congratu- 
lating him as a second Jackson, and a saviour of the country by 
his firmness.^ 

These demonstrations were effectively made under the joint 
action of Sickles and John Russell Young in Washington, of 
Dougherty in Philadelphia, and of Rynders in New York. They 
worked upon the weak side of Buchanan's character, and Ander- 
son was allowed to remain in Fort Sumter. 

Buchanan excused himself to the Carolinians by saying that 
he would have ordered Anderson back, had they given him time 
before themselves taking possession of Moultrie, and raising their 
flag over it. It was a poor excuse, but it was an occasion when 
any excuse would do. Passion was inflamed on both sides and 
recriminations began. The position occupied by Anderson was 
one of unstable equilibrium, impossible to be long maintained. 
He had indeed saved the "effusion of blood" of his own command, 
but the act made inevitable a deluge of other blood. 

The crisis came in April, when Fort Sumter ran short of pro- 
visions, and here the Confederate leaders lost the opportimity 
of their Uves in not allowing provisions to be supphed, and other- 
wise maintaining the then status. They might thus have avoided 
at least the odium of firing the first gun, and gained valuable 
time for preparation, or for possible compromises through the 
influence of the border states. But no compromise is ever pos- 
sible after the firing of the first gun. There is in it some quahty 
which stirs the human heart as nothing else can do. Had the 
British not fired upon the Colonials at Lexington in 1775, we 
might all have been Colonials yet. For blood is thicker than 
water, and were it not so, the development of nations would often 
prove painfully slow. 

^ Men and Memories, Mrs. J. R. Young, p. 25. 



12 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



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Field of Bull Eun 



CHAPTER II 

The Battle of Bull Run (July, 1861) 

At Richmond. Gen. Robert S. Garnett. Orders Received. At Manas- 
sas. Installing Signal Stations. Strategic Opportunities. Beauregard's 
Suggestions. McDowell's Moves. Orders sent Johnston. Johnston 
Marches. Patterson remains Ignorant. The Odds against Us. 
Marked Batteries, etc. Blackburn's Ford. An Infantry Skirmish. 
An Artillery Duel. New Plan Needed. Plan Adopted. McDowell Over- 
persuaded. In the Confederate Lines. McDowell's New Plan. Beau- 
regard's Plan. How it Failed. Tyler at Stone Bridge. At the Signal 
Station. Beauregard Informed. A Pause. The Dust Cloud. The 
Action Begun. Bee and Bartow come in. The Generals go to the Left. 
Watching the Battle. Johnston and Beauregard Arrive. Reenforce- 
ment sent for. McDowell's Four Idle Brigades. Two Hours' Fighting. 
The Henry House Hill. Cummings's BrilUant Coup. The Federal 
Collapse. Leaving Signal Station. Stragglers in the Rear. Davis and 
Jackson. Lost Opportunities. Order checking Kershaw. Order 
stopping Pursuit. Affairs on the Right. Jones and Longstreet. 
Bonham takes the Lead. Bonham Halts. Overcaution in New 
Commanders. The Final Scene. Return from the Field. Hill's 
Report. Inaction of Council. 

I AKRiVED in Richmond, Saturday night, June 1, reported for 
duty Monday morning, and received my commission as captain 
of Engineers. Engineer officers were in demand, but President 
Davis remembered my appearing with Maj. Myer before the 
Military Committee of the Senate, in connection with the system 
of signals, and I was first ordered to start in Richmond a fittle 
factory of signal apparatus, such as torches, poles, and flags. I 
was told that I would soon be sent to install the system in some 
one of the small armies being collected at several points. 

I was quickly ready, and anxious for orders, which for some 
cause were delayed. Gen. Robert S. Garnett was in Richmond 
at the time, organizing a force for service in West Virginia, 
and made application for me upon his staff, but it was refused. 
He had been Commandant of the Corps of Cadets during my 

13 



14 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

first year at West Point, and the impression I formed of him 
as a soldier is not lower than that formed of any other officer 
I have ever known. In every one else I have seen some mere 
human traits, but in Garnett every trait was purely mihtary. 
Had he Uved, I am sure he would have been one of our great 
generals. 

He lost his hfe, however, in his first affair, July 13, 1861, near 
Carrick's Ford, Va., and in a characteristic manner. With ten 
of his men, who were raw troops, he had halted to delay the 
enemy at a creek crossing. His men were nervous under a sharp 
fire, and Garnett remarked that "they needed a httle example." 
He stepped out in full view of the enemy and walked slowly back 
and forth, a target for the sharpshooters. He was presently 
shot dead, just when he was prepared to withdraw. 

Nearly the whole of June passed while I was kept, from day to 
day, awaiting orders. Near the end of June, I was ordered to 
organize five batteries of artillery into a battalion, and prepare 
them for the field. I was forming classes for the instruction of 
officers, and making requisitions for supplies when new orders 
came, sending me to signal duty with Beauregard at Manassas. 

I had just decided to have my wife come on to Richmond, and 
she was en route when I had to leave. I regretted giving up the 
Artillery Battalion. It would have been a decided step in advance 
had we inaugurated, so soon, a battalion organization of several 
batteries. We came to it about a year later, but meanwhile our 
batteries had been isolated and attached to infantry brigades. 
So they fought singly, and in such small units artillery can do 
httle. 

On July 2, 1 arrived at Manassas, reported to Beauregard, was 
assigned to duty upon his staff, and ordered to install the system 
of signals for use in the coming battle. It was certain that a 
battle must be fought soon. 

Federal armies were being collected in West Virginia under 
McCleilan; on the upper Potomac threatening Winchester, 
under Patterson; at Alexandria under McDowell; and, at 
Fortress Monroe, under Butler. These armies were mostly raw 
troops, but among them were the 75,000 three-months men, first 
called out in April, and they were now fairly well disciplined. 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 15 

Their terms of service would begin to expire soon after the 
middle of July, and it was sure that some use would sooner be 
made of them. For we wer ejhen less a military nation than / S'(p O 
ever before or^since, and neither side recognized its ownlmpi^ 
paredness. 

By June 24 McDowell had submitted a plan of aggressive opera- 
tion, and July 8 had been named as the date of the proposed 
movement. Gen. Scott had urged longer delay, and that 
the three-months men should be allowed to go, and their 
places supplied with the three-years men now being enlisted. 
Political necessities, however, overruled his objections. For- 
tunately for the Confederates, with all their resources the Federal 
forces were not able to move before the 16th, and when they 
did move, they consumed four days more, from the 17th to the 
20th inclusive, in about 20 miles of marching and in pre- 
liminaries. Battle was only delivered on July 21, and the 
crisis of this battle occurred about 3.30 p.m. _^ 

We shall see that not only every day of that delay, but even u> l . .^u 
every hour of it, was essential to the Confederate victory which . . wt, 
resulted. 

So on my arrival at Manassas, July 2, there was really more 
time to install the signals than I expected, for "rumors of the 
foe's advance" now swelled upon almost every breeze. I had 
brought with me from Richmond all necessary equipment and I 
had only to select men and train them. I soon made acquaint- 
ances and got the names of some intelligent privates, who might 
later be promoted. I had these detailed and put upon a course 
of instruction and practice. Meanwhile I procured a horse, and 
between times began an exploration of the coimtry to find what 
facilities it offered for lines of signals. 

The topography was far from favorable. Our line of battle 
had been chosen behind the stream of Bull Run, about three 
miles north of Manassas, and the course of the stream was gen- 
erally wooded and bordered with small fields and pastures, 
giving few open stretches. I was not sanguine of rendering 
any valuable service, but fortunately had time to examine the 
country, and, as will be seen, the line was found which disclosed 
the enemy's attack in time to defeat it. 



16 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

About a mile east of Manassas, on the farm of a Mr. Wilcoxen, 
was a high rocky point having a good outlook over a valley 
to the north and west. I made this point a central station, and 
by a Uttle clearing here and there got two straight six-mile 
ranges. One was northwest to a bluff over Bull Run valley on our 
extreme left, near the house of Van Ness, just above the Stone 
Bridge by which the Warrenton Turnpike crossed Bull Run. 
The other was north, to Centreville, about three miles beyond 
the Run, opposite our centre. A third station was found near 
the house of McLean, opposite our right centre, and a fourth 
near our headquarters at Centreville. This was the utmost 
the topography permitted, and the men were encamped at the 
stations and set to practising by day and night. 

Where the opponents have each two armies in the field, each 
has the opportunity to combine his whole force upon his adver- 
sary. 

This was the situation in Northern Virginia. McDowell, 
at Alexandria with 35,000 men, and Patterson near Harper's 
Ferry, about 50 miles away, with 15,000, were opposed by 
Beauregard at Manassas with 22,000, and Johnston at Win- 
chester with 11,000. 

No effort was made by the Federal commander-in-chief to 
unite Patterson's force with McDowell's, but McDowell was 
assured that Patterson should threaten Johnston, and keep him 
in the Valley, so that McDowell would have Beauregard only 
to deal with. The Confederate armies, unfortunately, had no 
commander-in-chief. 

In theory the power resides with the President, but his action 
is apt to be slow and comparatively inefficient. In the ap- 
proaching battle this was weU illustrated. Although the enemy 
was so slow as to allow amazing time, and the battle was saved, 
it was, as it were, "by the skin of our teeth" and without any of 
the fruits of victory. 

Beauregard had proposed to the President on June 12 to take 
the aggressive and unite the two armies in an attack upon 
Alexandria. It was disapproved, but Beauregard did not let 
the matter drop. 

On July 13 he sent Col. Chestnut, a staff-officer, to Richmond 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 17 

to urge the concentration of the two armies and a prompt offen- 
sive movement. A formal hearing was had by the President, 
with Cooper and Lee, but the proposition was rejected, on the 
good ground that the enemy was as yet practically within his 
fortified lines, where he could not be attacked, and could bring 
up, at his leisure, Patterson and other reenforcements. The 
only effective way to combine the two armies was to make it a 
surprise to the enemy when away from his fortifications. 

About noon, July 16, McDowell put his army in motion. There 
were ten brigades in four divisions, comprising about 30,000 
men, with 49 guns. He did not bring his whole force, but left 
in reserve, in the works behind him, Runyon's division of over 
5000 men. This large division would have been of greater value 
on the field, and he should have had at least 100 guns, for artillery 
is the best arm against raw troops. The four divisions moved 
by different roads, converging toward our advanced positions 
about Fairfax. They made on the first day only short marches 
of six or eight miles, going into camp far oustide of our picket 
lines, so as not to divulge the movement. This was so well 
managed that, although rumors reached the Confederates, yet 
nothing was known until next morning. Then our advanced 
posts were driven in and a few of our pickets were captured. At 
this moment Johnston 's army should have been ready to march 
to Beauregard over roads previously selected and reconnoitred. 
The men should even have been kept for days encamped where 
they could quickly stretch out on the proper roads. For many 
contingencies beset all marches, and preparation saves hours 
big with fate. 

The whole day of the 17th was lost to the Confederates by the 
news having to go to the President. Beauregard, sometime 
during the day, telegraphed him as follows : — 

"Manassas, July 17, 186L 
"The enemy has assailed my outposts in heavy force, I have fallen 
back on the line of Bull Run, and wiU make a stand at Mitchell's Ford. 
If his force is overwhelming, I shall retire to the Rappahannock rail- 
road bridge, saving my command for defence there, and for future 
operations. Please inform Johnston of this, via Staunton, and also 
Holmes. Send forward any reenforcements at the earliest possible mo- 
ment, and by every possible means. — G. T. Beauregard." 



18 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Apparently after some deliberation, the Executive acted, for 
about 1 A.M. on July 18, Johnston in Winchester received a 
telegram. It is worthy of study as a model not to be followed in 
such cases. It was as follows : — 

"Richmond, July 17, 1861. 
" Gen. Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive blow 
all of your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make the 
movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpeper C. H. either 
by railroad or by Warrenton. In all the arrangements exercise your 
discretion. — S. Cooper, Adj't. and Ins. General." 

When Johnston came to make his report of the battle of 
Bull Run he wrote as follows of this message : — 

"About one o'clock in the morning of July 18 I received from the 
Government a telegraphic despatch informing me that the northern army 
was advancing upon Manassas, then held by Gen. Beauregard, and 
directing me, if practicable, to go to that officer's assistance, after send- 
ing my sick to Culpeper C, H. In the exercise of discretion conferred 
by the terms of the order, I at once determined to march to join Gen. 
Beauregard." 

President Davis took great offence at this language and ordered 
the word "after" before the words "sending your sick" to be 
erased from the report in the records. He resented also Beaure- 
gard 's speaking of this order in his report as only permissive, and 
not mandatory. And even in his book, written after the war, he 
claims that the order was a "positive" one, and considers it 
"strange that any one has construed it otherwise." 

The words "if practicable" are always of such doubtful 
interpretation that they should be excluded from all important 
orders. They leave matters in doubt. Every order should be 
distinctly either the one thing or the other. Lee used the 
phrase at Gettysburg, in ordering Ewell to press a routed enemy, 
and lost his victory by it. 

It is notable, too, that this order not only failed to urge haste, 
but, by injunctions concerning sick and baggage by rail, im- 
phed that time would permit, which it did not. Exclusive use 
of the railroad by the troops was absolutely necessary. 

Had Johnston felt any reluctance to the movement, or had 
Patterson's attitude been in the least threatening, excuses 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 19 

would have been easy to make for non-compliance. But John- 
ston was a good soldier, and he lost no time in taking the road. 
He quickly arranged for the best route of march, and for the 
indispensable help of the railroad in moving his infantry. His 
leading brigade was under command of Jackson, soon to show 
the world the stuff of which he was formed, and to earn an 
immortal name. Jackson's brigade left camp at noon, and at 
ten o 'clock that night bivouacked at Paris, 17 miles, fording the 
Shenandoah and crossing the Blue Ridge en route. This is an 
average of about one and three-quarters miles an hour and is an 
excellent march under the circumstances. 

The other three brigades, Bee's, Bartow's, and Elzey's, made 
about 13 miles, and encamped at the Shenandoah, itself a good 
march. Next morning, Friday, the 19th, Jackson's brigade 
covered the remaining six miles from Paris to the railroad station 
at Piedmont, 34 miles from Manassas by 8 a.m. Trains were 
awaiting it, and by 10 a.m. it was off, arriving at Manassas about 
1 P.M. say, 2500 strong and coming 57 miles in 25 hours. The 
other brigades arrived at Piedmont during the afternoon; but 
although the railroad had promised to deliver all four brigades 
in Manassas by sunrise Saturday, the 20th, only two more 
regiments, the 7th and 8th Ga., of Bartow's brigade — about 
1400 men — were sent. The cavalry and artillery continued 
their march by the wagon road, but the infantry waited at 
Piedmont, some of it for two days, and without rations. The 
trouble was that the railroad had no relays of employees, and was 
unable to hold its men at constant work. 

On the 20th Johnston himself went with the 4th Ala., the 2d 
Miss., and two companies of the 11th Miss., about a thousand 
meii. These were the last troops to arrive in time for the opening 
of the battle. 

During the night, the 6th N.C., 10th Va., 3d Tenn., and 1st 
Md. were taken — about 2000 men — under Kirby Smith and 
Elzey. These, arriving at Manassas before noon on Sunday, 
were hurried to the battlefield, six miles, arrived at the critical 
moment at the critical point, and changed defeat into victory. 
The remaining 2500 of Johnston's 11,000 (the 9th Ga., 2d Tenn., 
13th Va., the Ky. Battalion, and eight companies of the 11th 



20 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Miss.) only arrived the day after the battle, having been nearly 
four days making the 57 miles. 

On the 19th, while Johnston was waiting at Piedmont, one of 
Beauregard's staff arrived to sugest that Johnston should march 
by Aldie, and fall upon McDowell's flank at Centreville, while 
Beauregard attacked from Bull Run. It was an unwise scheme, 
and Johnston's decision to unite the two armies out of the 
presence of the enemy was safest. 

Meanwhile, by monumental mismanagement, Patterson's 
army might as well have been upon another planet. He had 
been notified that McDowell would advance on the 16th, and 
that he must hold and occupy Johnston. Accordingly, on the 
15th he advanced from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill. He 
remained all day on the 16th at Bunker Hill, and on the 17th 
moved as far as Charlestown, in the direction of Harper 's Ferry. 
Here he remained until after the battle on the 21st. On the 18th 
he telegraphed: — 

"The enemy has stolen no march on me. I have kept him actively 
employed and, by threats and reconnoissances in force, caused him to^be 
reenforced. I have accomplished, in this respect, more than the General- 
in-Chief asked, or could well be expected in face of an enemy far 
superior in numbers." Only on the 20th did he find out that something 
had happened, and he reports : " With a portion of his force Johnston left 
Winchester by the road to Millwood on the afternoon of the 18th. His 
whole force was about 35,200." 

These telegrams are fair specimens of the colossal misinforma- 
tion often conveyed in official reports. Johnston, in his narra- 
tive, humorously suggests that the overrating of each other's 
strength, by opposing commanders, resulted probably from the 
same feefing which made his antagonist's sword seem to Gil 
Bias " d 'une longueur excessive." If Johnston 's sword had been 
as long as Patterson befieved, it would have been creditable in 
the latter to approach even within 14 miles. 

And now, at sunrise on the 17th, McDowell is in front of our 
pickets at Fairfax, and within 10 miles of our fine of battle, and 
he is to have us at the mercy of his superior force until the after- 
noon of the 21st — say four days and a half. If the shades of 
departed warriors watched the contest, the odds among them 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 21 

against us at this stage must have been high. Against their force, 
our position and our organization were both inferior. Our line of 
battle was nearly seven miles long, and communications in rear of 
it were poor and crooked. Our six brigades were all independent 
of each other, no divisions having been formed, and there were^ 
besides, several unbrigaded regiments and batteries, making a 
command too complex to be efficiently handled, especially with 
an inexperienced staff. Apart from their superior numbers, the 
effective division organization of the Federals, and especially 
their batteries of regular artillery with each division, would seem 
enough to insure Federal victory even for a front attack by brute 
force. This might have been made, even on the afternoon of the 
17th, by a bold pursuit of our advanced guard, which comprised 
but one brigade. 

For the slowness of the Federal advance that day (it holds the 
record for slowness) McDowell was personally responsible. He 
had issued to his troops a good order of march, in which he called 
attention to the strength of each column, and its abihty to cope 
with all it was likely to meet, even without the help of the other 
columns. But he had spoiled the moral effect of his own lan- 
guage and practically demoraUzed his brigade commanders by 
one unwise caution. 

It "would not be pardonable in any commander to come upon a 
battery or breastwork without a knowledge of its position." 
That caution meant more to McDowell 's officers than appears 
on its face. For the newspaper reporters of those days, with 
the appetite for sensations which still distinguishes the craft, 
had made a great bugbear of ''masked batteries." The term 
originated at the attack upon Fort Sumter, where a certain 
battery was constructed, masked by a house which was destroyed 
just before opening fire. After that masked batteries figured on 
every field and in every event. When Butler was repulsed at 
Big Bethel it was a masked battery which did it. When 
Schenck's railroad reconnoissance from Alexandria on June 17, 
accidentally ran into Gregg's reconnoissance from Manassas at 
Vienna, and was fired into by Kemper's six-pounders, the 
mysterious masked battery got the credit. Soon, to read the 
newspapers, one might believe the woods were infested with such 



22 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

batteries, not to mention " Louisiana Tigers " and "Black Horse 
Cavalry," two other scarecrow names which had caught the 
reporters' fancies, and been made to do enormous duty. 

Now, the threat conveyed in McDowell's order impUed the 
real existence of formidable dangers, and is doubtless responsi- 
ble for the excessive caution which consumed the day in making 
an advance scarcely over five miles. Beauregard's advanced 
guard had not sought to delay the Federals, but had fallen back 
beyond Centreville, where it bivouacked ; and, early next morn- 
ing, it crossed Bull Run and took position in the Confederate 
line of battle. 

Beauregard had concentrated the bulk of his force between 
Union Mill's Ford, on the right, and Mitchell's Ford on the left, 
in which space — about three miles — he had, in order from the 
right, Ewell's, D. R. Jones's, Longstreet's, and Bonham's 
brigades, with only Early in reserve some 250 yards behind 
Longstreet. Cocke's brigade held Ball's Ford, and Evans with 
the 4th S.C. and Wheat 's La. Battalion held the Stone Bridge, 
two and three miles to the left. 

On the morning of the 18th the slow advance of the Federals 
was resumed, and about noon Tyler 's division occupied the hills 
overlooking the valley of Bull Run, opposite Blackburn's and 
Mitchell's fords. McDowell was not with his advanced forces. 
He had ridden far to the left to reconnoitre, with a view to turn- 
ing our right flank — a duty he might have more wisely confided 
to his staff. During his absence a small affair occurred at 
Blackburn's Ford, terminating favorably for the Confederates. 

Tyler's instructions were to reconnoitre our position and to 
threaten our left so as to draw attention to that quarter, but 
not to bring on a general engagement. These instructions were 
our salvation, for our army was weak and badly posted and could 
not have withstood a vigorous attack by the force in front of us. 
Both of our flanks were in the air, and Bull Run could be crossed 
by infantry in many places. Our centre was a large salient 
whose lines the enemy could enfilade. The ground on their 
side was commanding and afforded close approach under 
excellent cover. On our side it was low and gently rising to the 
rear, giving no cover whatever, except of the woods. Our whole 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 23 

force present on the field was about 21,000, of whom about 
5000 (Evans's and Cocke's commands) were too far to the left 
to be available. McDowell's force available was about 37,000.^ 

Tyler, about noon, brought up some guns and began firing at 
the few points in our territory where he could discern signs of 
our presence.^ 

After cannonading for some time without drawing reply, Tyler 
ordered Richardson's brigade to scour the woods in front, and a 
squadron of cavalry with two guns to advance on the road to 
Mitchell's Ford. Two of our guns under Kemper fired upon the 
cavalry when it came into view. It was quickly withdrawn, and 
Tyler soon decided to withdraw Richardson also. Meanwhile, 
this brigade had suddenly become engaged. It had found itself 
on a low bluff overlooking Bull Run, scarcely 50 yards away, a 
thin fringe of woods intervening. Just across the creek was 
Longstreet's brigade, about 1400 strong, occupying the low 
opposite bank of the stream. Immediately both sides opened 
fire, and a portion of Longstreet's men, finding themselves in 
the lower position and on open ground, broke to the rear badly. 
Longstreet rode among and rallied them, and soon led them 
back, the enemy's fine having also withdrawn under cover. 
Longstreet called upon Early for reenforcement, and the 7th 
La. was sent forward to him. Meanwhile the Federals made 
a second advance and poured in another volley and fell 
back. These tactics were repeated several times, Longstreet 
meanwhile attempting to cross some of his men over the ford 
to meet the enemy. The 7th La., however, on one of the 
Federal advances, had opened fire while still behind Longstreet's 
line. This fire in the rear threw Longstreet into such confusion 
that the order to cross was recalled. Our fine was in bad shape 

» O. R. 2, 309. 

' One of these was the Wilmer McLean residence, on a shady knoll in the 
cultivated fields a half mile in the rear of Bull Run, which Beauregard had 
announced as his headquarters for the battle. One of the earliest shots 
struck the kitchen and ruined the dinner being prepared. Within a year 
the family were compelled to abandon the plantation and remove to another, 
which they owned, at Appomattox C. H., Va. Here, by remarkable coin- 
cidence on April 9, 1865, the last fighting between the same two armies 
took place, upon their land as the first had done. Grant made his head- 
quarters in their residence, and in it Lee made the surrender of his army. 



24 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

when the Federal attack ceased and their force was rapidly with- 
drawn. Two companies, however, under Captain Marye had 
crossed the stream, and these pursued the enemy's retreat for 
some distance and brought back some 20 prisoners and 100 
muskets. This gave an air of victory to the termination of the 
infantry combat. 

There then followed a sharp artillery duel, for about 45 minutes. 
The Federals engaged eight guns (two 20-Pr. and two 10-Pr. 
Parrott rifles ; two 6-Pr. guns and two 12-Pr. howitzers), and fired 
415 rounds. The Confederates engaged seven guns, four 6-Pr. 
guns and three 3-inch iron rifles, made in Richmond, firing a 
6-Pr. Burton and Archer projectile. They fired 310 rounds. 
Our guns stood in the open plateau about 150 yards behind our 
infantry fine, and were hidden from the enemy's view by the 
thin fringe of tall timber along the creek. This saved us from a 
speedy defeat, for our limbers and caissons were without cover 
until Longstreet ordered them brought forward on the flanks, 
and kept them behind the trees. Thus neither of the comba- 
tants could see more of the other than the smoke of his guns, and 
the fire was but little better than random. 

Our guns belonged to the Washington Arty, of New Orleans, 
the oldest and best drilled organization of artillery in the Con- 
federacy, and it illustrates the lack of professional skill among 
our volunteers to know that a favorable report was made upon 
the Burton and Archer projectile, from its performance in this 
affair, where it was used for the first time. Yet, the first com- 
petent test, made of it a few weeks later, showed it to be entirely 
worthless and caused its manufacture to be at once discontinued. 
It would not fly point foremost, but "tumbled" and had no 
range. 

Besides these three rifles with ineffective ammunition, a fourth 
Confederate gun, a brass 6-Pr., soon became useless from an 
enlarged vent. During the first half of the affair, however, the 
enemy's fire was not accurate and all went well. There was 
then a pause during which they managed to improve their aim, 
and, when they resumed, our men soon realized how they were 
overmatched. Capt. Eshleman was wounded and Capt. Squires 
called for reenforcement. Longstreet had no more artillery 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 25 

available, and ordered Squires to withdraw gradually, one gun 
at a time, but meanwhile to keep up a slow reply. 

Just then, as so often happens when a battle is becoming 
desperate, the enemy ceased to fire, and allowed Squires, who 
deserved it, the honor of the last shot, and Beauregard the in- 
valuable morale of the first victory. In this duel the Confeder- 
ates had one killed, five wounded, and six horses disabled. The 
Federals two killed, two wounded. In the whole affair the losses 
were : — 

Confederate : 15 killed, 53 wounded, missing 68 total 

Federal: 19 " 38 " 26 " 83 " 

On the night of the 18th McDowell found himself compelled 
to make a change in the plan of attack which had been decided 
on in Washington before starting. That had contemplated 
turning of our right flank. But his reconnoissance in that direc- 
tion had found the country so wooded and broken, and with 
soj few good roads, as to be unfavorable for operations. His 
next thought was of direct attack upon our front. That was, 
beyond question, his best opportunity. 

We had, practically, no intrenchment, and there were gaps, 
sometimes wide ones, between out brigades. Holmes's brigade 
of two regiments (the 2d Tenn. and 9th Ark.), coming from 
Acquia Creek, did not arrive until late on the 19th. The con- 
fusion caused in our ranks by Tyler's demonstration — for it 
can scarcely be called an attack — indicates that a serious 
effort with the whole force at hand would have succeeded. 

McDowell had disapproved of Tyler's affair, upon his return 
from his reconnoissance, and seems to have misunderstood the 
facts. In his official report he writes that this affair had shown 
us to be too strong to be attacked at Blackburn's Ford. He also 
states that the Stone Bridge was mined and defended by a 
battery and a heavy abattis, and that his only alternative was 
to seek a route to turn our left flank. No one of these state- 
ments was correct. At Stone Bridge there was neither abattis, 
earthwork, nor mine. There were only two 6-Pr. guns with 
the 4th S.C. regiment and Wheat's La. battahon — say 1400 
men. There were no other supports within a mile. 



26 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

The movement decided upon, however, promised excellent 
results if it could be carried out before Beauregard was reen- 
forced. It was decided to turn the Confederate left by cross- 
ing Bull Run above the Stone Bridge. This involved further 
loss of time in reconnoissance, but confidence was felt that 
Patterson would keep Johnston in the valley, so the engineers 
were ordered to find the desired roads. It was not dreamed 
that Johnston's forces were crossing the Blue Ridge as the sun 
was setting that afternoon. 

McDowell proposed to make his reconnoissance by main force, 
driving in our pickets and developing our exact position and 
strength, but he weakly allowed himself to be persuaded, in- 
stead, into a reconnoissance by stealth, which is less to be de- 
pended upon. 

It is worthy of note that upon three occasions in this advance 
McDowell was persuaded by his leading subordinates to modify 
orders which he had issued and these modifications lost him the 
battle. The first occasion was on the 17th, when his army only 
marched some five or six miles, as already noted. McDowell 
wished to have the march prolonged to 12 miles, but yielded to 
persuasion to go into bivouac when half the distance was covered. 
That practically lost the entire day. 

The second occasion was the reconnoissance by stealth to which 
he now consented. It occupied a day and a half and went miles 
astray, as may now be seen, in finding the shortest route. It 
was noon on the 20 th when the engineers made their report of 
having found a concealed road crossing Bull Run at Sudley 
Ford, and the march was decided upon. From their present 
camps the average distances to be covered by the turning 
brigades were between nine and ten miles. McDowell proposed 
that they should make four miles that afternoon, leaving only 
six for the next morning. For the third time his officers pro- 
posed, and McDowell consented to, a change. It would be more 
convenient, they urged, to remain in their camps that afternoon 
and night, and to march a couple of hours earUer in the morn- 
ing, say at 2.30 a.m. Orders were issued, accordingly, for the 
21st. When they came to be executed, the routes of various 
commands were found to interfere, and although there was a 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 27 

bright moon, and the country was open and roads good, the 
head of column was about four hours in covering the first four 
miles. This involved a further loss of at least two hours. 

It is now time to revert to the Confederate hues and note what 
had happened on the 19th and 20th. An attack in force by the 
Federals had been expected each morning, and its non-occur- 
rence gratefully appreciated. It might be supposed that our 
time would have been busily used to intrench, erect batteries, 
and provide abattis and obstructions, but almost nothing of the 
sort was done. It required a yea r's experience to educate our 
army to the value of such work, although the enemy meanwhile 
noFoniy set us many examples, but had given us some severe 
object lessons. On the 19th Holmes's brigade had arrived from 
Acquia Creek. It took position behind Ewell, on our right flank. 
Jackson's brigade also arrived and was placed in reserve behind 
Mitchell's Ford. On the 20th Johnston arrived in person, 
also the 7th and 8th Ga. of ?Bartow's brigade, the 4th Ala., 
and the 2d Miss, of Bee's. These troops were placed in 
reserve behind Blackburn's Ford. As already told, these were 
the only troops of Johnston's army to arrive in time for the 
beginning of the battle, though another brigade under Kirby 
Smith arrived in time to turn the wavering scale about 3 p.m. 
on the 21st. 

It is strange that all this could go on in such close proximity 
to. the Federal army without discovery through some negro or 
deserter. It is still stranger that McDowell seems to have had 
no scouts out, upon either flank, who might easily have learned 
it. Only one intimation reached him of what was going on, 
and that he refused to credit. Gen. Tyler was an experienced 
railroad manager, and from the hills north of Bull Run, on the 
19th, he had hstened to the exhaust of many engines bring- 
ing heavy loads into Manassas from the direction of the 
Valley. He correctly guessed that they were bringing John- 
ston's army, and reported the facts and his conclusions to 
McDowell, not only on the 19th, but again on the 20th. The 
suggestions were received very coolly, and no steps were taken 
to find out. 

From Centreville the Warrenton pike runs straight southwest 



28 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

for many miles. At two miles it crosses Cub Run, a tribu- 
tary of Bull Run, on a high wooden bridge. In the retreat this 
bridge became blocked and many guns were lost there. At 
four miles it crosses Bull Run on Stone Bridge. A little beyond 
Cub Run a farm road to the right, by a circuitous route of six 
miles, leads to Sudley Springs ford of Bull Run, which is two miles 
above Stone Bridge in an air-Une. From Sudley, on the south 
side of Bull Run, a road to the southeast crosses the Warrenton 
pike a mile beyond Stone Bridge and leads to Manassas. McDow- 
ell's plan was as follows: Tyler with three brigades was to 
take position opposite the Stone Bridge, make demonstrations, 
and be prepared to cross. McDowell in person would conduct 
the five brigades of Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions by 
the circuitous road, cross Bull Run at Sudley Ford, and attack 
Stone Bridge in the rear. As soon as it was carried Tyler's 
three brigades would cross, and the eight brigades, united be- 
hind our left flank, could easily sweep our entire Une. 

There was, however, one bad feature. The circuitous route 
by which the five brigades would march would take them 
dangerously far from his other forces, should Beauregard take 
the offensive and attack his left at the moment when this turn- 
ing column was entangled in the circuitous road. The fear of 
such an attack induced McDowell, while actually on the march, 
to halt his rear brigade — Howard's — and leave it behind, until 
the four other brigades had crossed Bull Run and were in action 
on the south side. That brigade was thus out of use for four 
critical hours, and when it rejoined, the battle had been lost. 
Its only service was in covering the retreat. 

Meanwhile, by a coincidence, Beauregard had planned to make 
the very attack which McDowell had feared, and at the very 
time when he was stretched out on the circuitous road. As 
Johnston was Beauregard's senior, he was now in command of 
the joint forces, but as Beauregard was more familiar with the 
situation, it was left to him to decide upon the order of battle. 
By uniting the two armies, the Confederates had prepared a 
siirprise for the Federals, but, to reap the full benefit, it should 
be sprung upon them before they became aware of their danger. 
Beauregard's order of battle proposed to cross Bull Run with 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 29 

our three right brigades, envelop the enemy's exposed left 
flank, and drive it toward Centre ville. As soon as this battle 
was joined it would be taken up to the left, by adjoining brigades, 
in succession. We now had eight brigades concentrated on a 
front of about three miles, and, opposed to them, McDowell had 
left but three brigades. We could never hope for a more favor- 
able opportunity to quickly crush these three brigades and be 
prepared to meet in detail those which McDowell would have 
to bring back from his right. Unfortunately, however, we failed 
to improve the opportunity, and it vanished. The history of 
our failure is as follows: — 

Had Beauregard been in command, the so-called "orders" 
issued would have been immediate, and have been put into 
process of execution at dawn. But, presumably by Johnston's 
wish, they were merely instructions to each brigade to "place 
itself in position of attack upon the enemy," and await orders. 
The "orders to attack would be given by the Commander-in- 
Chief." These instructions were sent out at 5 a.m. and were 
differently understood by the officers addressed. Ewell, with 
Holmes, did not advance across Bull Run, but simply held him- 
self in readiness on the south side. Jones and Longstreet crossed 
their brigades and took position on the north bank. Bonham's 
brigade did not move. 

Johnston had expected the arrival during the night of his 
troops still in the rear. When he found that they had not 
arrived, he determined not to attack, but to await developments. 
He consented, however, to a demonstration by Beauregard's 
right, and orders were sent Ewell and Jones to advance. The 
order to Ewell was lost. It never reached him and was never 
found or accounted for afterward. Jones crossed and waited 
for two hours before the situation was developed. It was then 
thought too late, and he was withdrawn. 

About 6 A.M. Tyler's division appeared before our force under 
Evans at Stone Bridge, and presently opened a slow fire with a 
30-Pr. Parrott rifle. The movement of Tyler toward Stone 
Bridge early in the morning had been discovered by Longstreet's 
scouts. He writes of it in his book (page 45) : "Their report 
was sent promptly to headquarters, and, after a short delay, 



30 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

the brigade [Longstreet's] was ordered back to its position be- 
hind the Run." 

About 8 A.M. Johnston and Beauregard, accompanied by 
staffs and couriers, rode to the vicinity of Mitchell's Ford, where 
they left their party under cover, and took position on an open 
hill some 200 yards to the left of the road. On the Federal side 
of the Run, the three brigades, left to amuse our line while the 
flanking column made its march around us, had taken position 
on the hills about a half-mile north of the creek, started to pro- 
tect itself with abattis, and opened fire with a few guns upon 
all movements which they could discover on our side. To this 
fire we made no reply and kept our positions concealed, but we 
did nothing to strengthen them. 

As he rode out in the morning, Beauregard directed me to go 
with a courier to the Wilcoxen signal station and remain in 
general observation of the field, sending messages of all I could 
discover. I went reluctantly, as the opportunity seemed very 
sHght of rendering any service. There were but two signal stations 
on our line of battle, — one in rear of McLean's Ford, and one near 
Van Ness' house, on a bluff a few hundred yards to the left and 
rear of the Stone Bridge. Beyond the latter station the broad, 
level valley of Bull Run for some miles, with its fields and pastures, 
as seen through the glass, was foreshortened into a narrow band 
of green. 

While watching the flag of this station with a good glass, 
when I had been there about a half-hour, the sun being low in 
the east behind me, my eye was caught by a ghtter in this 
narrow band of green. I recognized it at once as the reflection 
of the morning sun from a brass field-piece. Closer scrutiny 
soon revealed the glittering of bayonets and musket barrels. 

It was about 8.45 a.m., and I had discovered McDowell's turn- 
ing column, the head of which, at this hour, was just arriving at 
Sudley, eight miles away. 

I appreciated how much it might mean, and thought it best 
to give Evans immediate notice, even before sending word to 
Beauregard. So I signalled Evans quickly, "Look out for your 
left; you are turned." Evans afterwards told me that a picket, 
which he had had at Sudley, being driven in by the enemy's 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 31 

advance guard, had sent a courier, and the two couriers, one 
with my signal message and one with the report of the picket, 
reached him together. The simultaneous reports from different 
sources impressed him, and he acted at once and with sound 
judgment. He left four companies of his command to watch 
the bridge and the enemy in his front, — Tyler and his three bri- 
gades. With the remainder of his force (six companies of the 
4th S.C. and Wheat's La. battaUon) he marched to oppose 
and delay the turning column, at the same time notifying Cocke, 
next on his right, of his movement. But he sent no word to 
Beauregard, whom he supposed that I would notify. 

Having sent Evans notice of his danger, I next wrote to 
Beauregard, as follows : — 

"I see a body of troops crossing Bull Run about two miles above the 
Stone Bridge. The head of the column is in the woods on this side. 
The rear of the column is in the woods on the other side. About a half- 
mile of its length is visible in the open ground between. I can see both 
infantry and artillery." 

In his report of the battle, Beauregard does not mention this 
note, but says, generally, that Capt. Alexander gave him 
"seasonable and material assistance early in the day with his 
system of signals." 

Johnston, in his report, says : — 

"About eight o'clock Gen. Beauregard and I placed ourselves on a 
commanding hill in rear of Gen. Bonham's left. Near nine o'clock, the 
signal officer, Capt. Alexander, reported that a large body of troops 
was crossing the valley of Bull Run some two miles above the bridge. 
Gen. Bee, who had been placed near Col. Cocke's position, Col. Hampton 
with his legion, and Col. Jackson from a point near Gen. Bonham's left, 
were ordered to hasten to the left flank." 

Bee's force comprised the 4th Ala. and 2d Miss., with the 
7th and 8th Ga. under Bartow. The Hampton Legion was 
one regiment, and Jackson had five regiments, the 2d, 4th, 
5th, 27th, and 33d Va. So 10 regiments, with an average 
distance of about three miles to go, were now en route to reen- 
force Evans with his two half-regiments. 

Now, for an hour and a half, nothing took place but the 
enemy's desultory artillery firing across Bull Run. McDowell's 



32 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

turning column was arriving at Sudley, crossing the creek and 
having a half-hour to rest, drink, and fill their canteens. Evans 
was getting into a position on the road from Sudley to Manassas, 
about a mile in front of McDowell, and three-quarters of a mile 
north of the Warrenton turnpike. Bee and Bartow were march- 
ing to join Evans. Hampton's Legion was following, and be- 
hind it Jackson's brigade was also coming. In order toward the 
right were Cocke, Bonham, Longstreet, and Early, south of the 
Run ; Jones north of it ; and Ewell, with Holmes, south of it at 
Union Mill's Ford, on the extreme right. 

Meanwhile, from my signal station, I had watched McDowell's 
column arrive at Sudley, and about 10 a.m. reported the rear of 
it — except Howard, left halted, as already told, some four miles 
behind. Soon after that picket firing was heard and presently 
an occasional gun. About 10.30, as the sun grew hotter, an 
immense column of dust began to develop, apparently about 
10 miles to the northwest. I afterward acquired more experience 
with army dusts than I then possessed, but never during the war 
did I see a dust cloud tower higher or rise more densely than 
this. It proved, finally, to be the wagon trains of Johnston's 
forces on their march down from the Valley. But, as Patter- 
son's army might be expected to follow Johnston, this portentous 
dust seemed at first an important phenomenon. So I deter- 
mined to be my own messenger to tell of it, and perhaps to 
point it out to the generals as it had now risen to a high altitude. 

This I was able to do, and Johnston refers to it as follows : — 

" The signal officer soon called our attention to a heavy cloud of dust 
to the northwest and about ten miles off, such as the march of an army- 
would raise. This excited apprehensions of Gen. Patterson's approach." 

Meanwhile, quite a fire of both musketry and artillery was 
beginning to develop on the left, where McDowell 's advance had 
now come in colHsion with Evans's little force. 

As a bystander I soon appreciated that Johnston believed the 
battle was to be fought upon the left and wished to go there, but 
Beauregard was reluctant to give up the proposed attack on 
Centreville by his right. 

Evans, with his 11 companies and two guns, maintained a good 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 33 

fight. He was fighting for time, and he managed to delay the 
Federal advance for about an hour. The fighting was not bad 
for beginners. Wheat's Tigers (the 1st La. battahon) lost 
38 in killed and wounded, and Evans's six companies of the 
4th S.C. regiment doubtless lost at least 50 ; though the exact 
figures in the reports are consolidated with other companies. 
It was doubtless influenced by the morale gained on the 18th. 
The Federal tactics were poor and timid. The engagement was 
begun by a single regiment, and this was reenforced by others 
successively, but there was lack of concert and combined power. 
New troops going into action are very prone to "fire and fall 
back," — to touch and let go, — as one handles a piece of hot iron 
when uncertain how hot it may be. There were cases of this 
among the volunteer regiments upon both sides. 

When Jackson, at Chancellorsville, turned Hooker's flank, he /^y 
formed his force into a double line of battle, with an interval of ^J^^ 
about 200 yards between the lines, before he made his attack.^ <'^^*^ 
When made it was irresistible and produced an immediate ^ 

panic. Had he begun it by piecemeal, it would have proved 
a failure. Had McDowell first advanced even two brigades, 
formed in a double fine, Evans's force could scarcely have de- 
tained them ten minutes. 

As it was, he was able to hold on until he was reenforced by 
Bee and Bartow with their four regiments. But soon after 
these had prolonged Evans's line of battle, facing the troops 
advancing from Sudley, their right was taken in flank and rear 
by Sherman's and Keyes's brigade of Tyler's division, which had 
found fords and crossed Bull Run about halfway between the 
Stone Bridge and Sudley, which McDowell's reconnoissance on the 
19th had missed. The roar of the young battle now swelled in 
volume. There came crashes of musketry which told that 
whole brigades were coming in, and the fire of the guns 
increased. 

Of course the Confederate line could not be held long against 
the odds now opposed to it, but the fight which it made has 
seldom been excelled by such raw troops. Jackson's brigade, 

^ Jackson gave order to form three lines, but gave signal for advance 
before the third line had gotten up and it followed in column. 



34 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

later that day, by steadfast fighting, conferred the immortal 
name of Stonewall upon its commander. The killed and 
wounded in its five regiments were 561, an average of 112 each. 
The killed and wounded in Bee's and Bartow's four regiments 
were 658, an average of 164 each. The 8th Ga., Bartow's 
own regiment, lost 200, and the 4th Ala. 197. Equally to 
their credit is the fact that though forced back a half-mile they 
were not demorahzed, but on meeting the reenforcements 
many were ralhed and re-formed, and fought throughout the 
day. It was in this later fighting that both Bee and Bartow 
were killed. The victory could never have been won without 
them.^ 

We must now return to the hill near Mitchell's Ford occupied 
by the two generals. When the sudden increase of fire broke 
out, which marked the arrival on the field of Bee and Bartow, 
Johnston seemed so restless that Beauregard was moved to 
despatch a staff-officer, Maj. Stevens, with a half-dozen couriers, 
under orders to ride rapidly, learn the situation, and send back a 
messenger every ten minutes. Not a word of information had 
yet come from the left, except what I had seen from the signal 
station. About 11.30 a.m., Stevens having gone less than a 
half-hour, there came a further access of fire both of musketry 
and artillery. It was doubtless due to the attack of Sherman 
and Keyes upon the flank of Bee and Bartow. No one who heard 
it could doubt its import. No messages from the left were needed 
now. All paused for a moment and Hstened. Then Johnston 
said, "The battle is there ! I am going." Walking rapidly to 
his horse, he mounted and set off at a gallop, followed by his own 
staff, as fast as they could get their horses. 

* In this connection mention should be made of Maj. Robert Wheat of 
the La. battalion, known as " The Tigers." As a boy, Wheat had run 
away from home in Baltimore and served gallantly in the Mexican War, 
and, after that, in desperate fighting with Walker in Nicaragua. In his 
report Evans writes that he was much indebted to Major Wheat " for his great 
experience and his excellent advice." He doubtless advised Evans in his 
movement to the left. Early in the action he fell, shot through the lungs. 
He survived and in June, 1862, again led his battalion in the bloody charge 
at Gaines Mill. Just before starting, to a friend who gave a greeting, he said, 
" Something tells Bob that this is his last." He had advanced but a short 
distance when he feU, only living to exclaim, " Bury me on the field, boys ! " 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 35 

Beauregard only paused to give a few brief orders. Holmes's 
and Early's brigades, and two regiments of Bonham's with 
Walker's and Kemper's batteries, were to march to the firing. 
Jones's brigade was to be recalled to our side of Bull Run. I was 
ordered to return to my signal station, which I did reluctantly. 
From it I watched the progress of the battle for hours, but could 
only distinguish a single event to be reported. This was the 
arrival at Sudley Ford between one and two o'clock of another 
Federal brigade. This, I afterward learned, was Howard's 
brigade, now tardily brought forward. 

I was able to follow the progress of the conflict by the rising 
clouds of smoke and the gradual approach of the musketry for 
an hour or two, after which, for a long time, there was little 
change, and the battle seemed to stand still. When Evans and 
Bee were broken by Sherman's attack upon the flank, their 
retreat was specially pressed by the Federal artillery. On 
reaching the Warrenton pike they were met by the Hampton 
Legion, and Hampton made an earnest effort to rally the retreat- 
ing force upon his command. The ground, however, was 
unfavorable, and though Hampton made a stubborn fight 
(losing 121 out of 600) and delaying the advance near 
two hours before leaving the pike, our whole fine then fell 
back imder the enemy's fire. Here, however, its tenacity 
was rewarded. A fresh brigade was drawn up in Une on 
the elevated ground, since known as the Henry house hill, 
and its commander, tiU then unknown, was henceforth to be 
called Stonewall. Bee rode up and said to him, ''General, 
they are driving us." "Then, sir," said Jackson, "we will 
give them the bayonet," 

The hill was really a ridge, with a plateau-hke top, some 200 
yards more across. The inner edge of such a ridge is a fairly good 
position for a defensive line of battle. It affords some cover 
both from view and from fire. If the enemy bring their artillery 
to the front edge of it, they are within musket range, and are 
also near enough to be charged. There was a good fringe of 
young pines, masking the inner edge of the hill. Jackson, while 
marching to the firing, had recognized this comparatively good 
position and occupied it. Bee galloped among his retreating 



36 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

men and called out to them, "See Jackson standing like a stone 
wall. Rally behind the Virginians." ^ 

It was at this moment, when Jackson's 3000 men and Hamp- 
ton's 600 were the only organized troops opposing the Federal 
advance, and Bee, Bartow, and Evans were attempting to rally 
their broken forces, that Johnston and Beauregard reached the 
field. A heavy Federal fire was being poured after the fugitives. 
The two generals had picked up and brought with them two 
batteries, Pendleton's and Alburtis's, of four guns each. Their 
first efforts were to rally the stragglers and, by example, to 
encourage the whole line. Both were veterans at such work. 
Johnston took the colors of the 4th Ala. and estabhshed it 
in the line of battle. His ordnance officer. Col. Thomas, was 
placed in command of a battalion formed of fragments of all 
commands. Thomas was killed while leading them through the 
day. Beauregard had his horse killed under him. When the 
line of battle seemed well estabhshed, it was agreed that its 
immediate conduct should be left to Beauregard, and that 
Johnston should take his position at the Lewis house, a short 
distance in the rear, whence he could control the movements of all 
forces, and direct the reenforcements as they approached the field. 

Two incomplete regiments of Cocke's brigade, the 8th Va., 
of seven companies, and the 49th, of three companies, were 
brought from Ball's Ford. Swell's brigade was sent for from 
Union Mills. Orders to hasten were sent the two regiments under 
Kershaw, and Early's and Holmes's brigades already on the 
march. Longstreet, at his own request by courier, was author- 
ized to cross Bull Run and make demonstrations against the 
enemy in his front, and Jones was authorized to join him. 

Besides these there was also on the way Kirby Smith 's brigade, 
which, as before told, had arrived at Manassas during the morn- 
ing, and was at once started to the field. 

Beauregard's task, therefore, was to hold his line of battle 

^ It is a coincidence that the same comparison was made the same after- 
noon by Gen. Johnston. I was acting as his guide late in the evening, 
and, in speaking of the fighting, he instanced the 4th Va. regiment of 
Jackson's brigade, under Col. James F. Preston, and said, so impressively 
that I always remembered it, " Preston's regiment stood there like a stone 
waU." 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 87 

until some of these six bodies of reenforcements could reach him. 
It was his last chance. And to do it he had about 3000 fresh 
infantry, and about as much more which had been engaged and 
driven back, and he had about 16 guns, mostly 6-pounders. 
His great advantage was that he had a fairly good position and 
was on the defensive. 

It was McDowell's task — and it was his last remaining of all the 
chances on his side at the beginning — to crush Beauregard's line 
before reenforcements could reach it. He had eight brigades, 
about 20,000 men, and 24 guns, mostly 12-pounders, and rifles. 
But he set about the work with only four brigades. Howard's 
brigade, as has already been told, had been left miles behind, 
when he felt uneasy about the long flank march. He sent for it 
about this time, but it arrived too late. 

Burnside's brigade he had weakly permitted Burnside to beg 
off for a rest, and to replenish ammunition. It was lying in the 
woods, in rear of where it was first engaged in the morning, and 
from Burnside 's report it laid there nearly five hours and was 
not again engaged. 

The third brigade missing from the fighting line was Keyes's. 
It had followed Sherman closely in its arrival on the field, and 
had borne some part in driving back the Confederate fine. 
Then it had borne to its left, and gotten into the valley of Bull 
Run. There was no Confederate infantry there, but it took 
shelter in the valley from a few guns which looked after our flank 
and rear in that direction. Here it was out of touch with every- 
thing. McDowell did not even know where it was. Had it 
advanced upon the Confederate guns, or had it communicated 
with Schenck's brigade on the north side of Bull Run, and the 
two moved on Cocke 's brigade at Ball 's Ford, — had it, in 
short, tried anything, it might have accompUshed important 
results. The fourth brigade missing was Schenck's, which 
never crossed Bull Run. Schenck still beheved that the bridge 
was mined, but he had ventured to cross axemen, one at a time, 
and had them cutting out the forest trees which had been felled 
across the Warrenton pike in the low ground beyond the bridge. 
The axemen got their task completed just in time for Keyes's 
brigade to retreat by that route. 



38 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

The absence of these four brigades, and the losses suffered by 
the other four, probably reduced McDowell's fighting line to 
about 9000 men, and Beauregard's advantage in the defensive 
equalized the remaining differences. For McDowell made the 
further mistake of continuing to fight in front instead of hunting 
for a Confederate flank. 

So now, for over two hours, these lines of battle fired away 
at each other, across the front ridge of the plateau, neither one 's 
fire being very murderous, as each fired mostly at random at the 
other's smoke. That, indeed, is the case in nearly all battles 
since long-range guns have come into use. It is rare that hostile 
lines get so near together, and are so exposed to each other's 
view, that men can select fheir targets. When this does occur, 
some decisive result is apt to be reached quickly. Fighting 
rarely consists now in marching directly upon one's enemy and 
shooting him down at close range. The idea is now a different 
one. It rather consists in making it rain projectiles all over the 
enemy's position. As far as possible, while so engaged, one 
seeks cover from the enemy's fire in return. But the party 
taking the offensive must necessarily make some advances. The 
best advance is around the enemy 's flanks, where one meets less 
fire and becomes opposed by smaller numbers. But here, 
McDowell, encouraged by his early success, endeavored to push 
straight forward. All along Young's Branch, at the foot of the 
rolling slopes, was more or less cover in which his troops could 
form. They could then advance, sheltered from view imtil 
their heads would begin to show over the front edge of the 
plateau, to the Confederate line along its rear edge. Then they 
would receive an accelerated and more accurate fire. They 
would return a volley or two and then run back down the hill 
until they found cover again. Some commands would try it 
over and over again, a number of times, but none ever made a 
lodgment. 

If McDowell had had some of his absent brigades at hand, he 
would doubtless have sent a single column to do the work in a 
single charge. But his successive attacks in partial force were 
only consuming time, while the Confederate reenforcements were 
already beginning to arrive on the field. And as they came, 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 39 

Johnston, with good judgment, hurried them to the left and 
extended the Confederate flank. 

At length, as his infantry could not make a lodgment, Mc- 
Dowell determined to try it with a dozen guns, manned by 
Griffin's and Ricketts's splendid companies of regulars. A 
gentle swale in the face of the ascending slope left the Henry 
house on a sort of knoll between the swale and the Sudley-Ma- 
nassas road. Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries were ordered to 
advance to the Henry house, and two or three regiments were 
directed forward to their support. This was about 3 p.m. 

The Henry house was a two-story frame, of about two rooms 
on each floor, in open grass land, with a small flower garden and 
a few locust trees by it. Heretofore it had not been in the line of 
fire, but there had been enough near to drive off all occupants 
except Mrs. Henry herself, who, old and bedridden, had to be 
left. The house now became suddenly the focus of a heavy 
fire. Mrs. Henry was killed in her bed, struck by a cannon shot 
and several musket balls. The enemy was within canister range 
of our lines, and the battle waxed hot. A regiment of Zouaves, 
following in support of the Federal batteries, were charged by 
a company of cavalry under Col. Stuart. The Zouaves took 
cover in a body of woods, and the cavalry lost 9 men and 18 
horses in a very few minutes. Other Federal regiments sent in 
support entered the woods, to the right and rear of the bat- 
teries, and found them being occupied from the other direction 
by the Confederate reenforcements which Johnston was now 
directing to our left flank. 

Meanwhile, Griffin and Ricketts had fired but a short while 
when the 33d Va., under Col. A. C. Cummings from Jack- 
son's left, leaving the shelter of the ridge and thickets, and, 
partly obscured from view by a fence, marched boldly out 
toward them. Col. Cummings moved of his own accord 
and without orders, tempted by the enemy's near approach. 
The day had been very dusty, and all uniforms, blue and 
gray, were now of the same dusty color. All over the field, 
and on both sides, cases of confusion had occurred, but the 
most important of all took place now. Griffin saw the regiment 
coming, and prepared to give them a bhzzard of canister. But 



40 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

the Federal chief of artillery, Maj. Barry, stopped him, saying 
that it was a Federal regiment coming to his support. One can 
scarcely imagine an intelligent officer becoming so confused as 
to points of the compass, but it is often seen upon battle-fields. 
A few zigzag changes of direction upon unfamiHar ground will 
upset the "orientation" of many men. Maj. Barry had been 
fighting that regiment in Jackson's line for some hours, yet he 
let it march up to a fence within 70 yards and deliver a 
volley. That volley was the end of the two batteries. About 
40 men and perhaps 75 horses were killed or disabled by it. 
Ricketts was badly wounded and captured, and his first lieuten- 
ant, Ramsay, was killed. Griffin managed to drag off three of 
his guns, but the other nine were left isolated between the two 
armies, surrounded by the dead and wounded men and horses. 

McDowell, however, did not tamely abandon his guns. The 
33d Va. soon found itself too far from home to maintain 
its position, and it had to leave its captures and fall 
back. Then there were two or three efforts on each side to hold 
them before the final one, about 4 p.m. Then Beauregard ad- 
vanced his whole line of battle. The Hampton Legion and the 
18th Va. finally swept over the captured guns, and Ferguson 
and Chisolm, of Beauregard 's staff, turned some of them upon 
the Federal forces now dissolving into rout. 

Within the last half -hour, Kirby Smith's brigade had reached 
the field, closely followed by Early's brigade, and with them 
came Beckham's battery. As Kirby Smith led in his troops, 
extending our fine on the left, he was severely wounded and had 
to turn over the command to Elzey. Early took Stuart's 
cavalry and Beckham's battery and advanced across the Warren- 
ton turnpike, where the ground is rolling and open. Beckham 
came into action in a position taking the Federal forces in flank. 
Having lost Griffin and Ricketts from their right flank, there 
was little artillery available to fight Beckham, and meanwhile, 
Beauregard, in the front, was now taking the aggressive. The 
Federal soldiers appreciated that the long and crooked road by 
which they had advanced would be peculiarly exposed in re- 
treat, and great numbers dissolved ranks and started back to 
Centre ville by the route they had come. Only Keyes's brigade, 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN ' 41 

and some of those nearest the left, took the Warrenton pike and 
crossed on the Stone Bridge. Early's brigade and the cavalry 
followed the fugitives who went by Sudley, The infantry could 
do but little in this pursuit, and the cavalry by nightfall had 
loaded themselves with as many prisoners as they could care 
for, so most of these commands halted at Sudley and bivouacked 
for that night. 

We may now return briefly to my signal station, whence at 
1.15 P.M. I sent my last message, reporting what I now know to 
have been Howard's brigade arriving at Sudley Ford, and two 
dust columns, both made by Johnston 's wagons coming from the 
valley. My message was dated at 1.15 p.m. and was as fol- 
lows ; — 

"Large reenforcements are pushing toward the enemy, crossing Bull 
Run far above Stone Bridge. The column of dust, which has come down 
from toward the mountains, is going straight toward Manassas Station. 
It now appears about three miles from the Junction. Another column 
is visible in the. far distance toward Paris. Six pieces in battery at 
Butler house. Centre ville road." 

After two o'clock the roar of the battle began to increase 
again, and about three, a new battery opened fire from a point 
farther to my left than any previous firing. It was plainly 
engaged in enfilading one of the opposing lines, and I watched 
anxiously to see which. Presently one of its shells burst high in 
the air over the Federal position. I was satisfied that I could be 
of no further service at the signal station, and I rode for the 
field. Had I not seen the direction in which that new battery 
was firing I would soon have believed our army to have been 
already defeated from the swarms of stragglers met upon my 
road. A few had flesh wounds, and all had stories of disaster 
which had left few survivors of their commands. President 
Davis had arrived at Manassas from Richmond, early in the 
afternoon, and, even then, stragglers from the field had met the 
train at the Junction, a half-mile from the station, with such 
alarming stories that the conductor feared to carry the train 
farther. After persuasion, however, he sent the President and 
an aide up to the station on a locomotive. 

At the station horses and a guide were procured, and Mr. Davis 



42 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

rode to the field. He soon encountered the procession of strag- 
glers and heard their stories. He was so impressed by their 
numbers that he said to an officer riding with him, "Fields are 
not won where men desert their colors as ours are doing." 

Quite near the field, the road crossed a small stream. Here 
the surgeons had established field hospitals, and about these 
and under shade of the trees the crowd of wounded, attendants, 
and stragglers was extensive. As he had ridden along the 
road, the President had frequently called upon men to turn 
back to the field, and some had done so. Here he seemed to 
fear that the whole army was in retreat. As he rode his horse 
into the stream he drew his rein, and with a pale, stern face, 
and in a loud, ringing voice he shouted, "/ am President Davis. 
Follow me back to the field!" Not far off, Stonewall Jackson, 
who had been shot through the hand, but had disregarded it 
until victory was assured, was now having his hand dressed by 
Surgeon Hunter McGuire. Jackson did not catch the Presi- 
dent's words, and McGuire repeated them to him. Jackson 
quickly shouted: "We have whipped them! They ran like 
sheep ! Give me 5000 fresh men, and I will be in Washington 
City to-morrow morning." In that sentence, as we shall see, 
appears almost the only evidence of appreciation among our 
leaders, on that field, of the great opportunity now before them. 

The enemy were routed. Jackson saw their demorahzation, 
and felt that, if rapidly followed up, it would spread and might 
involve the capital itself. And every soldier should have seen 
in it at least a good chance to cut off and capture many thou- 
sands of fugitives retreating by long and roundabout roads. 

There was httle effort, worthy of the name, even to do this. 
Our small bodies of cavalry did their best and captured about 
as many prisoners as they could handle. In all 871 unwounded 
were taken. But to fully improve such an opportunity much 
more was necessary. All the troops best situated to cut the line 
of retreat should have been put in motion. Not only staff-offi- 
cers, but generals themselves, should have followed up to inspire 
and urge pursuit. The motto of our army here would seem to 
have been, "Build a bridge of gold for a flying enemy." 

Jackson's offer to take Washington City the next morning 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 43 

with 5000 men had been made to the President as he arrived 
upon the field, probably about five o'clock. It was not sunset 
until 7.15, and there was a nearly full moon. But the President 
himself and both generals spent these precious hours in riding 
over the field where the conflict had taken place. Doubtless it 
was an interesting study, the dead and badly wounded of both 
sides being mostly where they had fallen, but it was not war 
to pause at that moment to consider it. One of the generals — 
Beauregard, for instance — should have crossed Bull Run at Ball's 
Ford or Stone Bridge with all the troops in that vicinity, and 
should have pushed the pursuit all night. Johnston should 
have galloped rapidly back to Mitchell's Ford and have marched 
thence on Centreville with Bonham, Longstreet, and Jones, who 
had not been engaged. No hard fighting would have been 
needed. A threat upon either flank would doubtless have been 
sufl&cient ; and, when once a retreat from Centreville was started, 
even blank volleys fired behind it would have soon converted it 
into a panic. 

It would be vain to speculate how far the pursuit might have 
been pushed or what it might have accompHshed had all the 
available force been energetically used. We were deficient in 
organi25ation, discipline, and transportation, but these deficiencies 
are no sufficient excuse for not attempting the game of war. In 
that game, to use the slang of more modern days, it was now 
"up to the Confederates" to pursue their routed enemy to the 
very utmost. His line of retreat was circuitous and offered us 
rare opportunity to cut it at Cub Run by a short advance from 
Stone Bridge; or at Centreville, by an advance of three miles 
from Mitchell's Ford. Johnston and Beauregard both sent orders 
to different commands to make such advances, but neither went 
in person to supervise and urge forward the execution of the orders, 
though time was of the very essence. Both generals and the Presi- 
dent spent the valuable hours of daylight still left in riding over 
the battle-field, as Napoleon lost his opportunity to crush 
Wellington at Quatre Bras by wasting hours in riding over the 
field of Ligny. Owing to their absence from the field, the 
advance from Mitchell's Ford was countermanded by Major 
Whiting of Johnston's staff, and that from the Stone Bridge, 



44 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

after being first checked, was later countermanded by Beaure- 
gard on receipt of a false rumor, which would not have been 
credited had the orders been in process of execution. 

It was my fortune to carry the first order checking the pur- 
suit, and my recollection of the circumstances is vivid. When I 
reached Beauregard, coming from the signal hill, the enemy 
was in full flight, some retreating across the Stone Bridge and 
others toward Sudley; and orders were being despatched to 
different commands concerning the pursuit. Kershaw, with the 
7th and 8th S.C. regiments, was ordered to pursue across 
the Stone Bridge and along Warrenton pike. I accompanied 
the general in riding over the field and in looking after 
minor matters for some time. About 6 p.m. I happened to be 
the only one of his personal staff with him. Rather abruptly, 
and apropos of nothing that I saw or heard, he said to me: 
"Ride across the Stone Bridge and find Col. Kershaw, who 
is conducting the pursuit along the pike. Order him to advance 
very carefully and not to attack." 

I had recently read accounts of the affair at Big Bethel, Va., 
June 10, in which Magruder had repulsed Butler, whose troops 
fell back to Fortress Monroe in a panic, though entirely 
unpursued. I noted two facts: (1) That Magruder's cavalry, 
which had been ordered to pursue, had allowed itself to be 
"bluffed" by Greble's U. S. Battery. This was entirely out 
of ammunition, but it had turned back pursuit of our cav- 
alry by unlimbering their empty guns. (2) That though victo- 
rious, Magruder retreated to Yorktown the same afternoon, though 
perhaps with less haste than was used in Butler's return to 
Fortress Monroe. It seemed to me now that peremptory orders 
"not to attack" might result in another such scandal. I hesi- 
tated to make any suggestion, remembering army stories of 
rephes by old generals to young aides who had volunteered advice. 
But I ventured to say : " Shall I tell him not to attack under 
any circumstances, no matter what the condition of the enemy 
in his front?" He replied: "Kemper's battery has been 
ordered to Join him. Let him wait for it to come up. Then 
he can pursue, but cautiously, and he must not attack unless 
he has a decided advantage." 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 45 

Better satisfied, I rode on my errand. A mile beyond the 
Stone Bridge a member of Congress, Mr. Ely of N.Y., was 
brought out of the woods a prisoner, as I passed, and turned 
over to the guard. A half-mile farther I overtook Kershaw 
forming in line of battle, a Federal gun, near the bridge over 
Cub Run, having opened fire upon his column. After a few 
minutes, during which skirmishers were advanced, Kemper's 
battery arrived and opened fire with two guns on the position at 
Cub Run. 

I then turned back to rejoin Beauregard, and, at the Stone 
Bridge, met Elzey's brigade coming over. It was now nearly 
seven o'clock and the sun about a half-hour high when on the 
Stone Bridge I met Ferguson of Beauregard's staff, bearing 
orders not only to stop the pursuit, but to recall all troops to 
the south side of Bull Run. I asked the reason and was an- 
swered that a message had been brought to the generals, who 
were still on the battle-field, that a force of the enemy had been 
seen south of Bull Run in rear of our right flank. Ferguson 
pronounced the message as absurd, and was carrying the orders 
reluctantly. I soon rejoined the two generals upon the field, 
and among the staff-officers found that no regard was being 
paid to the story. But the orders already despatched were not 
recalled, and, until late at night, all the troops on the north side 
were being brought back. 

Meanwhile, Kemper's fire on the bridge at Cub Run had 
wrecked a team on the bridge, and caused a panic and an in- 
extricable jam of over fifty vehicles, including guns, caissons, 
wagons, and ambulances, from which the drivers had cut many 
of the teams. Hundreds of the infantry also had thrown their 
guns into the stream as they crossed the bridge. Here Kershaw 
was joined by some of our cavalry which had crossed Bull Run 
at Ball's Ford, and later, by some which had followed the enemy 
via Sudley. When the orders to return to the south side were 
received, he left one of his regiments of infantry and this cavalry 
in charge of the situation. These during the night cleared up 
the blockade and in the morning brought to Manassas 17 guns, 
including the 30-pounder Parrott, with over 20 caissons and 
many other vehicles. 



46 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

It now only remains of the battle, to give the brief story of 
the five brigades of our right and centre which held the line of 
Bull Run, opposite Centreville, and were confronted by Miles 
with three brigades. Under the confusion of orders in the 
morning which has been mentioned, Ewell, about 10 a.m., started 
to cross Bull Run, was recalled; was again sent across and a 
mile and a half in advance ; was again recalled, and, about 2 p.m., 
was ordered to march to the battle-field. Here he was followed 
by Holmes. They reached the vicinity of the field after the 
rout of the enemy. Then, on the false alarm about 6.30 p.m., 
they were ordered to march back to Union Mills, where they 
arrived late at night, worn out with dust, heat, and fatigue, 
without having fired a shot all day. 

Next to Ewell and Holmes came Jones, who had crossed early 
and waited for Ewell, as has been told. He was also recalled 
about 11 A.M. About noon he was ordered to cross again and 
to make some demonstrations. He did so and attempted to 
charge a battery with Jenkins's S.C. regiment, but became 
entangled in difficult ground under sharp artillery fire. After 
losing 14 killed and 62 wounded, and finding his effort 
isolated and hopeless, he fell back. Next to the left of Jones 
was Longstreet. He also crossed and recrossed Bull Run in 
the morning, and crossed again about noon as Jones did. In 
the afternoon about four he was called back to the south side 
by orders from Johnston, But he had scarcely completed the 
movement, when, about half -past five, there came from Johnston 
orders for Bonham and Longstreet to advance upon Centreville 
and intercept the routed forces from Stone Bridge. Neither of 
the generals came to see this order executed, and the manner 
in which it was ignored and disobeyed is instructive. It shows 
that the giving of orders to go into action is but one-half of the 
duty of a commanding general. 

Here, time was of the essence, as the sun was less than two 
hours high. Longstreet's brigade, having the advantage in 
position, got the lead. It was the strongest brigade, having five 
regiments present. Bonham also had five, but two, under 
Kershaw, were now across Stone Bridge, as has been told. Long- 
street, with superfluous caution, left one regiment to hold Black- 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 47 

burn's Ford. With the other four he was well under way when 
Bonham, holding the older commission, claimed command of 
the joint operation, and put his own brigade in front. Long- 
street had to yield and halt, and half the precious dayhght was 
sacrificed to this vain whim. In the Federal official reports are 
noted several incidents showing that, even after all this delay, 
the enemy were caught retreating and might have been attacked 
at much disadvantage. For instance, Lt. Edwards, command- 
ing a battery, says that he marched close along the front of 
a Confederate regiment, drawn up in the woods, on the side of 
the road he was following. He says : — 

"It was the most dangerous position occupied during the day. One 
shot was fired over the battery, and there was a simultaneous movement 
of muskets along the line as if to continue the fire. Fortunately it was 
not followed up." 

After Bonham took the lead, the advance was continued but a 
short distance, when it was halted and a small squad of cavalry 
was sent ahead to reconnoitre, — a timid waste of time. They 
came back and reported the enemy drawn up on the hills about 
Centreville. The rest of the daylight was consumed in deploy- 
ing the column on both sides of the road, and then, after resting 
a half-hour, they fell back to Bull Run without firing a single 
shot. 

From all accounts of the condition of the enemy at this time, 
had Bonham even stood still and fired blank cartridges to make 
a great roar and pretend that he was coming, the panic at 
Centreville would have been doubled, and soon he could have 
advanced and found it deserted. 

His report of this episode is an instructive picture of how 
opportunities may be lost from overcaution, bred by the sense 
of responsibihty in commanding officers not inured to its weight. 
Few who have never felt it can realize what this may be. Bonham 
had served in Florida and Mexico and had been wounded at 
Contreras. He was personally brave, but had here no major- 
general to give him orders, and the responsibility overwhelmed 
him. To nothing else can we attribute the excessive caution 
which here characterized the conduct of both our generals and 
of the President. Similar instances may be found in the stories 



48 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

of many battles, Magruder had already illustrated it at Big 
Bethel. Meade afterward did likewise at Gettysburg, and, even 
in our most recent war, the siege of Santiago narrowly escaped 
being terminated by a retreat. The capture of the Spanish 
fleet at Manila was delayed by a suspension for breakfast, and 
for an unnecessary inventory of ammunition. All these events 
took place under the pressure of new responsibilities. 

Longstreet, in his book, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 52, gives 
the following account of the final scene : — 

"When within artillery range of the retreating column passing through 
Centreville, the infantry was deployed on the sides of the road under cover 
of the forest, so as to give room for the batteries ordered into action in the 
open. Bonham's brigade on the left, the other on the right. 

"As the guns were about to open there came a message that the enemy, 
instead of being in precipitate retreat, was marching around to attack 
the Confederate right. With this report came orders, or reports of orders, 
for the brigades to return to their positions behind the Run. I denounced 
the report as absurd, claimed to know a retreat, such as was before me, and 
ordered that the batteries open fire, when Maj. Whiting, of Gen. Johns- 
ton's staff, rising in his stirrups, said, — 

" ' In the name of Gen. Johnston, I order that the batteries shall not open.' 
" I inquired, ' Did Gen. Johnston send you to communicate that order ? ' 
"Whiting rephed, 'No, but I take the responsibility to give it.' 
" I claimed the privilege of responsibility under the circumstances, and 
when in the act of renewing the order to fire. Gen. Bonham rode to 
my side and asked that the batteries should not open. As the ranking 
officer present, this settled the question. By that time, too, it was near 
night. Col. G. W. Lay, of Johnston's staff, supported my views, not- 
withstanding the protest of Maj. Whiting. 

" Soon there came an order for the brigades to withdraw and return to 
their positions behind the Run. Gen. Bonham marched his brigade 
back, but, thinking there was a mistake somewhere, I remained in position 
until the order was renewed, about ten o'clock. My brigade crossed and 
recrossed the Run six times during the day and night. 

"It was afterwards found that some excitable person, seeing Jones's 
brigade recrossing the Run, from its advance under previous orders, took 
them for Federal troops crossing at McLean's Ford, and, rushing to head- 
quarters at the Junction, reported that the Federals were crossing below 
and preparing for attack against our right. And upon this report one 
of our staff-officers sent orders, in the names of the Confederate chiefs, 
revoking the orders for pursuit." 

On my return from the message to Kershaw I rejoined Beaure- 
gard on the field, and was with him until after dark, when I was 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 49 

sent to escort Gen. Johnston back to Manassas Junction by 
the Sudley-Manassas road. .On the road we were overtaken by 
President Davis with Beauregard and most of his staff. Be- 
tween 10 and 11 P.M. we all arrived at the headquarters in the 
village. After supper a conference was held between the Presi- 
dent and the two generals in an upper room. While it was in prog- 
ress, probably about midnight, there arrived Maj. R. C. Hill, a 
staff-officer in Johnston's command, who had taken part in the 
pursuit in the afternoon, and who now came to report that he had 
" made his way into Centreville, and had found it entirely deserted, 
and the streets blockaded with abandoned artillery and caissons." 

This was the first intimation which reached headquarters that 
the enemy's retreat, even without any pursuit, had degenerated 
into a panic, and Maj. Hill was taken at once upstairs to make 
his report in person to the generals and the President. He was 
well known under the sobriquet of "Crazy Hill," to distinguish 
him from another Hill, classmate at West Point. Nothing that 
he had ever done had justified his nickname, but it arose from 
something peculiar in his eye, tones, and manner, all suggestive 
of suppressed excitement. As a matter of fact, he had not been 
to Centreville, but only to Cub Run bridge. He had come upon 
the field with a company of cavalry, and had seen the blockaded 
guns and caissons. There was no other such blockade, at Centre- 
ville or elsewhere. 

The details of what took place in the council, after Hill had 
told his story and been dismissed, indicate that the case was 
one where too many cooks spoiled the broth. Immediate ad- 
vance should have been made. While Hill had not really been 
at Centreville, an advance there after midnight would have 
found it nearly if not entirely deserted, and might have over- 
taken the rear of the retreating Federals. Mr. Davis suggested 
immediate pursuit, and there was some discussion as to which 
troops were in best condition and most conveniently situated. 
Johnston, who was the commander-in-chief, offered no definite 
motion, and there ensued a pause. Beauregard's adjutant, 
Col. Jordan, then asked the President if he would dictate 
an order. He complied and dictated one for immediate pursuit. 
Conversation began on whether pursuit at dawn would answer, 



50 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



and also as to Hill and his story. It was brought out that Hill 
was known as "Crazy Hill," and, though no one knew him per- 
sonally, some doubt was felt, and the order was modified into 
one directing a reconnoissance at dawn by Bonham's and Cocke's 
brigades and infantry. 

At dawn next morning it was pouring rain and it continued 
most of the day. This heavy precipitation has often been ap- 
pealed to by the rain-makers as confirmation of their theories 
that rain may be induced by heavy cannonading. 

The reconnoissances ordered were made and, of course, found 
the country deserted. Our cavalry followed the retreat beyond 
Fairfax Court House, and picked up a few stragglers and about 
20 wagons. These small matters and the artillery captured at 
Cub Run and brought in during the day amused and interested 
us while the last hours of our opportunity passed away. Never 
did an enemy make a cleaner escape out of such an exposed 
position after such an utter rout. 

CASUALTIES. BULL RUN, JULY 21, 1861 

Confederate 



Brigades 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Army of Potomac 










Bonham (5 Reg'ts) 


10 


66 




76 


Ewell (3 " ) 


3 


23 




26 


Jones (3 " ) 


13 


57 




70 


Longstreet (4 " ) 


2 


12 




14 


Cocke (3^-2 " ) 


23 


79 


2 


104 


Early (4 " ) 


20 


117 


6 


143 


Evans (6 Go's. ) 


8 


38 


2 


48 


Hampton (6 Go's. ) 


19 


100 


2 


121 


Total 


98 


492 


12 


602 


Army of Shenandoah 










Jackson (5 Reg'ts) 


119 


442 




561 


Bartow (2 " ) 


60 


303 




363 


Bee (2K " ) 


72 


260 


1 


333 


Elzey (3 " ) 


8 


18 




26 


6th N.C. (1 " ) 


23 


50 




73 


Total 


282 


1073 


1 


1356 


Total 


380 


1565 


13 


1958 



THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN 
Federal. 1st Division. Tyler 



51 



Killed 



Wounded 



Missing 



Total 



Keyes 
Schenck 
Sherman 
Richardson 



Total 



Franklin 

Wilcox 

Howard 



Total 



19 
19 
20 



50 


154 


15 


16 


208 


253 


not 


engaged 



58 



273 



423 



71 
71 
50 



192 



197 
172 
115 



484 



26 
186 
180 



392 



223 

50 

481 



754 



2d Division. Hunter 


Porter 
Burnside 


84 ' 
40 


148 

88 


245 
61 


477 
189 


Total 


124 


236 


306 


666 


3d Division. Heintzelman 



294 
429 
345 



1068 



5th Division. Miles 



Blenker 
Davies 


6 
1 


16 
2 


94 
1 


116 
4 


Total 


7 


18 


95 


120 


Aggregate 


481 


1011 


1216 


2708 



CHAPTER III 

Fall and Wintee of 1861 

Ordnance Service. Breech-loading Small-Arms. Confederate Arma- 
ments. Richmond Ordnance Bureau. Secret Service. McClellan's 
Secret Service. Military Situation. A Council of War. Ball's Bluff. 
Occoquan Battery. Winter. Army Organization. Federal Organi- 
zation. Lines of Advance on Richmond. Retreat from Manassas. 
The Valley. Kernstown. 

On the day after Bull Run I was appointed Chief of Ordnance 
of Beauregard 's corps, and within a few days Johnston extended 
my office over the whole army, which, about this period, took 
the name ever afterwards used, — "The Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia." The enemy, about the same time, adopted their equally 
well-known title, "The Army of the Potomac." 

My new duties largely absorbed my time, but I remained in 
charge of the signal service, the work being now confined to 
sending instructed parties to all parts of the Confederacy where 
they might be of use. During the fall a "Department of Sig- 
nals" was organized in Richmond, and the charge of it,' with the 
rank of colonel, was offered me, but dechned, as I was unwilfing 
to leave the field. As head of a department I was soon made 
Major, and, later, Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery. Col. William 
Norris of Baltimore became the Chief Signal Officer. 

Briefly, my duties embraced the supply of arms and ammuni- 
tion to all troops in the field, — infantry, artillery, and cavalry. 
I organized the department, with an ordnance officer or sergeant in 
every regiment, from whom I received weekly statements show- 
ing the arms and ammunition on hand in cartridge boxes and 
regimental wagons. Reserve storehouses were provided at the 
nearest railroad points, and reserve trains for brigades and divi- 
sions, to run between the storehouses and the troops. For emer- 
gency, under my own control was held a train of ammunition 
and battery wagons equipped with tools and expert mechanics 
for all sorts of repairs from a broken mainspring to a spiked 

52 



FALL AND WINTER OF 1861 53 

fieldpiece. I was fortunate in securing for superintendent 
of this train, Maj. George Duffy, an expert from Alexandria, 
who became an institution in the army, and remained with it 
throughout the war. 

In its early stages we had great trouble with the endless 
variety of arms and calibres in use, scarcely ten per cent of them 
being the muzzle-loading rifled musket, calibre 58, which was 
then the regulation arm for United States infantry. There were 
several breech-loading small-arms manufactured at the North, 
but none had secured the approval of the United States Ordnance 
Department, although many of them would have made more 
formidable weapons than any muzzle-loaders. 

The old idea was still widely entertained that, because the 
percentage of hits is always small, the fire of infantry should not 
be rapid, lest the men waste too much ammunition. After a 
year or two some of the best breech-loaders got admission among 
cavalry regiments, and common sense and experience gradually 
forced a recognition of the value of a heavy fire. By 1864, the 
Spencer breech-loading carbine had been adopted as the regula- 
tion arm for the Federal cavalry, and by the fall of that year 
brigades of infantry began to appear with it. 

On October 7, 1864, on the Darbytown road, Field's division 
was easily repulsed by two brigades armed with Spencers, with 
severe loss, including Genls. Gregg killed and Bratton wounded; 
and on Nov. 30, 1864, at FrankUn, Tennessee, Casement's, 
brigade with these arms decided that battle with terrific slaughter, 
It was written of this fight that "never before in the history of 
war did a command, of the approximate strength of Casement 's. 
in so short a period of time kill and wound as many men." 

There is reason to believe that had the Federal infantry been 
armed from the first with even the breech-loaders available in 
1861 the war would have been terminated within a year. 

The old smooth-bore musket, calibre 69, made up the bulk of 
the Confederate armament at the beginning, some of the guns, 
even all through 1862, being old flint-locks. But every effort 
was made to replace them by rifled muskets captured in battle, 
brought through the blockade from Europe, or manufactured at 
a few small arsenals which we gradually fitted up. Not until 



54 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

after the battle of Gettysburg was the whole army in Virginia 
equipped with the rifled musket. In 1864 we captured some 
Spencer breech-loaders, but we could never use them for lack of 
proper cartridges. 

Our artillery equipment at the beginning was even more inade- 
quate than our small-arms. Our guns were principally smooth- 
bore 6-Prs. and 12-Pr. howitzers, and their ammunition was 
afflicted with very unreliable fuses. Our arsenals soon began to 
manufacture rifled guns, but they always lacked the copper and 
brass, and the mechanical skill necessary to turn out first-class 
ammunition. Gradually we captured Federal guns to supply 
most of our needs, but we were handicapped by our own am- 
munition until the close of the war. 

No department of our government deserves more credit than 
our Ordinance Bureau in Richmond under Gen. Josiah Gorgas, for 
its success in supplying the enormous amount of ordinance ma- 
terial consumed during the war. Although always economical 
of ammunition, yet we never lost any action from the lack of it. 
We were, however, finally very near the end of our resources, in 
the supply of one indispensable article. To make percussion 
caps nitric acid, mercury, and copper were required. Our 
Nitre and Mining Bureau had learned to make saltpetre from 
caves, and the earth under old barns and smoke houses, and from 
all kinds of nitrogenous waste material. From the saltpetre 
our chemists could make nitric acid. Our quicksilver came from 
Mexico, but after the fall of Vicksburg we were cut off from it, 
and about the same time the supply of sheet copper was ex- 
hausted. The chemists found out a mixture of chlorate of 
potash and sulphuret of antimony which they could use in 
place of fulminate of mercury; and we collected all the turpen- 
tine and apple-brandy stills in the country and sent them to 
Richmond to be cut up and rer oiled into copper strips. 

From this copper and the above chemical mixture all the 
caps were made which we used during the last year of the war, 
but at its close the copper stills were exhausted. It is hard to 
imagine what we would then have done had not the surrender at 
Appomattox reheved the quandary. 

In August our line of pickets was advanced within five miles 



FALL AND WINTER OF 1861 55 

of the Potomac, opposite Washington, and it included two hills, 
Munson 's and Mason 's, from which many houses in Washington 
were plainly visible. This suggested opening a Hne of secret 
signals from a window in one of these houses to an observation 
room on the top of a residence on Mason's Hill. A powerful 
telescope was borrowed from Charleston, and an intelligent 
signal employee, E, P. Bryan, of Maryland, was sent in disguise 
to Washington to find a room with an available window, and to 
install himself therein. The scheme was entirely feasible, but 
before it could be put into operation Johnston decided that it 
was unwise to hold our lines so close to the enemy, and they 
were withdrawn, giving up the positions on the two hills. 

Bryan then established a signal line across the Potomac, some 
15 miles below Alexandria, with messengers from its termini to 
Manassas and to our secret agents in Washington. The principal 
business of these agents was to supply us with the Northern 
papers, although for some time careful account was kept of 
arrivals of new troops at Washington. But this was found less 
reliable than the accounts in the daily papers. From them we 
learned not only of all arrivals, but also of assignments to brig- 
ades and divisions, and, by tabulating these, we always knew 
quite accurately the strength of the enemy's army. 

Why the enemy, by similar obvious methods, did not, also, 
always know our strength, remains a mystery. But McClellan 
had a bureau under Pinkerton to estimate for him, from the 
reports of spies, prisoners, and deserters, and impUcitly believed, 
by preference, the most absurd and impossible of all their re- 
ports. As an illustration may be taken his report in October, 
1861, in which he estimates the Confederate army on the Po- 
tomac as "not less than 150,000 strong, weU-drilled and equipped, 
ably commanded and strongly intrenched." 

In fact, the Confederate army at the time was only about 
40,000 strong. It was very poorly drilled and wretchedly 
equipped, and it had, practically, no intrenchments whatever. 
And although it numbered able oflEicers among its generals, it 
was badly commanded, in that it was not organized into divisions, 
and could not have been well handled either on a march or in 
action. 



56 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

McClellan, though unfit to command in battle, had no superior 
in organizing an army to take the field as a thoroughly fit 
machine, able to concentrate its energies wherever needed. By 
the end of October he might easily have advanced upon the 
Confederates with a force three to one in numbers and twice 
better armed and organized. 

Public opinion would have forced McClellan into making an 
attack, but for the moral effect of the imaginary battahons which 
Pinker ton's Bureau had conjured into existence and drilled and 
equipped so easily. And as so good a fighting machine of 
American soldiers would do hard fighting, even without a gen- 
eral at their head, as was abundantly shown by McClellan 's 
subsequent career, it is entirely possible that the Confederates 
may owe their escape from a defeat in November, 1861, as much 
to yarns spun by their deserters as to their own impudent 
attitude in the field. 

After the battle of Bull Run it was apparent that if the South 
sat quietly in a defensive attitude until the enemy was ready to 
advance again, he would come in overwhelming force. Conse- 
quently the burden was upon us to bring on the collision while 
pur comparative resources were greatest. Johnston and Beaure- 
gard recognized this, but deferred action from day to day, 
hoping to receive reenforcements worth waiting for, and to ac- 
cumulate transportation and supplies. President Davis recog- 
nized it also, and sent some new regiments from time to time, 
but the demands upon him were very great. He had urgent 
appeals for more troops from every quarter, from the Potomac 
to the Rio Grande. And, as scarce as men were, arms were even 
scarcer. He divided out all he had according to his best judg- 
ment, but it must be admitted that this was often mistaken. 
Troops were certainly held at Pensacola, Savannah, Charleston, 
Norfolk, and in West Virginia, which might have given the 
needed strength to the army at Manassas to enable it to take the 
offensive. As it was, the new troops sent were little more than 
enough to make good the losses from sickness which befell the 
army in the summer of 1861. 

The entire country about Bull Run was malarial, and the 
troops were badly equipped and ignorant about sanitary meas- 



FALL AND WINTER OF 1861 57 

ures. All our new regiments from country districts were great 
sufferers from measles, which often reduced their effective force 
one-half. 

In the latter part of Sept., feeUng that the opportunity 
was about to pass. President Davis was induced to visit Johns- 
ton, Beauregard, and Smith at Manassas, and this matter was 
discussed. The three generals asked for 10,000 or 20,000 
more men than the 40,000 they had. With this addition 
to their numbers they proposed to cross the Potomac and make 
an offensive campaign in Maryland. Mr. Davis seemed greatly 
disappointed to find so few troops available. He acknowledged 
the force of the argument for the offensive, but he could not see 
his way to taking troops from other points, and he could not 
provide more men until he could procure more arms. 

On Oct. 21 an accidental affair took place at Ball's Bluff, 
near Leesburg, Virginia, which greatly elated the Confederates. 
Evans's brigade, of four regiments and a battery, was held at 
Leesburg in observation of the Potomac, and of a force under 
Gen. Stone on the Maryland shore. On Oct. 19, McClel- 
lan had sent out a strong reconnoissance toward Leesburg 
from his main body covering Washington. The reconnoissance 
was scarcely extended half-way to Leesburg, but McClellan 
thought that it might alarm Evans and cause him to fall back 
nearer to Manassas; so on Oct. 20 he wired Stone, suggesting 
a demonstration on his part. Stone made it by crossing the river 
at two points, Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, about three 
miles apart. Both parties crossed without opposition, but the 
Ball's Bluff party, having occupied the high bluff on the Vir- 
ginia shore, pushed out a reconnoissance through the woods 
toward Leesburg, some two miles off. 

Evans, with three of his regiments and his battery, was observ- 
ing the Edward's Ferry body, which had taken a strong position 
and intrenched itself. His fourth regiment, the 18th Miss., 
came in contact with the Ball 's Bluff advance, and drove it back 
to the main body at the top of the bluff. There the fight grew 
hotter. Gen. Baker, commanding the Federals, brought up his 
whole brigade of five regiments and three pieces of artillery, — 
about 3000 men, — and Evans sent two of his three regiments, the 



58 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

8th Va. and 17th Miss., from in front of Edward's Ferry, 
making the Confederate force engaged about 1600. After 
a sharp and well-conducted fight under the inspiration of Col. 
Jenifer, Baker was killed, his artillery captured, and his entire 
force driven into the river, many being drowned. The casual- 
ties were : — 

Federal : Killed 49, wounded 158, missing 714, total 921 

Confederate: " 36, " 117, " 2, " 155 

This affair, so soon following Bull Run, had a powerful in- 
fluence upon the Confederate morale. About this period we 
unmasked on the Potomac, near the mouth of the Occoquan, some 
heavy batteries, which, for some weeks, we had been secretly 
constructing to blockade the river. The enemy submitted to 
this blockade during the whole winter, although a well-planned 
attack at any time might have captured the batteries and 
estabhshed a very threatening lodgment, upon our right flank. 

McClellan's apparent apathy in this matter, taken in conjunc- 
tion with the disaster at Ball's Bluff, gradually gave rise in Mr. 
Lincoln's mind to a loss of confidence in him as a leader which 
was never fully restored, and which materially influenced the 
course of events. Lincoln was now accumulating a force which 
seemed enormous. The expense incurred was certainly very 
great, and he became impatient to see reprisals. McClellan 
calmly advised waiting until he had collected and thoroughly 
organized an army of about 273,000 men, which he said would 
take the blockading batteries without firing a gun. Lincoln 
submitted, but his discontent was increased. 

Meanwhile winter put in its appearance. The vicinity of 
each army became a vast quagmire, and all mihtary operations 
became impossible. The Confederate army was withdrawn to 
Centreville and the vicinity of Bull Run, where it went into 
winter quarters. Soon after this Beauregard was transferred to 
the Western Army under Gen. A. S. Johnston. His position in 
Virginia had been that of a supernumerary, and in his new 
position it was Uttle better until after the battle of Shiloh, where 
Johnston was killed as he was about to grasp a victory. Beaure- 
gard was not yet inmaune to attacks of overcaution, the bane of 



FALL AND WINTER OF 1861 59 

new commanders, and his excellent chance to win a great success 
was lost. He recalled his attack just at the critical moment 
when it gave every promise of developing a panic among the 
enemy. 

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston at this time had organized his army 
into four divisions, two of four brigades each, commanded by 
Van Dorn and G. W. Smith ; and two of five each, under Long- 
street and E. Kirby Smith. These 18 brigades averaged about 
four regiments, and the regiments averaged about 500 men each. 
Besides these there were other troops under Jackson in the valley 
and under Holmes near Acquia. The total effective strength on 
February 28, 1862, was 47,617, with about 175 guns. 

Early in March the Federal army was organized into five 
army corps under McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, and 
Banks. Each corps was generally composed of three divisions, 
each division of three brigades, and each brigade of four regi- 
ments. The regiments were generally fuller than ours, and 
would average about 700 men. The total effective strength of 
all arms on February 28, 1862, was 185,420, with 465 field guns, 
of which 100 were massed in a reserve under the Chief of Artillery. 

During the winter the Federal engineers had completely sur- 
rounded Washington with a cordon of fortifications consisting of 
detached forts impregnable to assault, with heavy guns and 
permanent garrisons connected by infantry parapets, and bat- 
teries for field guns. Within these lines a small movable force 
could defy any adversary not able to sit down and resort to 
siege operations. This was amply shown when Lee, in August, 
1862, drove Pope into Washington, and also in July, 1864, when 
Early made his demonstration, but withdrew without venturing 
to attack. 

The Federal government, however, had received such a scare 
in the Bull Run campaign that it had small confidence in forti- 
fications without a big army to hold them. So when McClellan 
proposed to make his next advance upon Richmond, from 
Fortress Monroe as a base, Mr. Lincoln gave but reluctant con- 
sent, as it involved the removal of a large body of troops from 
their position between the enemy and the capital. At length 
he agreed that about 73,000 would be enough to keep for the 



60 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

defence of Washington, This would allow McClellan to have 
about 150,000 at Fortress Monroe. Early in April, however, 
under some strong political pressure, Mr. Lincoln detached 
Blenker's division, about 10,000 men, from McClellan's force 
and sent them to Fremont in West Virginia. 

Before taking up the history of this campaign, it will be 
interesting to take a general view of all routes to Richmond 
which were tried during the war. 

There were seven campaigns under as many different com- 
manders. 

First. McDowell set out to follow the Orange and Alexan- 
dria Railway, but was defeated at Manassas in his first battle. 
, Second. McClellan set out from Fortress Monroe via the 
York River. As we shall see, he had some success. His ad- 
vance was within six miles of Richmond when he was beaten 
at Gaines Mill. He found a refuge on the James River, but his 
army was soon recalled to Washington. 

Third. Pope, in August, 1862, followed in McDowell's foot- 
steps along the railroad from Alexandria, and was defeated upon 
nearly the same ground which had witnessed McDowell's defeat. 

Fourth. Burnside took the railroad via Fredericksburg, and 
in December, 1863, met a bloody repulse at that point and gave 
up his campaign. 

Fifth. Hooker also took the Fredericksburg route, but was 
attacked at Chancellorsville so severely that he also gave up 
his campaign early in May, 1863. 

Sixth. Meade, after repulsing Lee at Gettysburg in July, 
1863, in November essayed an advance from Alexandria upon 
Lee's right flank at Mine Run, about halfway between the two 
railroad lines. He found Lee so strongly intrenched that he 
withdrew without attacking. 

Seventh. On May 4, 1864, Grant, with the largest force yet 
assembled, set out from Alexandria on a line between Meade's 
Mine Run and Hooker's Spottsylvania routes. Lee attacked 
his columns in the Wilderness. The battle thus joined raged for 
over 11 months, and only ended at Appomattox on April 9, 1865. 
Our only concern here is to note the advantages and the dis- 
advantages of the different lines. The overland route again 



FALL AND WINTER OF 1861 61 

proved a failure. At Spottsylvania, North Anna, Totopotomoy, 
Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, Grant found Lee across his path, 
and was unable to drive him off. His only recourse, on each 
occasion, was to move to his left and try the next road to the 
eastward. And now every intermediate road had been tried, 
and, after losing 65,000 men, he was only on the James River 
with Fortress Monroe as his base, where his fleet might have 
landed him at the beginning and without losing a man. 

Here at last, literally driven into the location in front of 
Petersburg, Grant found himself in a position of rare strategic 
advantage; certain to give him possession of Richmond when 
properly utihzed. Indeed, it seems strange that it had not been 
reaUzed in 1862, that the position astraddle both rivers at the 
junction of the James and Appomattox was the key to Richmond. 
For it would force Lee to hold an exterior line of such enormous 
length — from the Chickahominy River to the south of Peters- 
burg, nearly 30 miles — that it could not be long maintained. 

As McClellan selected the York River Une before the James 
River was opened (by the loss of Norfolk and of the ironclad 
Merrimac), he is entitled to the credit of having selected the 
best route available at the time. After his retreat from Rich- 
mond, he very nearly had stumbled into the key position itself. 
His army was recalled to Washington by the Executive, against 
his strong protests and appeals. 

Johnston fully realized that his inferiority of force left him 
no recourse but to stand upon the defensive, and watch to take 
advantage of any blunders his enemy might make. And it 
was ordered from Richmond, very prudently, that the army 
should be withdrawn from Manassas before the roads became 
good. 

Johnston's movement was accordingly begun on March 8, 
which was some weeks before it would have been possible for 
McClellan to move his army. He followed Johnston's with- 
drawal slowly, for a short distance, but there was no colUsion. 
A considerable loss of provisions resulted to the Confederates 
from the condition of the roads, and the fact that their Com- 
missary Department had established a meat-packing depot on the 
Manassas Gap Railroad at Thoroughfare Gap, and accumulated 



62 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

there an amount of stores much greater than the railroad could 
remove upon short notice. 

The army paused for a while behind the Rappahannock, but 
then took a better position behind the Rapidan, where it awaited 
developments. 

Meanwhile on March 23, something took place in the Valley. 
Stonewall Jackson had been in command there of two small 
brigades through the winter, but had fallen back, about 40 miles 
south of Winchester, when Johnston's army abandoned Manassas. 
Banks's Federal Corps had been opposed to him, and it was 
now ordered to Manassas. Jackson learned of the movement in 
progress, and, believing that he might surprise its rear, and at 
least disconcert plans, he made a march of 36 miles in a day 
and a half, and fell upon his enemy at Kernstown. 

His attack was so vigorous that, for a while, it bore promise 
of success, but the Federal force at hand was largely greater than 
had been anticipated. It consisted of Shields's division of three 
brigades, about 10,000 men. Jackson had upon the field only 
about 3500. Consequently, when the battle became fully de- 
veloped, Jackson was driven off with a loss of 455 killed and 
wounded and 263 captured. Shields lost 568 killed and wounded, 
and 22 captured. It was a small affair, and apparently a 
Federal victory, but it was bread cast upon strategic waters. 

There soon followed a serious development. Jackson's name 
and aggressiveness, and the fierceness of his attack, all tended 
to increase Mr. Lincoln's reluctance to see Washington stripped 
of any force available for its defence. He had already taken 
Blenker's division of 10,000 men from McClellan, and now, on 
April 4, he took also McDowell's corps of 37,000, ordering it to 
report to the Secretary of War. As the result of that order 
was to keep McDowell out of the "Seven Days" battles in June, 
Jackson's battle at Kernstown, though generally reckoned a 
defeat, was really the first step to Lee's victory in June. 



CHAPTER IV 

YORKTOWN AND WiLLIAMSBURG 

McClellan at Fortress Monroe. Johnston goes to Yorktown. Reorgan- 
ization. Dam No. 1. Yorktown Evacuated. Retreat from York- 
town. Battle of Williamsburg. Early's Attack. Hancock's Report. 
Casualties. Eltham's Landing. 

In the latter part of March, the Confederate signal Imes began 
to report the movement of a great army down the Potomac, 
and it was soon discovered that it was being concentrated at 
Fortress Monroe. On April 5, some five divisions of Federal 
infantry, with cavalry and artillery, from that point, approached 
the Confederate lines across the Peninsula at Yorktown. These 
were held by Gen. Magruder, whose force at the time was 
onty about 13,000 men. They occupied a Une about 12 miles 
in length — partly behind the Warwick River, and partly pro- 
tected by slight earthworks. Another opportunity as good as 
that offered McDowell at Bull Run was here offered to McClellan, 
who could have rushed the position anywhere. He contented 
himself, however, with some cannonading and sharp-shooting. 
Of course, he was still under the Pinkerton delusion as to the 
enemy's strength. Magruder, who was expecting reenforce- 
ments, made the bravest possible display, exhibiting the same 
troops repeatedly at different points. It was just at this junc- 
ture, when a great success was in McClellan's grasp, had he had 
the audacity to risk something, that the news reached him that 
Lincoln had taken from him McDowell's 37,000 men. This, 
doubtless, had its effect in discouraging him and leading him to 
resort to siege operations against Yorktown instead of attempt- 
ing to pass the position by main force. 

Meanwhile, Johnston had been summoned to Richmond, and 
had advised Davis that a defence of Yorktown involved great 
risk, and at best could gain no important result. He advocated 
its abandonment, and the concentration at Richmond of all 

63 



64 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

forces from Virginia to Georgia. With these McClellan's force 
should be attacked when it came near Richmond. 

A conference was called, which included Lee, Longstreet, 
G. W. Smith, and the Sec. of War, Randolph. It was advo- 
cated by Lee, and finally determined, that Johnston should 
risk making all the delay possible at Yorktown. This was a safe 
conclusion to reach, only in view of the cautiousness of McClellan. 

Johnston had already begun sending some reenforcements to 
Magruder, and had brought a large part of his army near Rich- 
mond. About Apr. 15 he went to Yorktown, taking Smith's 
and Longstreet's divisions, which gave him a total force of 55,633. 

In the whole course of the war there was little service as try- 
ing as that in the Yorktown lines. There was much rain and 
the country was low and flat, so that the trenches were badly 
drained and would frequently be flooded with water. The 
general flatness left no cover in rear of the lines. The enemy's 
rifle-pits were within range and view at many points, and the 
fire of sharp-shooters with telescopic rifles was incessant, and 
that of artillery was often severe. At many important poirfts, 
the crowded ranks in the trenches had to either sit or crouch 
behind the parapet, in water up to their knees, from daylight 
until darkness permitted one to rise upright or to step outside 
of the trench. The only rest at night was to sleep in the uni- 
versal mud and water. Although the men in the worst locations 
were relieved as often as possible, an unusual amount of sickness 
resulted. Gen. D. H. Hill wrote in his official report : — 

" Our Revolutionary sires did not suffer more at Valley Forge than did 
our army at Yorktown, and in the retreat from it. Notwithstanding the 
rain, mud, cold, hunger, watching, and fatigue I never heard a murmur 
or witnessed an act of insubordination. The want of discipline manifested 
itself only in straggling which was and still is the curse of our army. 
This monstrous evil can only be corrected by a more rigid government 
and a sterner system of punishment than have yet been introduced into 
our service." 

During our stay here a reorganization of the army took place. 
The majority of our troops had enlisted for a year in the spring 
of 1861. It was now necessary to reenlist them for the war. 
Congress had enacted that reenlistment furloughs should be given 



YORKTOWN AND WILLIAMSBURG 65 

to a few men at a time, and that a reelection of officers should 
take place in each regiment. This feature was very detrimental 
to the standard of good discipline. 

During the whole of the siege there was but one affair of any 
consequence, and it is of interest principally as indicating the 
great improvement wrought in the Federal troops by the disci- 
pline which had been given them during the fall and winter. 

On Apr. 16, a Federal reconnoissance was made by W. F. 
Smith's division, of a position on our Hues called Dam No. 1. 
Here our intrenchment, at the upper part of Warwick Creek, 
was protected by inundations. Just below Dam No. 1 the in- 
undation from No. 2 was only about waist deep and perhaps 
100 yards wide, thickly grown up with trees and undergrowth. 
These facts were discovered by a bold reconnoissance under cover 
of a heavy fire. Four companies of the 3d Vt. were ordered 
to cross the inundation and develop what we had on the other 
side. 

They made their advance very handsomely, fording the over- 
flow, and actually got possession of our line of infantry parapet 
some 20 yards on the farther side. This was occupied at the 
time by only a picket line of the 15th N.C., Col. McKinney, 
the rest of the regiment being at work upon a second line 
200 yards in the rear. McKinney promptly formed his regi- 
ment and moved forward to drive the enemy out, but was killed, 
and his men repulsed in confusion, the enemy fighting from the 
far side of our parapet. Presently, however, the brigade com- 
mander, Howell Cobb, arrived, and as the enemy were not re- 
enforced, after holding their ground for perhaps a half hour, 
they retreated, losing 83 men out of 192 who crossed the stream. 
The entire casualties of the Federals were 165. The casualties 
of the 15th N.C. were 12 killed and 31 wounded. 

It was plain from this affair that the fighting we would soon 
have to face was to be something better than that of 1861. 

Meanwhile McClellan was preparing for Yorktown a terrific 
bombardment by which he hoped to wreck our water batteries 
so that his fleet could pass us. Siege batteries mounting 71 
guns, including two 200-Pr. rifles and five 100-Prs. and several 
13-inch mortars were being rapidly mounted. On May 1 his 



66 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

100-Pr. rifles opened fire, and by May 6 he expected all the 
other batteries to be able to join in. But Johnston had never 
intended to risk siege operations at this point, and at sundown 
on May 3 put his army in motion toward Richmond. His heavy 
guns were fired actively all the day before, and until midnight, 
when the artillerists spiked them and withdrew. 

I recall that night's march as particularly disagreeable. The 
whole soil of that section seemed to have no bottom and no sup- 
porting power. The roads were but long strings of guns, wagons, 
and ambulances, mixed in with infantry, artillery, and cavalry, 
splashing and bogging through the darkness in a river of mud, 
with frequent long halts when some stalled vehicle blocked the 
road. Then men from the nearest ranks would swarm in to 
help the jaded horses pull the vehicle out. Meanwhile, every- 
thing in the rear must halt and v^^ait, and so it went on all night 
— a march of one or two minutes, and halt for no one could 
guess how long. The average time made by the column was 
under a mile an hour. 

Our movement was not discovered by the enemy until after 
daylight on the 4th. His cavalry was at once started in pursuit, 
and these were followed during the day by five divisions of 
infantry under Smith, Hooker, Kearney, Couch, and Casey, the 
whole under command of Sumner. Besides these, Franklin's 
division was loaded upon transports during the day, and early 
on the 6th sailed up the York to intercept us near West Point. 
Two other divisions, Sedgwick's and Richardson's, were also to 
have been sent by water, and McClellan remained in Yorktown 
to see them loaded and despatched. But the fighting next day 
at Williamsburg proved so severe that he rode to the front and 
had both divisions to follow him. 

Near Williamsburg, Magruder had, some months before, 
selected a line of battle across the Peninsula four or five miles 
long, on which he had at a few places some slight intrenchments 
with slashings of timber in front, and, about the centre, an en- 
closed fort of some size, called Fort Magruder. 

As the rear of our column came into Williamsburg during the 
afternoon of the 4th, the cnomy's cavalry suddenly appeared 
so near to this fort, that Semmes's tired infantry brigade had 



YORKTOWN AND WILLIAMSBURG 67 

to be taken back at the double quick to occupy it, and a sharp 
skirmish was fought before sundown. McLaws reenforced 
Semmes with Kershaw and two batteries, and we captured one 
of the enemy's guns, stuck in the mud, ten horses being unable to 
get it off. After dark Kershaw and Semmes were reheved by 
Anderson's and Pryor's brigades of Longstreet's division. 

That night we stayed at Williamsburg, and it poured rain all 
night. About 2 a.m. the leading divisions were pushed forward. 
Johnston was anxious to get his troops ahead to meet the forces 
he expected McClellan to send by water to West Point. 

To hold the enemy in check at WilUamsburg, Longstreet re- 
tained his whole division of six brigades as a rear-guard. Soon 
after daylight on the 5th, the enemy developed their presence 
before Pryor and Anderson. Hooker's and Smith's Federal 
divisions had reached the field about dark on the 4th. 

The fighting began with fire upon our lines from artillery and 
skirmishers, and gradually increased in volume. The whole of 
Longstreet's division was brought up, and advanced upon the 
enemy in the edge of the wood, where it captured one of his 
batteries. Toward noon, when it became evident from the slow 
progress of the marching columns that the enemy would have to 
be held off until night, Johnston returned to the field, and the 
division of D. H. Hill, which had only advanced a short distance 
from Wilhamsburg, was brought back as a reserve. One of its 
brigades, Early's, was divided, two regiments sent into the fight 
on our right, and the other four sent out in observation beyond 
our left flank. 

D. H. Hill and Early both went with this left column, and 
got into trouble from a little superfluous aggressiveness. 

On the extreme right of the Federals, Gen. Hancock had 
discovered some vacant intrenchments — part of Magruder's old 
line, before mentioned. With five regiments, parts of two bri- 
gades, and 10 guns, he occupied a commanding ridge, and opened 
artillery toward the Confederate fines. Early, on lower ground 
and in the woods, could not see Hancock's position, but sug- 
gested an attack to Hill. Hill approved, but referred the ques- 
tion to Johnston. Johnston, who had left the battle entirely to 
, Longstreet's direction, referred it to the latter. Longstreet very 



68 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

properly refused to give permission, as we fought only to cover 
our retreat up the Peninsula, and it was assured. But this 
message taken to Hill did not satisfy him. He was a brother- 
in-law of Stonewall Jackson and was a soldier of the same type. 
He visited Longstreet in person, and Longstreet now weakly 
yielded to his appeal. Rains's brigade had meanwhile been 
brought up behind Early's, and it would have been possible to 
organize an attack which might have routed Hancock. But 
Hill, to lose no time, began the formation of the four regiments 
for the charge. The distance to be traversed was over half a 
mile, much of it wood and swamp. Hill placed the four regi- 
ments in a Hne of battle extending through a wood, with Early 
leading the two left regiments, while he led the two right. But 
Early mistook one of Hill's commands to his own wing, for 
the order to charge, and he led off at once with his left regi- 
ment, the 24th Va., which had open ground before it. 
Hill's extreme right regiment, the 5th N.C., also had open 
ground in front, and, soon becoming aware that a charge had 
been begun, it also advanced without orders. Hill, tangled 
in wood and swamp with the two centre regiments, could do 
nothing. After passing the wood between them, the two out- 
side regiments could see each other and the Federal guns, now 
scarcely 500 yards distant in front. These guns immediately 
opened a severe fire of shell and canister. The 5th N.C. 
obhqued to its left to close the wide gap between them and 
both advanced to the charge, reserving their fire generally until 
within 150 yards of the enemy. A large portion of Hancock's 
infantry lay concealed behind the crest of the ridge until the 
two regiments, now with ranks disorganized by their advance, 
were within 30 yards, when the Federals raised and fired, advanc- 
ing over the crest and continuing the fire for 15 or 20 rounds. 
Hancock says in his official report : — 

"The plunging fire from the redoubt, the direct fire from the right and 
the oblique fire from the left, were so destructive that, after it had been 
ordered to cease and the smoke arose, it seemed that no man had left 
the ground unhurt who had advanced within 500 yards of our line. 

" The enemy's assault was of the most determined character. No troops 
could have made a more resolute charge. The 5th North Carolina 



YORKTOWN AND WILLIAMSBURG 69 

was annihilated. Nearly all of its superior officers were left dead or 
wounded on the field. The 24th Virginia suffered greatly in superior 
officers and men." 

Gen. Early, Col. Terry, and Lt.-Col. Hairston of the 24th 
Va. all fell severely wounded, and the regiment lost : killed 30, 
wounded 93, missing 66, total 190. In the 5th N.C. Lt.-Col. 
Badham was killed, and the regiment lost "about fifty per 
cent" of its members, but no official report was made. 

Hancock reported his losses in the affair as : killed 10, wounded 
88, missing 31, total 129. This affair about terminated the 
fighting. It had rained nearly all day, and on our right Long- 
street simply kept back the enemy's advance by fire, and by 
threatening their flanks. 

The total Federal casualties as reported were: killed 456, 
wounded 1410, missing 373, total 2239. The Confederate casual- 
ties [reported by Longstreet only] were : officers 102, men 1458, 
total 1560. We captured 12 guns of which five were brought 
off, five were chopped down with axes, and two had to be left, 
as neither horses or axes were available. We also brought off 
about 400 prisoners. 

As far as possible the wounded were brought into Williams- 
burg, and soon after dark our march was resumed over roads 
now even worse than any we had had before. I rode with 
Johnston's staff, and late in the forenoon of May 6 we were at 
Barhamsville, and the greater part of the army was halted and 
resting in the vicinity. 

It had been a special feature of McClellan's strategy that on 
our retreat from Yorktown we should be intercepted at Eltham's 
landing by a large force. But our battle at Williamsburg had 
proved a double victory, for it had prevented Franklin's division 
from being reenforced so as to be either formidable or aggressive. 
It arrived at the mouth of the Pamunkey at 5 ,p.m. on the 6th. 
During the night it disembarked and next morning reconnoitred 
its vicinity and took a defensive position, sending Newton's and 
Slocum's brigades through a large wood to examine the country 
beyond. 

On the far edge of that wood about 9 a.m. their skirmishers 
ran into those of Hood's and Hampton's brigades of Whiting's 



70 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

division, which were there to see that our trains passed without 
interruption. 

The Federals fell back and were followed until they were 
under the protection of Franklin's intrenched camp, and all our 
trains passed unmolested. 

The Federals reported: killed 48, wounded 110, missing 28, 
total 186. 

The Confederate loss was but 8 killed, and 40 wounded, and 
they captured 46 prisoners. There was no further effort to 
interfere with our retreat. This was continued at leism-e until 
the 9th, when we halted on the north bank of the Chickahominy. 



CHAPTER V 
Seven Pines or Fair Oaks 

Drury's Bluff. The Situation. Attack Planned. Johnston's Plan 
Changed. Johnston's Problem. Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. 
A Misunderstanding. Longstreet's Mistake. Huger Delayed. Huger 
unjustly Blamed. Signal Given. Hill's Battle in Brief. Losses. 
Reenforcements. Reports. Wilcox's Report. Couch's Position. 
Johnston's Battle. Whiting's Advance. A Second Attack. Johnston 
Wounded. G. W. Smith in Command. Smith's Battle, June. The 
Confederates Withdraw. Lee placed in Command. Resume. Staff 
and Organization. Artillery Service. Davis and Johnston. 

Meanwhile, Norfolk had now been evacuated by our forces, 
which were withdrawn at first to Petersburg and then to Rich- 
mond. Our ironclad, the Virginia (the old Merrimac), drawing 
too much water to ascend the James, had been blown up. This 
river was now open to the Federal fleet, except for some hurriedly 
built batteries at Drury's Bluff, about six miles below Richmond, 
covering obstructions made of a row of piles and some sunken 
schooners. 

On May 15 the fleet, which included three ironclads, the 
Monitor, Galena, and Naugatuck, attacked the batteries, but was 
repulsed with 25 killed and wounded, and considerable injury 
to some of the vessels. Until that time Johnston had con- 
templated fighting on the north of the Chickahominy, but he 
now decided to concentrate his army nearer Richmond, and on 
May 17 it was all encamped within three or four miles to the 
east of the city. 

The situation had grown very threatening; for McDowell's 
army, still at Fredericksburg with 31,000 men, had again been 
assigned to McClellan. He only awaited the arrival of Shields, 
marching to join him with 11,000 more, before advancing. 

If it was now in Johnston's power to do anything to save 
Richmond, it must be done before McDowell arrived. It was 

71 



72 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



not likely that McClellan would himself seek battle when such 
a large reenforcement was near. Johnston's only chance, there- 
fore, lay in taking the offensive. He had no such works to rely 
upon as the Federals had around Washington. There were, in- 
deed, a few small enclosed forts, erected during the first year of 
the war, each armed with a few of the smooth-bore guns of that 
day, but they were located too near the city limits to have any 
value. 
The lines in which we afterward fought were but light infantry 




Vicinity op Richmond 

(The dotted lines show roads of minor importance.) 

trenches with occasional barbette batteries, usually thrown up 
by the troops under emergency. 

The enemy soon followed us up and established a line of bat- 
tle, upon which at different points earthworks began to appear. 

His right flank, on the north bank of the Chickahominy, 
rested upon Beaver Dam Creek, a strong position which Johns- 
ton's engineers had selected for our own left flank, before we 
left Yorktown, when Johnston contemplated fighting on that 
bank. Thence, the Federal line extended southeast along the 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 73 

Chickahominy some three miles to New Bridge. Then, crossing 
this stream, it bent south and ran to White Oak Swamp, where 
the left rested, giving about four miles on the south side in a line 
convex toward Richmond, and scarcely six miles away at its 
nearest point. 

In observation of McDowell at Fredericksburg was Gen. 
J. R. Anderson at Hanover Junction with about 9000 men; 
and near Hanover C. H. was Branch's brigade, about 4500. 
Johnston directed that these forces should be drawn behind the 
Chickahominy, on our left, and united into a new division under 
A. P. Hill, Before this could be accomplished, however, Branch 
was attacked by Morell's division and Warren's brigade of 
Porter's corps, and was forced back with a loss of about 300 
killed and wounded, and 700 prisoners, the enemy reporting 62 
killed, 223 wounded, and 70 missing, total 355. 

At Fredericksburg, McDowell's column was at last joined by 
Shields, who had been detached from Banks in the Valley, and 
on May 26 McDowell was put in motion. In the forenoon of 
the 27th notice of his advance reached Johnston, who at once 
recognized that he must now attack before McDowell could 
unite with McClellan. 

The latter had moved so cautiously as to offer no favorable 
opportunity until his last move which had put his army 
astride of the Chickahominy. That presented as fair a chance as 
Johnston could now expect. So he immediately determined to 
attack on the 29th. As McDowell was approaching behind the 
enemy's right, his strongest effort would be made to crush that 
flank. On the 28th Johnston got his troops into position to 
attack at dawn on the 29th. Three of his seven divisions (Whit- 
ing's, A. P. Hill's, and D. R. Jones's) were to attack Porter's 
corps at Beaver Dam. The other four divisions on the south 
side of the Chickahominy (McLaws's, Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's, 
and Huger's) would be held in observation, ready to cross when 
Porter's corps was driven back. Everything was in readiness 
by sundown on the 28th, when further news was received. 
McDowell had suddenly stopped his advance, and his troops 
seemed to be falling back toward Manassas. What had hap- 
pened was that Jackson had again broken loose in the Valley and 



74 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

defeated Banks at Strasburg on May 23, and at Winchester on 
May 25, and was moving on the Potomac, as will be told more 
fully in a later chapter. 

This had created a panic at Washington, for rumor had 
magnified Jackson's forces greatly, and McDowell, just in the nick 
of time for us, had been turned back for the defence of the capital. 

Johnston was glad of a respite, and an opportunity to con- 
sider as an alternative an attack upon McClellan's left. The 
strength of the position at Beaver Dam Creek made any direct 
attack very dangerous, and to turn it would consume time. 
To attack the enemy's left was certainly a safer proposition. 
On the south side his force was smaller and was much more 
easily gotten at. And while it was already partially fortified by 
abattis and trenches, quickly constructed in flat and wooded 
country, yet they had had time to do but little. Longstreet 
urged going on with the attack for which the troops were already 
in position, but Johnston decided to withdraw the troops north 
of the Chickahominy during the night of the 28th, and to have 
reconnoissances made to discover the location and strength of 
the enemy's position on the south side. Accordingly, on the 
29th, and again on the 30th, one or two regiments were advanced 
and drove in the enemy's pickets on our extreme right flank, 
developing his presence and that he was fortifying. This being 
reported to Johnston by D. H. Hill soon after noon on the 30th, 
Hill was informed in reply that "he would lead an attack upon 
the enemy next morning." 

There was nothing to gain by further delay ; for, by the arrival 
at Richmond of Huger's division from Norfolk on the 29th, 
Johnston now had all the force possible to get. His problem was 
to defeat four divisions of the enemy, 12 brigades fortified, and 
crush them before assistance could cross the Chickahominy to 
their relief. If he could do this quickly his chance was good to 
involve in the defeat also some of the reenforcements the enemy 
would be sending across the bridges. He had seven divisions, 
27 brigades, numbering about 60,000 infantry and artillery. 
The four divisions to be attacked numbered about 37,000. Con- 
sidering the morale of our men, which will appear more fully 
after a description of the battle, the proposition was an easy one. 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 75 

if only we could succeed in bringing our fighting strength to bear 
in the right places and at the right times. But just there lay 
our greatest difficulty and weakness. Our army was not yet 
organized into corps, our divisions were often too large, and our 
staff service, by which information and orders were disseminated, 
was insufficient in amount and deficient in technical training 
and experience. Johnston was endeavoring to remedy some of 
these evils by assigning his ranking officers, G. W. Smith, Long- 
street, and Magruder, to command two or more divisions each, 
which he called wings and centre, but such temporary arrange- 
ments are always more apt to mar than to promote unity of 
action. And our general himself was impatient and unmindful 
of small detail. Let us now have the story of what happened. 

To use the slang expression, it was "up to" Johnston to play, 
and in a conference with Longstreet during the afternoon of 
May 30, the battle for the next day was planned in accordance 
with the intimation given D. H. Hill about noon. 

The conference was prolonged by the coming up of a violent 
rain-storm, scarcely second to any in violence, according to my 
recollection, that I saw during the war. Over three inches of 
rain must have fallen in the first two hours, and it kept up, more 
or less, until late at night. It was hoped that this rain would 
make our task easier by rendering the Chickahominy impassable 
for reenforcements to the enemy. Indeed, it did have this effect, 
but not until the night of the day after the rain. The im- 
mediate effect was only to make all of our marchings and ma- 
noeuvres slower and more difficult, and the flat, swampy country 
of much of the battle-field was entirely inundated. 

During this afternoon — prolonged by the rain-storm — 
Johnston gave verbal instructions to Longstreet as to the battle 
of the next day, and it is hard to imagine how any serious mis- 
understanding of such a simple movement could have taken 
place in a conversation prolonged for hours. One would need 
to have heard the whole of it to tell how it arose. But Johnston 
afterward recognized the fact that it had occurred, and wrote to 
G. W. Smith that the misunderstanding " may be my fault, as I 
told you at the time," Smith, however, denies recollection of 
any such telling. 



76 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

The following sketch will illustrate the misunderstanding 




Johnston intended to have the battle begun at an early hour by 
D. H. Hill's division of four brigades, three of which were al- 
ready in position, in the front line, on our extreme right on the 
Williamsburg road. Rodes was on picket on the Charles City 
road, not far off, and, unfortunately, Johnston's plan included 
his being relieved and joining his division before the attack was 
begun. Any preliminary movement, however simple it may 
appear, will usually turn up fated to cause unexpected delay. 
Rodes is ordered to be relieved by a brigade of Huger's division, 
of three brigades, now in camp on the north bank of Gilliss Creek, 
near Richmond. This is ordered at an early hour to go down the 
Charles City road and relieve Rodes, after which it will guard and 
protect Hill's right flank and render it aid if opportunity offers. 
Longstreet's division of five brigades is in camp on the Nine 
Mile road nearest the Chickahominy on our left. Johnston's 
plan is that it shall march straight down that road, perhaps 
three miles, pass our line of battle, here held by Magruder's 
division, form line of battle, and listen for the sounds of battle 
begun by D. H. Hill's attack upon Casey's division, which will be 
within a mile or two of his front and right. He will be in a 
position to take Casey on the right flank and with Hill's four 
brigades, having abundant force, can hope to make short work of it. 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 77 

Meanwhile, Whiting 's division of five brigades (considered a 
part of Smith's "Wing ") had been a part of the attack proposed 
two days before, and were still encamped farther up the Nine 
Mile road. After Longstreet left Johnston's headquarters, the 
rain having slacked, the latter sent word to Smith to order Whiting 
to march down the Nine Mile road early in the morning and take 
position at our line of battle behind Longstreet, to further re- 
enforce him in the battle. 

Smith came in person, some five miles, arrived at 4.30 a.m., 
and now first learned of the proposed attack, and had it all 
explained. Johnston proposed to make his own headquarters 
on the Nine Mile road where he could observe any efforts of the 
enemy to cross the Chickahominy. It would have been much 
wiser to have first visited the right and seen his battle started. 
The whole Confederate plan at Bull Run had gone astray for 
the lack of this precaution, and now it turned out that Long- 
street had understood him either to order or to consent that his 
division was to be marched across from the Nine Mile road to the 
Wilhamsburg road and to go into action behind D. H. Hill's 
division. It will soon appear how utterly this wrecked and 
ruined Johnston's excellent and simple plan. How the mis- 
understanding occurred has never been explained, for neither 
Johnston or Longstreet in their official reports or other writings 
ever gave any explanation or even admitted openly that a mis- 
take was made. But Johnston induced G. W. Smith to change 
his official report, to avoid its being made public therein. The 
official reports also disclose that on that day Longstreet was 
anxious to have Huger's division recognized as under his com- 
mand, although Huger was the senior officer. Possibly Long- 
street made some request of Johnston for authority over Huger, 
and Johnston in complying may have thoughtlessly used some 
expression which Longstreet interpreted as permission to go to 
the right. But the whole history of this battle remains a monu- 
ment of caution against verbal understandings. 

Longstreet 's division was early upon the road, and it soon 
developed that its route to the Williamsburg road cut off and 
blocked the prescribed marches of both Whiting's and Huger's 
divisions as they respectively came up. 



78 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

After some delay, Whiting sent a note to Johnston's head- 
quarters, complaining that his march was obstructed by Long- 
street. Johnston, supposing only that Longstreet was preceding 
Whiting down the Nine Mile road, as ordered to do, answered 
to that effect, and G. W. Smith, who was still with Johnston, 
sent an aid, Capt. Beckham, down the Nine Mile to overtake 
Longstreet and learn the cause of any delay. Beckham followed 
this road to Magruder 's Hne, and, not finding Longstreet, guessed 
that he had gone across to the Williamsburg road. So he sent 
back a note saying that he would continue his search in that 
direction. 

When this note was shown Johnston about 9 a.m., he was still 
so convinced that Longstreet was upon the Nine Mile road that 
he despatched his aide-de-camp, Lieut. Washington, down the 
same road to find him. 

Washington pushed his investigation so far as to follow the 
Nine Mile into the enemy 's pickets where he was captured about 
10 A.M. His capture, and his disturbed manner when some firing 
was soon after heard, convinced Gen. Keyes that an attack was 
on foot, and Keyes was accordingly alert and prepared. 

Meanwhile, Longstreet 's column, having delayed Whiting on 
the Nine Mile road for two or three hours (for the column took 
its wagons along), found itself next blocking the column of 
Huger at Gilliss Greek. The creek was bank full from the rain. 
Longstreet says : — 

"The delay of an hour to construct a bridge was preferred to the 
encounter of more serious obstacles along the narrow lateral road flooded 
by the storm. As we were earlier at the creek, it gave us precedence of 
Huger 's division, which had to cross after us." 

As Longstreet knew that one of Huger 's brigades must re- 
lieve Rodes's brigade, on the Charles City road, and let it rejoin 
Hill 's division before the battle could commence, it would have 
saved much to waive this precedence at least for one brigade. 

Colston, commanding one of these brigades, wrote as follows 
of this occasion : — 

"A Uttle brook near Richmond was greatly swollen, and a long time was 
wasted crossing it, on an improvised bridge, made of planks, a wagon 
midstream serving as a trestle. Over this the division passed in single 



i 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 79 

file, you may imagine with what delay. If the division commander had 
given orders for the men to sling their cartridge boxes, haversacks, etc., on 
their muskets and wade, without breaking formation, they could have 
crossed by fours with water up to their waists, and hours would have 
been saved. When we got across we received orders to halt on the roadside 
until Huger's division passed us. There we waited five or six hours." 

He had just passed Huger, and now he waits for Huger to 
pass him ! 

When one contemplates the fact that there was a commanding 
officer, hoping to win a great victory, then at his headquarters 
within two miles of this spot where nine brigades were thus wast- 
ing the precious hours passing and repassing each other, the whole 
performance seems incredible. And when it is further said that 
six of these brigades were lost, with their commander, and that the 
staff of the general was seeking them at that moment, high and 
low, miles away along the picket-line, it is almost ludicrous. 
And any friends of Huger may be excused for finding even a 
tragic side to the situation. For when the whole affair was over, 
and had ended in defeat, Johnston and Longstreet laid the entire 
blame upon Huger. I give as illustrations two quotations from 
Johnston, and there were equally disparaging statements by 
Longstreet. 

" General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack instead of the 
combined movement which had been planned, waited from hour to hour 
for Huger's division." — " Had Huger's division been in position and ready 
for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am satis- 
fied that Keyes's Corps would have been destroyed instead of being merely 
defeated. Had it gone into action even at four o'clock the victory would 
have been much more complete." 

After the battles were over and Johnston was recovering from 
his wound, Huger made vain effort to have the injurious state- 
ments corrected and applied for a Court of Inquiry. This was 
promised by the War Department, but it was to be held 
"as soon as the state of the service will permit." The state 
of the service never permitted, and the court was never 
held. 

About 1 P.M., however, Rodes's brigade was relieved on the 
Charles City road, and hurried to join the other three brigades 



80 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

under Hill, who had fretted greatly under the delay. He started 
his two brigades on the left of the road as soon as he saw 
Rodes approaching. 

The formation was Garland's brigade on the left of the road^ 
followed by G. B. Anderson- Rodes's brigade on the right, 
followed by Rains. Each brigade marched in column until the 
enemy were met, when it formed line. The rear brigades formed 
about 300 yards behind the leading ones. 

In Johnston's Narrative, he states that "Longstreet as rank- 
ing officer of the three divisions to be united near Hill's camp, 
was instructed verbally to form his own and Hill's division in 
two lines crossing the WilUamsburg road at right angles and to 
advance to the attack in that order." But the circumstantial 
evidence is overwhelming that on the morning of the battle, 
Johnston was expecting Longstreet to be in position on the Nine 
Mile road, and to support Hill's attack upon the WilUamsburg 
road by his attack down the Nine Mile. That was the only quick 
way of bringing his large force into proper action, and it is hard 
to see how the two divisions could have failed to crush the enemy 
in their front. 

It is no wonder that Johnston said when he found out where 
Longstreet was, that he wished the troops were all back in their 
camps, for the victory was surely his if only he could play his 
game correctly. 

It was being started badly. It was on a front of only two 
brigades, supported by two in a second fine, while nine other 
brigades encumbered the one good road leading to the battle. 
From a glance at the field one might now confidently predict 
the outcome. 

It is D. H. Hill's division, about 8500 strong, excellent troops, 
and there is not living a more honest fighter than D. H. Hill. 
They will first meet Casey's division, of about equal strength, 
partly fortified with trenches and abattis. Behind Casey are 
three other divisions holding two other fines partly intrenched. 
Hill may carry the first line and even have some success against 
the second. But, by that time, he will be worn out, and the 
dayhght will be gone before enough of the nine brigades (those 
behind him) -can be gotten to him in force to cut any figure. The 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 



81 



fight on this road cannot amount to more than a bloody draw, 
prolonged until night. 

That is what any one, knowing the conditions, might have 
predicted, and that is just what happened. To follow all the 
details is useless, but the Hst of casualties, and some brief descrip- 
tions of incidents will give a good idea of the fighting. 

The Confederate reports of casualties, particularly in battles 
fought during active campaigns, are far from being full, and are 
not at all uniform in their shape and detail. Complete figures, 
therefore, for the whole division cannot be given. 

Of Rains's brigade, the official report only states that its losses 
were one-seventh of the force. The reports show that this 
brigade was employed in a flank movement around the enemy's 
left which it executed successfully, but did not repeat it. Hill 
expressed disappointment and says that Rains might have saved 
Rodes's brigade from suffering 500 casualties.^ Rains fought on 
the left. Had Longstreet's division that morning not gone 
astray, all of its brigades would have been on the enemy's flank, 
and have had similar chances. The other three brigades re- 
ported their strength and losses as follows : — 

SEVEN PINES, MAY 31, 1862 





Position 


Brigade 






Q 
H 


IZi 




< 


a 






H 


ij 




m 


H 


A 








M 

M 


^ 


s 


O 

H 




Front right 


Rodes 


2200 


241 


853 


5 


1099 


50 


Front left 


Garland 


2065 


98 


600 


42 


740 


37 


Rear left 


Anderson, G. B. 


1865 


149 


680 


37 


866 


47 






6130 


488 


2133 


84 


2705 


44 



This record shows great fighting power, and will compare 
favorably for a half-day's fighting of an equal body of men, with 
any records of the war. 

^ Rains was a graduate of West Point of class of 1827, and was now fifty- 
nine years of age. He liad had some Indian fighting in Florida, and had 
been wounded, but he was not in the Mexican War. He was an expert and 
enthusiast upon explosives, and, soon after the action at Seven Pines, he 
was relieved of his brigade and assigned to the Torpedo Bureau, which was 
organized for submarine defence of our rivers and harbors. . 



82 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

At Waterloo, the losses were: Allies 20 per cent, French 34 
per cent, British regulars 29 per cent. At Balaklava, the Light 
Brigade (600) lost 49 per cent. 

On the Federal side the battle was opened by Casey's division, 
moderately well fortified with trenches, batteries, and abattis, 
and soon supported by Peck's brigade of Couch's division. 
These four brigades were finally routed from their first line by 
the Rains's flank movement. They then fell back upon the 
second intrenched fine, where they united with Couch's two re- 
maining brigades. Rains's brigade now dropped out of the fight. 

The three other brigades pushed their attack upon the enemy's 
second fine, which was now being reenforced by Kearny's divi- 
sion, but Hill received also a reenforcement of R. H. Anderson's 
brigade, which he divided. Two regiments under Jenkins he 
sent to the left and the remainder under Anderson to his right. 
A Httle later also he received two regiments, the 11th Ala. and 
the 19th Miss., of Wilcox's brigade. With this help the second 
line was carried. Four Federal regiments and a battery re- 
treated north toward the Chickahominy unpursued. The 
remainder fell back slowly and night put an end to the fighting. 
Kemper's brigade also arrived, brought by Longstreet to Hill's 
aid. It came upon the field, but too late to take effective 
part. On the Federal side Hooker's division also came up as 
the fighting ceased. 

Hill's division was now worn out, and Longstreet relieved it 
from the seven idle brigades still left on the Charles City and 
Williamsburg roads. 

Hill's forces during the battle had averaged about four bri- 
gades, for R. H, Anderson had come up, after Rains dropped 
out with a loss of only 14 per cent. Anderson's losses are not 
given, but they were severe and probably equalled the average 
of Hill's. Jenkins's official report says : — 

"We never fought twice in the same place, nor five minutes in one 
place, and steadily on the advance ; were under fire from 3 p.m. to 7.40 p.m. 
The service we did will be evidenced by our list of killed and wounded. 
In my two color companies out of 80 men who entered, 40 were killed or 
wounded, and out of 11 in the color guard 10 were shot down, and my 
colors, pierced by 9 balls, passed through four hands without touching the 
ground." 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 



83 



The following shows a comparison of the total casualties of 
Hill's part of the battle, as nearly as they can be ascertained, 
including the three brigades already given : — 

CASUALTIES. HILL'S BATTLE. WILLIAMSBURG ROAD, 
MAY 31, 1862 





Division 


Strength 


Kjlled 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Keyes's Corps 
Keyes's Corps 
Heintzelman's 


Casey 
Couch 1 
Kearny 


8,500 
8,500 
8,500 


177 
195 
193 


927 
773 
816 


325 

127 

82 


1429 
1095 
1091 


Federal 


Total 


25,500 


565 


2516 


534 


3615 


Confederate 


TotaP 


12,000 


608 


2751 


156 


3515 





The Confederates captured 10 guns, 5000 muskets, and about 
400 prisoners. The following extracts from official reports give 
an idea of the fighting. Rodes writes : — 

"The total number of men carried into action was about 2200. The 
aggregate number present at camp was, however, 2587. The 6th Ala. 
lost nearly 60 per cent of its aggregate force . Some of its men were drowned 
after having been wounded, as they fought at times in a swamp in which 
the water w^as from six inches to two feet in depth. The right company 
of the 6th Alabama was thrown back at right angles to the line of battle 
by Col. Gordon, to protect his rear, and engaged the enemy at such 
close quarters that its brave commander, Capt. Bell, after having fallen 
wounded mortally, was able to use his revolver with effect upon the 
enemy. The company fought with great heroism. Its loss was 21 killed 
and 23 wounded out of a total of 55 " (80 per cent). 

' It remains to say a few words of the movements of the 
unengaged troops on the WiUiamsburg and Charles City roads. 
Longstreet at 3.30 p.m. placed Wilcox in charge of his own, 
Pryor's, and Colston's brigades, and ordered him to follow and 
support Huger. Soon after this order was modified and Wilcox 
was ordered to precede Huger. But, having moved to the front, 
he was soon countermarched and ordered to return to the 
WiUiamsburg road, and then to follow that road to the front. 
He had retraced his steps about a mile when his fourth order 

* This includes 12 killed, 45 wounded, 12 missing, total 69, which oc- 
curred in Johnston's battle on the left. 

* This omits Kemper, who was not seriously engaged. 



84 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

again reversed his direction. He was now to follow down the 
Charles City road, keeping abreast of the firing which was heavy. 
And soon a fifth order came, of which Wilcox writes in his re- 
port : — 

"Again orders were received in writing to move across to the Williams- 
burg road, following country roads and paths through woods and fields, 
a guide being furnished to conduct the command. The intervening dis- 
tance between the two roads was low and flat, and in many places covered 
with water, at one point waist deep. The march was of necessity very 
slow. It was about 5 p.m. when the head of the column reached the Wil- 
liamsburg road." 

It was at this time that the 11th Ala. and 19th Miss, of Wil- 
cox's brigade were sent into the action, as has already been 
told. Later, these brigades with the others of Longstreet and 
Huger, which were brought up, relieved the troops which had 
been so heavily engaged. 

So terminated what should properly be called "D. H. Hill's 
Battle," for the whole, as we shall see, embraced three minor 
battles, at different times and places, and under different com- 
manders. Hill's battle was fought principally against Keyes's 
corps ; and we have seen that Couch with four regiments and a 
battery retreated northward toward the Chickahominy. 

Here he soon found friends. Sumner's corps on the north 
side of the river had been formed about 1 p.m., and moved 
toward two recently contracted roadways and bridges across 
the Chickahominy. At 2.30 p.m. orders to cross were received, 
and Sumner, having two roads, was able to cross quite rapidly. 
The river was high and rising, and by nightfall and until next 
morning the stream was impassable. 

Now we enter upon the second, which may be called "John- 
ston's Battle." 

It has been told how his original plans were destroyed by 
Longstreet's taking his division to the Wilhamsburg road. It 
must have been near eleven o'clock when Johnston learned 
where Longstreet was, and reahzed that it was too late to get 
the troops back for that day. He hesitated whether to wait 
and prepare for the morrow or to go on, and unfortunately 
decided to let it go on. He took no measures to supply, the 



4 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 85 

place on the Nine Mile road of the six brigades of Longstreet. 
Whiting's five brigades, however, were at hand. Three of them, 
Whiting's, Hood's, and Pettigrew's, were at the fork of the Nine 
Mile and New Bridge roads; Hatton's and Hampton's in re- 
serve near by. 

Toward noon Johnston left his headquarters, which were on 
the Nine Mile road about three miles from Richmond, and took 
his position at a house near the fork of the Nine Mile and New 
Bridge roads. His intention now was to send Whiting's division 
down the Nine Mile road to cooperate with D. H. Hill's attack 
down the Williamsburg road. 

By coincidence of bad luck, his right wing having lost several 
hours in the morning, his left wing lost about three hours in 
the afternoon. The signal for Whiting's advance was to be 
the sound of Hill's musketry on the Williamsburg road, two 
miles southeast, through a wooded country. This musketry 
began about one o'clock, and was heard in the Federal lines, 
five miles northeast; also, near Richmond five miles west; but 
was not audible two miles to the northwest at the position occu- 
pied by Whiting's division and by Gen. Johnston.^ 

Longstreet reports having sent a message, upon the capture 
of Casey's first line, but it was not received, and Johnston's first 
knowledge of the battle came about four o'clock, from an officer 
whom he had sent at three to investigate and report. 

Soon after 4 p.m.. Whiting's five brigades were put in motion, 
with Hood in front. Hood was directed to leave the Nine Mile 
road to his left and to push over toward the York River Rail- 
road, and find Hill's troops, while the remaining brigades moved 
down the railroad. Already there had been upon the railroad 
all day Pickett's brigade of Longstreet's division, sent there by 
Longstreet before the beginning of the action, 'Ho report any 
advance of the enemy up that road." It is remarkable that 
Longstreet contented himself with this, and did not utilize this 
road as a route of advance for some of his many brigades. Be- 

* Such phenomena, called acoustic shadows, are of common occurrence 
and are to be expected upon every battle-field, in some direction; especially 
in wooded localities. Here the intervening ground was moderately wooded. 
The artillery could be distinguished, but the amount of it was not great. 



86 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

sides his own six he could have called on some of Huger's three, 
and have led a strong attack down the railroad, turning Casey's 
right flank. An opportunity for one of the most briUiant strokes 
in the war was here overlooked and lost. Soon after five o'clock, 
Whiting's four rear brigades had straightened out upon the Nine 
Mile road, with Whiting's own brigade in front near Fair Oaks 
Station, when a battery opened fire upon the column from its 
left. 

It was the battery with four regiments of Couch's division, 
which had been cut off from Casey's second Une and had re- 
treated northward, unpursued, toward the Sumner bridges. 
Here it had met Sedgwick's division of Sumner's corps and 
Richardson's division was not far away. Johnston was riding 
with Whiting when the Federal battery opened fire, but supposing 
the Chickahominy to be impassable, he thought that there could 
be no great force there, and Whiting was ordered to charge the 
position with his brigade. Near the Chickahominy the ground 
was rolling, and the enemy's guns secured fine positions. For 
fully 800 yards the Confederate advance was exposed to 
fire. 

The reception which it met, however, made it speedily ap- 
parent that the errand upon which it had been sent was much 
beyond the dimensions of a brigade. 

Johnston was impatient, and directed the attack to be renewed 
at once by all the brigades present. Hood 's brigade might have ' 
been recalled, and several batteries of artillery, not far off, could 
have found positions against the two batteries the enemy pres- 
ently had in action. But a very hurried formation of the three re- 
maining brigades — Hatton's, Hampton's, and Pettigrew's — was 
made, and the attack was renewed without bringing up artillery, 
although there was much of it near. It was met by Sedgwick's 
division and Abercrombie 's four regiments, and received a bloody 
repulse, to which the enemy's artillery contributed largely, 
having a fair sweep and no artillery opposing them. Hatton 
was killed, Pettigrew wounded and captured, and Hampton 
wounded. 

The casualties of the division for the day were reported as 
follows : — 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 



87 



Johnston's Battle 


Strength 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Hood's Brigade 
Hampton's 
Whiting's (Law) 
Pettigrew's 
Hatton's 


1,922 
2,225 
2,398 
2,017 
2,030 


45 
28 
47 
44 


13 

284 
286 
240 

187 


42 
54 
13 


13 
329 
356 
341 

244 


Total Confederate 


10,592 


164 


1010 


109 


1283 


Sedgwick's Division 


8,000 


62 


282 


3 


347 


Abercrombie's Brigade 


2,000 


12 


45 


12 


69 


Total Federal 


10,000 


74 


327 


15 


416 



Before sundown Johnston recognized that his attack was a 
failure, and he was about to arrange that his troops should sleep 
on their arms and renew the fight at dawn, when he received two 
wounds. The first was a flesh wound in the shoulder from a 
musket ball, and the second, a few moments later, was a blow in 
the chest from a heavy fragment of shell, knocking him from his 
horse. He was placed in an ambulance and started toward his 
headquarters, but suffered such pain from the motion caused by 
the fearful roads that a Utter had to be substituted. He was in- 
capacitated for service until the middle of November, when he 
was assigned to the principal command of the Army in the West. 

G. W. Smith succeeded Johnston in the command, and the 
action of the next day is therefore to be called "Smith's Battle." 
It is sometimes stated in Confederate accounts, that this day 
offered the Confederates their best opportunity to crush the 
enemy, because it is supposed that the Chickahominy was now 
entirely impassable. This is a mistake. The railroad bridge 
had been repaired and covered with plank, and was always 
available for infantry and for horses, though not for vehicles. 
By 8 A.M., June 1, the Federal engineers had built a pontoon bridge 
at the site of the New Bridge, but it was under Confederate foe, 
and the approaches to it were impassable during the flood. By 
noon Sumner's upper bridge was again practicable for infantry, 
and by dark the lower one. By morning, June 1, therefore, the 
Federal army was practically safe from any Confederate attack. 
It had six divisions on the ground and a good line of battle, 
extending across the railroad nearly parallel to the Nine Mile 



88 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

road, with its left flank retired and protected by White Oak 
Swamp. The only chance of a successful assault by the Con- 
federates would have been with a heavy artillery fire upon the 
obtuse angle where Sedgwick's line bent back to connect with 
the other divisions. The condition of the ground, as well as the 
unorganized state of the Confederate artillery service, made such 
an attack impossible, and no effort at it seems to have been 
made. Late at night. May 31, Longstreet reported to Smith, 
and received orders to attack in the morning from the Williams- 
burg road northward, Smith proposing to take up the battle, 
with Whiting and other troops, when it was well developed. 

It is easy to see that the Federals had nothing to fear from 
anything the Confederates were likely to do. 

Early in the morning there was some sharp firing at many 
points along the line, where daylight brought into view troops 
and skirmishers which had been posted after dark; and, in 
accordance with Smith 's instructions, four of Longstreet 's bri- 
gades — Pickett 's, Wilcox's, Pryor's, and Colston's — and two of 
Huger 's, Mahone 's and Armistead 's, advanced upon the enemy 's 
position, which ran largely through the woods. There resulted 
a number of more or less severe affairs at different points, which 
were waged with varying fortunes for some hours. The brigades 
which had been engaged the day before were held in reserve 
near the captured redoubt. Meanwhile, with dayhght, the 
enemy's position of the afternoon before, opposite Whiting, 
showed itself strengthened by intrenchments, and Smith thought 
there was evidence of additional reenforcements being sent from 
the north side. So the battle in Whiting 's front was not renewed. 
Longstreet, too, soon began to call for reenforcements. The 
following notes were received from him in quick succession : — 

"June 1st. Yours of to-day received. The entire army seems to be 
opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my favor 
during these attacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition 
gives out too easily." 

"10 A.M., June 1. Can you reenforce me? The entire army seems 
to be opposed to me. We cannot hold out unless we get help. If we 
can fight together, we can finish the work to-day and Mac's time will be up. 
If I can't get help, I fear that I must fall back." 

On receipt of these notes. Smith ordered 5000 men to 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 



be withdrawn from Magruder's force along the Chickahominy, 
above New Bridge, and sent to Longstreet, but meanwhile 
D. H. Hill, seeing that the fighting was accomplishing nothing, 
sent orders withdrawing the troops to the fine of the night before. 
This was done rapidly at some points, and more slowly at others, 
but the enemy made no marked advance, and the action soon 
died out, it being now about 11 a.m. 

About 1.30 P.M. President Davis arrived at Smith's head- 
quarters, and informed him that Lee had been assigned to the 
command of the army, and Lee himself soon arrived. The 
party then rode over to Hill's position, whence Magruder's 
troops, which had arrived, were ordered back to the Chicka- 
hominy. After dark orders were received by Hill from Long- 
street for all troops to return to their camps within the Con- 
federate lines. In his official report, Hill says : "The thirteen 
brigades were not got together until near midnight. . . . We 
regained our own intrenchments near sunrise." The moon 
that night was about five days old. 

The official reports do not show separately the casualties either 
of this last action or of Hill's battle on the 31st, though those 
of Johnston's battle are given by both sides. But Kearny's 
division and some of Longstreet 's brigades were engaged both 
on the 31st and the 1st, and, on the latter day, two of Huger's. 
The totals of the whole affair, as nearly as can be estimated, 
are shown in the following table, averaging where exact figures 
are wanting: — 

TOTAL CASUALTIES. SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 



Battle 




Engaged 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Hill's 
May 31 


Confederate 
Federal 


11,642 
18,000 


608 
565 


2751 
2516 


156 
534 


3515 
3615 


Johnston's 
May 31 


Confederate 
Federal 


10,592 
10,500 


164 

74 


1010 
327 


109 
15 


1283 
416 


Smith's 
June 1 


Confederate 
Federal 


14,136 
17,000 


208 
151 


988 
751 


140 
98 


1336 
1000 


Aggregate 


Confederate 
Federal 


36,370 
45,500 


980 
790 


4749 
3594 


405 
647 


6134 
5031 



90 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

A glance at this table suggests at once the weakness of our 
army. Three separate times we advanced to give offensive 
battle, expecting to meet and to crush two Federal corps which 
we knew would average over 15,000 men each. We had about 
50,000 men to do it with, and it was necessary to do it quickly 
when once begun, for three other Federal corps were close at 
hand. On neither of the three occasions did we succeed in getting 
over about 14,000 men into action at all. 

The fighting quaUties of the troops engaged proved excellent, 
but the trouble was in our organization, which could not handle 
the available force effectively. That was due partly to our lack 
of staff-officers trained to military routine, partly to the unwieldy 
structure of our army into large divisions, instead of into corps, 
and partly to the personal peculiarities of our commander, 
whose impatience of detail appears in the misunderstanding 
between himself and Longstreet, and in the lack of written 
orders to officers charged with carrying into effect important 
plans. 

Perhaps our greatest deficiency at this period was in the 
artillery service. None of our batteries were combined into 
battalions, but each infantry brigade had a battery attached to it. 
There were no field-officers of artillery, charged with combining 
batteries and massing them to concentrate heavy fire upon im- 
portant points. There was never greater need or better op- 
portunity for this than in Johnston's battle of the 31st. The 
enemy had but two batteries, Kirby 's and Brady 's, and no more 
were available. They did not receive a single hostile cannon 
shot, and were able to devote their whole fire to our infantry 
fines, which in every case seemed to be finally repulsed only 
by heavy canister at close quarters. 

We had no lack of batteries. The roads were full of them, but 
there was no organization to make them effective. Both roads 
and open fields were in very miry condition, and all movements 
would have been slow, but a competent officer by doubfing 
teams could have brought up guns with Httle delay. 

The opportunity to place Lee in command of the army was a 
very gratifying one to President Davis, and it increased our 
chances of success to have cordial relations established between 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 91 

the War Department, under the Chief Executive, and the army 
under its commander. 

Relations had not been cordial before, and at this particular 
time the strain upon them was being increased daily by Davis's 
feeling that he was not being taken into Johnston 's confidence 
as to his plans. 

In Volume II of his Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, Davis 
writes of this period as follows : — 

" Seeing no preparation to keep the enemy at a distance, and kept in 
ignorance of any plan for such purpose, I sent for Gen. Lee, then at 
Richmond in general charge of army operations, and told him why and 
how I was dissatisfied with the condition of affairs. 

"He asked me what I thought it was proper to do. I answered that 
McClellan should be attacked on the other side of the Chickahominy 
before he matured his preparations for a siege of Richmond. To this he 
promptly assented, as I anticipated he would, for I knew it had been his 
own opinion. He then said: 'Gen. Johnston should, of course, advise 
you of what he expects or proposes to do. Let me go and see him and 
defer this discussion until I return.'" 

No date is given, but in the War Records the following letter 
from Lee to Johnston appears, and it was probably the result of 
this conversation : — 

"May 21, 1862. 
" (Wednesday.) 
" Gen. Joseph E. Johnston : — 

" General : The President desires to know the number of troops around 
Richmond, how they are posted, and the organization of the divisions 
and brigades ; also the programme of operations which you propose. 

"The information relative to the composition and position of your army 
can readily be furnished, but your plan of operations, dependent upon 
circumstances, perhaps yet to be developed, may not be so easily explained, 
nor may it be prudent to commit it to paper. I would, therefore, respect- 
fully suggest that you communicate your views on this subject personally 
to the President, which perhaps would be more convenient to you and 
satisfactory to him. I am, etc., 

"R.E.Lee, General." 

The War Records follow this letter with a statement of the 
army's complete organization, and its strength (53,688), but 
there is nowhere record of any other reply. From Mr. Davis's 
narrative it is clear that no further communication took place. 
The narrative goes on : — 



92 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

"When Gen, Lee came back, he told me that Gen. Johnston pro- 
posed, on the next Thursday, to move against the enemy as follows : 
Gen. A. P. Hill was to move down the right flank and rear of the enemy; 
Gen. G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to cross the Chicka- 
hominy at the Meadow bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and by the 
conjunction of the two it was expected to double him up. Then Long- 
street was to cross on the Mechanicsville bridge, and attack him in front. 
From this plan the best results were hoped for by both of us." 

The "next Thursday" was May 29. In the Records appear 
no signs of battle until May 27. On that day came news that 
McDowell was starting south from Fredericksburg. Johnston 
immediately ordered troops into position for the attack at dawn 
on the 29th. But, as has been told, on the 28th he received 
news of McDowell 's recall north. That night he countermanded 
the battle orders, and had the troops withdrawn under cover of 
darkness from all advanced positions. 

The President's narrative goes on : — 

"On the morning of the day proposed, I hastily despatched my office 
business and rode out toward the Meadow bridge to see the action com- 
mence. On the road I found Smith's division halted, and the men dis- 
persed in the woods. Looking for some one from whom I could get 
information, I finally saw Gen. Hood, and asked him the meaning of 
what I saw. He told me that he did not know anything more than that 
they had been halted. Riding on to the main road, which led to the 
Mechanicsville bridge, I found Gen. Longstreet, walking to and fro in 
an impatient, it might be said, fretful manner. Before speaking to him, 
he said his division had been under arms all day waiting for orders to 
advance, and that the day was now so far spent that he did not know 
what was the matter. Thus ended the offensive-defensive programme 
from which Lee expected much, and of which I was hopeful." 

But two days afterward, May 31, the President rode out again 
late in the afternoon, and when on the Nine Mile road, heard 
firing in the direction of Seven Pines. Mr. Davis writes : — 

"As I drew nearer I saw Gen. Whiting with part of Gen. Smith's 
division file into the road in front of me; at the same time I 
saw Gen. Johnston ride across the field from a house before which 
Gen. Lee's horse was standing.^ I turned down to the house and 

* Among the staff-ofRcers who saw this incident, it was believed that Gen. 
Johnston saw Mr. Davis approaching, and that he sought to avoid a meet- 
ing by mounting quickly and riding rapidly to the extreme front, where 
he remained until he received his wounds. I was a witness of the scene. 



SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS 93 

asked Gen. Lee what the musketry firing meant. He repUed by asking 
whether I had heard it, and being answered in the affirmative, he said 
he had been under that impression himseK; but Gen. Johnston had 
assured him that it could be nothing more than an artillery duel. It is 
scarcely necessary to add that neither of us had been advised of a design 
to attack the enemy that day." 

It seems clear from this narrative that Gen. Johnston en- 
tirely disregarded the letter of May 21, so far as it required 
him to acquaint the President with his proposed programme of 
operations. The verbal message conveyed by Lee, that he pro- 
posed to attack north of the Chickahominy on the 29th, may 
serve to acquit him of literal disobedience; but the change of 
programme was neither notified beforehand, or explained after- 
ward, nor was any notice given of the attack at Seven Pines on 
the 31st, although there was ample opportunity to do so. 

It is not probable, however, that Johnston intended his course 
to be one either of disrespect or disobedience. It had its source, 
doubtless, in his aversion to detail, or to committing himself as 
to what he proposed to do, when he was fighting a superior force 
and was really waiting for opportunities to turn up. 

It must be admitted that at Seven Pines our prospects, had 
Johnston not been wounded, would have been dismal. Besides 
the lack of cordial relations between the President and Johns- 
ton, the latter 's effort to handle the army in battle had been an 
utter failure. His orders were given, he says, " for the concen- 
tration of 23 of our 27 brigades against McClellan's left wing." 
Yet nowhere were ever over four brigades in action at one time. 
No complaint is made of any disobedience, slowness, or non- 
performance, by any officer, except Huger, and the facts in his 
case distinctly reheve him from any blame whatever. Indeed, it 
is almost tragic the way in which he became the scapegoat of this 
occasion, the true history of which is even yet not generally 
understood. Gen. Smith, however, in 1891, published all the 
facts for the first time with documentary proof. 



CHAPTER VI 

Jackson's Valley Campaign 

The Valley. Jackson's Plan. Battle of McDowell. Shields joins Mc- 
Dowell. Jackson attacks Front Royal. Banks Retreats. Winchester 
Captured. Cavalry not at Hand. Steuart's Faux Pas. Jackson's 
Report. McDowell's Delay. Lincoln keeps Sunday. Panic in Wash- 
ington. Jackson keeps Sunday. Jackson's Retreat. Race down the 
Valley. Death of Ashby. Port Republic, June 8. Cross Keys, 
June 8. Port Republic, June 9. Winder Repulsed. Taylor's Charge. 
After Effects. 

Before taking up the history of affairs before Richmond in 
June, 1862, with Lee at the head of the army, it is necessary to 
review events in the Valley of Virginia. 

This Valley constituted the only route by which a Con- 
federate army could invade Maryland and threaten Washington 
City in rear. 

Cool judgment at the head of affairs, after Washington had 
once been fortified against an attack by open assault, might 
have laughed at any idea of real danger from such an invasion. 
It should have been clear to all that no invasion could maintain 
itself long enough to carry on a siege, or to do more than to fight 
one great battle. The trouble was the lack of railroad trans- 
portation. Wagons alone would have to be relied upon to 
bring all supplies from Staunton, Va., a distance via the Valley 
roads of nearly 200 miles to Washington. But fear, approach- 
ing panic, took possession of Washington whenever a Confederate 
force appeared in the Valley, and every other operation would 
be suspended to concentrate all efforts upon driving it out. 

This oversensitiveness of the Federals cut its greatest figure 
in 1862, and was, more than once, the only salvation of Rich- 
mond. For the Confederate generals understood it, and as the 
situation in front of Richmond became more threatening, they 
sought more earnestly to reenforce the Valley. 

94 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 95 

It happened that Stonewall Jackson had been assigned as 
the commander of the Valley District in Nov., '61, and the 
reader has already been told of the battle of Kernstown, which 
he fought there on Mar. 23, '62. 

After that battle he had fallen back with his division, about 
8000 strong, to Swift Run Gap. Ewell, with about as many 
more, was at Gordonsville, and Edward Johnson, with about 
3000, was near Staunton. 

The Federals had made in West Virginia two separate de- 
partments. That of the Shenandoah, under Banks, included 
the Valley in which Banks had, in April, about 19,000 men near 
Harrisonburg. 

About 40 miles west in the mountains was Fremont, com- 
manding what was called the Mountain Department, in which 
he had about 15,000 men. About 3700 of these, under MiLroy, 
were at McDowell, a point 25 miles west of Staunton. 

On April 29, Jackson proposed to Lee in Richmond that he, 
Jackson, should unite his own force and Johnston's and attack 
Milroy and Fremont, and drive them back into the mountains. 
Then returning quickly, and being joined by Ewell, his whole 
force should fall upon Banks. Lee approved the project and 
committed its entire execution to Jackson. 

Ewell's division was brought up to Swift Run Gap to observe 
Banks, while Jackson concealed his object by marching his own 
division back across the Blue Ridge toward Charlottesville, and 
moving from a railroad station near Charlottesville by rail to 
Staunton. Here he united with Johnson and marched rapidly 
upon Mihoy. He had started on April 30, and, taking a country 
road, had been three days in moving his guns and trains through 
12 miles of mud to reach a metalled road. He had intended 
to rest over Sunday, May 4, but news of Fremont's cavalry 
having advanced, induced him reluctantly to put his infantry 
upon the cars and move to Staunton on that day. On May 7, 
he left Staunton, and on May 8 he confronted Milroy at McDowell. 
Milroy had been reenforced by Schenck's brigade. Jackson kept 
most of his force concealed, and about 2500 Federals were ad- 
vanced against him in the afternoon. A sharp affair ensued 
with about 2800 of Jackson's force, holding the crest of a steep 



96 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 




Jackson's Valley Campaign, Mat and June 



1862 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 97 

ridge more exposed to fire than was the enemy. The latter 
only lost about 250 killed and wounded, while the Confederates 
lost 498 ; but next morning the Federals had retreated. Jackson 
pursued for two or three days, going nearly to Franklin, and 
then on May 12 turned back, damaging and obstructing all 
roads behind him, and thus practically neutrahzing for a while 
Fremont's whole force. He now marched to unite with Ewell 
and to strike at Banks. Friday, May 16, had been appointed 
by the Confederate President a day of fasting and prayer, and 
it was spent in camp at Lebanon Springs near Staunton. 

Meanwhile, during Jackson's absence, the situation in the 
Valley had changed. Shields's division, about 9000 men, had 
been taken from Banks and ordered to join McDowell at Fred- 
ericksburg, where the latter would await it before advancing to 
join McClellan before Richmond. This reduced Banks's force to 
about 10,000, and he had been withdrawn down the VaUey to 
Strasburg, which he was ordered to fortify and hold. 

Jackson had now with Ewell's division about 16,000 men. 
On May 20 he arrived at New Market, whence there were two 
roads to Winchester. The western, the most direct and shortest, 
going by Strasburg, and the eastern, crossing the Massanutten 
Mountains to Luray, followed the vaUey of the South Fork of 
the Shenandoah to Front Royal, about 12 miles east of Stras- 
burg. Then, crossing the river, it united with the direct road 
at Newtown, within 12 miles of Winchester. 

His march was by the eastern route and was conducted with 
such secrecy that the enemy had no idea that he was within 
60 miles, when, at 1 p.m., May 23, his skirmishers attacked a 
Federal outpost at Front Royal held by Col. Kenly with about 
a thousand men and two guns. Kenly, seeing a much supe- 
rior force, set fire to his camp, and, crossing the Shenandoah, 
also set fire to the bridge behind him, but Jackson's men rushed 
in and saved it, though so damaged as to make the use of it slow 
and difficult. 

Jackson, crossing at a ford with the 6th Va. Cav., under 
Col. Flournoy, charged the enemy, capturing the two guns and 
600 prisoners, the enemy losing 154 killed and wounded, and 
the Confederates only 26. 



98 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Even a more brilliant success might have resulted here but 
for an unfortunate failure of our staff service, as foUows : — 

As he approached Front Royal from the south, about three 
and a half miles from the town, a rough country road 
diverged to the east and gave a second approach to the 
town by an obscure route of about eight miles over some 
steep hills. 

The more surely to avoid the enemy's pickets and to execute 
a surprise,, Jackson had taken the head of his column by this 
road. But after striking the enemy's pickets near Front Royal, 
he sent back orders for the rear brigades to follow the short and 
nearly level highway to the town. As usual at that time in the 
Confederate armies, the courier service was performed by a 
small detachment of cavalry, temporarily detailed; not by 
specially selected men, as was later practised. 

In this case the coiu-ier selected to carry the order not only 
failed to dehver it, but took himself off, and was never heard of 
again. It resulted that Jackson waited in vain the whole after- 
noon for the coming up of most of his artillery and infantry. 
Part of it only arrived after dark, completely exhausted by its 
laborious march; and one of his brigades, tired out, encamped 
four miles short of Front Royal. The cream of the whole occa- 
sion was thus lost. 

Banks did not appreciate the situation until next mornuig, 
and only toward 10 o'clock did he get off from Strasburg in 
retreat for Winchester. Jackson, too, was able to make only a 
late start, and, being delayed by forces sent out by Banks to 
protect his right flank, he missed, by two hours, intercepting 
Banks's infantry, though he captured and destroyed about 100 
wagons, and took some prisoners. There was much delay, also, 
from poor discipline in both the Confederate infantry and 
cavalry, especially in the latter. It was not easy for either to 
resist the temptations offered by so many wagons loaded with 
articles of food and clothing, calculated to appeal strongly to 
Confederate wants. 

But if time was thus wasted, Jackson made it up by pushing 
his march for the greater part of the night. It was 3 a.m. when 
he finally allowed his exhausted men to he down and sleep, and 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 99 

they were now near enough to Winchester to make it sure that 
Banks could not get away without a battle. 

Early in the morning Jackson attacked Winchester. The 
enemy made a stubborn resistance, having good position but an 
inferior force. He was finally, however, broken and driven from 
the town in great confusion. Jackson, in his official report, says 
of the occasion : — 

"Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry 
to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory. Hoping that the cavalry 
would soon come up, the artillery, followed by infantry, was pressed for- 
ward for about two hours for the purpose of preventing by artillery fire 
a re-forming of the enemy ; but as nothing was heard of the cavalry, and 
as but little or nothing could be accomplished without it in the exhausted 
condition of our infantry, between which and the enemy the distance was 
constantly increasing, I ordered a halt and issued orders for going into 
camp and refreshing the men." 

This had been the critical moment of Jackson's whole strategic 
movement. He had successfully concentrated a superior force 
upon his enemy, and routed him, and needed but his cavalry to 
reap the full fruits of a great success. He had three regiments 
of cavahy, — the 7th under Col. Turner Ashby, and the 2d and 
6th, which, the day before, had been placed under the command 
of Gen. Geo. H. Steuart. Ashby's regiment was recruited in 
the Valley and was noted for every good quaUty except disci- 
pUne. Being near their homes, the opportunity to loot the 
captured trains had been pecuharly seductive, and the regi- 
ment for some days was but little more than a company. With 
his small force remaining, Ashby, unfortunately, the night before, 
had ridden to Berryville, fearing the enemy might attempt to 
escape by Snicker's Gap. The 2d and 6th regiments under 
Steuart were with Swell's troops on the right of the attack, 
Jackson being with the left. There was no reason, therefore, 
except our fatal faciUty of blundering, why these two regiments 
should not have been promptly at hand, and, for once, the 
spectacle be seen of a Confederate army reaping the fruits of 
victory. 

The story is a curious one, and is told in Jackson's official 
report as follows: — 

LOFC 



100 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

"I had seen but some 50 of Ashby's cavalry since prior to the pillag- 
ing scenes of the previous evening, and none since an early hour of the 
past night. The 2d and 6th Va. regiments of cavalry were under 
the command of Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Steuart of Ewell's command. 
After the pursuit had been continued for some distance beyond the town, 
and seeing nothing of the cavalry, I despatched my aide-de-camp, 
Lt. Pendleton, to Gen. Steuart with an order 'to move as rapidly as 
possible and join me on the Martinsburg turnpike and carry on the pur- 
suit of the enemy with vigor.' His reply was that he was under the com- 
mand of Gen. Ewell and the order must come through him. Such con- 
duct and consequent delay has induced me to require of Lt. (now Maj.) 
Pendleton a full statement of the case, which is forwarded herewith." 

Pendleton tells how Steuart, who was a graduate of West 
Point and an officer of the old army, had refused and failed to 
obey Jackson's order for immediate action, because not given 
through a division commander. 

Gen. Jackson then goes on to say : — 

"About an hour after the halt of the main body had been ordered, 
Brig.-Geno Geo. H. Steuart, with his cavalry, came up, and renewing the 
pursuit pushed forward in a highly creditable manner and succeeded 
in capturing a number of prisoners; but the main body of Banks's army 
was now beyond the reach of successful pursuit, and effected its escape 
across the Potomac. 

"Before reaching Bunker Hill Gen. Steuart was joined by Gen. 
Ashby with a small portion of his cavalry. Upon my inquiring of Gen. 
Ashby why he was not where I desired him at the close of the engage- 
ment, he stated that he had moved to the enemy's left for the purpose of 
cutting off a portion of his force. Gen. Steuart pushed on to Martins- 
burg, where he captured a large amount of army stores. 

"There is good reason for believing that had the cavalry played its 
part in this pursuit as well as the four companies had done under Col. 
Flournoy two days before in the pursuit from Front Royal, but a small 
portion of Banks's army would have made its escape to the Potomac." 

This narrative shows how our efficiency was impaired by our 
deficiencies of discipline. Our strategy, marching and fighting, 
had all been excellent. Yet, owing to the failure of one courier, 
and a single mistake of narrow-mindedness in a general, Banks 
had escaped with but trifling loss of men or material. The 
campaign, however, had not been undertaken to capture men 
or material. Its great object was to break up McDowell's pro- 
posed march from Fredericksburg to reenf orce McClellan in front 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 101 

of Richmond. This, it will be seen, was fully accompUshed by 
the help of the following chapter of accidents and just at the 
critical moment. 

McDowell had been ordered to march as soon as he was joined 
by Shields 's division. It arrived on May 22. Only one day was 
needed to equip it for the march to Richmond, but the loss of 
three days followed. Its artillery ammunition had been con- 
demned by an inspector and a second day was lost, waiting 
for ammunition which had been delayed by the grounding 
of a schooner near Alexandria. Everything, however, was 
ready by the night of the 24th, and McDowell was anxious to 
march on Sunday, the 25th. But a third day's delay now en- 
sued from Mr. Lincoln's superstitious feehng that his chances of 
success might be improved by showing some special regard for 
the Sabbath. 

McDowell's official report says : ^ — 

" I was now ready to march with over 40,000 men and over 100 pieces 
of artillery. Though I could have started, and would have started, Sun- 
day, yet it was resolved not to march till Monday ; this out of deference 
to the wishes of the President, who was with me at the time, having come 
down Friday night, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of War, on 
account of the day." 

When it is remembered that the distance to unite with McClellan 
could have been easily covered within three marches, one is im- 
pressed with the influence of small events upon great matters, 
especially when the small events involve the loss of time, even 
of hours. It has already been told how McDowell did actually 
start, but, having made only a part of a day's march, he was re- 
called, and sent after Jackson. Had he made even a full day, it is 
very doubtful if he would have been recalled. 

On the morning of Sunday, the 25th, everything in Washington 
was serene. Those best posted, and in highest authority, con- 
fidently expected the early fall of Richmond, and had good 
reason for their expectations Indeed, the New York Herald that 
morning had had a leader headed, " Fall of Richmond." By noon 
the papers were issuing extras headed, " Defeat of Banks, Washing- 
ton in Danger," A volcanic eruption could scarcely have startled 

1 O. R. 15, 282. 



102 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

the administration more. Telegrams were sent the governors 
of a dozen states calling for instant help to save the capital. 
Reinforcements were rushed to Williamsport and Harper's Ferry- 
to assist Banks. McDowell's march, already begun before orders 
could reach it, was countermanded, and half his force, under 
Shields and Ord, was hurried to the Valley to attack Jackson 
from the east, while Fremont's 15,000 attacked from the west. 

McDowell, who was a good soldier, appreciated that no force 
possible for Jackson to have collected, could accomplish any 
serious results, and remonstrated, and begged in vain, to be 
allowed to carry out his projected march upon Richmond. When 
this was refused, he suggested that he be directed upon Gordons- 
ville, but this too was overruled, and Shields and Ord were 
directed to march upon Strasburg, toward which point also 
Fremont was approaching. 

Meanwhile, Jackson, having gone into camp about noon on 
Sunday, the 25th, when his infantry and artillery could no longer 
pursue the enemy, felt moved, even as Lincoln had done, to 
recognize the Sabbath by making up for the services missed in 
the morning. 

His official report says : — 

"On the following day (the 26th), divine service was held for the pur- 
pose of rendering thanks to God for the success with which He had blessed 
our arms, and to implore His continued favor." 

During the next two or three days he made demonstrations 
toward the Potomac, advancing his troops to Charlestown, and 
within two miles of Harper's Ferry; but these demonstrations 
were only for their moral effect at the North, and to occupy 
time, while he filled his wagons with captured stores and pre- 
pared a convoy of a double line of wagons near seven miles long 
and about 2300 prisoners. Only on the 30th did he put his 
columns in motion toward the rear. 

Had his opponents acted boldly and swiftly, their positions 
would now have enabled them to cut off Jackson's retreat and 
to overwhelm him. But the moral effect of his reputation doubt- 
less caused some hesitation, and Jackson's entire force and his 
whole convoy, with some skirmishing at Front Royal with 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 103 

Shields, and at Wardensville with Fremont, passed between his 
converging foes at Strasburg on the 31st, a portion of one of 
his brigades making in one day a march of 36 miles. 

Besides the prisoners and stores brought off, Jackson left about 
700 Federal sick and wounded at Winchester, and burned many- 
stores for which he had no transportation. Two guns and over 
9000 muskets were saved. 

After passing Strasburg on the 31st, the race was continued 
up the main Shenandoah Valley, with Jackson leading and 
Fremont following in his tracks, while Shields advanced up the 
Luray Valley on the east. 

At New Market the road from Luray enters the Valley through 
Massanutten Gap, but Jackson had sent cavalry ahead who 
burned the bridges by which Shields might have had access. 

At Conrad's store another bridge across the South Fork gave a 
road to Harrisonburg, and Shields rushed his cavalry ahead to 
gain possession of it, but again he was too late. Meanwhile, 
there had been a severe rain-storm on June 2, and though Shields 
could hear the guns of Jackson's rear-guard and Fremont's ad- 
vance on the other side of the Massanutten Mountains, he was 
powerless to cross. 

On Thursday, June 5, Jackson reached Harrisonburg, and here 
diverged east to cross the South Fork upon the bridge at Port 
Republic. On the 6th, in a severe cavalry affair of the rear- 
guard. Gen. Turner Ashby was killed. Of the civiUan soldiers 
whom the war produced, such as Forrest, Morgan, and others, 
scarcely one gave such early and marked indication of rare 
military genius as Ashby. ^ 

^ Col. Henderson writes of Ashby as follows: — 

" The death of Ashby was a terrible blow to the Army of the Valley. From 
the outbreak of the war he had been employed on the Shenandoah, and from 
Staunton to the Potomac his was the most f amUiar figure in the Confederate 
ranks. His daring rides on his famous white charger were already the theme 
of song and story, and if the tale of his exploits, as told in camp and farm, 
sometimes bordered on the marvellous, the bare truth stripped of all exaggera- 
tion was sufficient in itself to make him a hero. His reckless courage, his 
fine horsemanship, his skill in handling his command, and his power of 
stimulating devotion, were not the only attributes which incited admira- 
tion With such qualities, it is said, were united the utmost generosity 
and unselfishness, and a delicacy of feeling equal to a woman's." 



104 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

On the 7th Jackson's advance at night reached the vicinity of 
Port RepubUc. This village is situated in the angle between 
the North and South rivers, which here unite and form the 
South Fork of the Shenandoah. The North River is the larger 
of the two, and the road from Harrisonburg crosses it by a wooden 
bridge. The South River was fordable. 

On the morning of Sunday, the 8th, Jackson had sent two com- 
panies of cavahy across the river to scout on the Luray road 
toward Shields's advance. About 8 a.m. these companies were 
driven back in a rout and followed into the village by a body of 
Federal cavalry, who, with four guns and a brigade of infantry 
following, formed Shields's advance. 

Jackson himself was in the village and narrowly escaped cap- 
ture, riding across the bridge over the North River. Three of 
his staff were captured, but afterward escaped. Three brigades 
of infantry, however, and three batteries were near at hand, and 
the Federals were soon brought under a fire that sent them back 
in confusion with a loss of about 40 men and two guns, which 
had been brought across the South River. As their leading 
brigade, Carroll's, fell back, it met a second brigade of Shields's 
division, Tyler's, with artillery, and the two brigades, selecting a 
position about two miles north, decided to await the arrival of 
Shields with the rest of the division. 

Jackson left two brigades to protect the bridge, and with the 
remainder of his force marched back about four miles to Cross 
Keys, where he had left Ewell's division holding a selected posi- 
tion against Fremont. Fremont was now in reach of Jackson, 
and, by all the maxims of war, should have exerted his utmost 
strength to crush him. He could afford to risk fighting his last 
reserves, and even to wreck his army, if he might thereby detain 
or cripple Jackson, for other armies were coming to his help 
and were near at hand. His attack, however, was weak. He 
had about 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavahy, and 12 batteries. Ewell 
had at first but 6000 infantry and 500 cavahy. Fremont brought 
into play about all of his artillery, but he advanced only one 
brigade of infantry from his left flank. This was repulsed and 
followed, and the whole of Fremont's left wing driven back to 
the shelter of his hne of guns. Elsewhere there was no more 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 105 

than skirmishing and artillery duelHng, of which the Federals 
usually had the best with their superior metal and ammunition. 
It was Jackson's role to fight only defensive battle, until he had 
shaken off the superior force which beset him; so the battle 
lingered along all day, the casualties being : — 

Federal : killed 114, wounded 443, missing 127, total 684 

Confederate: " 41, " 232, " 15, " 288 

During the night of the 8th, Jackson returned to Port Repubhc 
and improvised a foot-bridge to carry his infantry dry shod 
across the South River. Early next morning, leaving a rear- 
guard of two brigades under Trimble and Patton to delay 
Fremont, the rest of his force was put in motion to find and 
attack Shields's two brigades, which had unwisely halted about 
two miles from Port Repubhc the day befoi;e. 

I say \mwisely, because they were only about 4000 men and 
16 guns, but they had a position so beautiful that they were 
excusable just for the chance of fighting from it. 

From the river on the right it extended straight across a mile 
of open plain, along a hollow road running between good banks, 
strongly fenced, to a considerable ravine in the wooded foot-hills 
of the Blue Ridge. The key of the position was a high retired 
shoulder on the Federal left, on which were posted seven guns, 
strongly supported by infantry sheltered in the near-by wood, 
and commanding every foot of the plain. 

Jackson, this morning, proposed to himself a double victory, 
and he built the foot-bridge across the South River to enable 
him to win it. He intended, by making a very early start, to 
fall upon Shields's two brigades and crush them, and thendoubhng 
back upon his track to recross the rivers and meet Fremont, 
whom he would expect to find advancing toward Port Repubhc, 
against the opposition which Trimble and Patton would make. 
It was a good plan and entirely feasible, but two things went 
wrong in its execution. 

The first was with the foot-bridge over the South River. This 
was rudely constructed of a plank footway, supported upon the 
running-gear of wagons standing in the stream, which was about 
breast deep. Such a bridge may be made quite serviceable, 



106 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

but this one was not strongly built, and before it had been in 
use long, it became impassable, except in single file. This made 
the passage of each brigade over twice as long as it should have 
been. 

The second trouble was Jackson's impatience, which defeated 
his own purpose. Winder's brigade, leading his column, began 
to cross the bridge about 4.45 a.m., and Jackson was near the 
head of the column. When the enemy's position was discovered, 
it was plain that the key position above noted was its most as- 
sailable point. Time and blood would both have been saved by 
bringing up at once a force amply sufficient to overwhelm it. 
As he had five brigades at hand, and an abundance of artillery, 
there need have been no failure, and no more delay than the 
time needed to bring up his troops. Going into battle before 
enough troops were brought up, was sure to result in more or less 
disaster. 

Winder's brigade, about 1500 strong, with two batteries, first 
attacked the Federal centre. It was not only badly repulsed, 
but the enemy gave a counterstroke, pursuing the fugitives and 
capturing a gun which they succeeded in carrying off. Other 
troops were arriving to reenforce Winder, but they were arriving 
too slowly. The Federal commander saw a chance to defeat his 
adversary by taking him in detail, and was swift to take ad- 
vantage of it. He brought forward two fresh regiments from 
his left to reenforce an advance from his centre. 

In vain Jackson himself rode among his own old brigade, 
exposing his life freely and endeavoring to rally them. Their 
thin fines had been for the time practically wrecked against supe- 
rior numbers in a position almost impregnable. Fortunately, at 
the critical moment, relief came suddenly. 

Jackson had recognized the key position held by the enemy's 
seven-gun battery, early in the morning, and had directed Taylor's 
fine La. brigade to attack it, and later, sent a second brigade to 
follow Taylor. 

Their approach was made through forest, and the enemy were 
unaware of it. Taylor urged his march to the utmost, and was 
admonished by the sounds of the battle in the open country on 
his left that his friends were in need of assistance. So, without 



JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN 107 

waiting for the brigade which followed him, he broke cover and 
charged boldly on the Federal battery at just the critical moment 
for Jackson on the left. 

The sudden bursting out of so severe a battle at this vital point 
at once relieved the pressure upon Winder's centre. Taylor had 
a desperate fight, the battery being taken and retaken and taken 
again, before six of its guns and all of its caissons were finally 
held, and its fire opened upon the now retreating Federals. 
Taylor's brigade lost 288 men in this action, but accompHshed 
its victory before the arrival of its support. 

It was now about 10.30 a.m. About nine Jackson had realized 
that he would not be able to accomphsh the double victory he 
had hoped for, and had sent word to Patton and Trimble to come 
across the bridges at Port Repubhc and to burn them. They 
had not been followed closely by Fremont. He only showed up 
on the opposite bank at noon, having had but seven miles to 
come. 

He had a pontoon train, but made no effort to cross, and con- 
fined his activity to cannonading the Confederates from the 
north bank, wherever he could find an opportunity, during 
the whole afternoon. It accomphshed Httle harm except to the 
Federal wounded, driving off the ambulances which were gath- 
ering them. 

Jackson pressed the retreat of Tyler's two brigades for about 
nine miles down the river, capturing about 500. He then with- 
drew by roads which avoided Fremont's guns on the west bank, 
and went into camp between midnight and dawn on the 10 th in 
Brown's Gap on the Blue Ridge, some of his regiments having 
marched over 20 miles. 

The casualties in this action were as follows, the Federals 
having but two brigades engaged and the Confederates four : — 

Confederate: killed 94, wounded 703, missing 36, total 833 
Federal: " 67, " 393, " 558, " 1018 

The entire casualties for the whole campaign sum up as follows 
for the two armies : — 

Confederate : killed 266, wounded 1580, missing 36, total 1903 
Federal: " 269, " 1306, " 2402, " 3977 



108 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

When, in his retreat, Jackson had gotten safely past Stras- 
burg, the Federal War Department gave up all hope of capturing 
him, and began to take measures to renew McDowell's advance 
upon Richmond. One of McDowell's divisions, McCall's, had 
been held at Fredericksburg, and, about June 6, it had been 
sent by water to join McClellan upon the Peninsula. On the 8th 
orders were sent for McDowell himself with Shields's and Ord's 
divisions to march for Fredericksburg; but before these orders 
could have any effect there came the news of Jackson's sharp 
counterstrokes at Cross Keys and Port Republic, which had the 
purely moral effect of causing the order to be countermanded. 
It remained countermanded, and McDowell and his two divisions 
were kept in the valley about Front Royal until June 20. This 
delay took away his last possible chance to reenforce McClellan 
before Lee took the offensive. Indeed, the movement to Fred- 
ericksburg, resumed about June 20, was stopped on June 26 by 
the formation of a new army to be commanded by Gen. John 
Pope. It comprised the entire forces of Fremont, Banks, and 
McDowell, and was charged with the duty of overcoming the 
forces under Jackson. 

So we may now leave him and his gallant but wearied foot 
cavalry to enjoy about five days of rest on the banks of the 
Shenandoah, and take up the story of Lee before Richmond. 



CHAPTER VII 
Seven Days' Campaign. The Attack 

Lee in Command. Ives predicts Lee's Audacity. Lee's Plan. McClel- 
lan's Delay. Lee's Opportunity. Lee's Order. Stuart's Raid. Inti- 
mations to the Enemy. Conference of Officers. Jackson's First 
Failure. Jackson's March. Stuart and Trimble. Branch Moves. 
A. P. Hill Moves. Battle of Mechanicsville. Porter's Retreat. A. P. 
Hill's Advance. Gaines Mill Position. The Chances. Jackson at 
Cold Harbor. Porter's Account. Hill's Account. Lee's Account. 
Jackson ordered in. General Advance. Enemy's Escape. Casualties. 
Remarks. 

When Gen. Lee, on June 1, 1862, took command of the 
Army of Northern Virginia, he brought with him his personal 
staff, — Col. R. H. Chilton, Adjutant, Col. A. L. Long, MiUtary 
Secretary, and Majs. Taylor, Venable, Marshall, and Talcotts, 
as Aides. He retained the chiefs of all departments, — Corley as 
Quartermaster, Cole as Commissary, Guild as Medical Director, 
and myself as Ordnance Officer, — and all matters of routine went 
on as before. 

The chances of a successful campaign against McClellan had 
increased greatly when Johnston fell, wounded, as has been 
already told. Johnston had proposed the concentration at 
Richmond of a large force, to be drawn from points farther 
south. Lee would be able to bring this about more effectively, 
occupying, as he had done, the position of Mihtary Adviser to the 
President. He had, as yet, never commanded an army, and his 
accession to his present command did not at once inspire popular 
enthusiasm. His only active service had been in West Virginia, 
where he was Department Commander in the fall of 1861. This 
campaign had generally been considered a failure, but should 
have been recognized as a success, for there had been at least no 
loss of men, nor any serious reverse. It was absurd for the Con- 
federacy to seek to occupy so extensive and mountainous a 

109 



110 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

country as West Virginia, so close to the great state of Ohio, 
and with a population strongly favoring the Federal cause. It 
was impossible to supply our armies over their long and diflScult 
roads. Mountain barriers in that section not only gave the 
country to the Federals, but proclaimed peace. This came to be 
recognized after one compaign. With this for a result, and no 
battles having been fought, an idea arose that Lee would not be 
an aggressive commander. This was strengthened when Lee's 
first care was to select a line of battle and begin to fortify it. 
To some of the amateur critics, who wrote for the pubUc press, 
this seemed little better than a confession of cowardice. 

The Richmond Examiner, edited by Pollard, was conspicuous 
in the bitterness of its attacks. Through some of these I chanced 
upon an interview which impressed me very forcibly at the time, 
and which proved to be quite a prophetic estimate of Lee as a 
commander. It came about as follows : On the staff of the 
President was Col. Joseph C. Ives, a graduate of West Point in 
the class of '52. He was born in New York and appointed 
from Connecticut, but had married in the well-known Semmes 
family of Georgia and Alabama, and had joined his fortunes with 
the South. He served on the staff of President Davis during the 
whole of the war. While in no way conspicuous, he impressed 
all who met him as particularly intellectual, and as an unusually 
accompUshed officer. 

When Lee had been in command about two weeks, I had a 
long ride with Ives about our lines, one afternoon, during which 
he referred to these newspaper attacks and asked if I thought 
they in any way impaired the confidence of the army in Lee. I 
had seen no such effect and told him so, and then went on to 
say: "Ives, tell me this. We are here fortifying our lines, but 
apparently leaving the enemy all the time he needs to accumulate 
his superior forces, and then to move on us in the way he thinks 
best. Has Gen. Lee the audacity that is going to be required 
for our inferior force to meet the enemy's superior force, — to 
take the aggressive, and to run risks and stand chances?" 

Ives's reply was so impressive, both in manner and matter, 
that it has always been remembered as vividly as if to-day. 
He reined up his horse, stopped in the road, and, turning to me, 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 111 

said: "Alexander, if there is one man in either army, Con- 
federate or Federal, head and shoulders above every other in 
audacity, it is Gen. Lee ! His name might be Audacity. He 
will take more desperate chances and take them quicker than 
any other general in this country, North or South ; and you will 
live to see it, too." 

It is needless to say that I did live to see it many times over. 
But it seems, even yet, a mystery how, at that time, Ives or 
President Davis or any other Uving man had divined it. No 
one could meet Lee and fail to be impressed with his dignity of 
character, his intellectual power, and his calm self-reUance ; 
but all those qualities might be recognized without deducing from 
them, also, the existence of such phenomenal audacity, except by 
an inspiration of genius. 

The principal feature of Lee 's proposed plan had long been the 
bringing down of Jackson from the Valley to attack the enemy's 
right wing. Even before Jackson had extricated himself from 
the pursuit of his enemies, on June 8, Lee had written him to set 
on foot the arrangements to mislead the enemy as to his inten- 
tions. 

The arrangements adopted were both elaborate and effective. 
Not only were all sorts of exciting false rumors set on foot 
throughout the Valley, but Whiting's division, from before 
Richmond, and Lawton 's large brigade — arriving from Georgia 
nearly 4000 strong — were sent by rail from Richmond to Staun- 
ton about June 11, to create the impression that Jackson's raid 
was about to be repeated with a much larger force. Meanwhile, 
Jackson's force was marched again to the Shenandoah near 
Port Republic, about the 11th, after Shields and Fremont had 
fallen back to the neighborhood of Strasburg. Here Jackson 
took five days of rest preparatory to the movement upon Rich- 
mond. 

During most of this period, by all the rules of the game, Mc- 
Clellan was in default for not attacking. He had come within 
arm's length, but allowed the initiative to Lee. McDowell had 
been taken from him, so that he had nothing to gain by wait- 
ing, while his enemy had the opportunity both of reenforcement 
and of fortification. Lee was, indeed, doing his utmost in 



112 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

each direction. McClellan seemed to have been subconsciously 
aware that he ought to attack, and that his advantage was being 
lost by every day's delay ; for his reports to Washington repre- 
sented his army, from day to day, as being only held back from 
a general advance by waiting for some slight additional advan- 
tage, which a day or two would bring. 

On June 2, which was his best opportunity, he was only waiting 
for the water to fall in the Chickahominy. On June 7 he was 
waiting for McCall's division (about 10,000 strong) which ar- 
rived on the 12th and 13th. On June 16 he was waiting for two 
days to let the ground harden. On June 18 the general en- 
gagement might begin at any hour. On June 25 " the action will 
probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time." And at last 
he was right, for Lee began it on the 26th, and during the inter- 
val, since June 2, the advantage had shifted from McClellan 's 
side to Lee's. 

As the game and the players now stood, the game was Lee's 
for a great success, — the greatest ever so fairly offered to any 
Confederate general. His strategy had been good and had been 
carried through without a flaw. Jackson's entire army, reen- 
forced by Whiting's division and Lawton's brigade, had been 
brought down secretly from the Valley and, on the night of June 
25, was encamped at Ashland within 13 miles of Mechanicsville. 
It was about 18,500 strong. Meanwhile, Lee had drawn together, 
available for battle, around Richmond, about 65,000 other troops, 
and had fortified his lines on the southeast between the Chicka- 
hominy and the James, enough to make them quite secure with 
half his force. McClellan 's right flank was but a single corps, 
Porter 's not over 30,000 strong, and separated from the Federal 
centre by the Chickahominy River and about foxir miles of dis- 
tance. Under these circumstances, with even fairly good tac- 
tics, Porter's corps should have been practically destroyed, and 
with it the Federal line of supply from the York River. That 
once accomplished, the capture or destruction of the remainder 
of McClellan 's army, during their retreat to the James River, 
would have been an easier task than the first. 

All this was in the game which Lee set out to play on June 26, 
and the stakes were aheady his if his execution were even half as 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 113 

good as his plan. At the beginning there was every promise that 
it would be. Two days before, a confidential order had been 
issued to general officers and heads of departments, which is 
given in part, in contrast with Johnston 's method, as developed 
at Seven Pines. 

" Genebal Orders No. 75. 

" Headquarters in the field, June 24, 1862. 

"Gen. Jackson's command will proceed to-morrow from Ashland 
toward the Stark (or Merry Oaks) Church, and encamp at some convenient 
point west of the Central Railroad. Branch's brigade of A. P. Hill's 
division will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the Chickahominy 
near Half-Sink. 

"At three o'clock Thursday morning, 26th inst.. Gen. Jackson will 
advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his 
march to Gen. Branch, who will immediately cross the Chickahominy and 
take the road leading to Mechanics ville. 

"As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered. Gen. 
A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near 
Meadow Bridge and move direct upon Mechanicsville. 

"To aid his advance the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will, at 
the proper time, open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy 
being driven from Mechanicsville and the passage across the bridge opened, 
Gen. Longstreet, with his division and that of Gen. D. H. Hill, will cross 
the Chickahominy at or near that point. Gen. D. H. Hill moving to the 
support of Gen. Jackson, and Gen. Longstreet supporting Gen. A. P. 
Hill. The four divisions keeping in communication with each other and 
moving en echelon on separate roads, if practicable, the left division in 
advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extending their front, will 
sweep down the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from 
his position above New Bridge, Gen. Jackson bearing well to his left, 
turning Beaver Dam Creek, taking the direction toward Cold Harbor. 

"They will then press forward toward the York River Railroad, 
closing upon the enemy's rear and forcing him down the Chickahominy. 
Any advance of the enemy toward Richmond will be prevented by vig- 
orously following his rear and cripphng and arresting his progress. . . ." 

But one grave error had been committed. Among the 
preparations which Lee had made for the occasion had been 
a forced reconnoissance of the enemy's rear, which was made 
by his cavalry commander, Stuart, between June 11 and 
15. Stuart, with about 1200 men and two guns, passing well 
behind the enemy 's right, had gotten into his rear and discovered 



114 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

that his right flank did not extend for any distance northward 
from the Chickahominy and rested on no natural obstacle. But 
the expedition could not safely return, Stuart thought, by the 
route taken in going. He determined, therefore, to make the 
circuit of the Federal army, crossing the Chickahominy below 
by a bridge which he expected to find. 

In this he was disappointed, but with great resource he 
got safely across, partly by swimming, and partly by rebuilding 
a bridge, and brought off his guns and a few prisoners. 

But this raid, though ordered by Lee and handsomely con- 
ducted, had one unfortunate effect. It would have been much 
better to have obtained the necessary information by scouts. 
It seriously alarmed McClellan for his rear. But for it the 
probabihties are that he would never have given the subject any 
thought, and he would certainly not have been prepared with a 
fleet of loaded transports on hand when he was, soon after, 
forced to change his base to Harrison's Landing on the James 
River. It is hard to estimate the difference in the result, had 
McClellan been taken by surprise on this occasion and been 
forced, perhaps, to retreat down the Peninsula. On the whole, 
therefore, the eclat of our brilliant raid cost us much more than 
its results were worth. Where important strategy is on foot, too 
great care can scarcely be used to avoid making any such power- 
ful suggestions to the enemy as resulted in this case. 

It is interesting to note that the enemy got no intimations 
of what was going on until June 24. On that day a deserter 
from Jackson's force was brought in. After trying in vain to 
pass himself off as a Union prisoner, escaped from Jackson, he had 
told of Jackson's march and its supposed intent to attack Mc- 
Clellan 's flank. 

McClellan wired the story to Stanton, and also sent out two 
negroes to go along the railroad and investigate, but Stuart's 
pickets were too vigilant for the negroes to pass them. Stanton 
gave some credence to the deserter's story, but it cut small 
figure among the rumors which McClellan was receiving from 
his detective bureau. He beheved that Beauregard had ar- 
rived and that Lee now had 200,000 men. 

On June 25 he made his first forward movement by advancing 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 115 

the skirmish-lines of several brigades and taking up a portion of 
the neutral ground in front of our picket-lines, near the Will- 
iamsburg road. Sharp skirmishing ensued and lasted all day, 
the Federal losses being reported as about 700, and our own 
about 400. The affair was called Orchard or Oak Grove 
Skirmish. 

Before issuing order of battle No. 75, Lee had had on June 23 
Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Jackson, to meet in con- 
ference at his headquarters to arrange all details. Longstreet 
had asked Jackson to fix the date on which the attack should be 
made. The latter named June 25. Longstreet suggested that 
he allow more time, and the 26th was agreed to. 

When summoned to this meeting by Lee on Saturday, June 21, 
Jackson was near Gordons ville. He started on a freight train 
bound to Richmond, but left the train before midnight that night 
at a station where he spent Sunday, attending church twice. ^ 
At midnight he set out on horseback for the conference at 
Richmond about 50 miles away, arriving about 3 p.m. 

Had he kept on the freight train to Richmond, he would have 
arrived early Sunday morning. His brigades on the march also 
kept Sunday in camp. It was usually the general's custom to 
keep account of Sundays spent in fighting or marching, and to 
make up for each by a week-day rest, and sermons, at the earliest 
opportunity. 

On the march from Gordonsville the railroad was utilized for 
the infantry, as far as could be done, by picking up the rear 
brigades and carrying them forward. Artillery and cavalry 
marched all the way. 

On Tuesday morning, June 24, Jackson's infantry was at 
Beaver Dam Station, on the Virginia Central road, about 18 ' 
miles from Ashland, where they were expected to encamp that 
night, and about 25 miles from the Virginia Central R.R. near 
the Stark Church, whence order No. 75 required Jackson to 
march at 3 a.m., Thursday, June 26. 

We now enter upon the story of performances. The orders 
governing the beginning of the action were simple and explicit. 
Every officer must have realized the supreme importance of 

* Henderson says it was Frederick Hall, other reports say Louisa C. H. 



116 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

time, even without the hint given by Lee in his order fixing the 
hour of Jackson's march at 3 a.m. 

It is, therefore, a great surprise to see that instead of crossing 
the Virginia Central R.R. at 3 a.m. on the 26th, they do not 
begin to cross it until 10 a.m. on that date. That is practically 
a whole day late, because, with the distance still to be traversed, 
it will be too late to commence the great battle intended, in time 
to win it and gather the fruits of victory. 

Had Jackson pushed his march to Ashland on the night of the 
24th, about 18 miles from Beaver Dam, as Lee's order contem- 
plated, he would have had only six miles to march on the 25th, 
and his men would have been in excellent condition to set out 
at 3 A.M. on the 26th, with less than 10 miles to go to reach the 
enemy. The result of crossing the Central R.R. at 10 a.m. 
was to fight the battle a day late and at Gaines Mill, three miles 
nearer McClellan's main army, thus losing the opportunity to 
cut off Porter's corps at Beaver Dam. This opportunity, the 
cream of the whole campaign, was lost by Jackson's not 
demanding of his troops better marching on the 24th and 
25th. 

His biographers have found many excuses for him, but, how- 
ever good or bad these excuses may be, they will not be dwelt 
upon here for two reasons : — 

First. The object of the narrative is neither praise nor 
blame, but only that military students may realize, more fully 
than they could without such an example, the infinite value of 
hours when a battle is on foot, and how easily hours may be 
lost. 

Second. The excuses of the biographers will best be given 
after finishing the whole story; for, unfortunately, this loss 
of the first day is not the only, nor is it the worst, failure of 
Jackson during these Seven Days, to come to time as was ex- 
pected of him. He nowhere, even distantly, approached his 
record as a soldier won in his every other battle, either before or 
afterward. As one reads of his weak and dilatory performance 
day after day, and recalls what he had always been before, and 
always was afterward, one feels that during these Seven Days he 
was really not Jackson. He was a different individual. He was 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 117 

under a spell ! Nothing that he had to do was done with the 
vigor which marked all the rest of his career. 

Crossing the Central R.R. at 10 a.m. on the 26th, he marched 
but eight miles farther that day, going into bivouac about five 
o'clock, at Hundley's Corner. He was here in easy reach of 
Porter's rear and in full hearing of the heavy cannonading and 
musketry going on at Mechanicsville, which will be told of 
jpresently. 

He describes the march, as follows, in his official report : — 

"Pursuing the Ashcake road we crossed the Central R.R. about 
10 A.M. Approaching the Totopotomoy Creek, the Federal picket crossed 
to the south side of the stream, and partially destroyed the bridge, and, 
by felling trees across the road farther on, attempted to delay oar advance. 
After the Texas skirmishers had gallantly crossed over, Reilly shelled the 
woods for the purpose of driving the enemy from it, in order that we might 
safely effect a lodgment beyond the creek. Whiting rapidly repaired 
the bridge and the march was resumed. That night the three divisions 
bivouacked near Hundley's Corner. . . . We distinctly heard the rapid 
and continued discharges of cannon which announced the engagement 
of Gen. A. P. Hill with the extreme right of the enemy." 

Gen. Stuart, in his official report, says : — 

"At Dr. Shelton's we awaited the arrival of Gen. Jackson, sending 
a squadron in advance to seize and hold the bridge at the Totopotomoy. 
The enemy, anticipating us, had torn up the bridge, and held the opposite 
bank, and obstructed the road, without, however, making any determined 
stand. Capt. W. W. Blackford, Corps of Engineers, assigned to duty 
with my command, set about repairing the bridge, and in a half -hour, with 
the details furnished him, the bridge was ready. Passing Pole Green 
Church, Gen. Jackson's march led directly toward the crossing of Beaver 
Dam Creek opposite Richardson's. Reaching that point he bivouacked 
for the night." 

Gen. Trimble, in his official report, writes: — 

"On the 26th we moved, with the army, from Ashland in a southerly 
direction, passing to the east of Mechanicsville in the afternoon, and at 
4 P.M. distinctly heard the volleys of artillery and musketry in the engage- 
ment of Gen. Hill with the enemy. Before sundown the firing was not 
more than two miles distant, and, in my opinion, we should have marched 
to the support of Gen. Hill that evening." 

Now we will go back to the Chickahominy, where Branch 's 
brigade, some eight miles above the rest of A. P. Hill 's division 



118 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

at Meadow Bridge, is under arms and expecting to receive the 
signal to advance not later than 4 a.m. It does not come until 
after 10 o'clock. As soon as it was received, Branch crossed 
the Chickahominy and moved toward Mechanicsville, the ene- 
my 's pickets falling back before him. 

At one point the road pursued by Branch approached, within 
a short distance, a road upon its left, which was being followed 
by Ewell's column, and the two generals had a brief meeting, 
but there was no other communication between the columns 
until the next day. Meanwhile, since an early hour in the 
morning, the divisions of A. P. Hill at Meadow Bridge, and of 
D. H. Hill and Longstreet at the Mechanicsville bridge, two 
miles below, had been under arms and anxiously awaiting the 
sound of Jackson's guns. 

President Davis was on the ground, having ridden out from 
Richmond, not only to see, but anxious to participate in, the 
coming battle. A few siege-guns had been mounted on the low 
bluffs along the Chickahominy Valley, and they were now manned 
for use, in case our crossing at the Mechanicsville bridge was 
resisted. But hour after hour passed, and there came no sound 
of conflict from the direction of Jackson's advance. 

At 3 P.M. A. P. Hill, of his own motion, decided to wait for 
Jackson no longer. It is strange that he should have taken this 
responsibility without orders from Lee, who was within two miles, 
and who, it seems, would not have approved it. Henderson 
states that, "A message from Lee, ordering Hill to postpone aU 
further movement, arrived too late." ^ Doubtless Lee wished, 
now, to make a fresh start on the morrow, as Johnston had 
wished at Seven Pines. 

The enemy made slight resistance to Hill's advance, and fell 
back through Mechanicsville to his works behind Beaver Dam 
Creek, opening the road to Longstreet 's and D. H. Hill's divi- 
sions. A. P. Hill's division moved so rapidly that it arrived 
at Mechanicsville a mile and a half ahead of Branch's brigade. 
No advantage was gained, however, by thus anticipating the 
coming up of Jackson. The enemy held, behind Beaver Dam 
Creek, an intrenched position quite impregnable to assault. 

1 Hend. II., 16. 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 119 

It had not been intended to attack it with infantry, but to 
threaten it with artillery, while Jackson passed to the rear and 
cut off the enemy's retreat. 

Already Jackson, in spite of his slow march and the time 
wasted at Totopotomoy Creek, was within three miles of the 
enemy 's line of retreat and with no force opposing him but a few 
cavalry. But here he stopped his march, which had only been 
about 13 miles that day, and went into bivouac, regardless of 
the roar, not only of artillery, but, presently, of musketry also, 
appeaUng to him from Mechanics ville. For with haste and poor 
judgment Davis, Lee, Longstreet, and the two Hills, not content 
to merely cannonade the enemy in his position, were beginning 
to wreck whole brigades of infantry, as must now be told. 

The position was one in which good troops could repulse 
treble their numbers if assailed in front, but it was easily turned. 
Jackson, three miles off to the northeast, was already in easy 
reach of Porter 's line of retreat, and had but to push his advance 
a mile or two, and Porter would have been compelled to retreat 
precipitately or be caught in a trap. 

On the 26th of June, in the latitude of Richmond, the sun 
rises at 4.38 a.m. and sets at 7.27 p.m. and twilight lasts until 
about 8.30 p.m. There was no moon. As already told, Gen. 
Jackson arrived at Hundley's Corner at 4.30 p.m. and went into 
bivouac there for the night, after having marched from Ash- 
land about 11 miles off in an air line, and perhaps 12 to 14 by the 
roads traversed. 

At Mechanicsville the firing commenced at three o 'clock, and 
rapidly grew heavy. It was at first a long-range duel with the 
Confederate siege-guns on the Chickahominy, and then with the 
field-batteries accompanying Confederate brigades as they 
came up. A. P. Hill's five brigades of infantry were also put 
into action as soon as they could be formed, and advanced within 
range of the enemy's intrenched fines, when they opened fire 
both of artillery and infantry. Thus the battle was maintained 
until dark. Meanwhile, as the hours of daylight were closing, 
under urgent messages from Lee and President Davis, two 
regiments of Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division were 
launched in a direct charge on perhaps the very strongest point 



120 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 




SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 121 

of the whole Federal position. A more hopeless charge was 
never entered upon. They were the 1st N.C. and the 
44th Ga., raw regiments, which had never before been under 
fire. Their behavior illustrated the morale inspiring the army. 
Had they been given anything to do which it was possible to do, 
they would have done it, and become seasoned veterans in their 
first battle. 

They dashed across a wide plain through a storm of musketry, 
shells, and canister, and some even went across Beaver Dam 
and into the entangled slashing close under the Federal lines. 
There they were killed until their bodies laid, as a Federal 
account described it, "as thick as flies in a bowl of sugar," 
before the survivors reahzed the trap into which they had been 
sent, and got back as best they could. 

The 1st N.C. suffered 142 casualties, including all three 
field-officers and the adjutant. The 44th Ga. lost 335, includ- 
ing its Col. and Lt.-Col., — a regimental loss seldom equalled 
in so short a time. The total casualties of this battle were 
about 1350 and included 14 field-officers. The Federals re- 
ported their loss as 361. 

Porter, in his report, says that only during the night, by reports 
from scouts and outposts, did the Federals become aware of 
the close proximity of Jackson's force, and it was recognized at 
once that McClellan's army was in a very critical condition. He 
writes : — 

" But for the conception of the idea of a flank movement, changing our 
base by the left flank to the James River, our position would have left 
but one alternative — a hasty abandonment of our attack on Richmond, 
and a retirement by the way we had advanced." 

This conception, as before told, had been developed two 
weeks before by Stuart's raid, and it had not only been de- 
veloped, but, what was much more important, already transports 
had been loaded and many important preparations for carrying 
it into execution had been made in advance. The matter was 
decided in McClellan's mind during that night, though no 
orders were issued. Porter 's corps was ordered to withdraw to a 
strong position upon the north bank of the Chickahominy in 
close connection with the rest of his army. 



122 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

This position, about three miles in rear of Beaver Dam, had 
already been noted and selected by the Chief Engineer, Gen. 
Barnard, 

Porter, however, remained in his intrenched position until 
daylight, and then began to withdraw down the Chickahominy 
in good order, carrying with him guns of position which had been 
posted along the Chickahominy. The Confederate batteries 
reopened their fire at dawn, and the Federal rear-guard repUed 
heavily for over two hours. Had Jackson's corps made an 
early start, and been pushed as Jackson was wont to push, both 
before and after this Seven Days' spell, he would have struck 
Porter's corps on the flank as it marched toward Cold Harbor. 
But the advance was so late and slow that when at last, about eight 
o 'clock, it appeared in rear of Porter 's position, having marched 
about three miles, the last Federal soldier had withdrawn, and 
Jackson 's artillery fired by mistake into the head of Hill 's advanc- 
ing column. The trap was sprung, but the bird had flown. 

Gen. Gregg gives the following account : — 

"Early in the morning of the 27th I received orders from Gen. A. P. 
Hill to take the advance with the 2d brigade and to drive the enemy 
from their position on Beaver Dam Creek at Ellison's Mill. The brigade 
advanced to the attack. Slight resistance was made here by the enemy, 
and the passage of the stream, which presented a strong natural obstacle, 
was gained. Many Confederate soldiers, wounded or killed in a preceding 
unsuccessful assault, lay in the road toward the crossing of the creek, and 
had to be moved aside to allow the passage of our artillery. A small 
bridge, broken up by the enemy, had also to be repaired. This was toward 
eight o'clock in the morning. Crossing Beaver Dam Creek, the brigade ad- 
vanced along the road among piles of knapsacks and other property, and 
burning stores abandoned by the enemy, with skirmishers — out to the 
front and left. Coming into the edge of an open field, Capt. Cordero's 
company, 1st S.C, deployed as skirmishers, were fired on by ar- 
tillery in front, and Lt. Heise and a soldier were wounded, Capt. 
W, T. Haskell's company of the same regiment, advancing in open order, 
discovered that the forces meeting us in front from the left were those of 
Maj.-Gen. Jackson, and entered into communication with them so as to 
to avoid the risk of future mischiefs." 

At last then, the morning half gone, the four Confederate 
divisions were united and within three miles of the enemy. 
Porter had gone into the position selected behuid Boatswains' 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 123 

Creek, with three divisions of infantry, six regiments of cavahy, 
and 20 batteries, — in all about 27,000 men and 80 guns. The 
position was naturally strong, and it was being strengthened 
hourly with abattis and rifle-pits. 

Its development covered only about two miles of convex 
front. Its left flank rested on the open Chickahominy bottom, 
where heavy batteries from the south side secured it from being 
turned. Its right flank was its weak point, its protection there 
being only tangled thickets which also covered much of the front. 
Where this was lacking were generally three hnes of infantry, 
partially under cover, and abundant artillery so placed that its 
fire was over the heads of the infantry. His force was enough 
to cover his front six deep. Two bridges gave connection to the 
south side, and over them, during the action, McClellan sent 
Slocum's division (9000) of FrankUn's corps with two batteries, 
and French 's and Meagher 's brigades of Sumner 's corps, as re- 
enforcements, — say about 14,000 men. Porter himself was, 
perhaps, the hardest opponent to fight in the Federal army. 
No one in it knew better how to occupy and prepare his ground for 
defence, or was more diligent to do it ; and in his corps were con- 
centrated all of the regular regiments of the old Federal army. 

To attack such a position was no easy proposition, and Lee's 
force, checked and 1300 weakened by the ill-advised affair at 
Mechanicsville, had no margin to spare over the size of its task. 
Indeed, had McClellan reenforced Porter as he should have done, 
with a whole corps, he might have won a great victory. But 
he allowed himself to be imposed upon by the demonstrations 
made by Magruder and Huger, under orders from Lee, and 
neither attacked with his left, nor strengthened his right suflS- 
ciently. He weakly left the question of sending reenforcements to 
his four corps commanders. FrankUn sent Slocum's division, 
and Sumner sent French's and Meagher's brigades, but Keyes 
and Heintzelman reported that they could spare nothing. 

As it was, therefore, the fight should result in Lee's favor by a 
reasonable margin, provided it was well managed and its force 
not squandered in partial attacks. But this took place to an 
extent perilously near losing the battle. It did lose the precious 
hours of daylight necessary to gather any fruits of victory, and 



124 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

made the victory much more bloody than it need have been. 
The importance of time should have been appreciated and the 
march pushed to locate the enemy's new position and develop 
it with strong skirmish-hnes. Then, at the most favorable 
points, our utmost strength should have been marshalled and 
concentrated for simultaneous assaults of infantry, supported 
upon each flank by concentrations of batteries. It was but 
waste of time and blood to launch any small assault against that 
position, as had been done at Beaver Dam. 

The fact that we finally carried the position by a general 
charge, after the repulse of many partial ones, shows that our 
men were good enough and that we had enough of them to have 
made a success early in the afternoon, had our energies been 
first concentrated for the effort. 

During the morning of the 27th, the Confederates moved with 
a slowness only to be understood by remembering the inex- 
perience, in handling such large bodies, of many of our generals 
and staff-officers. By noon, however, we had developed the 
enemy's position. On our left Jackson was at Cold Harbor with 
four divisions, — his own, Ewell's, Whiting's, D. H. Hill's, — and 
Lawton 's large brigade in addition. He confronted the Federal 
right. A. P. Hill, with Longstreet in reserve, confronted their 
left. 

Porter, in the Century, writes: — 

"The advance column of these troops [Jackson's] came a little earlier 
than those under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, but were more cautious, and, 
for some hours, not so aggressive." 

What happened was this: D. H. Hill's division, crossing the 
Chickahominy behind A. P. Hill, had been pushed out to the 
left by Lee 's battle order and brought up behind and in support 
of Jackson's forces early on the 27th. But in the slow marching 
of the morning, D. H. Hill, with characteristic aggressiveness, had 
managed to pass Jackson's force and to take the lead. On 
approaching Cold Harbor and discovering the enemy's position, 
Hill at once moved his division up to the edge of the swamp held 
by the enemy upon the other side, and opened upon them with a 
battery. His battery was quickly answered by 10 guns, and 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 125 

after a brief action was withdrawn, crippled. Just at that 
juncture came orders from Jackson withdrawing Hill into some 
woods in rear, where the head of Jackson's long column was 
aheady standing halted. In his official report, Jackson thus 
explains his object in this manoeuvre: — 

" Soon after, Gen. A. P. Hill became engaged, and, being unacquainted 
with the ground, and apprehensive, from what appeared to me to be the 
respective positions of the Confederate and Federal forces engaged, that, 
if I then pressed forward, our troops would be mistaken for the enemy and 
be fired into, and hoping that Gen. A. P. Hill and Longstreet would drive 
the Federals toward me, I directed Gen. D. H. Hill to move his division 
to the left of the road, so as to leave between him and the wood on the 
right of the road [from which he is withdrawing D. H. Hill], an open 
space across which I hoped the enemy would be driven. Thus arranged, 
it was in our power to distinguish friend from foe in case the enemy should 
be driven as expected." 

It is not necessary to comment upon this too elaborate ex- 
planation of how more than a half of Lee's army was paralyzed 
for three hours, just on the verge of battle, further than to say 
that the inaction, and the excuse for it, are both unhke anything 
ever seen in Jackson before or after these Seven Days. D. H. 
Hill was withdrawn about 2 p.m. It was about 2.30 p.m. when 
A. P. Hill's advance, pressed as rapidly as he was able to bring 
up his six brigades, developed into a battle. 

Porter, in Battles and Leaders, further describes the fight made 
by this single division (about 12,000 men) which had had, only 
the evening before, sharp losses at Elhson's Mill. 

" Soon after 2 p.m., A, P. Hill's force, between us and New Cold Harbor, 
again began to show an aggressive disposition, independent of its own 
troops on its flanks, by advancing from under cover of the woods, in lines 
well formed and extending, as the contest progressed from in front of 
Martin's battery to Morell's left. 

"Dashing across the intervening plains, floundering in the swamps, 
and strugghng against the tangled brushwood, brigade after brigade 
seemed to almost melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery 
and infantry ; yet others pressed on, followed by supports as dashing and 
as brave as their predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the dis- 
heartening effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and 
dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing back in great dis- 
order from the deadly contest. For nearly two hours the battle raged, 
extending more or less along the whole line to our extreme right. 



126 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



"The fierce firing of artillery and infantry, the crash of the shot, the 
bursting of shells, and the whizzing of bullets heard above the roar of 
artillery and the volleys of musketry, all combined, was something fearful. 

"Regiments quickly replenished their exhausted ammiuiition by bor- 



C(wtiesllH\i. 

new- 
CoW 






/ 







Q^ 



»^* ^' Ql 



6 



n<(erv. 






1060 y«*S «5H4g^ 






Cnhticr^u 



7!ccLcroI 



rowing from more bountifully supplied and generous companions; some 
withdrew temporarily for ammunition, and fresh regiments took their 
places, ready to repulse, sometimes to pursue, their desperate enemy, 
for the purpose of retaking ground from which we had been pressed, and 
which it was necessary to occupy in order to hold our position." 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 127 

It is to make one almost sick of regret to read of such desperate 
valor so lavishly wasted upon an impossible effort, while three 
times as many men stood by and looked on, A. P. Hill's accoimt 
of it in his official report is as follows : — 

"The incessant roar of musketry and deep thunder of artillery told 
that the whole force of the enemy was in my front. Branch becoming 
hard pressed, Pender was sent in to his relief. Field and Archer were 
also directed to do their part in this murderous contest. Braxton's 
battery, accompanying Archer, had already opened. They were ordered 
to turn the enemy's left. These two brigades under their heroic leaders, 
moving across the open field, met the enemy behind an abattis and strong 
intrenchments at the base of a long wooded hill, the enemy being in three 
hnes on the side of this declivity, its crest falling off into a plateau, and this 
plateau studded with guns. 

"My front now presented a curved line, its convexity toward the enemy. 
Desperate but unavailing attempts were made to force the enemy's 
positions. The 14th S.C., Col. McGowan (having hurried up from picket 
duty on the other side of the Chickahominy, and arriving in the thickest 
of the fight), on the extreme left, made several daring charges. The 16th 
N.C., Col. McElroy, and 22d, Lt.-Col. Gray, at one time carried the crest 
of the hill, and were in the enemy's camp, but were driven back by over- 
whelming numbers. The 35th Ga., Col. Thomas, also drove through the 
enemy's line like a wedge, but it was all of no avail. Gregg and 
Branch fought with varying success, Gregg having before him the 
vaunted Zouaves and Sykes's regulars. Pender's brigade was suffering 
heavily, but stubbornly held its own. Field and Archer met a wither- 
ing storm of bullets, but pressed on to within a short distance of the 
enemy's works, but the storm was too fierce for such a handful of 
men. They recoiled and were again pressed to the charge, but with 
no better success. These brave men had done all that any soldiers 
could do. Directing their men to lie down, the fight was continued 
and help awaited. From having been the attacking, I now became 
the attacked, but stubbornly, gallantly, was the ground held. My 
division was thus engaged fully two hours before assistance was 
received. We failed to carry the enemy's lines, but we paved the 
way for the successful attacks afterward, in which attacks it was 
necessary to employ the whole of our army on that side of the Chicka- 
hominy. 

"About four o'clock reenforcements came up on my right from Gen. 
Longstreet, and later, Jackson's men on my right and centre, and my 
division was relieved of the weight of the contest. It was then con- 
tinued on more equal terms, and finally the extreme left of the enemy's 
line was most gallantly carried by Hood's brigade. 

"At seven o'clock the General-in-chief, in person, gave me an order to 



128 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

advance my whole line and to communicate this order as far as I could 
to all commanders of troops. This was done, and a general advance 
being made, the enemy were swept from the field and the pursuit only 
stopped by nightfall, and the exhaustion of our troops. The batteries 
of Crenshaw, Johnson, Braxton, and Pegram were actively engaged, 
Crenshaw and Johnson pretty well knocked to pieces. Pegram, with 
indomitable energy and earnestness of purpose, though having lost 47 
men and many horses at Mechanicsville, had put his battery in condition 
for this fight also." 

Lee's official report of this battle was not written until eight 
months afterward, during which period Jackson's great military 
genius had manifested itself undimmed by any spell; and with 
increasing brilliancy on the fields of Cedar Mountain, Second 
Manassas, Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg. 
There was, most wisely and properly, every disposition to ignore 
and forget the disappointments felt during the Seven Days, and 
the facts are glossed over with but brief and, as it were, casual 
mention, but they are plainly apparent. 

Lee by no means designed that A. P. Hill should alone engage 
the whole of Porter's force. He had had a personal interview 
with Jackson during the morning, and he knew that the head 
of his column was at Cold Harbor before 2 p.m. He expected it 
to immediately envelop and to turn Porter's right. He says 
that Hill — 

"Immediately formed his line nearly parallel to the road toward 
McGehee's house, and soon became hotly engaged. The arrival of Jack- 
son on our left was momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his 
approach would cause the extension of the enemy's line in that direction. 
Under this impression Longstreet was held back until this movement 
should commence." 

Hill went into action anticipating that Jackson's whole force 
would almost immediately be demonstrating or attacking upon 
the enemy's right flank. Why were they not? The head of 
the column was up, but it was hidden from the enemy's view 
in the woods, and its whole length, stretching for miles back, 
was simply standing idle in the road. Had the divisions even 
been closed up and disentangled from ordnance wagons, artillery, 
and ambulances, and massed near Cold Harbor, the time would 
not have been entirely wasted, but this was not done. Stern 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 129 

necessity, at length, forced Lee to call upon Longstreet's division 
to aid A. P. Hill. Three brigades were advanced within musket 
range as supports, but held back from the charge while the re- 
maining three were held near at hand and ready for action. At 
length, — probably about 4.30, — aroused to action both by the 
receding sounds of A. P. Hill's battle, and by urgent messages 
from Lee, Jackson sent D. H. Hill's division back into the wood 
from which he had withdrawn it before two o'clock. He also 
sent a staff-officer to his other divisions with instructions, quoted 
by Henderson, as follows : — 

"The troops are standing at ease along our line of march. Ride back 
rapidly along the line, and tell the commanders to advance instantly in 
echelon from the left. Each brigade is to follow as a guide, the right regi- 
ment of the brigade on the left, and to keep within supporting distance. 
Tell the commanders if this formation fails at any point, to form line of 
battle and move to the front, pressing to the sound of the heaviest firing, 
and attack the enemy vigorously wherever found. As to artillery, each 
commander must use his discretion. If the ground will at all permit, tell 
them to take in their field-batteries and use them. If not, post them in 
the rear." 

That the troops were still standing halted along the line of 
march appears in the official reports, as well as in the time con- 
sumed before they were able to make their power felt in the 
battle. This required from one to two hours. 

Winder, commanding Jackson's division, reports : — 

"Left bivouac near Totopotomoy Creek at about 5 a.m., being in the 
rear of the column, except one brigade. The march was slow and tedi- 
ous [about seven miles during the whole day]. Firing was heard on 
the right. Between 4 and 5 p.m. I received orders from Gen. Ewell 
to move up rapidly. I ordered the ordnance wagons and artillery to halt, 
and moved the brigade from the column fiUng to the right through a wood 
and swamp, to the point where I heard the heaviest fire." 

Lawton's official report says : — 

"In the order of march toward the battle-field on that day my brigade 
brought up the rear of Gen. Jackson's army, and was, therefore, the 
last to engage the enemy. I had remained at a halt for several hours, 
more than two miles from the point where the brigade afterward entered 
the field, and was not ordered forward until nearly 5 p.m. I then marched 
rapidly on, retarded much by the artillery and ambulances which blocked 
up the narrow road." 



130 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

While Jackson's troops were being brought up, the noise of 
battle waned, until an ominous silence seemed to possess the 
field as the sun drew near the horizon. Then the storm arose 
again and soon swelled to a magnitude never before heard on this 
continent. 

It was about seven o'clock when at last D. H. Hill, Ewell, 
Lawton, and a part of Winder were all hotly engaged in the 
swampy tangle in front of the Federal right, and, though in 
great confusion, were making headway through it, and several 
Confederate batteries were returning the Federal fire. Opposite 
their left. Whiting's two brigades had just arrived, being directed 
by Lee as they approached from Cold Harbor, and two of Winder's 
brigades were also close at hand. A. P. Hill's brigades, though 
much diminished, were still holding their fines, and Longstreet 
was all in position. It was, practically, anybody's fight. A 
fresh division to Porter would have easily held his fines until 
night. It might even have enabled him to make an effective 
counterstroke, though the natural obstacles behind which his 
lines were located, offered but one or two possible opportunities. 
Two fresh brigades, French's and Meagher's, were en route to 
him, but were yet too far off to lend any aid. 

But Lee, at last, was putting forth his whole strength. He 
issued orders for an advance of every command, regardless of 
the troops upon its right or left. A general advance was made, 
not simultaneous in its beginnings, but pressed to success by 
Whiting's two brigades supported by Longstreet on our extreme 
right, by Lawton's and Winder's brigades in the centre, and by 
D. H. Hill with Garland's and parts of Ripley's and Rodes's 
brigades upon our left. 

Had it been made two hours earfier, the fruits of the victory 
would have been important. As it was, they were so trifling 
as scarcely to be worth mention. Porter fell back in fairly good 
order under cover of his superior artillery, and our artillery could 
not be gotten forward across the swamps. Blessed night, for 
which the defeated pray, had let down her mantle while the 
firing was stiU severe, and before we could even feel fully assured 
of our victory. Under its friendly cover, and the protection of 
the French and Meagher brigades, by 4 a.m. the whole Federal 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE ATTACK 131 

army had crossed the Chickahominy, damaging the bridges be- 
hind them, and leaving us, as the fruits of victory, but 22 guns, 
2836 prisoners, and about 10,000 small-arms. 

The Federal casualties were reported as: killed 894, wounded 
3107, missing 2836, total 6837. 

The Confederate casualties cannot be exactly divided, but I 
estimate the total losses of the different divisions for this battle, 
as follows : — 

A. P. Hill's division, 6 brigades, 2688 



Longstreet's 
D. H. Hill's 

Whiting's 

Ewell's 

Jackson's 



Lawton's brigade _1 



1883 (Only 5 engaged.) 

1423 

1017 

764 
91 (Only 1 engaged.) 

492 



Totals 26 8358 

The heavy character of much of the fighting is shown by some 
of the regimental losses, although in many instances the reports 
give only the total casualties for the Seven Days, and do not 
distinguish between the battles. The charge by Whiting's two 
brigades, under Hood and Law, was notable for being driven 
home on the first effort, without halting to open fire. The 4th 
Tex., the first regiment to enter the enemy's works, lost 44 
killed and 206 wounded. There was no thicket or obstruction 
to seriously check the advance at this portion of the field, and 
part of the ground traversed was exposed to but httle artillery 
fire. 

Trimble, of Ewell's division, made the following observations 
in his official report : — 

" The subjoined list of killed and wounded best shows the severity of the 
conflict, and a comparison of those of different regiments fairly illustrates 
the superiority of a rapid charge over a standing fight, not only as the 
best mode of securing victories, but doing it with smaller loss. The 
15th Ala. and 21st Ga., numbering 1315 men, stood under a destructive 
fire for an hour or more, returning the enemy's volleys all the time, 
and advanced half a mile, with only fragments of companies, at the close 
of the day. Their loss in killed and wounded was 251 men. The 16th 
Miss, and 21st N.C., numbering 1244 men, passed under as hot a fire an 
equal distance in 15 minutes, losing in killed and wounded only 85 men." 



132 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Briefly, it may be said of this battle that it seems to have been 
left in the hands of the division commanders until it was nearly 
lost. Only at the last moment was the hand of the general in 
command revealed. But had Jackson's march that morning 
been pushed with the fierce swiftness natural to him on such 
occasions, and had he, during A. P. Hill's attack, thrown his 
whole force upon McClellan's right, a comparatively easy victory 
would have resulted. As has been stated, the enemy's right flank 
was his weakest point. It was not found. D. H. Hill would 
have attacked it even before A. P. Hill's battle, had not Jack- 
son stopped and withdrawn him, instead of reenforcing and 
pushing him, as it was naturally expected that Jackson would 
do — although no man ever needed pushing less than D. H. Hill. 
In the Century War Book, he wrote of this occasion : — 

"Had Jackson's command gone in on the left of the road running by 
the McGehee House, Porter's position would have been turned and the 
line of retreat cut off." 



CHAPTER VIII 

Seven Days' Campaign. The Puksuit 

June 28. June 29. Magruder's Report. Jackson's Report. Lee's 
Report. Lee to Magruder. Savage Station. June 30. Waiting in 
vain for the Signal. Holmes's Division. Huger's Division. Wright 
meets Jackson. Huger's Report. Jackson, June 29. Lee to Ma- 
gruder. Jackson, June 30. White Oak Swamp. Franklin's Report. 
Jackson's Account. The Cannonade. Munford's letter. Hampton's 
Crossing. Franklin's Comments. D. H. Hill's Explanation. Battle 
of Frazier Farm. Bayonet Fighting. A Successful Ruse. Lee's 
Report. 

The day after the battle, Saturday, the 28th, was given to the 
care of the wounded, the burial of the dead, and the collection 
of the scattered troops. During the night McClellan had begun 
his retreat to the James, ordering Keyes, with the 4th corps, to 
cross White Oak Swamp and take position to cover the passage 
of his trains, which were put in motion early on the 28th. On 
the 28th, also, the troops which had fought under Porter on the 
27th were sent forward across White Oak Swamp. 

On the Confederate side it was not yet clear what the enemy 
would do. Ewell's and Jackson's divisions had not been seriously 
engaged, and Ewell's was sent down the Chickahominy about seven 
miles to Despatch Station, to see if they showed any disposition 
to cross the stream and retreat down the Peninsula. Stuart's 
cavalry followed the railroad toward White House. Bottom's 
bridge was found burned, and the next morning White House 
was also burned and evacuated. On Sunday morning, the 29th, 
the enemy's intrenchments opposite Magruder and Huger were 
found abandoned, and his camps and depots were being burned. 
It was then apparent that his destination was the James River, 
and Lee, no longer hesitating, issued orders to his whole army 
for a vigorous pursuit. His best chance, that of destroying 
Porter's corps, had been lost ; but his adversary was on foot in 

133 



134 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

the woods, encumbered with enormous trains which he would 
try to defend, and there should be opportunities to overwhelm 
him in detail, and unprotected by breastworks. 

Magruder, immediately behind the enemy on the Williamsburg 
road, was ordered to pursue down that road. Huger, on the 
Charles City road, was ordered down that road. From the 
battle-field of the 27th, A. P. Hill and Longstreet were ordered 
to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and passing in rear 
of Magruder and Huger to move by the Darbytown, the next 
road to the right. Ewell from Despatch Station was to rejoin 
Jackson. Jackson, with the largest force, was directed to pursue 
by the shortest and most direct route. He was to cross the 
Chickahominy over the Grapevine bridge, across which Porter 
had retreated, and which he had partially torn up, and to press 
directly upon McClellan's rear with his whole force. This com- 
prised his own three brigades under Winder, Swell's three, 
D. H. Hill's five. Whiting's two, and Lawton's one, — in all 14 
brigades, nearly 25,000 strong. 

Looking back upon the course of events, it is interesting to 
inquire wherein lay the weakness of this order, apparently so 
simple and obvious in its execution. Yet the pursuit, from 
this moment, was bootless and a failure. It did capture a few 
guns and prisoners, but it paid for them in blood a price far be- 
yond their value. There were two ways in which Lee might have 
pursued. One is that just set forth. The recommendation of 
that method is that it seemed to reach the enemy with his largest 
forces by the shortest roads. But, per contra, is the considera- 
tion that on the shortest roads will be found the enemy's most 
formidable rear-guards and obstructions. With energetic Ueu- 
tenants these may be overcome ; but the chance exists whether 
the proper leaders will be at the right places. The alternate 
course would have been to leave the direct pursuit over the 
obstructed roads, and against the enemy's rear-guards, to but two 
divisions, — those of Magruder and Huger, — while Lee himself 
with Jackson, Longstreet, and A. P. Hill, moving swiftly around 
the rear by good roads, and reenforced by Holmes, put the 
bulk of his army, flushed with its recent victory, directly across 
McClellan's path near Malvern Hill. 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 135 

Not only would it count for a great deal that all the divisions 
should be under the personal eye of the commander, but there 
was strong probability that Lee might be able to force upon 
McClellan the disadvantage of having to take the offensive. On 
this occasion, as it turned out, Jackson was still under his "spell," 
and did nothing. Lee, having gone with Longstreet and A. P. 
Hill, lost touch of all three, — Jackson, Magruder, and Huger, — 
and entirely failed to get any service from them for the two 
critical days, the 29th and 30th. 

The orders for the pursuit were given soon after sunrise on 
Sunday, the 29th. Magruder had not entirely absorbed Lee's 
confidence that McClellan did not have in him the risking of a 
counter stroke. He knew that there were on the south side fully 
60,000 Federals, and that between them and Richmond there 
were now but 25,000 Confederates. His official report thus 
describes the situation: — 

"I received repeated instructions during Saturday night from Gen. 
Lee's headquarters enjoining upon my command the utmost vigilance, 
directing the men to sleep on their arms, and to be prepared for whatever 
might occur. These orders were promptly communicated by me to the 
different commanders of my forces, and were also transmitted to Gen. 
Huger on my right. I passed the night without sleep and in superin- 
tendence of their execution. Had McClellan massed his whole force in 
column and advanced against any point in our line . . . though the head 
of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have 
insured him success. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our 
wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent. 

"Our relief was therefore great when inteUigence reached us almost 
simultaneously from Col. Chilton and one of my staff, that the enemy, 
whose presence had been ascertained as late as 3.30 a.m., had evacuated 
his works and was retreating. 

"Col. Chilton, who rode into my camp on Sunday morning, hurried 
me off to see Gen. Lee on the Nine Mile road, and I gave, while riding 
with him, the necessary orders to put in motion my whole command, 
which extended over a distance of some miles, directing Gen. Griffith's 
brigade, which was nearest to the road, to advance at once from the 
centre, and ordering Gen. Jones's division, in advancing, to incline 
toward Fair Oaks Station, as I had been informed that Maj .-Gen- 
Jackson had crossed, or was crossing, the Grapevine bridge, and would 
operate down the Chickahominy. Having overtaken Gen. Lee, we rode 
together down the Nine Mile road, and the general informed me of the 



136 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

plans which he had adopted for the pursuit of the enemy. They were 
as follows : Longstreet's division was to have crossed the New Bridge and 
to take position on our extreme right, so as to intercept the enemy in his 
attempt to reach James River; Huger's division to march down the 
WiUiamsburg road on my right flank, and Maj.-Gen. Jackson's divi- 
sion, which he stated had crossed or was crossing the Grapevine bridge, 
over the Chickahominy River, was to operate doT\Ti that river on its right 
bank, while my own command would press him "\dgorously in front. 

" At Fair Oaks Station . . . Gen. Lee, having repeated his instructions, 
left the ground. . . . 

"I also despatched a staff-officer toward Grapevine Bridge, some three 
miles off, to ascertain the position of Maj.-Gen. Jackson's troops, 
which I had supposed from the statements above given had already 
crossed. ... In the meantime, Maj. Bryan, the staff-officer who had 
been sent to Maj.-Gen. Jackson, returned with his [Jackson's] engineer, 
Lt. Boswell, who reported that Maj.-Gen. Jackson was compelled to 
rebuild the bridge, which would be completed in about two hours. Maj . 
Bryan reported that Maj.-Gen. Jackson had crossed but a small portion 
of his infantry, not more than three companies, over the broken bridge." 

It is plain from this narrative that Lee's orders to Jackson to 
pursue by the Grapevine bridge road, above referred to, con- 
templated immediate performance on Jackson's part, and were 
given at an early hour on Sunday, the 29th. The name Grape- 
vine, applied to this bridge, was taken from a ford of the Chicka- 
hominy well known in the neighborhood, and reached by a coun- 
try road which crossed the swamp by the ford. In building a 
bridge the Federals utilized the road, and built the bridge near 
it, but without disturbing the ford, which was practicable at this 
time, the river being low, even while waiting to repair the 
bridge. 

Meanwhile, too, New Bridge and another bridge, three-quarters 
of a mile above it, were opened by Lee's order on Satm-day, the 
28th. The extra distance, which would have been involved in 
marching from the battle-field to Savage Station by the New 
Bridge, instead of by the Grapevine route, was only about three 
miles. But this was Sunday, and Jackson gave it strict observ- 
ance. The greater part of his troops remained in camp all 
day and until after midnight Sunday night. Then they made a 
start at, or before, 2.30 a.m. His official report entirely ignores 
the receipt of any orders from Gen. Lee, but says : — 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 137 

"The 28th and 29th were occupied in disposing of the dead and wounded 
and repairing Grapevine bridge over the Chickahominy, which McClel- 
lan's forces had used in their retreat and destroyed in their rear. During 
the night of the 29th we commenced crossing the Chickahominy, and on 
the following morning arrived at Savage Station." 

Lee, in his official report, written as before told, eight months 
later, accepts the excuse of Grapevine bridge, as follows : — 

"Jackson's route led to the flank and rear of Savage Station, but he 
was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing Grapevine bridge. Late 
in the afternoon, Magruder attacked the enemy with one of his three 
divisions [two brigades each], and two regiments of another. A severe 
action ensued, and continued about two hours, when it was terminated 
by night. The troops displayed great gallantry, and inflicted heavy 
loss upon the enemy ; but, owing to the lateness of the hour and the small 
force employed, the result was not decisive, and the enemy continued his 
retreat under cover of darkness, leaving several hundred prisoners, with 
his dead and wounded, in our hands." 

This was the insignificant outcome of the day, and in his refer- 
ence to Jackson's delay and to the lateness of the hour and the 
small force engaged, one may easily read that he had hoped to 
have had a very different story. 

After giving Magruder his orders, but unfortunately without 
waiting to see that Jackson failed to arrive, Lee had gone over 
to the Charles City road, where Huger was advancing, and thence 
he passed on to the Darbytown road to join A. P. Hill and 
Longstreet. Soon after being left alone, finding that Jackson 
was not near, Magruder became alarmed at a demonstration of 
the enemy's rear-guard, and sent such urgent calls for aid to 
Huger that the latter halted two of his four brigades, and marched 
back with them to Seven Pines. This lost for his division the 
cream of the day. Here he discovered the needlessness of 
Magruder's alarm, and, getting urgent messages from Lee, he 
returned to the Charles City road, marched down it until he 
found the enemy's pickets, late in the afternoon, and went into 
bivouac. 

Lee was much disappointed that evening at the lack of results, 
and wrote Magruder the following note : ^ — 

10. R. 13, 687. 



138 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

" General, I regret much that you have made so little progress to-day 
in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory the 
pursuit should be most vigorous. I must urge you then again to press 
on his rear, rapidly and steadily. We must lose no more time or he will 
escape us entirely." 

This note had also a postscript which will be quoted presently 
in another connection. 

Magruder had only brought into action two brigades, — 
Kershaw's and Semmes's, — and a half of Barksdale's. The force 
engaged against him had been Sumner's corps, and Smith's divi- 
sion of Franklin's. Heintzelman's corps had also been present in 
the morning, but in the afternoon it had crossed White Oak Swamp 
at Brackett's Ford. The remaining nine Federal brigades were, 
doubtless, too heavy a task for Magruder with only six, but had 
Jackson with his 14 brigades been present in the morning, the 
enemy should have been routed. Doubtless Magruder should 
have employed twice the force he did engage, and taken chances. 
His two and a half brigades were overmatched, though they 
fought until dark, losing over 400 men, and capturing prisoners 
from each of the three divisions opposed to them. They re- 
ported next morning 400 dead left by the enemy on the field, 
but such reports are always overestimated. 

Jackson arrived in person at Magruder's headquarters near 
Savage Station at 3.30 a.m. on Monday, the 30th, and informed 
Magruder that his troops would be up soon after dayhght. 

During the night, the entire Federal force had crossed the 
White Oak Swamp and McClellan had accompUshed one-half his 
retreat safely. He had had only about 16 miles to traverse, and 
his trains were now upon the last half of it, with his army well 
concentrated to protect his flank. With one more day his column 
would be so shortened that no exposed flank would be left, and 
his whole army could be united in the rear of the train. 

This was, therefore, the critical day. Serious blows had 
threatened the Federals on the 26th at Beaver Dam, on the 27th 
at Gaines Mill, and on the 29th at Savage Station ; but all had 
been escaped by bad handling on the part of the Confederates. 
Now a final opportunity was offered to repair all shortcomings, 
and every condition seemed favorable. Holmes's division, 6000 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 139 

strong, with six batteries, had been brought from south of the 
James River, and was at New Market at 10 a.m. on the 30th. 
Longstreet, with his own and A. P. Hill's divisions, had bivouacked 
on the Darbytown road, the night before, and this morning they 
moved into the Long Bridge road, and soon found the enemy's 
line covering Charles City cross-roads at Frazer's Farm or Glen- 
dale, and extending down the Quaker road toward Malvern Hill. 
These three divisions, 14 brigades, numbered about 23,000 men. 

In addition to these, Lee, early on the 30th, had withdrawn 
Magruder's six brigades, now about 12,000 strong, from Savage 
Station, and brought them down the Darbytown road within 
striking distance by 2 p.m., and had halted them at that hour 
near Timberlake's store. 

Huger's four brigades, about 9000 men, were advancing down 
the Charles City road, and were expected to open the action on 
this part of the field at an early hour. Either his guns or Jack- 
son's would be the signal for Longstreet and A. P. Hill to take 
up the battle. 

Meanwhile, Jackson, only four miles off in an air Une, but all 
of 15 miles by the pubhc roads, — the only ones generally known, — 
was confidently expected to make up for his non-appearance of 
the day before by an early and very vigorous one this morning, 
assaulting the enemy's rear-guard with his 14 brigades, 25,000 
strong, and emulating the reputation he had made in the Valley. 
Thus, with 44,000 men, all close at hand upon the enemy's 
flank, and Stonewall Jackson with 25,000 in his rear, fortune 
seemed at last about to smile broadly for once upon the Con- 
federate cause. Unknown to us, another circumstance was 
rarely in our favor. The Federal army was temporarily with- 
out a head. On the 29th, 30th, and July 1, McClellan, on each 
day, left his army without placing any one in command during 
his absence, while he did engineer's duty, examining the locaU- 
ties toward which he was marching. Had the Confederates 
accomplished their reasonable expectations, the criticism of 
McClellan would have been very severe. 

On the Confederate side, Lee, with Longstreet and Hill, in a 
field of broom-grass and small pines, waited impatiently for the 
signal. 



140 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

He was so close in rear of. his line of battle that men and 
horses among the couriers and staff, were womided by random 
shots. For quite a time, too. President Davis and his staff 
were present, in conference with the generals, while missiles 
grew more frequent, and wounded men began to come in from 
the front. 

For hours we stood there waiting — waiting for something 
which never happened. Every minute that we waited was 
priceless time thrown away. Twelve o'clock came and the pre- 
cious day was half gone. One o'clock, two o'clock, three o'clock 
followed. Even four o'clock drew near, and now, whatever was 
started, would be cut short by night. Our great opportimity 
was practically over, and we had not yet pulled a trigger. We 
had waited for either Huger or Jackson or both to begin, and 
neither had begun. As Beauregard, at Bull Run, had sent word 
to Ewell to begin, and then had gone to the centre and waited; 
as Johnston, at Seven Pines, had given orders to Hill and Loiig- 
street about beginning, and then gone to the left and waited; 
so now, Lee, having given orders beforehand to both Jackson 
and Huger, had passed on to the right and was waiting ; and in 
every case the opportunity passed unimproved. 

Briefly, this is what had happened, beginning with the extreme 
right colunm under Holmes, which, with Magruder's column, 
was to support Longstreet's right : — 

The river road from New Market to Harrison's Landing passed 
under and around Malvern Heights, between them and the river. 
From a point on this road, perhaps a mile and a half from the 
river, across low, flat ground, one could see a considerable ex- 
panse of the Malvern Heights, 1000 yards off across the meadows 
on the left; and over these heights were passing many of the 
5000 wagons composing McClellan's trains. No target is more 
attractive to an artillerist than his enemy's wagon train, and six 
rifle guns of Holmes's were sent down in the meadows to fire 
upon these wagons. Lee also saw the position, and approved 
the attack, and directed Holmes to bring up his whole division 
to support the guns. But no sooner did the six guns open than 
they were replied to by 30 of the heaviest rifles of the Federal 
Artillery Reserve, which, escorted by only about 1500 infantry 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT . 141 

under Fitz-John Porter, had just arrived on Malvern Heights 
to occupy the position. The fierce fire of this great battery 
was quickly aided by the fire of heavy guns from the gunboats 
in the James — lying in Turkey Bend, and directing their fire 
by wigwag signals between their mastheads — and the Federals 
on the Heights. The six guns were quickly wrecked. Two 
caissons were exploded, and so many horses killed that the guns 
were with difficulty withdrawn. No fire is so appalhng to un- 
seasoned troops as that of heavy artillery received in a thick 
wood where every shot cuts limbs and smashes trees around 
them, even though the actual damage from it may be trifling. 
Holmes's whole division, concealed in the woods in the vicinity of 
the six guns engaged, was now exposed to such a fire, converg- 
ing from opposite quarters. There was but one thing to do, and 
that was to get away. Some commands, especially among the 
infantry, behaved well, and withdrew in perfect order; some 
were thrown into confusion, and among some cavalry commands 
and light artillery a stampede took place. Two guns which had 
not been engaged were entangled in the woods and abandoned, 
and many men were run over and injured. Altogether, the con- 
fusion was so great that Lee directed Magruder's six brigades 
to march to Holmes's support, though they could have done no 
good, as there was nothing for them to attack or defend. 

Thus, Holmes and Magruder, 18,000 men, were diverted from 
the real work of the day. This was just about to begin when 
this side issue of the cannonade of Malvern Hill was ventured 
upon. The total casualties in Holmes's division (including 15 
wounded among the six guns) were two killed and 49 wounded, 
besides some injured in the stampede. 

Let us next turn to Huger's division. On Sunday, the 29th, 
the division made but a very short distance down the Charles 
City road for two reasons. Two of its brigades were called back, 
and had some miles of extra marching and countermarching in 
the hot sun by Magruder's false alarm when he found that he 
was not supported by the proximity of Jackson, as has been 
already told. 

The other two brigades thought it imprudent to pass any road 
on their left leading across White Oak Swamp, until it had been 



142 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

reconnoitred, as it was known that a large force of the enemy 
was still on the other side. 

At the first of these cross-roads, a force of the enemy was dis- 
covered attempting to cross to the south side. It was driven 
back, and the resulting skirmish consumed the day. 

It seems strange that Lee, though at no great distance on 
the next day (the 30th), should have still failed to see Huger, 
and either to bring him to the battle, which was waiting for his 
arrival, or to order it to proceed without him. But there is no 
intimation in the reports, of any communication ; nor, in Huger's 
proceedings, of any consciousness that important action was 
waiting upon him. 

At another swamp crossing, called Fisher's, Huger's column, 
Monday morning, discovered that the enemy's forces on the 
opposite side had been withdrawn. Wright's brigade was then 
ordered to investigate. He crossed the swamp with his brigade 
and got into the deserted camps of the enemy on the north side, 
picking up a few prisoners and finding some abandoned stores. 

By 2,30 P.M. he had made his way entirely across to the main 
road where Jackson, as is yet to be told, with his 14 brigades, was 
standing at bay at the main crossing, called the White Oak 
Bridge. Jackson seems to have taken no special interest in 
Wright's arrival, though it proved that at least one unob- 
structed crossing of the swamp was within three miles. Jackson 
ordered Wright to return along the edge of the swamp, to look 
for crossings as he went, and if he found one, to try and force 
it ; but he sent neither staff-officer to bring back a report, or re- 
enforcements to aid if any favorable point should be found. 
Apparently, he was satisfied to remain where he was and to do 
only what he was doing — nothing. Wright started back, and 
at one and a half miles came to Brackett's Ford, a well-known 
road, across which a large part of the Federal forces had crossed 
during the night, and which they had then obstructed by cutting 
down trees and destroying a small bridge. Pushing two com- 
panies of skirmishers through the swamp, Wright captured the 
enemy's picket force on the south side, but saw, beyond the 
picket, a force of the enemy with artillery, too strong for his 
brigade ; so he withdrew. Continuing his march along the edge 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 143 

of the swamp another mile and a half, he found a cow trail 
which led him across it about three-fourths of a mile below his 
crossing of the morning, and here he encamped. The occupa- 
tion of Huger 's other brigades during the day is given as follows 
in his official report : — 

" The troops bivouacked in their position while it was dark, and resumed 
the march at daylight (Monday, June 30) . Mahone advanced cautiously, 
captured many prisoners, and killed some cavalry scouts, one bearing an 
order to Kearny to retire and keep a strong battery of artillery with his 
rear-guard. After passing Fisher's house, we found the road obstructed 
by trees felled all across it. Gen. Mahone found it best to cut a road 
around the obstructions. For such work we were deficient in tools. The 
column was delayed while the work was going on, and it was evening 
before we got through and drove off the workmen who were still cutting 
down other trees. As we advanced through the woods and came to an 
open field on high ground (P. Williams on map), a powerful battery of 
rifled guns opened on us. Gen. Mahone disposed his troops and ad- 
vanced a battery of artillery, Moorman's, and a sharp artillery fire was 
kept up for some time. The enemy's fire was very severe and we had 
many men killed and wounded. List of casualties sent herewith (25 
killed, 53 wounded, total 78). I went to the front and examined the 
position. I withdrew most of our guns, and only kept up a moderate 
fire. On our left the White Oak Swamp approached very near. The right 
appeared to be good ground, and I determined to turn the battery by mov- 
ing a column of infantry to my right. It was now dark." 

It seems incredible that this division, within four miles of 
Lee, could have been allowed to spend the whole day in a mere 
contest of axemen, wherein the Federals, with the most axes, 
had only to cut down, and the Confederates, with the fewest, 
to cut up and remove. The result could scarcely have been 
doubtful. Our army at this time compared with an organized 
and disciplined army about as a confederacy would compare 
with a nation. Each division was an alHed but independent 
command, rather than a part of a single army. 

This will be even more evident in the story of Jackson's col- 
umn, now to be told. His command had always before acted 
alone and independently. Lee's instructions to him were very 
brief and general, in supreme confidence that the Jackson of the 
Valley would win even brighter laurels on the Chickahominy. 
The shortest route was assigned to him and the largest force was 



144 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

given him. Lee then took himself off to the farthest flank, as if 
generously to leave to Jackson the opportmiity of the most 
brilliant victory of the war. 

His failm-e is not so much a military as a psychological 
phenomenon. He did not try and fail. He simply made no 
effort. The story embraces two days. He spent the 29th in 
camp in disregard of Lee 's instructions, and he spent the 30th 
in equal idleness at White Oak Swamp. His 25,000 infantry 
practically did not fire a shot in the two days. 

Here is the story: It has already been related that early 
Sunday morning, Lee, coming from Jackson's direction, told 
Magruder that Jackson had been ordered to pursue, and was 
even then supposed to be crossing the Chickahominy. Magruder 
was also ordered to attack the enemy, and he and his lieutenants 
soon sent messengers to establish communication with Jack- 
son. Later, Magruder received a severe shock in the following 
note from Gen. Jones, commanding one of his three divisions, 
of two brigades each: — 

" Maj.-Gen. Magruder : 

"My line is formed to the left and somewhat to the front of Gen. Cobb. 
... I do not think it prudent for me to attack with my small force, 
unless there be a simultaneous attack all along our lines. I will keep a 
good lookout on my left. / had hoped that Jackson would have cooperated 
with me on my left, hut he sends me word that he cannot, as he has other 
important duty to perform.^ 

"Respectfully, D. R. Jones, Brig.-Gen." 

This note, taken in connection with the withdrawal of the 
two brigades which Huger had sent, depressed Magruder very 
much. Later in the evening he received some encouragement. 
Maj. Taylor of Lee's staff, bearing a message, arrived, hunting 
for Jackson. Upon being told that Jackson had been "ordered 
elsewhere," as Magruder loosely quoted his message to Jones, 
Taylor did not hesitate to say that there must be some mistake. 
As he did not know the country, and Magruder had upon his 
staff a Chaplain Allen who did know it, the message for Jackson 

1 13 W. R., 675, incorrectly dated June 28. On the 2Sth the retreat 
of the enemy was not known, and there were no orders to attack, or for 
Jackson to cross the Chickahominy. The situation is that of the 29th. 
The itahcs are mine. 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 145 

was intrusted to Allen, and Taylor returned to Lee. But Lee's 
note that night to Magruder, already quoted (p. 138), contained 
a postscript, as follows : — 

"P.S. Since the above was written I learn from Maj. Taylor that 
you are under the impression that Gen. Jackson has been ordered not 
to support you. On the contrary, he has been directed to do so, and to 
push the pursuit vigorously." 

It scarcely needs the corroboration of Lee 's word to know that, 
upon his discovery of McClellan's retreat, and his putting the 
rest of his army in motion with orders to press the enemy, he must 
have given similar orders to Jackson; and his statement to 
Magruder, that Jackson was even then crossing at Grapevine 
bridge, and his sending Taylor later with a message to Jackson, 
show that he beheved his orders were being executed. 

The explanation of Jackson's message to Jones is clear in the 
light of his regard for the Sabbath and from the particular ex- 
pression used. He mentions no physical obstacle nor any other 
demand upon his troops, who, indeed, are all resting quietly in 
their camps, but the "important duty^' to be performed seems to 
concern himself rather than his command, and to be entirely 
personal in character. Evidently, Jackson excused not only 
himself, but his troops also, because it was Sunday. He cer- 
tainly considered attendance upon divine service an "impor- 
tant duty" of the first magnitude. He confidently believed 
that marked regard for the Sabbath would often be followed by 
God 's favor upon one 's secular enterprises. If so, why not upon 
a battle or a campaign ? We have seen even Lincoln share the 
same beUef when he stopped the advance of McDowell from 
Fredericksburg on Sunday, and thus broke up McClellan's 
campaign, as has been told. (See p. 101.) 

The rebuilding of Grapevine bridge was not a serious matter. 
Lee clearly anticipated no delay there whatever. Jackson's 
engineer, early Sunday morning, reported that it would be finished 
in two hours. There was a ford close by, and other bridges within 
a few miles, but most of Jackson 's troops spent the entire day in 
camp. 

His early start next morning would seem to promise more vigor 



146 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

in the performance for that day, but its history does not bear 
out the promise. It was but seven miles from the bivouacs which 
his men left about 2.30 a.m. to White Oak Bridge where they 
went into bivouac at night. No obstacle to a swift march existed, 
but the earliest arrival noted in the reports is at 9.30 a.m. by 
Col. Crutchfield of the Artillery. Jackson himself puts it later. 

White Oak Swamp rises between the Charles City and the 
Williamsburg road near where the Confederate lines crossed 
them, five miles from Richmond. The course of the stream is 
southeast, almost parallel to that of the Charles City road for 
about six miles. Then it turns and runs directly toward the 
Chickahominy some three miles away. Just above this bend was 
Brackett 's Ford, and about a mile below it was the main road 
crossing at which Jackson arrived about 9.30 a.m., Monday. The 
stream itself was a small creek, averaging 10 to 15 feet wide 
and six inches deep, with sandy bottom. The swamp was merely a 
flat area densely grown up in trees and bushes, more or less wet in 
places, but generally with firm footing. Small farms and settle- 
ments were scattered along its edges, and residents and cattle 
had many paths in and through it. It was widest near its source, 
where the country was flatter. Near the bridge the country was 
rolling and the swamp grew narrow. Four crossings above the 
bridge were well known to the natives, — Chapman's (or Good- 
man's), Jourdan's, Fisher's, and Brackett 's, — and one below 
called Carter 's ; but besides these were many less-known paths. 

The road crossing was held by Franklin, who thus describes 
the operations of the day in his official report: — 

"About noon I was directed by the commanding general to assume 
command at the position guarding the crossing of the swamp, and repaired 
there at once. I found that a terrific cannonade had been opened 
by the enemy upon the divisions of Gen. Smith and Gen. Richardson 
and the brigade of Gen. Naglee. The two latter had been placed under 
my command by the commanding general. The casualties in Richard- 
son's division were quite numerous, but I have received no report of the 
action from him. In Gen. Smith's division and in Gen. Naglee 's brigade 
the number lost was insignificant. 

"The enemy kept up the firing during the whole day and crossed some 
infantry below our position, but he made no very serious attempt to cross 
during the day, and contented himself with the cannonading and the firing 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 147 

of his sharp-shooters. Nightfall having arrived, and the wagons having 
all disappeared, I took the responsibility of moving my command to the 
James River by a road to the left which had not been much used, and 
arrived at headquarters safely about daylight." 

The infantry referred to by Franklin as having crossed were 
only D. H. Hill's skirmish-line. No effort was made to cross any- 
thing more. Jackson 's own account of the day is as follows : — 

"About noon we reached White Oak Swamp, and here the enemy made 
a determined effort to retard our advance, and thereby prevent an im- 
meditate junction between Gen. Longstreet and myself. We found the 
bridge destroyed and the ordinary place of crossing commanded by their 
batteries on the opposite side and all approach to it barred by detach- 
ments of sharp-shooters concealed in a dense wood close by. A battery 
of 28 guns from Hill's and Whiting's artillery was placed by Col. 
Crutchfield in a favorable position for driving off or silencing the opposing 
artillery. About 2 p.m. it opened suddenly upon the enemy. He fired a few 
shots in reply, and then withdrew from that position, abandoning part of his 
artillery. Capt. Wooding was immediately ordered near the bridge to shell 
the sharp-shooters from the woods, which was accomplished, and Munford's 
cavalry crossed the creek, but was soon compelled to retire. It was soon seen 
that the enemy occupied such a position beyond a thick intervening wood on 
the right of the road as enabled him to command the crossing. Capt. 
Wooding's batteries turned in the new direction. The fire so opened on both 
sides was kept up until dark. We bivouacked that night near the swamp. 

" A heavy cannonading in front announced the engagement of Gen. Long- 
street at Frazier's Farm and made me anxious to press forward, but the 
marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and 
creek, and the strong position of the enemy for defending the passage pre- 
vented my advancing until the following morning. During the night the 
Federals retired." 

Considered as an excuse for Jackson's inaction during the 
whole day this report is simply farcical. 

It appears from subordinate reports that the long delay be- 
tween the arrival of the head of Jackson 's column and the open- 
ing of his 28 guns was caused by cutting a road to enable the guns 
to be kept concealed while getting position. Concealment here 
was of httle value, and the time thus lost by the artillery, and the 
sending across of Munford's cavalry at the road crossing, illus- 
trate the prominent feature of Jackson's conduct during the 
whole Seven Days, — to wit : a reluctance to bring his infan- 
try into action. Here infantry alone could accomplish anything, 



148 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

but only cavalry and artillery were called upon. He could 
have crossed a brigade of infantry as easily as Munford's cavalry, 
and that brigade could have been the entering wedge which 
would spUt apart the Federal defence and let in the 13 brigades 
which followed. The bridge, whose destruction is mentioned, 
was not necessary to a crossing. It was only a high-water 
bridge with a ford by it which was preferably used except in 
freshets. Now the floor of the bridge, made of poles, had been 
thrown into the ford, but Munford's cavalry got through with- 
out trouble, and infantry could have swarmed across. 

The cannonade, which was kept up during all the rest of the 
day, was not only a delusion, but a useless burning both of daylight 
and ammunition, for it was all random fire. The Federal and 
Confederate artillery could not see each other at all. They 
could scarcely even see the high-floating smoke clouds of each 
other's guns. They fired by sound, at a distance of three-quar- 
ters of a mile, across a tall dense wood, until they exhausted their 
ammunition. One Federal battery reported the expenditure of 
1600 rounds. The noise was terrific, and some firing was kept up 
imtil nine o 'clock at night, but the casualties on each side were 
naturally but trifling. Only one Confederate battery, Rhett's, 
mentions any, and it reported but two killed and five wounded. 

No reconnoissance was made for other crossings, even of Brack- 
ett's, over which much of the Federal force had passed, until 
Wright's brigade arrived and was sent back, as has been told. 
Meanwhile, two other crossings available for infantry were dis- 
covered within a very short distance below, and were both at 
once reported to Jackson by the officers discovering them 
— Col. Munford, commanding his cavalry, and Gen. Hamp- 
ton, commanding the 3d brigade of Jackson's division. I 
have in possession letters from Munford to Hampton, and from 
Hampton to myself, giving the following details. 

I have already quoted from Jackson 's report that his cavalry, 
sent across the creek at first, was forced to retire. Col. Munford 
in a letter to Gen. Hampton, dated Mar. 23, 1901, writes : — 

"At the battle of White Oak Swamp, after Col. Crutchfield's artillery- 
had disabled one gun, and driven the cannoneers from the battery which 
commanded the crossing at the old bridge at White Oak Swamp, Gen. 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 149 

Jackson directed me to cross the creek, with my regiment, at the ford, 
and to secure the guns in front of us. The enemy's sharp-shooters were 
stationed in rear of the building overlooking the ford ; and as soon as 
we neared the abandoned battery of the enemy, these sharp-shooters, 
and another battery stationed in the road at the edge of the woods, and 
commanding the road and the ford over which we had passed, opened a 
furious fire upon us, and I was forced to move a quarter of a mile lower 
down the creek, where I found a cow path which led me over the swamp. 
But en route, I found where Gen. Franklin's troops had been located, 
having now changed front. They had left a long hne of knapsacks and 
blankets, from which I allowed my men to take what they pleased ; and 
among their things were many late newspapers from Washington, which 
I despatched by a courier to Gen. Jackson, giving him full information 
of what I had seen and how and where I had crossed. 

"Thirty-nine years is too long a time to attempt to say what I wrote 
him, but I know that I thought, all the time, that he could have crossed 
his infantry where we recrossed. I had seen his infantry cross far worse 
places, and I expected that he would attempt it. 

"We remained near where we recrossed all day, with a vidette on the 
other side of the swamp. He put his sharp-shooters in on the right of the 
ford, and made no attempt to cross where we recrossed. 

" Why, I never understood. 

"Yours sincerely, Thomas T. Munford." 

All the crossings so far described were paths already marked 
by use of men and cattle, but another opportunity was discovered 
and brought to Jackson's notice by Hampton, who was an 
expert woodsman and hunter. While the infantry stood idly 
by and the useless cannonade went on, nothing was more natural 
to Hampton than a personal reconnoissance in front. He found 
a crossing and the flank of the enemy's infantry line. He 
returned and reported it to Jackson. In the last year of his Ufe 
he wrote out the story as given below. He has only omitted from 
it, modestly, the fact that, when he reported to Jackson his 
discovery, he begged permission to take his brigade across im- 
mediately and attack it. This request was at first put off by the 
order to go and build a bridge. After the bridge was reported 
finished, the whole matter was silently ignored, as his narrative 
describes. 

Hampton 's narrative is as follows : — 

"We left the Chickahorainy on Monday morning, June 30, though my 
impression is that the Grapevine bridge could have been used on Sunday, and 



150 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

at any rate there was a good ford of the stream not far below the bridge, 
near the road followed by the retreating enemy. Early on the morning 
of Monday we reached the White Oak crossing, my brigade being in ad- 
vance; and about the same time the 2d Va. Cav. under Col. Munford 
came up. This regiment had accompanied Gen. Jackson from the Valley 
covering his advance. 

"We found a large hospital tent on the brow of the hill overlooking 
the crossing of the small stream over which a Uttle bridge of poles had been 
made. The enemy had pulled off the poles and thrown them in the stream 
above the bridge, and a battery of four guns on the opposite hill commanded 
the causeway and the ford of the stream. Gen. Jackson ran up some 
guns and soon silenced those of the enemy, disabling one of them. The 
battery was withdrawn, and Gen. Jackson, accompanied by the regi- 
ment of cavalry, crossed with a view, I suppose, of capturing the disabled 
gun, or of ascertaining the position of the enemy — none of whom were in 
sight except those manning the gun. In a few minutes the General 
returned alone, while Munford took his regiment a short distance down 
the stream, where he crossed without difficulty. As there were no further 
hostile demonstrations where we were, I placed my brigade in a pine forest 
on the left of the road leading to the ford, directing the men to He down ; 
and, desiring to ascertain the character of the ground in front of us, I 
rode to the edge of the swamp, accompanied by Capt. RawHns Lowndes, 
and my son Wade, who was serving on my staff at that time. The swamp 
was comparatively open, the ground not at all boggy, and we soon struck 
the stream. 

"This was very shallow, with a clear sandy bottom, and not more than 
10 or 15 feet wide. Crossing this, we soon came in sight of the open land 
opposite our position. 

"We could see a very wide and deep ravine in which was a line of 
Federals lying down in line of battle, and evidently expecting, if any 
attack was made upon them, it would be from the open field below the 
ford of the stream. In this event their position would have been very 
strong. 

"Withdrawing without attracting their notice, I returned across the 
swamp and gave to Gen. Jackson all the facts stated above. 

" He asked if I could make a bridge across the stream, to which I replied 
that I could make one for the infantry, but not for artillery, as cutting a 
road would disclose our position. He directed me to make the bridge. 
Ordering a detail of my men to cut some poles where they were standing 
and to carry them into the swamp, a bridge was made in a few minutes, 
I then again reconnoitred the position of the enemy whom I found per- 
fectly quiet — unsuspecting. On my return to our side of the swamp, I 
found Gen. Jackson seated on a fallen pine alongside of the road that 
led down to the ford, and seating myself by him, I reported the completion 
of the bridge and the exposed position of the enemy. He drew his cap" 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 151 

down over his eyes which were closed, and after listening to me for some 
minutes, he rose without speaking, and the next morning we found Frank- 
lin with the rest of the Federal troops concentrated on Malvern Hill. 

"While we were waiting at the White Oak crossing we heard the noise 
of Longstreet's battle at Frazier's Farm, and Capt. or Maj. Fairfax 
of Longstreet's staff came with a message from the general to Gen. 
Jackson. Though I heard this message, I cannot recall it. . . . In speak- 
ing to Gen. Lee in 1868 on this subject he expressed the greatest sur- 
prise at my account of this matter, and he said that he never had under- 
stood why the delay had occurred. . . . 

" Gen. Jackson was too great a soldier, and I was too much attached 
to him, for me to venture to criticise his actions or his plans, but it seems 
to me that everything which throws light on the plans of our great 
chief, Gen. Lee, should go down in history. I believe that if Franklin, 
who opposed us at White Oak, could have been defeated, the Federal 
army would have been destroyed. . . . 

"Yoiirs truly, 

"Wade Hampton." 

Much comment suggests itself, but little is needed : Who that 
fought with Lee can picture to himself without emotion what 
might have happened had the Jackson of the Valley had the 
opportunity presented to him which Gen. Hampton has de- 
scribed as offered in vain to the Jackson of the Chickahominy. 

FrankUn, commanding the Federal force here opposed to 
Jackson, wrote of this occasion as follows (Battles and 
Leaders, II., 381): — 

"Jackson seems to have been ignorant of what Gen. Lee expected 
of him, and badly informed about Brackett's Ford. When he found how 
strenuous was our defence at the bridge, he should have turned his atten- 
tion to Brackett's Ford, also. A force coiild have been as quietly gathered 
there as at the bridge ; a strong infantry movement at the ford would have 
easily overrun our small force there, placing our right at Glendale, held 
by Slocum's division, in great jeopardy, and turning our force at the 
bridge by getting between it and Glendale. In fact, it is likely that we 
should have been defeated that day, had Gen. Jackson done what his 
great reputation seems to have made it imperative he should have done." 

D. H. Hill (who was Jackson's brother-in-law), writing in the 
Century of this occasion many years after the war, says : — 

"Our cavalry (Munford's regiment) returned by the lower ford and 
pronounced it perfectly practicable for infantry; but Jackson did not 
advance. Why was this ? It was the critical day for both commanders, 



152 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

but especially for McClellan. With consummate skill he had crossed his 
vast train of 5000 wagons, and his immense parks of artillery, safely over 
White Oak Swamp, but he was more exposed now than at any time in 
his flank march. Three columns of attack were converging on him and 
a strong corps was pressing upon his rear. Escape seemed impossible 
for him, but he did escape. . . . Gen. Lee, through no fault in his 
plans, was to see his splendid prize slip through his hands. Longstreet 
and A. P. Hill struck the enemy at Frazier's Farm (or Glendale) at 3 p.m., 
and both being always ready for a fight, immediately attacked. . . . 
There were five divisions within sound of the firing and within supporting 
distance, but not one of them moved. . . . Maj. Dabney, in his life of 
Jackson, thus comments on the inaction of that affair : ' On this occasion 
it would appear, if the vast interests dependent upon Gen. Jackson's 
cooperation with the proposed attack upon the centre were considered, 
that he came short of the efficiency in action for which he was elsewhere 
noted.' 

" After showing how the crossing of White Oak might have been effected, 
Dabney adds : 'The hst of casualties might have been longer than that 
presented on the 30th, of one cannoneer wounded, but how much shorter 
would have been the bloody fist filled up the next day at Malvern Hill ? 
This temporary echpse of Jackson's genius was probably to be explained 
by physical causes. The labor of the previous days, the sleeplessness, the 
wear of gigantic cares, with the drenching of the comfortless night, had 
sunk the elasticity of his wiU and the quickness of his invention, for the 
nonce, below their wonted tension.'" 

D. H. Hill does not comment upon this explanation, but it 
will not bear examination. For two days Jackson and his com- 
mand had been quietly in camp ; and his lapse from duty, while 
culminating only on June 29 and 30, in fact dated from the very 
jSrst of the Seven Days. Hill submits his own explanation of the 
matter as follows : — 

"I think that an important factor in this inaction was Jackson's pity 
for his own corps, worn out by long and exhausting marches, and reduced 
in numbers by its numerous sanguinary battles. He thought that the gar- 
rison of Richmond ought now to hear the brunt of the fighting." ^ 

This last expression is but another form of a rumor which, 
to my knowledge, had private circulation at the time among the 
staff-officers of some of the leading generals. It was reported 
that Jackson had said that " he did not intend that his men should 
do all the fighting." 

^ The italics are mine. 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 153 

Jackson's troops (his own and Ewell's divisions) had had a 
sharp campaign in the Valley, but the rest of the army at York- 
town, Williamsburg, and Seven Pines had suffered just as many 
hardships, and done even more severe fighting, as the casualties 
will attest. There were no arrears to be made up. The total 
killed and wounded of Jackson's six brigades in the Valley cam- 
paign from Kernstown (March 23) to Port Republic (June 9) 
were but 2311. Three brigades — Rodes's, Garland's, and G. B. 
Anderson's of D. H. Hill's division — had had killed and wounded 
the first day at Seven Pines 2621. During the Seven Days they 
lost 2277 more, while Jackson's six brigades lost but 1152. 

It is only natural and right that every division commander 
should feel both pity and affection for his own men, but to mani- 
fest either by shirking battle is no real kindness to them, apart 
from the tremendous consequences to the army and the nation. 

We may now return to Lee, Longstreet, and A. P. Hill at 
Frazier's Farm or Glendale, where we left them waiting vainly 
for the sounds of battle from Huger and Jackson. Between 
three and four o'clock the enemy, aware of their proximity, 
unwisely increased the fire of one of their batteries. Longstreet 
ordered Jenkins, second to none in either courage or ambition, 
to charge it. Jenkins charged the battery and got possession, 
but was attacked by the infantry in support. This brought on 
the battle at once, though not in the best shape ; for, instead of 
one simultaneous attack by the whole force, more time was 
wasted, and the brigades came in in piecemeal. A very desperate 
fight ensued, and lasted until long after dark, with varying 
fortunes. There were present but the two Confederate divi- 
sions, 12 brigades, which had borne the brunt of the 27th 
at Gaines Mill, and had lost 4300 men out of 22,000 engaged. 
They were taking the aggressive against Kearny's, McCall's, and 
Hooker's divisions (about 25,000 men), carefully posted, with 
some protection and obstructions. 

A fourth division, Sedgwick's, was in reserve in a second line 
behind McCall, and a fifth, Slocum's, was near on the right, each 
over 8000 strong. Almost the whole of these 40,000 troops took 
part in the battle. Within an hour's march were Richardson's 
and Smith's divisions and Naglee's brigade, 23,000 more, which 



154 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

could have been called in if needed. It goes without saying that 
while the Confederates might have more or less success, at the 
beginning, depending upon the cooperation of their brigades, 
only the approach of night could prevent their being finally 
repulsed and driven from the field, with losses proportionate to 
the persistence of their attacks. 

No more desperate encounter took place in the war; and no- 
where else, to my knowledge, so much actual personal fighting 
with bayonet and butt of gun. Randol's battery, over which it 
began, was taken and retaken several times. Once, when in pos- 
session of the 11th Ala. regiment of Wilcox's brigade, it was 
charged by McCall's Pa. Reserves, and after a desperate bayonet 
fight each side fell back to adjacent woods, leaving the guns de- 
serted, but under fire from both sides. Wilcox's report gives 
illustrations of the character of the fighting: — 

" Capt. W. C. Y. Parker had two successive encounters with Federal 
officers, both of whom he felled with his sword, and, beset by others of 
the enemy, he was severely wounded, having received two bayonet 
wounds in the breast and one in his side, and a musket ball breaking his 
left thigh. 

" Lt. Michie had a hand-to-hand collision with an officer, and having 
just dealt a severe blow upon his adversary, he fell, cut over the 
head with a sabre-bayonet from behind, and had afterward three bayonet 
wounds in the face and two in the breast, — all severe wounds which he 
survived, however, for three days." 

A little later, Field's brigade of Hill's division, in a counter- 
charge, again had bayonet fighting, and drove McCall's line back 
for a half-mile, and held the ground until the captured guns were 
carried safely to the rear. Severe fighting continued to take 
place until after dark. The enemy became so aggressive that 
Lee felt it necessary to send for Magruder's six brigades which 
had been unwisely marched to reenforce Holmes, and which 
had lost distance and time by confusion of roads and guides. 
These unfortunate troops, which had been marching all day, 
were now marched and countermarched until long after mid- 
night, so that they were thoroughly exhausted when they reached 
the field, and were put in front of those who had been equally 
worn out in the desperate fighting. Meanwhile a ruse which 
had been practised seems to have been successful in bringing 



SEVEN DAYS' CAMPAIGN. THE PURSUIT 155 

the pressure of the enemy's fresh battalions to an end. A. P. 
Hill thus describes it : — 

"About dark the enemy were pressing us hard along our whole line, 
and my last reserve, Gen. J. R. Anderson, with his Ga. brigade, was 
directed to advance cautiously, and be careful not to fire on our friends. 
His brigade was formed in line, two regiments' on each side of the road, 
and, obeying my instructions to the letter, received the fire of the enemy 
at 70 paces before engaging themselves. Heavy reenforcements to the 
enemy were brought up at this time, and it seemed that a tremendous 
effort was being made to turn the fortunes of the battle. The volume of 
fire that, approaching, rolled along the fine, was terrific. Seeing some 
troops of Wilcox's brigade, with the assistance of Lt. Chamberlayne 
and other members of my staff, they were rapidly formed, and being di- 
rected to cheer long and loudly moved again to the fight. This seemed 
to end the contest, and in less than five minutes all firing ceased and the 
enemy retired." 

In this battle the losses of Longstreet's division were about 
2600 and in A. P. Hill's about 1700 ; total 4300. The Federal 
losses are not given separately, but were, doubtless, not very un- 
equal. McCall was captured, riding into our lines by mistake, 
and we also secured 18 guns, besides some prisoners, and the 
gleanings of the field in small-arms. 

Lee, an example for all time of restraint in expressing per- 
sonal feeling, wrote in his report of this battle : — 

" Could the other commands have cooperated in this action, the result 
would have proved most disastrous to the enemy." 

I have often thought that in his retrospect of the war no one 
day of the whole four years would seem to him more unfortunate 
than June 30, 1862. It was, undoubtedly, the opportunity of 
his life, for the Confederacy was then in its prime, with more 
men available than ever before or after. And at no other period 
would the moral or the physical effect of a victory have been so 
great as upon this occasion. 



CHAPTER IX 

The Escape. Battle of Malvern Hill 

Enemy's New Position. Line Formed. Pendleton's Artillery. Artillery 
Combats. Whiting's Report. Sumner seeks Cover. Lee's Recon- 
noissance. Lee Misled. Attack Begun. Wright's Report. Semmes 
and Kershaw. D. H. Hill's Report. Toombs's Report. Casualties. 
Lee's Report. Stuart shells a Camp. McClellan Writes. Stuart's 
Report. Attack Abandoned. Casualties. An Artillery Raid. The 
South Side. Our Balloon. 

Next morning (Tuesdaj^, July 1) we began to pay the pen- 
alty for our unimproved opportunity of the day before. 

Of course, the enemy was gone, and about three miles down the 
road we came upon his whole army, now united and massed, upon 
Malvern Hill. 

This position is a high plateau stretching north from the low- 
lands along the valley of James River, over which it dominates 
in high steep hills, with Turkey Run on the west, and Western 
Run on the east. It is about a mile wide and, for two miles 
from the river, is open land, rolling and sloping toward the 
north where it ends in a heavy forest, intersected by marshy 
streams, with only one good road leading through the forest out 
upon the plateau. The Rev. L, W. Allen, already mentioned as 
on the staff of Magruder, was a native of this section, and had de- 
scribed to D. H. HiU its striking features, noting, — 

"its commanding height, the difficulties of approach, its amphitheatri- 
cal form and ample area, which would enable McClellan to arrange his 
350 field guns, tier above tier, and sweep the plain in every direction." 

HiU writes in the Century Magazine : — 

"Jackson moved over White Oak Swamp on July 1, Whiting's divi- 
sion leading. Our march was much delayed by the crossing of troops 
and trains. At WiUis's Church I met Gen. Lee. He bore grandly his 
terrible disappointment of the day before, and made no allusion to it. 
I gave him Mr. Allen's description of Malvern Hill and presumed to say, 

156 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 157 

'If Gen. McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone.' Long- 
street laughed and said, 'Don't get scared, now that we have got him 
whipped.'" 

Reconnoissance, ordered by Longstreet on the right, found a 
position favorable if we could employ a heavy force of artillery. 
A hill across Turkey Creek on the west gave ground whence 
40 or more guns could enfilade the enemy's batteries and lines 
of battle. A wheat-field to the northeast gave positions whence 
a hundred guns could cross fire with them. Could we mass and 
open two such batteries, and follow their fire by a simultaneous 
charge of heavy columns, we would have a chance of winning a 
victory. Lee ordered the plan carried into effect. Meanwhile, 
a line of battle had been formed through the woods and fields. 
Whiting was on the left with three brigades (one of Jackson's 
under Hampton, and two of his own). D. H. Hill came next 
with five, then two of Huger's, six of Magruder's, and two more 
of Huger's, including Ransom's, detached from Holmes's division. 
The remainder of Holmeg's was held on the River road, and was 
not engaged. Longstreet and Hill were in reserve behind Magru- 
der ; and Ewell's and Jackson's own division, behind Jackson. The 
enemy's batteries kept up a severe fire through the woods and 
along the roads, and the gunboats in the James participated 
for some hours with their heavy guns, until at length some shells 
burst prematurely over their own lines, when their fire was or- 
dered to cease. 

The order to charge the enemy's lines was, however, not made 
absolute. Magruder, Huger, and D. H. Hill, with their 14 bri- 
gades, were notified as follows about noon : — 

"July 1, 1862. 
"Batteries have been established to rake the enemy's Une. If it is 
broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, 
has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same. By order of 
Gen. Lee. 

"R. H. Chilton, A. A. G." 

The charge, therefore, was made to depend upon our being 
able to inaugurate and conduct with success an artUlery duel of 
some magnitude. 

Pioneers were sent to open a road to the left, and it was ex- 



158 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

pected that artillery would act upon both flanks; but here our 
organization broke down. Gen, Pendleton, Lee's Chief of Artil- 
lery, had a large artillery reserve, organized in four battalions of 
several batteries each, including our best rifled guns ; but he was 
not able to bring a single one of his batteries into action. His 
official report of the day is as follows : — 

"Tuesday, July 1, was spent by me in seeking, for some time, the 
commanding general, that I might get orders, and, by reason of the in- 
tricacy of routes, failing in this, in examining positions near the two armies 
toward ascertaining what could be best done with a large artillery force, 
and especially whether any position could be reached whence our large 
guns could be used to good purpose. These endeavors had, of course, to 
be made again and again under the enemy's shells ; yet no site was found 
from which the large guns could play upon the enemy without endanger- 
ing our own troops, and no occasion was presented for bringing up the 
reserve artillery. Indeed, it seemed that not one-half of the division 
batteries were brought into action on either Monday or Tuesday. To 
remain near by, therefore, and await events and orders in readiness for 
whatever service might be called for, was all that I could do. Here again 
it was my privilege to be thrown with the President, he having arrived 
sometime after nightfall at the house near the battle-field, where I had just 
before sought a resting-place." 

Between the lines one can but read a disappointing story. 
Pendleton did not find Lee all day long, nor did any orders from 
Lee find him. He implies that his reserve artiUery was not ex- 
pected to go in until all the division batteries were first engaged. 
The division batteries were not organized into battalions, and, 
acting separately, were easily overpowered when brought out, 
one by one, in the face of many guns already in position. Pen- 
dleton's battalions of from three to six batteries each, would have 
stood much better chances; and while there were not many 
places, there were two extensive ones, in either of which all of 
these battalions could have been used — Poindexter's field, 
and the position on Magruder's right, to which Lee made the 
pioneers open a road. As matters were, our whole reserve ar- 
tillery stood idle aU day. 

Pendleton graduated at West Point in 1830, one year after 
Lee. He resigned in 1833, and entered the ministry in 1837. 
In 1861, he returned to military life, and was appointed Chief 
of Artillery of the Army about Oct., 1861, under Gen. Johns- 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 159 

ton. His command did little during the Seven Days, and Col. 
Brown, commanding his largest battalion, in his report men- 
tions " the great superabundance of artillery and the scanty use 
that was made of it." 

Col. Cutts, commanding another battalion, also reported : — 

"My own small command (seven guns) was assigned a place near the 
battle-field of Tuesday, the 1st inst., and although I am sure that 
more artillery could have been used with advantage in this engagement, 
and also that my company could have done good service, yet I received 
no orders ; therefore, I have not had the honor to participate in any of 
the many engagements for the protection of our capital." 

Several field-batteries were brought in, one or two at a time, 
upon both flanks, but each was quickly overwhelmed. The 
artillery under D. H. Hill, which had been engaged at White 
Oak Swamp the afternoon of the 30th, had entirely exhausted 
its ammunition and been sent to the rear to replenish. In the 
demand for guns, A. P. Hill sent two of his batteries, Davidson's 
and Pegram's. Pegram had been engaged in every battle, be- 
ginning with Mechanicsville. Including Malvern Hill, he had 
60 casualties out of 80 men, and was only able to man a single 
gun at the close. This fighting, the artillery part of the action, 
began about noon and continued until about half-past three 
o'clock. D. H. Hill thus describes that in his front, — 

"Instead of ordering up 100 of 200 pieces of artillery to play on the 
Yankees, a single battery, Moorman's, was ordered up, and knocked to 
pieces in a few minutes. One or two others shared the same fate of being 
beat in detail. Not knowing how to act under the circumstances, I wrote 
to Gen. Jackson that the firing from our batteries was of the most 
farcical character." 

Whiting, on Hill's left, says : — 

"To our left was a very large wheat-field which afforded a good view 
of the enemy's position, and fair opportunities for artillery. Batteries were 
ordered up. . . . The first battery ordered into Poindexter's field found 
itself exposed to a vastly superior cross-fire and was soon compelled to 
retire with loss. Balthis's battery, better posted and better covered by 
the ground, fought well and continued the action until their ammunition 
was exhausted. Other batteries were ordered up. Our gunners replied 
with spirit, but from want of ammunition the contest was too unequal, 
and I caused them successively to withdraw. This cross-fire was ex- 
cessively severe upon the supporting troops." 



160 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Of the artillery fighting on the right flank, Gen. Armistead 
reported : — 

" By a reconnoissance first made by Col. E. C. Edmonds of the 38th Va. 
... I found that the enemy were in, near, and around Crew's house, 
and that the hill in front of the ravine we occupied was a good position 
for artillery. It was asked for, and Capt. Pegram's and Grimes's bat- 
teries were sent. The fire was a terrible one and the men stood it well. 
The enemy must have had 30 or 40 pieces opposed to ours and of superior 
caUbre. No men could have behaved better than Capts. Pegram and 
Grimes. They worked their guns after their men were cut down, and 
only retired when entirely disabled. I sent for more artillery repeatedly." 

These extracts sufficiently illustrate the character of the fight- 
ing during the hours devoted in theory to bringing a heavy 
enfilading and cross-fire of artillery to bear upon the enemy in 
his crowded position. The one advantage which we had was that 
all our shots were converging toward his centre, and stood fair 
chances of finding some of his troops, even when they missed their 
special targets. And, thin, scattered, and meagre as our artillery 
fire was, — " almost farcical," as D. H. Hill pronounced it, and di- 
rected entirely at the enemy's batteries, its effect upon his infantry 
lines was such that Sumner withdrew his whole corps from their po- 
sitions, and took refuge under the crest of the hills nearest the river, 
and he ordered Porter also to withdraw. Porter reports that he — 

"protested against such a movement as disastrous to us, adding that 
as the major-general commanding had seen and approved my disposition, 
and also Gen. Couch's, I could not change without his order, which 
could soon be obtained if desirable. He desisted and the enemy was 
soon upon us, compelling him to recall his own corps." 

How eloquent is this episode of what might have been the 
effect of bold and energetic use, early in the day, not only of 
our large artillery reserve, but of all our brigade and division 
batteries, brought in under their protection, as might have been 
done under efficient management. 

As it was, this inefficient artillery service so discouraged the 
prospects of an assault that before three o'clock Lee abandoned 
his intention to assault. Longstreet was informed,^ but no no- 

^ His report says, — "A little after 3 p.m., I understood that we would 
not be able to attack the enemy that day, inasmuch as his position was 
too strong to admit of it." 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 161 

tice was sent to other generals, as there seemed no apparent need. 
The aggressive efforts had grown gradually weaker, and by- 
three o'clock the firing on both sides had almost ceased. 

Shortly before this, Lee had taken Longstreet and ridden over 
to om- left in search of some route by which the enemy's position 
could be turned. 

This should have been done early that morning, not by Lee in 
person, but by staff -officers under cavalry escorts. Jackson, on 
the left flank, had with him a fair supply of staff, and Munford's 
regiment of cavalry. In the Valley he would have done it with- 
out waiting for orders. By a movement inaugurated that day, 
a force might easily have reached the high ground known as Eve- 
lington Heights, overlooking Westover (of which there will be 
more to tell later), or any nearer point threatening the enemy's 
line of retreat, where a Confederate force in position might com- 
pel the enemy to take the offensive at a disadvantage. 

A short reconnoissance induced Lee to order Longstreet at 
once to move his own division and Hill's to the left : Longstreet 
had rejoined his troops and was putting them in motion, when, to 
his surprise, he heard the sounds of battle break forth. He 
thought the enemy had taken the offensive, and that Magruder 
would soon be calling for reenforcements. His two divisions 
were, therefore, moved up to secure the right flank, though 
they did not become engaged. 

Longstreet, in his narrative, states that the battle was precipi- 
tated by accident, but this is a mistake. It was begun by a 
direct order from Lee given hastily under the influence of a mis- 
apprehension of fact, which occurred as follows : — 

When Sumner withdrew his corps under the cover of the hills, 
as has been told in the quotation from Porter, the movement 
was observed from our left by Whiting. He reported to Lee 
that the enemy were withdrawing both trains and troops. About 
the same time, a body of the enemy's skirmishers being advanced 
in front of Armistead's brigade, was attacked and easily driven 
back by three of his regiments. These followed the fugitives 
a short distance and occupied advanced ground, in a swale 
which afforded some shelter. This affair was considered a suc- 
cess, and it was also reported to Lee as he was returning from 



162 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

his reconnoissance with Longstreet. Had Sumner's movement, 
and the advance and easy retreat of the Federal skirmishers, 
been planned as a ruse to decoy us into a charge, its success 
would have been brilUant. That part of our plan which had 
called for a tremendous preliminary cannonade was forgotten. 
Lee believed that his enemy was retreating and about to escape 
him, and he hastened to send a verbal order to Magruder 
through Capt. Dickinson of Magruder's staff, who wrote the 
order as follows : — 

" Gen. Lee expects you to advance rapidly. He says it is reported 
the enemy is getting off. Press forward your whole line and follow up 
Armistead's success." 

Under Magruder's orders the advance was commenced by 
Wright's Ga. and La. brigade, followed by Mahone's Va. bri- 
gade, both of Huger's division. These two brigades formed our 
extreme right, and went into action only about 2500 strong, 
many stragglers having been lost from the ranks in the march- 
ings and skirmishes of the three previous days. 

To the left of Wright was Armistead of Huger's division, fol- 
lowed by Cobb's and Semmes's brigades. In support of these 
were all the rest of Magruder's and Huger's 10 brigades. Ransom, 
of Holmes's division, being also temporarily attached to Huger. 
Farther to the left came D. H. Hill's five brigades. Magruder's 
brigades consumed a little time in developing a full roar of mus- 
ketry, but no sooner was it heard than D. H. Hill's- division was 
also put in. 

Fitz-John Porter, in Battles and Leaders, thus describes the 
opening of the battle from the Federal point of view : — 

"The spasmodic, though sometimes formidable, attack of our antago- 
nists, at different points along our whole front, up to about four o'clock 
were, presumably, demonstrations or feelers preparatory to their engaging 
in more serious work. An ominous silence, similar to that which had 
preceded the attack in force at Gaines' Mill, now intervened, until, at 
about 5.30 o'clock, the enemy opened upon both Morell and Couch with 
artillery from nearly the whole of his front, and soon after pressed forward 
in columns of infantry, first on one, then on the other, or on both. 

"As if moved by a reckless disregard of life equal to that displayed at 
Gaines Mill, with a determination to capture our army or destroy it by 
driving us into the river, brigade after brigade rushed at our batteries; 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 163 

but the artillery of both Morell and Couch mowed them down with 
shrapnel, grape, and canister, while our infantry, withholding their fire 
until the enemy were in short range, scattered the remnants of their 
columns, sometimes following them up and capturing prisoners and colors." 

One can scarcely read the full story of this charge without 
believing that, made early in the day with the aid of all our re- 
serve artillery on the flanks and of the 22 brigades of infantry 
who were spectators, we might, by main force, have crushed the 
enemy's army as it stood. Porter himself, who was practically 
in command of the field, and the most accomplished of the Federal 
corps commanders, records that, at one period of the action, as 
he rode to bring up reinforcements, he felt such apprehensions 
of soon becoming our prisoner, that he took from his pocket and 
tore up his "diary and despatch book of the campaign." 

That the ground was less unfavorable for an assault from our 
right flank appears from the reports of Wright and Mahone, whose 
small force was not driven back at all, but made a lodgment and 
held their ground all night. Gen. Wright reports as follows : — 

"At 4.45 o'clock I received an order from Gen. Magruder through 
Capt. Henry Bryan, one of his stafif, to advance immediately and charge 
the enemy's batteries. No other troops had yet come upon the field. 
I ordered my men forward, and, springing before them, led my brigade, 
less than 1000 men, against a force I knew to be superior in the ratio of 
at least 20 to 1. Onward we pressed, warmly and strongly supported by 
Gen. Mahone's brigade, under a murderous fire of shot, shell, canister, and 
musketry. At every step my brave men fell around me, but the survivors 
pressed on until we had reached a hollow about 300 yards from the enemy's 
batteries on the right. Here I perceived that a strong force had been 
sent forward on our left, by the enemy, with a view of flanking and cutting 
us off from our support, now more than 1000 yards in our rear. I im- 
mediately threw the left of the 3d Ga. a Uttle back along the upper 
margin of the hollow, and, suddenly changing front of the regiment, poured 
a galling fire upon the enemy, which he returned with spirit, aided by a 
fearful direct and cross-fire from his batteries. Here the contest raged 
with varying success for more than three-quarters of an hour; finally 
the line of the enemy was broken, and he gave way in great disorder. 

"In the meantime, my front, supported by Gen. Mahone, had been 
subjected to a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, and had begun to 
waver, and I feared I would be compelled to fall back. Just at this 
moment firing was heard far away to our left, and soon we saw our columns 
advancing upon the enemy's centre. This diverted a portion of the 
enemy's fire from us, and I succeeded in keeping my men steady. We 



164 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

had now approached within a few hundred yards of the enemy's advanced 
batteries, and I again gave the order to charge, which was obeyed with 
promptness and alacrity. 

"We rushed forward, up the side of the hill under the brow of which 
we had been for some time halted, and dashing over the hill, reached an- 
other hollow or ravine immediately in front of, and, as it were, under, the 
enemy's guns. This ravine was occupied by a line of Yankee infantry 
posted there to protect their batteries. Upon this we rushed with such 
impetuosity that the enemy broke in great disorder and fled. . . . 

"The firing had now become general along the left and centre of our 
line, and night setting in, it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe. 

"Several of my command were killed by our own friends, who had 
come up on our immediate left, and who commenced firing long before 
they came within range of the enemy. This firing upon us from our 
friends, together with the increasing darkness, made our position peculiarly 
hazardous, but I determined to maintain it at all hazards, as long as a 
man should be left to fire a gun. The fire was terrific now, beyond any- 
thing I had ever witnessed, — indeed, the hideous shrieking of shells 
through the dusky gloom of closing night, the loud and incessant roll of 
artillery and small-arms, were enough to make the stoutest heart quail. 
Still my shattered little command, now reduced to less than 300, with 
about an equal number of Gen. Mahone's brigade, held our positions 
under the very muzzles of the enemy's guns, and poured volley after 
volley with murderous precision into their serried ranks. . . . 

"Just at this time a portion of Col. Ramseur's 49th N.C. regiment, 
having got lost upon the field, was hailed by me and ordered to 
fall in with my brigade. A strong picket was advanced all around our 
isolated position, and the wearied, hungry soldiers threw themselves 
upon the earth to snatch a few hours' rest. Detachments were ordered 
to search for water and administer to our poor wounded men, whose cries 
rent the air in every direction. Soon the enemy were seen with lanterns, 
busily engaged in moving their killed and wounded, and friend and foe 
freely mingled on that gloomy night in administering to the wants of 
wounded and dying comrades. . . . 

"Early on the morning of July 2, Gen. Ewell rode upon the field, and 
coming to the position where my men lay, I reported to him and was re- 
heved from further watching on the field. . . . My loss in this engagement 
was very severe, amounting to 55 killed, 243 wounded, and 64 missing 
(total 362) . I have no means of determining the loss of the enemy, though 
I am satisfied it was very heavy." 

Gen. Mahone reports that his brigade carried into action 
1226, and lost 39 killed, 164 wounded, and 120 missing (total 323). 

Wright's report gives a clear idea of the fighting upon our right 
flank. Next, on the left, Semmes and Kershaw also made, per- 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 165 

haps, the farthest advance of the attack, actually getting among 
the enemy's guns, where lay the body of a handsome young 
Louisiana officer, next morning, the farthest jetsam of the red 
wave which had stained all the green fields of our advance. Both 
of these brigades had been forced to fall back, not so much from 
the fire of the enemy in their front, as from that of their friends 
farther on the left, advancing on converging lines in the dusk. 
There were more troops concentrated in the forest in a small space 
than could be well handled, even in daylight; and the plateau 
over which their charge was to be made, when they got free of 
the wood, was so bare of shelter, and swept by such fire of mus- 
ketry and artillery, that not a single brigade faced it long without 
being driven back. The official reports show that in the storm 
and smoke around them single brigades often thought themselves 
to be the only ones engaged. 

D. H. Hill, whose advance was across the plateau, thus de- 
scribes the attack by his division : — 

"While conversing with my brigade commanders, shouting was heard 
on our right, followed by the roar of musketry. We all agreed that 
this was the signal agreed upon, and I ordered my division to advance. 
This, as near as I could judge, was about an hour and a half before sun- 
down. . . . 

"The division fought heroically and well, but fought in vain. Garland, 
in my immediate front, showed all his wonted courage and enthusiasm, 
but he needed and asked for reenforcements. I sent Lt.-Col. New- 
ton, 6th Ga., to his support, and, observing a brigade by a fence in 
our rear, I galloped back to it and found it to be that of Gen. Toombs. 
I ordered it forward to support Garland, and accompanied it. The bri- 
gade advanced handsomely to the brow of the hill, but soon retreated in 
disorder. Gordon, commanding Rodes's brigade, pushed gallantly for- 
ward and gained considerable ground, but was forced back. The gallant 
and accomplished Meares, 3d N.C., Ripley's brigade, had fallen at 
the head of his regiment, and that brigade was streaming to the rear. 
Colquitt's and Anderson's brigades had also fallen back. Ransom's 
brigade had come up to my support from Gen. Huger. It moved too 
far to the left and became mixed up with a mass of troops near the 
parsonage on the Quaker road, suffering much and effecting little. Gen. 
Winder was sent up by Gen. Jackson, but he came too late, and also 
went to the same belt of woods near the parsonage, already overcrowded 
with troops. Finally Gen. Ewell came up, but it was after dark, and 
nothing could be accompUshed. I advised him to hold the ground he 
had gained and not to attempt a forward movement." 



166 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Gen. Toombs's account of the advance of his brigade will give 
some idea of the confusion of commands upon the field after 
the battle was in full tide : — 

"Accordingly, I advanced rapidly in line of battle through the dense 
woods, intersected by ravines, occasionally thick brier patches, and other 
obstructions, guided only by the enemy's fire in keeping direction, fre- 
quently retarded and sometimes broken, by troops in front of me, until 
the command reached the open field on the elevated plateau immediately 
in front of, and in short range of, the enemy's guns. Here, coming up 
with a portion of the troops which I was ordered to support, I halted my 
line for the purpose of rectifying it and of allowing many of the troops 
whom I was to support, to pass me and form. These objects were but 
imperfectly accomplished by me, as well as by the rest of the troops 
within my view, from the great confusion and disorder in the field — ■ 
arising much from the difficulties of the ground over which they had to 
pass, and in part from the heavy fire of grape and canister and shells, 
which the enemy's batteries were pouring in upon them. But, having 
accomplished what could be done of this work, I ordered my brigade to 
advance. It moved forward steadily and firmly until it came up with 
the troops in advance, who had halted. I then ordered it to halt, and 
ordered the men to lie down, which they did, and received the enemy's 
fire for a considerable time, when an order was repeated along my line, 
coming from the left, directing the line to oblique to the left. This order 
I immediately and promptly countermanded as soon as it reached the 
part of the line where I stood, and arrested it in part. I saw that the 
immediate effect of the movement was to throw the troops into the 
woods and ravines on the left of the plateau, and necessarily throw them 
into great confusion. . .-. 

"In the meantime Gen. Kershaw came into the field with his bri- 
gade, near one of my regiments, the 2d Ga., which still remained in 
very good order; and my adjutant, Capt. Du Bose, proposed to him 
to unite that, and some other companies of other regiments, with his 
command in the attack on the enemy's batteries, to which he assented; 
and this command, under Cols. Butt and Holmes, accompanied by 
Capt. Du Bose and Maj. Alexander (my quartermaster, who acted as 
one of my aides on the field) advanced with Gen. Kershaw's brigade 
beyond the edge of the wood into the open field, but, under the destructive 
fire of the enemy's cannon and small-arms, wavered and fell back into the 
road skirting the pine thicket. . . . 

"My losses were very severe, the total being 194 killed and wounded, 
out of about 1200 carried into action. I am happy to add that the dis- 
orders which did arise were due rather to the difficulties of the ground, 
and the nature of the attack, than from any other cause, and that as far 
as my observation went, they extended to all troops engaged on the 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 167 

plateau in front of the enemy's guns. This is further evidenced by the 
fact that at roll-call next morning over 800 of my command answered to 
their names, leaving under 200 unaccounted for, many of whom soon 
made their appearance." 

There is no doubt that the entire force which had been engaged 
was wrecked for the time being, and that, had the enemy been 
in position for a counterstroke, the fragments could have made 
but Httle opposition. But A. P. Hill and Longstreet were close 
in rear, and Whiting's, Jackson's, and Swell's divisions were on the 
left, and Holmes a few miles off on the right. The enemy, more- 
over, having sent ahead all of their trains, were now very low 
both in ammunition and provisions, and could scarcely have 
ventured anything serious. 

Whiting's division had suffered 175 casualties in its two 
brigades, and 19 in Hampton's brigade, from the enemy's 
artillery fire, while lying in support of our artillery in Poindex- 
ter's field. Including with these the losses in Jackson's and 
Ewell's divisions and Lawton's brigade, the casualties were 599. 
In Magruder's division the casualties were 2014, and in Huger's, 
including Ransom's brigade, 1609. In Rodes's, Colquitt's, and 
Ripley's brigades of D. H. Hill's division, the casualties were 
making 889, a total, so far, of 5111. The other two brigades, 
Anderson's and Garland's, report only their total casualties for 
the campaign as 863 and 844, a total of 1707. A half, 854, is a 
moderate estimate for their losses at Malvern. 

This would make our total losses 5965 or more ; those of the 
enemy could scarcely have reached 2000, but the casualties of 
different battles are not separated. 

Of Jackson's part in this action there is very little to be said. 
He took no initiative, though complying promptly with orders 
or requests as received. But had he been the Jackson of the 
Valley, being on the left flank that morning, he would have turned 
Malvern Hill by his left, and taken position commanding the 
road somewhere beyond Turkey Creek. Malvern should not have 
been attacked ; only the enemy observed and held by Longstreet, 
while Jackson got a position which they would be forced to assault. 

Lee's report sums up the subsequent operations briefly, as fol- 
lows : — 



168 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

"On July 2, it was discovered that the enemy had withdrawn during 
the night, leaving the ground covered with his dead and wounded, and his 
route exhibiting abundant evidence of precipitate retreat. The pursuit was 
commenced, Gen. Stuart with his cavalry in the advance, but a violent storm 
which prevailed throughout the day greatly retarded our progress. The 
enemy, harassed and followed closely by the cavalry, succeeded in gaining 
Westover and the protection of his gunboats. He immediately began to 
fortify his position, which was one of great natural strength, flanked on each 
side by a creek, and the approach to his front commanded by the heavy 
guns of his shipping in addition to those mounted in his intrenchments. It 
was deemed inexpedient to attack him, and in view of the condition of our 
troops, who had been marching and fighting almost incessantly for seven 
days, under the most tr3dng circumstances, it was determined to withdraw 
in order to afford them the repose of which they stood so much in need." 

One episode of the pursuit, however, is worthy of note. On 
July 2, but little progress was made by the infantry, owing to the 
heavy rain-storm, but Stuart's cavalry (which had recrossed the 
Chickahominy by fording at Forge Bridge on the afternoon of 
July 1) followed the enemy and endeavored to shell his columns 
wherever opportunity offered. About 5 p.m. the last of these 
columns had arrived at its destination on the James River, 
Harrison's Landing, — a peninsula about four miles long by one 
and a half wide, formed by Herring Creek on the northeast, 
running for that distance nearly parallel to the James before 
emptying into it. At its head a small inlet from the river on 
the southwest left but a narrow front exposed to attack. 

But, across Herring Creek, an extensive plateau called Eve- 
lington Heights dominates the upper part of this peninsula so 
that, if held by artillery, the enemy would be forced to attack 
at a disadvantage — the creek being impassable for some distance 
above. During Wednesday night, Stuart received a report from 
Pelham, commanding his artillery, describing this position and 
recommending its being seized. He forwarded the report to 
Lee, through Jackson, and early on the 3d, with a few cavalry 
and a single howitzer, nearly out of ammunition, he ran off a 
Federal squadron and took possession of the heights. It is a 
pity that there was any ammunition, for Stuart writes that — 

" the howitzer was brought in action in the river road to fire upon the 
enemy's camp below. Judging from the great commotion and excitement 
below, it must have had considerable effect." 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 169 

It did have considerable effect of a most unfortunate kind for 
us. It awaked the enemy to instant appreciation of the fact that 
it was essential for him to hold that ground, and that it behooved 
him to take it before we brought up any more force. A military 
lesson is to be learned from the result, to wit, that dangers lurk 
in excess of enterprise as well as in its deficiency. In this cam- 
paign our cavalry affords two instances. Stuart's zeal, without 
necessity, led him to make the circuit of McClellan's army, 
June 11-15. The result was that McClellan was prepared to 
change his base to the James as soon as he found Lee threatening 
his communications. Now, the temptation to shell a camp and 
wagon trains loses to our army its last chance to take a position 
which would compel the enemy to assume the offensive. One 
howitzer could, of course, accomplish nothing but to alarm the 
enemy, and precipitate their attack. 

When Stuart opened fire, he thought that both Longstreet and 
Jackson were near. In fact, neither was within miles. Jackson 
had been sent in direct pursuit, being nearest the most direct 
roads, and his troops having been least engaged during the 
Seven Days. Two of the four brigades of his own division had 
been so httle exposed as to have had together but two killed and 
26 wounded, in the whole campaign. His 3d brigade. Winder's, 
had had but 75 casualties at Gaines Mill, and 104 at Malvern. 
Lawton's brigade, and Ewell's and Whiting's divisions, had only 
been severely engaged at Gaines Mill. 

Longstreet, with A. P. Hill's and his own divisions, was on the 
2d moved around the field of battle to Poindexter's house, 
and on the 3d was sent by roads to the left of Jackson. By 
mistake of the guides he was conducted too far to the left, and 
only reached Evelington Heights about dark on the 3d; Jack- 
son's troops came up at the same time by the direct road. 

Jackson's official report says : — 

"On the morning of the 3d, my command arrived near the landing 
and drove in the enemy's skirmishers," but the date is shown by all other 
reports to be a clerical error for the 4th. 

Had Stuart not opened fire, the enemy would not have dis- 
turbed him that day. During it McClellan wrote to the Secretary 
of War, as follows : — 



170 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

" I am in hopes the enemy is as completely worn out as we are. He 
was certainly very severely punished in the last battle. The roads are 
now very bad. For these reasons I hope we shall now have enough 
breathing space to reorganize and rest the men, and get them into posi- 
tion before the enemy can attack again. ... It is, of course, impossible 
to estimate, as yet, our losses, but I doubt whether there are to-day more 
than 50,000 men with their colors." 

By the next morning 21 Confederate brigades had arrived 
and would have been upon Evehngton Heights had Stuart not 
forced the enemy to come over and occupy them. McClellan's 
50,000 men would then have had the task of removing them. 

Stuart thus describes his resistance : — 

"I held the ground from 9 a.m. till 2 p.m., when the enemy had con- 
trived to get one battery into position on this side the creek. The fire 
was, however, kept up until a body of infantry was found approaching 
by our right flank. I had no apprehension, however, as I felt sure Long- 
street was near b}^, and, although Pelham had but two rounds of ammuni- 
tion left, I held out, knowing how important it was to hold the ground 
till Longstreet arrived. 

"The enemy's infantry advanced, and his battery kept up its fire. I 
just then learned that Longstreet had taken the wrong road and was 
then at Nance's shop, six or seven miles off. Pelham fired his last round, 
and the sharp-shooters, strongly posted in the skirt of woods bordering 
the plateau, exhausted every cartridge, but had at last to retire. . . . 
The next day, July 4, Gen. Jackson's command drove in the enemy's ad- 
vanced pickets. I pointed out the position of the enemy, now occupying, 
apparently in force, the plateau from which I shelled their camp the 
day before, and showed him the routes by which the plateau could be 
reached, to the left, and submitted my plan for dispossessing the enemy 
and attacking his camp. This was subsequently laid before the com- 
manding general." 

From the Federal reports it appears that the enemy occupied 
the heights on the afternoon of July 3 with Franklin's division. 
The next morning Longstreet was up with his own and A. P. 
Hill's di^dsion and two brigades of Magruder's. Jackson was 
also up with his OT\ai, Ewell's, A^liiting's, and D. H. HiU's divi- 
sions. Lee did not reach the field until noon, and, as Longstreet 
ranked Jackson, he ordered the enemy's pickets driven in and 
preparation made for an attack. 

A favorable opportunity was presented to regain the Evehng- 
ton Heights by main 'force. They were occupied by but one 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 171 

division, and, being across Herring Creek from the rest of the 
Federal army, it could not have been rapidly reenforced. There 
would have been very small risk in making the effort so earnestly 
urged by Stuart, for McClellan would never have dared a counter- 
stroke, had we failed. The enemy's gunboats could have ren- 
dered little assistance, as their own camps and lines intervened. 
Briefly, the game seems to have been worth the candle, and it 
should have been played. 

Jackson's troops, however, were in front, and Jackson pro- 
tested against the attack, saying that the troops were not in 
proper condition, and asking for delay until Lee should reach 
the field. To this Longstreet consented, and when Lee arrived, 
Jackson's arguments prevailed and the attack was given up. 
It was entirely unHke Lee, and he must have reluctantly yielded 
to Jackson's persuasion. Evidently, Jackson was still not the 
Jackson of the Valley. 

The next day the troops were moved back toward Richmond, 
and the campaign was ended. 

The total casualties of the two armies for the Seven Days 

were : — 

Confederate: killed 3286, wounded 15,909, missing 946, total 20,141 
Federal: " 1734, " 8,062, " 6053, " 15,849 

Including the Federal wounded, we took about 10,000 prisoners 
and captured 52 guns and about 35,000 muskets. We lost two 
guns in the stampede in Holmes's division. 

For a week after McClellan had estabhshed himself at West- 
over, he neglected to occupy the opposite bank of the James. 
As the fire of his gunboats commanded it, he could do so at 
pleasure, but as long as he did not, it was much better for us 
that he should not. Again, however, the temptation to shell a 
camp proved irresistible, and Lee was persuaded to authorize 
an expedition for the purpose under Pendleton's supervision. 

On July 12 some 47 rifled guns were collected, positions chosen, 
and ranges marked for night firing. After midnight they opened 
fire upon the Federal transports, wharves, and camps, and used 
up their small supplies of ammunition in a random cannonade. 
The enemy replied in like fashion, both from the shore and from 
gunboats. Of course, there was much commotion in the Fed- 



172 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

eral camps, but the actual damage done was trifling. Some 40 
casualties are reported among the Federals, and two or three 
among the Confederate artillerists. 

The next day the Federals established themselves on the South 
Side. The strategic advantages of a position astraddle of the 
James River have already been referred to (page 61, Chap. III.), 
but they were not yet generally appreciated. Fortunately for 
us, Lincoln and Halleck recalled McClellan and his army to 
Washington without ever reahzing them; although McClellan 
had tried hard to impress them upon his superiors. Fortunately, 
too, for us, Gen. S. G. French, in command at Petersburg, saw 
and appreciated the threat of the position, and immediately 
began the construction of a line of intrenchments about that 
city. These intrenchments, in 1864, defeated some attempts at 
surprise; and at last enabled Beauregard, with two divisions, 
to withstand the attack of Grant's whole army, between June 15 
and 18 of that year. 

My personal duties during the Seven Days were the supervi- 
sion and distribution of our ammunition supplies. Our organ- 
ized division supply trains and brigade wagons worked smoothly, 
and no scarcity was felt anywhere. 

In addition to these duties, I was placed in charge of a balloon 
which had been manufactured in Savannah by Dr. Edward 
Cheves, and sent to Gen. Lee for use in reconnoitring the 
enemy's lines. It was made from silk of many patterns, var- 
nished with gutta-percha car-springs dissolved in naphtha, and 
inflated at the Richmond Gas Works with ordinary city gas. 

I saw the battle of Gaines Mill from it, and signalled informa- 
tion of the movement of Slocum's division across the Chicka- 
hominy to reenforce Porter. Ascensions were made daily, and 
when the enemy reached Malvern Hill, the inflated balloon would 
be carried down the river and ascensions made from the deck 
of a boat. Unfortunately, on July 4, the boat — the Teaser, a 
small armed tug — got aground below Malvern Hill on a falling 
tide, and a large Federal gunboat, the Maritanza, came up and 
captured both boat and balloon, the crew escaping. 

We could never build another balloon, but my experience 
with this gave me a high idea of the possible efficiency of balloons 



THE ESCAPE. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL 



173 



in active campaigns. Especially did we find, too, that the 
balloons of the enemy forced upon us constant troublesome pre- 
cautions in efforts to conceal our marches. 



\fki/t 







^^\ 



3^4 



^3- 



^'^'^^^w^^./,. 




1 1 ' 1 



Malvern Hill to Westovee 

As affording a bird's-eye view of our organization and of the 
forces engaged in the different actions, and the severity of the 
conflicts, a table of Confederate division casualties is attached, 
showing as accurately as can be determined, the losses of each 



174 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



command for each action. The total Federal losses in killed 
and wounded (excluding prisoners) is also approximately divided 
for the principal actions as nearly as records permit. 

DIVISION CASUALTIES. SEVEN DAYS BEFORE RICHMOND 



Divisions 


H 
Q 

Hi 

o 
6 


> 


1 

w 
< 




'A 
O 




OS 

H 

M 




i 

< 

A 
W 
W 

E-t 

o 




Whiting's Div. 


2 




1017 






175 




1192 


Jackson's Div. 


3 




91 






117 




208 


Lawton's Brig. 


1 




492 






75 




567 


Swell's Div. 


4 




764 






223 




987 


D. H. Hill's Div. 


5 


586 


1423 






1743 


15 


3767 




f D. R. Jones's 
Div. 


2 










424 


455 


879 


03 o 


McLaws's Div. 


2 






357 




315 




672 




Magruder's 
Div. 


2 






84 




874 


9 


967 


Longstreet's Div. 


6 




1883 




2555 






4438 


Huger's Div. 


3 










1137 


394 


1531 


A. P. Hill's Div. 


6 


764 


2688 




750 


8 




4210 


Holmes's Div. 


3 










499 


178 


677 


Pendleton's Art. 














2 


2 


Stuart's Cav. 














71 


71 


Totals 

10 Divisions 


39 


1350 


8358 


441 


3305 


5590 


1124 


20168 


Federal Losses 
(killed and wounded 
only) 




361 


4001 


400 


2034 


2000 


1000 


9796 



CHAPTER X 
Cedar Mountain 

Recuperation. Gen. Pope Arrives. Gen. Halleck Arrives. McClellan 
Recalled. Lee Moves. Jackson Moves. Cedar Mountain. The Night 
Action. Jackson's Ruse. Casualties. 

The close of the Seven Days found both armies greatly in 
need of rest. Lincoln called upon the governors of the Northern 
States for 300,000 more men, and bounties, State and Federal, 
were offered to secure them rapidly. They were easily obtained, 
but a mistake was made in putting the recruits in the field. 
They were organized into entirely new regiments, which were 
generally hurried to the field after but little drilling and traia- 
ing. President Davis also called for conscripts, — all that could 
be gotten. No great number were obtained, for those arriving 
at the age of conscription usually volunteered in some selected 
regiment. Those who were conscripted were also distributed 
among veteran regiments to repair the losses of the campaign, 
and this was done as rapidly as the men could be gotten to the 
front. Although this method allowed no time for drill or train- 
ing, yet it was far more effective in maintaining the strength of 
the army than the method pursued by the Federals. 

During the short intermission from active operations, some- 
thing was accomplished, too, to improve our organizations, though 
leaving us still greatly behind the example long before set us 
by the enemy. Longstreet and Jackson were still but major- 
generals commanding divisions, but each now habitually com- 
manded other divisions besides his own, called a Wing, and the 
old divisions became known by the names of new commanders. 
Thus, Jackson's old division now became Taliaferro's, and Long- 
street's division became Pickett's, while Longstreet and Jackson 
each commanded a Wing, so called. 

It was not until another brief rest in October, after the battle 

175 



176 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

of Sharpsburg, that Longstreet and Jackson were made lieu- 
tenant-generals, and the whole army was definitely organized into 
corps. Some improvement was also made in our armament by 
the guns and rifled muskets captured during the Seven Days, and 
my reserve ordnance train was enlarged. Lines of fight earth- 
works were constructed, protecting Chaffin's Bluff batteries on 
the James River, and stretching across the peninsula to connect 
with the lines already built from the Chickahominy to the head 
of White Oak Swamp. 

Gen. D. H. Hill also constructed lines on the south side of the 
James, protecting Drury's Bluff and Richmond from an advance 
in that quarter; and Gen, French at Petersburg, as already 
mentioned, threw lines around that city, from the river below to 
the river above. 

Just at the beginning of the Seven Days' Battles, President 
Lincoln had called from the West Maj.-Gen. John Pope, and 
placed him in command of the three separate armies of Fremont 
and Banks, in the VaUey of Virginia, and McDowell near Fred- 
ericksburg. The union of the three into one was a wise measure, 
but the selection of a commander was as eminently unwise. 
One from the army in Virginia, other things being equal, would 
have possessed many advantages, and there was no lack of men of 
far sounder reputation than Pope had borne among his comrades 
in the old U. S. Army. He had spent some years in Texas 
boring for artesian water on the Staked Plains, and making 
oversanguine reports of his prospects of success. An army 
song had summed up his reputation in a brief parody of some 
well-known lines, "Hope told a flattering tale," as follows: — 

"Pope told a flattering tale, 
Which proved to be bravado, 
About the streams which spout Uke ale 
On the Llano Estacado." 

Pope arrived early in July and began to concentrate and or- 
ganize his army. A characteristic "flattering tale" is told in 
an address to his troops, July 14, dated "Headquarters in the 
Saddle": — 

"Let us understand each other. I come to you from the West where 
we have always seen the backs of our enemies ; from an army whose busi- 



CEDAR MOUNTAIN 177 

ness it has been to seek the adversary, and beat him when he was found ; 
whose poUcy has been attack and not defence. ... I presume I have been 
called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. . . . 
Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases, which 
I am sorry to find so much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of 
'taking strong positions and holding them'; of 'lines of retreat,' and of 
'basesof supplies.' Letusdiscard such ideas. . . . Letusstudythe probable 
lines of retreat of our opponents and leave our own to take care of them- 
selves. . . . Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk 
in the rear. ..." 

The arrogance of this address was not calculated to impress 
favorably officers of greater experience in actual warfare, who 
were now overslaughed by his promotion. McDowell would 
have been the fittest selection, but he and Banks, both seniors 
to.Pope, submitted without a word ; as did also Sumner, Franklin, 
Porter, Heintzelman, and all the major-generals of McClellan's 
army. But Fremont protested, asked to be relieved, and practi- 
cally retired from active service. 

Meanwhile, after the discomfiture of McClellan, Mr. Lincoln 
felt the want of a mihtary advisor, and, on July 11, appointed 
Gen. Halleck commander-in-chief of all the armies of the 
United States, and summoned him to Washington City. Pope's 
Story of the Civil War thus comments upon this appointment : — 

" It is easy to see how this unfortunate selection came to be made : 
Halleck was at that time the most successful general in the Federal service ; 
it was perfectly natural that he should be the choice of the President and 
Secretary of War, to whom his serious defects as a military man could 
not have become known. His appointment was also satisfactory to the 
pubhc, for, as so much had been effected under his command in the West, 
he was generally credited with great strategic abiUty. . . . But both the 
people and the President were before long to find out how slender was 
Halleck 's intellectual capacity, how entirely unmilitary was the cast of 
his mind, and how repugnant to his whole character was the assumption 
of any personal and direct control of an army in the field." 

Halleck arrived in Washington and took charge on July 22. 
He found, awaiting for his decision, a grave problem. It was 
whether McClellan's army, now intrenched at Westover on the 
James, should be heavily reenforced and allowed to enter upon 
another active campaign from that point as a base, or whether 
it should abandon the James River entirely, and be brought 



178 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

back, by water, to unite with the army now under Pope, in 
front of Washington. 

McClellan earnestly begged for reenforcements, and confidently 
predicted success if they were given him. He had begun to 
appreciate the strategic advantages of his position, and he was 
even proposing as his first movement the capture of Petersburg 
by a cowp-de-main. This would not have been, at that time, a 
difficult operation. McClellan had 90,000 men available, for he 
could have even abandoned his position on the north side and 
used his whole force. As to its effect, it would probably have 
finally compelled the evacuation of Richmond, as it did in 1865. 
Had McClellan possessed enterprise and audacity, he would have 
waited neither for permission nor reenforcements, but have made 
the dash on his own responsibility as soon as he found that 
there was serious thought of recalling his army. All of this time, 
however, McClellan was still representing to his government 
that Lee had 200,000 men. If he really believed this, it is not 
strange that he kept closely within his intrenchments ; but Mr. 
Ropes, the most careful historian of the war, asserts that nei- 
ther McClellan nor Halleck believed this "preposterous story." 
McClellan told it, and stuck to it, trying to scare the administra- 
tion into giving him unlimited reenforcements: but his real 
belief, Mr. Ropes thinks, is apparent in his offer to undertake 
the new campaign with only 20,000 reenforcements, raising his 
force to only 110,000. Mr. Ropes says that Halleck saw and 
appreciated McClellan's insincerity, but, wishing to have the 
army brought back, he affected to believe in the 200,000 men, 
and easily confounded McClellan's arguments by pointing out 
what such a force might do imder such generals as Lee and 
Jackson. 

Halleck had visited McClellan on the James soon after his 
arrival in Washington, and the matter was argued, pro and con, 
in correspondence afterward for some weeks. 

McClellan ended with a strong appeal, pointing out that he 
could deliver his battle within 10 miles of Richmond, which 
was the heart of the Confederacy, while a victory 70 miles off 
might count for little. Halleck answered that it was unsafe to 
have a divided army in the face of Lee's force ; that the location 



CEDAR MOUNTAIN 179 

on the James River was very unhealthy in the fall months, and 
that most of McClellan's leading generals favored the withdrawal 
of the army. So orders were given, and the Federal army, on 
Aug. 14, began the evacuation of the only position from which 
it could soon have forced the evacuation of Richmond. They 
were only to find it again after two years' fighting, and the loss 
of over 100,000 men ; and they would find it then, only by being 
defeated upon every other possible line of advance. The army 
was marched to Fortress Monroe, whence, as rapidly as boats 
could be furnished, it was carried up the Potomac to Acquia 
Creek or Alexandria. Thence, each corps, as fast as it arrived, 
was marched to join Pope's army, it being designed to concen- 
trate everything behind the Rappahannock. 

Now let us turn to Lee, and see how he met the difficulties of 
his situation, and what fortune attended his efforts. He realized 
that the immediate danger was that McClellan should be re- 
enforced and renew his campaign from his new base. The first 
solicitude was to have McClellan's army recalled. Some early 
efforts were made to demoralize the transport vessels, on the 
James, by which the army was supplied. Light guns were sent 
to various points along the river, whence they could, as it were, 
ambush passing vessels and fire upon them. But the Federal 
gunboats had soon learned the danger points and how to pro- 
tect transports passing them, and no serious result could be ac- 
complished. There were, however, persistent rumors that the 
Confederates were constructing one or more ironclads at Rich- 
mond, which would soon come down the James and destroy the 
whole Federal fieet. The uneasiness caused in Washington by 
these rumors may have contributed to the result finally reached. 
But Lee could not afford to wait at Richmond for the enemy to 
make up his mind slowly. His only chance was to strike Pope's 
army before it could be joined by McClellan's. As early, there- 
fore, as July 13, he had ordered Jackson, with Tahaferro's and 
Ewell's divisions, to Gordonsville, to oppose reported advances 
of Pope. The latter had, on July 14, ordered Gen. Hatch to 
seize Gordonsville, then held by only about 200 infantry and a 
few cavalry. Hatch, however, lost time by listening to false 
reports that the Confederates were near at hand, and by waiting 



180 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

to take infantry, artillery, and a wagon-train, along with the 
considerable cavalry force which Pope had intended should alone 
be used. It alone would have been ample, as Jackson's troops 
did not reach Gordonsville until July 19. Hatch's expedition, 
therefore, was a failure. 

Jackson, on his arrival, was anxious to undertake some aggres- 
sive operation against Pope, but found his force — only about 
12,000 men — inadequate to accomplish anything against Pope's 
47,000 ; so he appealed to Lee for reenforcement. Not yet assured 
that McClellan would not soon resume the offensive, Lee hesi- 
tated ; but, on July 27, ordered A. P. Hill's division, about 12,000 
strong, to Gordonsville. Hill joined Jackson on Aug. 2. 
Meanwhile, Pope had received instructions from Halleck to make 
demonstrations toward Gordonsville, with the view of occupy- 
ing Lee's attention, and preventing his interference with the 
contemplated withdrawal of McClellan's force from the Peninsula. 

On Aug. 6, Pope began to cross his infantry over the Rappa- 
hannock to concentrate about Culpeper. With swift apprecia- 
tion of the opportunity, Jackson, on the 7th, put his whole force 
in motion to fall upon that portion of the enemy which first 
reached Culpeper. Could he defeat one of Pope's three corps, 
and occupy that central position in time, he might deal with 
the other two in succession, as he had dealt with Shields and 
Fremont at Port Repubhc. His strategy was excellent, but it 
was defeated by his own logistics. On the 7th the march was but 
eight miles, having only been begun in the afternoon. On the 8th 
there were 20 miles to go to reach Culpeper, with the Rapidan 
and Robertson rivers to ford, the latter river being held by the 
Federal cavalry, about 12 miles in front of the town. The 
weather was intensely hot, and it could hardly be expected that 
the Confederates would make the march in time to give battle 
on the same day. It would have been, however, only an easy 
march to reach a point, so close to the enemy, that battle could 
be delivered at an early hour on the 9th, allowing time to reap 
the fruits of victory, if successful. But on the 8th, some httle 
blunders and omissions in giving the orders to the three divi- 
sions utterly confounded the march, and the head of the column 
only made eight miles, and the rear of it but two. 



CEDAR MOUNTAIN 181 

In the first place, each division was allowed to take its own 
wagon-train behind it on the road, instead of concentrating all 
three into one train behind the whole force. In the next place, 
Swell's division, which was to lead and be followed by Hill's, 
had its route changed without Hill's being informed. This led 
to delay on Hill's part; and to Jackson's division (now com- 
manded by Winder) getting ahead. Winder presently found 
his line of march intersected by Ewell's. It was also charged 
that Hill showed little zeal, being offended that Jackson, with 
his usual reticence, had given him no information of his plans. 

Lee, indeed, in a recent letter had given Jackson a hint that 
his reticence might be carried too far. He had said : — 

"A. P. Hill you will, I think, find a good officer, with whom you can 
consult, and, by advising with your division commanders as to your 
movements, much trouble will be saved you in arranging details, and they 
can aid more intelligently." 

The whole incident shows that our staff service was poorly 
organized, and not efficient in its operations. The result of all 
this delay was that it was about 3 p.m. on the 9th before Swell's 
division on the right, and Winder's on the left, had formed line 
in front of Banks's corps, which had been encountered at Cedar 
Mountain, some seven miles south of Culpeper. Lawton's large 
brigade of Swell's division and Gregg's of HiU's division, had 
been left behind to guard the wagon-trains against the enemy's 
superior force of cavalry. The remainder of Hill's division was 
not yet up, and, while waiting their arrival, 26 rifled guns were 
brought up by Jackson and opened upon the enemy's lines and 
batteries. 

The left of Winder's division rested along the front edge of a 
considerable body of wood, which had not been thoroughly 
examined. Pope, in his report, asserts that Banks had been 
ordered to take a strong position and hold it, awaiting reenforce- 
ments, which were rapidly coming up. This should have been 
his play; but Pope had used expressions in orders, sent by his 
Chief of Cavalry, which Banks understood as permission to attack 
if the enemy were not in great force. Being, personally, both 
brave and aggressive, Banks thought the opportunity had arrived, 



182 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

and before Jackson was ready to advance, between 5 and 6 p.m., 
he attacked with his whole force. The right of his Hne over- 
lapped the left of Winder's division, and taking it in flank and 
pressing vigorously, it entirely routed the left brigade under 
Garnett, and threw the whole division into much confusion. 
Winder himself had been killed by a cannon-shot in the pre- 
liminary artillery fighting. 

Just at this juncture, however. Hill's division arrived upon 
the field, and not only restored the battle, but drove the enemy 
from the field and across Cedar Creek, a short distance in rear. 
By this time it was about dark, but Jackson was determined to 
lose no possible chance. Favored by a moon but little past the 
full, he brought forward two fresh brigades, — Field's and Staf- 
ford's, and Pegram's battery, — crossed the creek, and continued 
the pursuit. 

Banks's corps, however, had, in its retreat, met Ricketts's divi- 
sion of McDowell's corps, accompanied by Pope in person, and 
followed also by the leading troops of Sigel's corps. About one 
and a half miles beyond Cedar Creek the Confederate advance 
found itself close in front of a strong line of battle, composed of 
Ricketts's four brigades, with four batteries of artillery. Pegram's 
four guns were pushed to the front, and, at close canister range, 
opened upon the enemy. They were replied to by a dozen guns, 
but continued the action until they were practically cut to 
pieces. It was now nearly midnight, and Jackson, having 
learned from the cavalry of the capture of prisoners from Sigel's 
corps, was constrained to halt for the night. By morning he 
found that the greater part of Pope's army was now united in 
his front, and that his opportunity to attack the enemy in de- 
tail had passed, — lost by the bad marching on the 8th. He 
still, however, felt able to defeat them if they could be induced 
to attack him in position, as Pope was pledged to do in his order 
75, so he withdrew his line across the creek, and occupied him- 
self in gleaning the battle-field of arms. Pope showed too much 
wisdom to accept the gage of further battle. Heavy reenforce- 
ments were coming to him, and it was as clearly his game to 
await their arrival as it had been Jackson's to anticipate it. So, 
on the 11th, he sent in a flag of truce asking permission to bury 



CEDAR MOUNTAIN 183 

his dead of the 9th, which were still within Jackson's lines. It 
was granted, until noon, and then extended until sundown. 

On the 12th, finding that Pope would not be tempted to attack 
him there, he tried another ruse. He fell back from the battle- 
field, not only to the south side of the Rapidan, where he might 
easily have halted and maintained himself, but he continued 
his retreat through Orange C. H. and on to GordonsvUle. He 
hoped that Pope would construe the move as a confession of 
weakness and would be inspired by it and his own boastings to 
follow. This strategy was very nearly successful. On Aug. 
12, Pope, having heard that the reenforcements under Burn- 
side would soon join him, wired Halleck that, on their arrival, 
he would cross the Rapidan and advance upon Louisa C. H. 
This would have given the Confederates the very opportunity 
desired. On Aug. 13, Lee had ordered Longstreet and Hood, 
with 12 brigades, to proceed by rail to Gordonsville, and, on 
the 14th, he also ordered up Anderson's division of infantry, 
three brigades, and kStuart's cavalry. On the 15th he went up 
in person and took the command. 

The casualties at Cedar Mountain had been as follows : — 

Confederate : killed 229, wounded 1047, missing 31, total 1307 
Federal: " 314, " 1445, " 622, " 2381 

The Confederate losses were distributed among nine brigades 
of infantry and one of cavalry, and were greatest in Garnett's 
and Taliaferro's, of Jackson's division, slightly over 300 in each. 
The Federal losses were in eight brigades of infantry and one of 
cavalry. Crawford's brigade lost 857, Geary's 465, Prince's 452, 
and Gordon's 344. The fighting upon Jackson's left, where 
Garnett's and Tahaferro's brigades were broken by the charge 
of Crawford's and Gordon's brigades, and the Une reestablished, 
by Branch's, Archer's, and Winder's brigades, was very desperate, 
as is shown by the casualties of some of the Federal regiments.^ 

^ Gen. Williams, in his official report, says : — 

"The 3d Wis., especially, fell under a partial flank fire from the under- 
brush, and woods, which swept its right companies with great destruction, 
and under which Lt.-Col. Crane fell pierced with several fatal wounds, and the 
regiment was obliged to give way. The enemy was, however, driven out of 
the open field by the other regiments and some distance into the woods, 



184 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

An incident of the battle was a charge upon Taliaferro's brigade 
by two squadrons of the 1st Pa. Cav., under Maj. Falls, when the 
brigade, in some disorder, was pressing hard upon the retreat of 
the Federal infantry. The charge successfully rode through 
the Confederate skirmish-line, but was driven back by the fire 
of the line of battle with the loss of 93 men out of 164. 

where, being strongly reenforced, their fire became overwhelming. No better 
proof of its terrific character can be given than the fact that of the three 
remaining regiments which continued the charge (28th N.Y., 46th Pa., and 
5th Conn.) every field-oflBcer and every adjutant was killed or disabled. In 
the 28th N.Y., every Company officer was killed or wounded; in the 26th 
Pa., all but five, and in the 5th Conn, all but eight. A combat more persist- 
ent or heroic can scarcely be found in the history of the war, but men, even 
of this unequalled heroism, could not withstand the overwhelming numbers 
of the enemy, especially when left without the encouragement and direc- 
tion of officers." 



CHAPTER XI 

Second Manassas 

The Situation, Aug. 15. Lee's Plan. How it Failed. A Federal Scout- 
ing Party. Pope Escapes. Stuart's Raid. Storna frustrates Efforts 
Lee plans his Move. Ropes's Criticism. Jackson's March. Aug. 26 
Manassas Captured. Destruction of Stores. Pope's Move. Lee and 
Longstreet's March. Pope Blunders. Jackson's Move. Orders Cap- 
tured. Johnson's Skirmish. Pope at a Loss. Ewell attacks King. 
Hard Fighting. Losses. Thoroughfare Gap. Flanking the Gap. The 
Opposing Forces. Sigel's Attack. Reno's and Kearny's Attack. 
Hooker's and Reno's Attack. Grover's Brigade. Porter's Corps. 
Pope versus Porter. Kearny and Reno Attack. Longstreet takes 
Position. Longstreet meets King. Pope is Misled. Lee awaits At- 
tack. The Forces. The Lines. A Surprise. Longstreet comes in. 
The Henry House Hill. Night and Rain. No Pursuit. Centreville 
Turned. Affair at Ox Hill. Stevens and Kearny. Casualties. The 
Ammunition Supply. 

Gen. Lee had arrived at Gordonsville early on Aug. 15, 
and taken command. On the 13th McClellan had abandoned 
his camp at Harrison's Landing and marched for Fortress Mon- 
roe. Lee now left at Richmond but two brigades of infantry 
to protect the city against cavalry raids, and took the rest of his 
army to the vicinity of Gordonsville for an aggressive campaign 
against Pope. He now occupied interior lines between McClellan 
and Pope, and it behooved him to crush Pope before McClellan's 
forces could join him. Lee understood this thoroughly, and 
Halleck and Pope understood it equally well; but Pope, per- 
haps inspired by his own boast that he was about to "seek the 
adversary and beat him when he was found," and tempted, also, 
by Jackson's retreat from Cedar Mountain, had decided to cross 
the Rapidan and advance upon Louisa C. H. Nothing could 
have suited Lee's plans better, but Halleck had not taken entire 
leave of his senses, and he no sooner heard of Pope's de- 
sign to cross the Rapidan than he promptly forbade it. He 

185 



186 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

also, in another letter, told Pope that he had much better be 
north of the Rappahannock. Lee's idea of the game the Federals 
should have played was to retreat to the north side of Bull Run. 

'Pope's army had now been reenforced by Burnside, and num- 
bered about 52,000 men. Its left flank rested near Raccoon Ford 
of the Rapidan, some four miles east of Mitchell Station on the 
0. & A. R. R. His centre was at Cedar Mountain, and his right on 
Robertson's River, about five miles west of the railroad. He was, 
therefore, directly opposite Gordonsville, where Jackson's forces 
had arrived on the 13th. 

About two miles below Rapidan Station was a high hill 
called Clark's Mountain, close to the Rapidan, and giving from 
its top an extensive view of the flat lands of Culpeper, across the 
river. A signal station was maintained there, and from tt the 
white tents of the Federal camps, marking out their positions, 
were plainly visible. Spurs of Clark's Mountain, running parallel 
to the Rapidan, extended eastward down the river about three 
miles, to the vicinity of a ford called Somerville's, two miles 
above Raccoon Ford. Raccoon Ford was within ten miles of 
Culpeper C. H., almost as near it as the position of Pope's army, 

Lee, on arriving about 8 a.m. on the 15th, and learning the de- 
tails of the situation, lost no time. The topography gave him 
a beautiful opportunity to mass his army (now about 54,000 
men) behind Clark's Mountain, to cross at Somerville Ford, 
fall upon Pope's left flank and sweep around it with a su- 
perior force, cutting off Pope's retreat to Washington. Prob- 
ably at no time during the war was a more brilliant opportunity 
put so easily within his grasp. He appreciated it, and promptly 
issued the necessary orders on the very day of his arrival. His 
army, however, was not yet sufficiently well organized to be called 
a "military machine," or to be relied upon to carry out orders 
strictly. On the contrary, in some respects, it might be called a 
very "unmihtary" machine, as the history of the failure in this 
case will illustrate. 

Lee, in his report, tells the story very briefly. He says, — 

"The movement, as explained in the accompanying order, was ap- 
pointed for Aug. 18, but the necessary preparations not having been com- 
pleted, its execution was postponed until the 20th." 



SECOND MANASSAS 187 

This postponement was the fatal act, for on the 18th the enemy 
discovered his danger, and in great haste put his army in motion 
to the rear and fell back behind the Rappahannock, during that 
day and the next. 

The principal failure in the preparations was the non-arrival 
of Fitz-Lee's brigade of cavalry at the appointed rendezvous at 
Verdiersville, near Raccoon Ford, where it was to cross on the 
morning of the 18th to act upon the right flank of the army. Its 
commander had duly received orders from Stuart, but had taken 
the liberty to delay their execution for a day, not supposing that 
it would make any material difference. Stuart's report gives the 
following details : — 

"On Aug. 16, 1862, in pursuance of the commanding general's secret 
instructions, I put this brigade (Fitz-Lee's) on the march for the 
vicinity of Raccoon Ford, near which point the army under Gen. Lee 's 
command was rapidly concentrating. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee was directed 
by me to proceed the next day, from near Davenport 's Bridge, opposite 
Beaver Dam, across to the vicinity of Raccoon Ford, where I promised to 
join him on that evening (17th). I proceeded on the cars directly to 
the commanding general, whom I found near Orange C. H." 

After dark on the 17th Stuart arrived at Verdiersville with 
his staff, having ridden from Orange C. H., but to his surprise 
could find or hear nothing of Fitz-Lee's brigade. As it was 
highly important to communicate with it, he despatched a staff- 
officer on the road by which the brigade was expected, to find it. 
Unfortunately, he selected his adjutant -general, Maj. Fitzhugh, 
who carried Stuart's copy of Lee's order of the 15th, disclosing 
his plan. 

This was careless practice, and some blame must, also, rest 
upon Stuart, for not having given his orders to Fitz-Lee so ex- 
pHcitly that the latter could neither misunderstand or disobey 
them. For the latter had deliberately marched on the 17th 
from near Davenport's Bridge to Louisa C. H. instead of to 
Verdiersville, as ordered. These three points are very nearly 
at the angles of an equilateral triangle, with sides of about 20 
miles each. Taking his route by Louisa not only occupied two 
days, but so exhausted his horses that a third day was required 
to rest them before the proposed movement could be begun. 



188 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Fitz-Lee made no official report, but in his life of Gen. Lee 
refers to this occasion, as follows : — 

"The brigade commander [Fitz-Lee] he [Stuart] had expected [at 
Verdiersville] did not understand from any instructions he had received 
that it was necessary to be at this point on that particular afternoon, and 
had marched a little out of his direct road in order to reach his wagons, 
and get from them a full supply of rations and ammunition."' 

Such loose practices may occur a hundred times without any- 
serious result, but once in a while the fate of campaigns will be 
changed by them, and this was such an occasion. A scouting 
party of Federal cavalry had been sent across Raccoon Ford on 
the evening of the 17th, and, in the darkness of the night, Maj. 
Fitzhugh, searching for the lost brigade, rode into it and was 
captured. His copy of Lee's order was taken from him, and on 
the 18th was delivered to Pope. 

Meanwhile, Stuart and his staff had slept in the porch of a house 
at Verdiersville, and in the morning had been surprised by the 
Federal scouting party. All managed to escape, but the enemy 
secured Stuart's cloak and plumed hat. But the end of the 
matter was not yet. When no cavalry appeared at Verdiersville, 
as expected on the night of the 17th, Longstreet ordered two 
regiments of infantry to be put on picket on the road to Raccoon 
Ford. The order was brought to Toombs's brigade, when he was 
absent, visiting a neighboring brigadier. The senior colonel, 
however, sent out the regiments, and they were duly posted. 
Not long afterward Toombs, returning, came upon the regiments, 
and finding them to be a part of his brigade, ordered them back 
to camp, claiming that no orders should be obeyed from su- 
perior officers which did not come through himself. Thus it 
had happened that the Federal scouting party got within our 
lines unannounced. When these facts were developed. Long- 
street's adjutant, in sword and sash, was sent to place Toombs 
in arrest. He was afterward ordered to Gordonsville and to con- 
fine himself to the Hmits of the town. After a few days, how- 
ever, he sent an apology and was restored to duty, followed the 
army, overtook it, and rejoined his brigade, to their great de- 
hght, on Aug. 30, in the heat of the battle of Second Manassas. 

1 Fitz-Lee's Lee, p. 183. 



SECOND MANASSAS 189 

When Lee learned of the absence of the cavalry, he at first 
proposed to defer the attack only a single day. Jackson is said 
to have urged that it would be best to make no delay at all, but 
to go ahead with the infantry. But the reports from the signal 
station on Clark's Mountain represented the enemy as quiet, 
and Lee decided to wait. Later, a telegraphic despatch from 
Fitzhugh Lee representing his animals as in bad condition, it 
was decided to postpone the movement until the 20th, and or- 
ders were issued accordingly. 

Doubtless, Lee found it hard to believe that Pope, so soon after 
his boasting order, and still sooner after the "victory" he had 
claimed at Cedar Mountain, would now turn his back and fly 
without firing a shot ; but, later on that day, there came reports 
of activity and stir among the enemy's camps, and on the 19th 
Lee and Longstreet, going up the mountain to see for themselves, 
saw Pope's whole army march away to the Rappahannock. 

On the 20th Lee's advance took place, but although the march 
was rapidly made in hopes of overtaking some delayed portion of 
the enemy, the hopes proved vain. 

On the north side of the Rappahannock, Pope found such 
advantages of position that, although for five precious days Lee 
sought diligently by feints and demonstrations to find a favorable 
opening, his efforts were vain. But to do nothing was to lose the 
campaign; By a bold raid of Stuart's, however, Lee now had the 
good luck to turn the tables and come into possession of Pope's 
private despatch book, with copies of his most important corre- 
spondence with Lincoln, Halleck, and others. Stuart had gotten 
Lee's permission to try to burn a railroad bridge over Cedar Run, 
near Catlett's Station, some 12 miles in rear of Pope's army. 
With about 1500 cavalry and two guns, he crossed the Rappa- 
hannock at Waterloo Bridge, above Pope's right flank, on Aug. 
22, and pushed on through Warrenton toward Catlett's Station. 
A terrific rain-storm came on late in the afternoon, and in it the 
command captured the enemy's picket and surprised the Federal 
encampments. The night was memorable for black darkness, 
the time being just at the change of the moon. A negro recog- 
nized Stuart and volunteered to lead him to the camp of Pope's 
staff and baggage. A regiment under W. H. F. Lee raided this 



190 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

camp, while other regiments raided other camps in the vicinity., 
and a force was sent to burn the bridge. This was impossible 
on accomit of the rain, the structm-e being a two-story trestle. 
The party had no torpedoes, so a few axes were fomid and all 
damage possible was done with them, but it was not serious. 

The storm which had prevented Stuart from burning the bridge 
and hastened his return, also nipped in the bud aggressive opera- 
tions by both commanders. Jackson, on Lee's left, had crossed 
Early's brigade at Sulphur Springs, upon an old dam across the 
river, while his pioneers were repairing the broken bridge for a 
crossing in force. Pope, upon his own left, had designed to cross 
the Rappahannock and attack Lee's right flank. The freshet 
in the river not only called a halt upon both operations, but 
prevented all the Federal concentrations. Pope made a feeble 
effort to crush Early's brigade, but it was repulsed, and when a 
larger force had been brought up by the Federals, Early had with- 
drawn over the completed bridge. 

Meanwhile, the information gained from Pope's correspondence 
showed Lee that his campaign was to be an utter failure, unless, 
within the next seven days, he could bring Pope to battle upon 
open ground. For, already, two of the corps of McClellan's 
army, the 3d and the 5th, and with Reynolds's Pa. Reserves, 
in all 20,000 men, were within two days of juncture with Pope, 
and the 2d, 4th, and 6th, with Sturgis's division, and Cox's 
7000 men from Kanawha, could not be more than five days later. 
Lee had but about 55,000 men. In two days Pope would have 
about 50,000, and in five days more he would have near 130,000. 
The situation was desperate, and it required a desperate remedy. 
Two divisions of infantry, — D. H. Hill's and McLaws's, — two 
brigades under Walker, and a brigade of cavalry under Hampton, 
which all together would raise Lee's force to 75,000, had been 
ordered up from Richmond, but could not be expected in time for 
the present emergency. Immediate action was necessary. It 
was taken with the quick decision characteristic of Lee. 

Jackson, with three divisions of infantry (14 brigades about 
22,000) and Stuart's cavalry (two brigades about 2000), set out 
in fight marching order, with no trains but ordnance, ambu- 
lances, and a few wagons with cooking utensils, by a roundabout 



SECOND MANASSAS 191 

march of over 50 miles, to fall upon Pope's depot of supplies at 
Manassas Junction, 24 miles in Pope's rear, and only 26 miles from 
Alexandria. Lee, with Longstreet and about 30,000 men, would 
hold the line of the Rappahannock, and occupy Pope's attention, 
while Jackson was making his forced march. Lee's army, then, 
of 55,000, would be spht in half, and Pope's army of about 80,000 
would be about midway between the two halves. Any miUtary 
student would pronounce such a situation absolutely ruinous to 
the divided army. 

In his History of the Civil War, Mr. Ropes writes of Lee's 
strategy : — 

" The disparity between Pope 's force and that of Jackson is so enor- 
mous that it is impossible not to be amazed at the audacity of the con- 
federate general, in thus risking an encounter in which the very exist- 
ence of Jackson 's command would be imperilled, and to ask what was the 
obj6ct which Gen. Lee considered as warranting such an extremely dan- 
gerous manoeuvre. The answer is not an easy one. . . . We shall . . . 
only remark here that this move of Gen. Lee 's in dividing his army, was 
an illustration of the daring, not to say hazardous, policy which he pursued 
in this summer of 1862." 

The best answer is the one given by Lee himself, who is reported 
in Allan's Army of Northern Virginia to have said, in referring to 
some discussion of this matter, — 

" Such criticism is obvious, but the disparity of force between the con- 
tending forces rendered the risks unavoidable." 

It was scarcely 60 days since Ives, as has been told, stopped his 
horse in the road to say to me, — 

" If there is a man in either army, head and shoulders above all others 
in audacity, that man is Lee, and you will Uve to see it." 

There has been speculation whether this turning movement 
originated with Lee or Jackson. Lee's report only says, — 

" In pursuance of the plan of operations determined upon, Jackson was 
directed on the 25th to cross above Waterloo," etc. 

Jackson's report says, — 

"Pursuing the instructions of the commanding general, I left Jeffer- 
sonton on the morning of the 25th," etc. 



192 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

The most natural supposition would ascribe the plan to Lee. 
His own words would seem to confirm the supposition, and 
Jackson's form of expression to indorse it. 

Col. Henderson, who would certainly assert a claim for 
Jackson, if it were possible, has written:^ — 

" It is only certain that we have record of few enterprises of greater dar- 
ing than that which was there decided on ; and no matter from whose brain 
it emanated, on Lee fell the burden of the responsibihty. It is easy to 
conceive. It is less easy to execute, but to risk cause and country, name 
and reputation, on a single throw, and to abide the issue with unflinching 
heart, is the supreme exhibition of the soldier's fortitude." 

Early on Aug. 25, Jackson set out upon what Henderson calls 
"his most famous march." He marched 26 miles that day, and 
bivouacked very late that night at Salem. His course was first 
northwest to Amissville, and thence about north to Salem. AlS 
his march was intended to be a surprise, it had been favored- by 
the storm of the 23 d. This tended to prevent large columns of 
dust, which so great a movement would surely have raised in dry 
weather. Considering the object of the march, it was a mistake 
to allow the infantry regiments to carry their banners displayed. 
For the country was moderately flat, and was dominated on the 
east by the Bull Run Mountains; upon which it was to be ex- 
pected the enemy would have scouts and signal stations. This 
was actually the case, and the march of the column was observed 
by 8 A.M. on the 25th, and it was watched for 15 miles, and fair 
estimates were made of its strength from counting the regimental 
flags and the batteries. It was plainly seen that their immediate 
destination was Salem. 

This information was promptly commimicated to Pope, Hal- 
leck, and the leading generals, who began to guess what the move- 
ment meant. Naturally, no one guessed correctly ; for the simple 
reason that no one could imagine that Lee would deUberately 
place his army in a position where Pope could deal with the two 
halves of it separately. It was correctly guessed that the troops 
marching to Salem were Jackson's, but Pope supposed them to be 
on their way to the Valley and probably covering the flank of 
Lee's main body, which might be on their left moving upon Front 
Royal. 

1 S. J. II., 124. 



SECOND MANASSAS 193 

He has been justly blamed for not ordering a strong recon- 
noissance to develop the true state of affairs. His proper move 
at the time, as, indeed, it had been for some days, was to fall back 
with his whole army to Manassas. He would, perhaps, have done 
this but that Halleck had ordered him to hold especially the 
lower Rappahannock, covering Falmouth, and to "fight like the 
devil." 

On the 26th, Jackson marched at dawn, and now the head of his 
column was turned to the east, and his men knew where they were 
going. In front of them was Thoroughfare Gap, through the Bull 
Run Mountains, which debouched upon the heart of the enemy's 
territory, held by six times their numbers. A march of about 
20 miles brought Jackson to Gainesville, on the Warrenton and 
Alexandria pike, by mid-afternoon. Here he was overtaken 
by Stuart with the cavalry. These had skirmished at Waterloo 
Bridge all day of the 25th, and marched at 2 a.m. on the 26th 
to follow Jackson's route. Near Salem, finding the roads blocked 
by Jackson's artillery and trains, they had left the roads, and with 
skilful guides had found passes through the Bull Run Moun- 
tains, without going through Thoroughfare Gap. Here Jackson, 
instead of marching directly upon Manassas Junction, where 
Pope's depot of supplies was located, took the road to Bristoe 
Station, seven miles south of Manassas. There the railroad 
was crossed by Broad Run. Jackson designed to destroy the 
bridge and place a force in position to delay the enemy's ap- 
proach, while he burned the supplies at Manassas. The head of 
Ewell's column reached Bristoe about sunset, having marched 
about 25 miles. 

So far, during this whole day, no report of Jackson's march had 
reached the Federals. Now, a train of empty cars, running the 
gantlet of a hot fire and knocking some cross-ties off the track, 
escaped going to Manassas, and gave the alarm. While Ewell's 
division took position to hold off the enemy, Gen. Trimble 
volunteered, with two regiments, the 21st Ga. and 21st 
N.C., to march back and capture Manassas, before it could be 
reenforced from Alexandria. 

Proceeding cautiously in line of battle, it was nearly midnight 
when these troops were fired upon with artillery from the Ma- 



194 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

nassas works. Losing only 15 wounded, they charged the lines, 
and took them with eight guns. Our cavalry, following the move- 
ment, gathered 300 prisoners. Next morning Jackson came up 
with Tahaferro's and Hill's divisions at an early hour, and, about 
the same time, a Federal brigade, sent by rail from Alexandria, 
advanced from Bull Run in line of battle, expecting to drive off 
a raid of cavalry. Had the Confederates restrained their im- 
patience, and permitted the enemy to approach, the whole bri- 
gade might have been captured. But their artillery could not 
resist the temptation to open upon the unsuspecting advance, and 
it retreated so rapidly that, although it was pursued for some 
miles, its whole loss was but 135 killed and wounded, and 204 pris- 
oners. The Federal general, Taylor, was killed. 

The Federal and sutler's supphes stored at Manassas presented 
a sight to the ragged and half-starved Confederates, such as they 
had never before imagined. Not only were there acres of ware- 
houses filled to overflowing, but loaded cars covered about two 
miles of side-tracks, and great quantities of goods were stacked in 
regular order in the open fields, under tarpaulin covers. The sup- 
phes embraced everything eatable, drinkable, wearable, or usable, 
and in immense profusion. During the day, Jackson turned his 
men loose to feast and help themselves. At night, after aston- 
ishing their palates with real coffee, with cheese, sardines, and 
champagne, and improving their underwear, apparel, and foot- 
gear, and filhng their haversacks, the torch was systematically 
apphed. When Pope next day looked upon the ashes, he must 
have felt that it was bad advice, when he said, "Let us study 
the probable Unes of retreat of our opponents and leave our own 
to take care of themselves." 

Meanwhile, at Bristoe, Ewell had been unmolested until near 
three o'clock. About that time he was attacked by Hooker's 
division. This Pope had sent to develop the situation at Ma- 
nassas, of which he was as yet not informed. Hooker had only 
about 5500 men, — less than Ewell had at hand, — but his attack 
was so vigorous that the latter, whose orders were not to bring 
on a general engagement, after an hour's fighting, withdrew across 
Broad Run (having fought on the south side) and marched to 
join Jackson at Manassas, without being followed. 



SECOND MANASSAS 195 

Jackson had now accomplished the first object of his expedi- 
tion — the destruction of the Manassas Depot. Pope would 
have to abandon his fine on the Rappahannock, and would, of 
course, move at once to crush Jackson. A Napoleon, in his place, 
might have cut loose from his base and marched upon Rich- 
mond, leaving Lee to wreck his army on the fortified fines around 
Washington, but Pope was no Napoleon. When he realized the 
situation, however, his first orders were very judicious, a safer 
play if less brilfiant than a Napoleonic advance upon Rich- 
mond would have been. He ordered the two corps of Mc- 
Dowell and Sigel, with Reynolds's division, about 40,000 men, to 
Gainesville. In support of them, to Greenwich, he sent Heintzel- 
man with three divisions. Hooker was sent to Bristoe to attack 
Ewell, with Porter marching to support him. Banks, in the rear, 
protected the trains. The best part of all of these orders was the 
occupation of Gainesville with a strong force, for Gainesville was 
directly between Jackson and Longstreet. It behooved Pope to 
prevent any possible junction between these two, and now on the 
night of the 27th at Gainesville he held the key to the whole posi- 
tion. 

But, unfortunately for Pope, as yet he had no conception that 
Lee, with Longstreet 's corps, would be hurrying to throw him- 
self into the lion 's den by the side of Jackson. He seems to have 
thought that his effort should be to "bag Jackson," rather than 
to keep him from uniting with Lee. 

Let us now turn to Lee and Longstreet. On the 26th, Jackson 
having about a day and a half the start, . Longstreet 's corps set 
out to follow. One division, Anderson's, of four brigades, was 
left at Sulphur Springs, in observation of the enemy, while the 
remaining 17 brigades, somewhat loosely organized into about 
five divisions, say 25,000 men, were put in motion to follow in 
Jackson's track. Lee rode with this command, and they biv- 
ouacked for the night near Orleans. At dawn on the 27th the 
march was resumed. He was delayed at Salem by some cavalry 
demonstrations from the direction of Warrenton, and, having 
no cavalry, he went into bivouac at White Plains, having 
marched about 18 miles. 

I have already told of the course of events having been twice 



196 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

modified in this campaign, by the commanders coming into pos- 
session of their rival 's plans or orders, by virtue of some accident, 
and there is yet to tell of other similar occurrences. Besides 
these there was also a narrow escape from capture by Lee 
himself. A Confederate quartermaster, on the morning of the 
27th, was riding some distance ahead of Longstreet 's column on 
the march northward from Orleans. Approaching Salem, he sud- 
denly came upon the head of a Federal squadron. He turned and 
took to flight, and the squadron, breaking into a gallop, pursued 
him. Within a short distance the fugitive came upon 
Lee with some ten or twelve staff-officers and couriers. He 
yelled out as he approached, " The Federal cavalry are upon you, " 
and almost at the same instant, the head of the galloping 
squadron came into view, only a few hundred yards away. It 
was a critical moment, but the stafT-officers acted with good 
judgment. Telling the general to ride rapidly to the rear, they 
formed a Une across the road and stood, proposing "to delay the 
Federals until Lee could gain a safe distance. This regular 
formation deceived the enemy into the belief that it was the head 
of a Confederate squadron. They halted, gazed for a while, and 
then, wheeling about, turned back, never dreaming of the prize 
so near. 

On the night of the 27th, while Jackson is burning Manassas, 
Lee and Longstreet are in bivouac at White Plains, 24 miles west 
and beyond Thoroughfare Gap, while McDowell, Sigel, and Rey- 
nolds are about Gainsville, directly between them. In this situa- 
tion, the game is in Pope's hands, but, as already said, instead 
of trying to keep Lee and Jackson apart, his ambition is to make 
short work of Jackson, who, he probably supposed, would fight in 
the earthworks around Manassas. In some such belief, during 
the night he issued further orders. All of his forces were ordered 
to march upon Manassas at dawn on the 28th. This is the order 
which lost Pope his campaign. 

It is now time to return to Jackson. He knew that Lee and 
Longstreet were coming, and his most obvious move, perhaps, 
would have been to march for Thoroughfare Gap by some route 
which would avoid McDowell at Gainesville. His movement, 
however, had not been made solely to destroy the depot at 



SECOND MANASSAS 197 

Manassas. That was but the first step necessary to get Pope 
out of his strong position. Now it was necessary to bring him 
to battle quickly, but in detail. His decision was a master- 
piece of strategy, unexcelled during the war, and the credit of 
it seems solely due to Jackson himself. 

Soon after nightfall Taliaferro's division was started on the road 
toward Sudley 's Ford of Bull Rim, to cross the Warrenton turn- 
pike and bivouac in the woods north of Groveton. A. P. Hill's 
division was sent by the Blackburn 's Ford road to Centreville. 
After midnight, Ewell, who had arrived from Bristoe and gotten 
some supplies, followed Hill across Bull Run. Then he turned up 
the stream, and made his way on the north side to the Stone 
Bridge. This he crossed and made a junction with Taliaferro's 
division. Hill remained at Centreville until about 10 a.m., when 
he moved down the Warrenton turnpike, also crossed at Stone 
Bridge, and, moving up toward Sudley, took position on Jack- 
son's left. His march and Ewell's were each about 14 miles. 
The wagon-trains all went with Taliaferro's division, which 
marched about nine miles. The sending of two divisions across 
Bull Run was doubtless to be in position to interpose if Pope 
attempted to move past him toward Alexandria. Perhaps, also, 
it had in it the idea of misleading the enemy, for it certainly had 
that desirable effect. It happened that a part of Stuart's 
cavalry, which was on that flank, during the morning raided 
Burke's Station on the railroad, only 12 miles from Alexandria. 
This, with the reported presence of Hill at Centreville, entirely 
misled Pope as to Jackson's true location. 

Early on the 28th, two Federal couriers were captured, bearing 
important orders. Those of the first were from McDowell to 
Sigel, directing him to march to Manassas Junction. This order 
was taken to Jackson, and he seems to have interpreted the 
movement to mean that Pope was about to retreat to Alex- 
andria, for he at once sent orders to A. P. Hill, at Centreville, to 
move down to the fords of Bull Run to intercept the enemy. 
But, fortunately, the other captured courier bore orders from 
Pope to McDowell, ordering the formation of his line of battle for 
the next day on Manassas plains, and these orders, being brought 
to Hill, he appreciated that the enemy was not retreating and 



198 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

that it would be dangerous to separate his division from the other 
two. So, as has been told, about 10 a.m. he marched to join 
them. 

Though it was Jackson's desire now to conceal his where- 
abouts until Longstreet was near, yet one of his brigadiers. 
Col. Johnson, came near, bringing the force which was now 
marching from Gainesville toward Manasses, down upon the 
right flank of Tahaferro's and Ewell's divisions. Johnson, 
with two guns, was on a high hill, a little out from Jackson's 
extreme right. He saw the head of a column, and skirmishers 
advancing, as he thought, upon his position. It was the head of 
Reynolds 's division, on McDowell 's left, straightening itself out 
for its prescribed march to Manassas, ten miles to the southeast. 
Johnson opened fire upon them with his guns. The enemy 
promptly deployed his column, advanced skirmishers, and 
brought into action a superior force of artillery, on which John- 
son abandoned his hill and withdrew his small force to Jackson 's 
lines. The enemy's skirmishers advanced and occupied the hill, 
but the Confederate force was now nowhere to be seen. So it 
was supposed that the affair was only a demonstration by some 
reconnoitring party, and, after caring for a few killed and 
wounded, the division marched for Manassas, where it was still 
supposed that Jackson was awaiting them. 

The Federal marches were not rapid, and it was not until near 
noon that Pope himself arrived at Manassas, and found that 
Jackson had mysteriously vanished. He was utterly at a loss to 
guess where he had gone. His first supposition was that he had 
gone toward Leesburg, and he ordered McDowell to move to 
Gum Springs in pursuit. He soon countermanded that order, and 
hearing of Hill's having been at Centreville, and of the cavalry 
attack upon Burke's station, he ordered a general concentration 
of his troops at Centreville. This was his last order for that day, 
and all was now quiet for some hours. Jackson and his three 
divisions lay hidden in the woods within seven miles of the ruins 
of Manassas, until 5 p.m. At that hour King's division of Mc- 
Dowell's corps, — four brigades about 10,000 strong, with four 
batteries, — appeared upon the Warrenton pike, in front of Jack- 
son's ambush, marching toward Centreville in pursuance of 



SECOND MANASSAS 199 

Pope's order. King had been marching from Gainesville to 
Manassas, and Pope's orders had intercepted the march and 
changed its direction. Jackson, about a mile from the road, 
might have remained hidden and allowed King to pass. Had 
he known that, at that moment, Lee and Longstreet were still 
beyond Thoroughfare Gap, and that Ricketts's division of Mc- 
Dowell 's corps was at the gap, one might suppose that he would 
hesitate to disclose himself. But if Pope was allowed to with- 
draw behind Bull Run, the result of the whole campaign would 
be merely to force Pope into an impregnable position. It was 
the fear of this which led Jackson to attack King immediately, 
even though he knew that it would draw upon him Pope 's whole 
force. 

Leaving Hill's division in position on his left (holding the 
road to Aldie by which he might retreat in case of emergency), 
Jackson formed a double line of battle, with Tahaferro 's division 
on the right and Ewell's on the left. Tahaferro (W.B.) had in 
his front line from left to right the old Stonewall brigade, now 
imder Baylor, and that of A. B. Taliaferro, and in rear the 
brigade of Starke. His fourth brigade under Bradley Johnson 
was detached and in observation near Groveton. Ewell had in 
his front line Lawton 's and Trimble 's brigades, and in his second 
Early's and Forno's, — in all about 8000 infantry. Orders were 
sent for 20 pieces of artillery, but owing to difficulties of the 
ground only two small batteries arrived in time to be engaged. 
These were isolated and could not be maintained against the 
superior metal of the enemy. King's division, not dreaming of 
the proximity of the enemy, was marching down the pike with 
only a small advanced guard and a few skirmishers in front. 
The brigades were in the following order: Hatch's, Gibbon's, 
Doubleday's, Patrick's. 

The action which now ensued was somewhat remarkable in 
several features. It was fought principally by the brigadiers on 
each side. McDowell, in command of the Federal corps, was 
absent, having gone to find Pope and have a personal conference. 
The division commander. King, was absent, sick at Gainesville, 
only about two miles off. Ewell and Taliaferro (W.B.), the two 
Confederate major-generals, were both seriously wounded, Ewell 



200 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

losing his leg. Probably, for these reasons, less than a half of 
either force was brought into the brunt of the action. When 
this had developed itself, Jackson ordered Ewell's second line, 
Early and Forno, to turn the enemy's right flank. In the dark- 
ness, they were unable to make their way in time through the 
woods, and across the deep cuts and high fills of an unfinished 
railroad, stretching from near Sudley 's Ford toward Gainesville. 
The fighting, meanwhile, had ceased. The notable part of this 
action was fought by Gibbon 's brigade of three Wisconsin regi- 
ments, and one Indiana reenforced by two regiments of Double- 
day's,— the 56th Pa. and the 76th N.Y.,— in all about 3000 
men. Opposed was Taliaferro 's front line of two brigades (A. G. 
Taliaferro's on the right, and the Stonewall brigade, now only 
about 600 strong, under Baylor, on the left) with some help also 
from Ewell's front line of Lawton's brigade, and Trimble's. 
These troops were all veteran infantry, and it is to be noted that 
the decidedly smaller force of ithe Federals had never before been 
seriously engaged. They had, indeed, the great aid and support 
of two excellent batteries, but their desperate infantry fight, 
attested by their losses, illustrates the high state of efficiency to 
which troops may be brought solely by drill and discipline. It 
may be a sort of mechanical valor which is imparted by long- 
trained obedience to military commands, but it has its advan- 
tages, even though there may be appreciable differences in it 
from the more personal courage inspired by a loved cause. 

A good idea of this contest is given in the official report of 
Gen. W. B. Taliaferro : — 

"At this time our lines were advanced from the woods in which they 
had been concealed to the open field. The troops moved forward with 
splendid gallantry and in most perfect order. Twice our lines were 
advanced until we had reached a farm-house and orchard on the right of 
our line, and were within 80 yards of a greatly superior force of the enemy. 
Here one of the most terrific conflicts that can be conceived of occurred. 
Our troops held the farm-house and one edge of the orchard, while the 
enemy held the orchard and the enclosure next to the turnpike. To our 
left there was no cover, and our men stood in the open field without cover 
of any kind. The enemy, although reenforced, never once attempted to 
advance upon our position, but withstood with great determination the 
terrible fire which our lines poured upon them. For two hours and a half, 



SECOND MANASSAS 



201 



without an instant 's cessation of the most deadly discharges of musketry, 
round shot and shell, both lines stood unmoved, neither advancing and 
neither broken or yielding until at last, about nine o 'clock at night, the 
enemy slowly and sullenly fell back and yielded the field to our victo- 
rious troops." 

Separate returns for this action were made only for Lawton's 
and Trimble's brigades. Only partial statements for the other 
commands are found in the few official reports. Of many com- 
mands there are no reports, owing to the number of commanding 
officers who were killed or disabled in succeeding battles. The 
returns of Lawton 's and Trimble 's brigades are as follows : — 







Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 






OFFICERS 


MEN 


OFFICERS 


MEN 


MEN 


Aggregate 


Lawton's 
Trimble's 


8 
8 


105 

82 


23 
12 


273 
202 


5 
6 


414 
310 


Total 


16 


187 


35 


375 


11 


724 



The Stonewall brigade, out of its small force of 600 muskets, 
lost three colonels, two majors, and over 200 men, killed and 
wounded. Taliaferro's brigade lost a lieutenant-colonel and 
two majors. Its other casualties were probably about 100. 
Gibbon's brigade, out of 2300 men, lost about 750, and Double- 
day 's two regiments, about 800 strong, lost about 350. Hatch 's 
brigade, from the front, and Patrick's from the rear, were not 
engaged, partly because of the length to which the marching 
column had been strung out upon the march, and partly, perhaps, 
because of the absence of Gen. King. But he came upon 
hearing of the action, and at 1 a.m. on the 29th, by his order, the 
division was put in m^otion for Manassas Junction. He thought 
himself in the presence of superior forces, and decided that it was 
best to get nearer to reenforcements. 

It is now time to return to Lee and Longstreet, who bivouacked 
between White Plains and Thoroughfare Gap rather early in the 
afternoon of the 27th. Scouts sent ahead by Longstreet re- 
ported the Gap clear, and messages were received from Jack- 
son that he was in ambush upon the Warrenton road. To make 



202 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

sure of the passage through Thoroughfare Gap, D. R. Jones's 
division was sent forward to occupy it. The Gap is a narrow 
pass, only 80 yards in width, bounded on the north by basaltic 
cliffs over 200 feet in height and on the south by steep hills, 
rocky, and covered with vines and undergrowth, A small force 
in possession could hold the pass against any front attack. As 
Jones's column drew near the Gap, officers riding ahead discovered 
the approach of a large Federal force. It was Ricketts 's division, 
sent by McDowell upon his own responsibility, to prevent the 
advance of reenforcements to Jackson. It was a move which, 
quickly made and strongly backed, might have brought victory to 
the Federals. 

Jones deployed the 9th Ga. of Anderson's brigade, and sent 
them through the Gap. They met and drove back the Federal 
pickets, until, meeting heavier forces with artillery, they were 
themselves driven into the Gap, where the whole brigade formed, 
and essayed to scale the mountain on the left. This was only 
possible at a few places, but the 1st Ga. succeeded and got 
into a good position, and repulsed with loss an attack by the 
enemy who came so near that some were killed by pistol fire of 
the officers. 

Meanwhile, Benning, commanding Toombs's brigade, was 
ordered to occupy the mountain on the right of the pass. He 
started off at the double-quick, through a hot fire of artillery, 
and after a stiff chmb occupied the crest just in time to repulse 
the enemy advancing upon it from the other side. 

Sharp skirmishing took place until dark. Jones's division had 
no artillery, and it could only oppose the enemy's by selecting 
men armed with rifled muskets, and sending them as skirmishers 
to pick off the cannoneers and horses; yet this was done so 
successfully that the enemy's batteries were often compelled to 
move, and Ricketts speaks of his total losses as "severe." 
Jones's total casualties were "about 25." 

One great disadvantage under wliich the whole Confederate 
army was still laboring at this period was that most of its arms 
were the old "calibre 69," smooth-bore musket, using the round 
ball with effective range of only about 200 yards. When 
Benning collected from two regiments all rifled muskets, he 



SECOND MANASSAS 203 

got only about 30 from the 20th Ga., and 10 or 12 from the 2d 
Ga. 

When the enemy's heavy fire of artillery disclosed his force in 
front of the Gap, Longstreet at once took measures to turn the 
position. Hood, with his two brigades, was ordered to cross 
the mountain by a cattle trail a short distance to the north, and 
Wilcox's division of three brigades was ordered to force a pas- 
sage, if necessary, through Hopewell Gap, three miles to the 
north. 

Both of these flank movements were accomplished during the 
night, but Ricketts had decided not to wait. He had been so 
discouraged by his reception, that he scarcely waited until 
nightfall to start back to Gainesville; and at daylight next 
morning, having learned that King's division had fallen back to 
Manassas, Ricketts took the road to Bristoe. 

The departure of the enemy from their front at dark on the 
27th was observed by the Confederates, and on the morning of 
the 28th the remainder of Jones's division marched through the 
Gap, and was joined by Hood and Wilcox from their respective 
routes by the cattle trail and Hopewell Gap. By noon Lee and 
Longstreet had arrived at Gainesville, and connected with Jack- 
son, and the second great step in Lee's strategy had been success- 
fully accomplished. The third and last, also, by that time was 
in a fair way of accomplishment, for Pope, instead of concen- 
trating his forces behind Bull Run, had taken the offensive, and 
had already begun his attack upon Jackson. Of that action it is 
now to tell. 

Jackson's whereabouts had been disclosed to Pope by the 
attack upon King's division, but Pope failed to note that Jackson 
was the aggressor. He supposed that King had intercepted 
Jackson in an effort to escape through Thoroughfare Gap. His 
available forces, on the morning of the 29th, were as follows : — 

On Bull Run, two miles east of Jackson, were Sigel's 
corps, three divisions, and Milroy's independent brigade, 
together about 11,000 strong, and Reynolds's division of Pa. 
Reserves, about 8000, with 14 batteries. At Centreville, seven 
miles to the northeast, were the three divisions of Hooker, 
Kearny, and Reno, about 18,000. About seven miles to the 



204 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

southeast at Manassas, and between there and Bristoe were the 
corps of McDowell and Porter, about 27,000, — in all about 
64,000. 

Jackson's forces, now about 18,000 infantry, with 40 guns, 
were formed along the unfinished railroad line, which stretched 
south from Sudley's Ford to the Warrenton pike, about three 
miles. Of this the two miles nearest Sudley were held in force; 
the rest by skirmishers, except that the right flank, on the Warren- 
ton pike, was held by Early's and Forno's brigades of Ewell's 
division. The left of the line was held by A. P. Hill's strong 
division of six brigades. In front of the extreme left was wide, 
open ground for a half mile. Then came about a mile of wood 
from 200 to 600 yards wide, and then again the open, rolling 
fields. Hill's division was formed in three lines of battle, with 
16 guns to command the open ground in his front. 

Ewell's division, now under Lawton, held the centre, with the 
brigades of Lawton and Trimble, in two lines. Taliaferro's divi- 
sion, now commanded by Starke, held the right, formed in three 
lines of battle, with 24 guns massed to fire over the open ground 
in front. 

Pope was not obliged to fight — certainly not to take the 
offensive. He might have withdrawn across Bull Run, and 
awaited the arrival, within two or three days, of Sumner's and 
Franklin's corps and Cox's division. If he did fight, he would 
have stood a fair chance of success, had he first massed his army, 
and concentrated its power in united effort, with reserves to 
follow up every success. But he was sure to lose if he allowed 
his divisions to fight in piecemeal. 

As Jackson was forming his lines at sunrise, Sigel's and Rey- 
nolds's columns were visible, nearly two miles away, deploying 
for the attack. Sigel held the right, with three divisions, sup- 
ported by Mihoy's brigade. Reynolds held the left. The 
enemy's line was not parallel to Jackson's, their right being 
nearest to Jackson's left, and their left somewhat retired. About 
seven o'clock the enemy's batteries were brought forward and 
opened fire. Their skirmishers were advanced, and the lines of 
battle followed. On the right and the left of Groveton wood 
(the wood in front of Jackson's left centre), the Confederate 



SECOND MANASSAS 205 

batteries, having fair play, held back the enemy's advance. 
Opposite the wood the enemy encountered only skirmish fire, 
and they easily entered. But when they approached the Con- 
federate line of battle and met its fire, the conflict was short and 
the Federals retreated, Gregg's brigade following them. Milroy's 
brigade came to their help, but Thomas's brigade came to Gregg's, 
and the Federals were driven completely through the wood and 
pursued by the Confederate fire as they retreated across the 
fields. 

This much was over by 10.30 a.m. The best of Pope's oppor- 
tunity would be lost by 1 p.m., for by that hour Longstreet's 
troops would be on hand. But now Reno and Kearny, from 
Centreville, were beginning to come upon the field, and Sigel, 
calling upon Reno for reinforcements, again made a desperate 
assault, which reached the Confederate line in such strength as 
to necessitate the calling up of Branch's brigade from Hill's 
third line. With this brigade the wood was again cleared and 
Sigel's divisions were practically put hors du combat. It was 
now about noon, and Pope, who had been at Centreville, not 
realizing the size of the affair near Groveton, arrived upon the 
field. He immediately organized a fresh attack with the three 
divisions of Kearny, Hooker, and Reno. Had he awaited their 
arrival before wrecking Sigel in vain efforts, his chances would 
have been better. 

These three divisions made their assault about one o'clock. 
As before, the division on the extreme right, Kearny's, was held 
off by the 16 guns firing over the open ground on Jackson's left. 
The other two divisions came through the wood, and this time 
portions of the assaulting column actually crossed the railroad 
line, and fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued, the brunt of it 
falling upon Field's and Thomas's brigades. Field was severely 
wounded; but Pender's brigade, from Hill's third line, joining 
in the melee, the Federals were again borne back, and again 
pursued, not only through the wood, but out into the open ground 
beyond, where Pender incautiously followed. Here he met a 
hot fire of artillery, and fell back to the woods. 

On seeing his retreat, Grover's brigade of Hooker's division, 
being in reserve, was sent forward for a counterstroke. Advanc- 



206 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ing slowly through the wood, it gave a volley and then rushed 
the somewhat disorganized Confederate line, and carried a con- 
siderable space. Had they had prompt and ample support, 
victory was within their grasp. 

By this time, Longstreet's troops had connected with Jackson's 
extreme right, relieving the brigades of Early and Forno. These 
had been brought from their isolated position on the right flank, 
and placed in the rear of the centre. Jackson had seen Grover's 
advance, and now sent Forno's Louisianians and a regiment of 
Lawton's Georgians to the onset. Johnson's and Starke's bri- 
gades were also brought to fire upon Grover's left flank. So, 
caught in the whirlwind of fire which burst upon him in the high 
tide of his success, Grover was swept back across the line and 
out of the wood, and driven beyond the Warrenton pike, with a 
loss of one-fourth of his command. 

Four determined assaults had now been made through the 
Groveton wood, and each had met with a bloody repulse. At 
least 4000 Federals had fallen in them. Not one attack had had 
any chance of success, for each had been made with too few 
men; but the continuous fighting from 7 a.m. until 4 p.m., had 
also thinned the Confederate lines, and had greatly reduced the 
ammunition supply of many of the brigades. There was now a 
lull in the battle for a while, during which many Confederates 
collected cartridges from the bodies of the fallen. On the right 
and left of the Groveton wood the fighting had been largely of 
artillery, or musketry, at long range, and there had been no actual 
collisions. 

Pope had been very sanguine in the morning that he was 
about to "bag Jackson," and he was now unwilling to give up 
the effort, while the sun was still high above the horizon, and 
while he still had comparatively fresh troops. Kearny's three 
brigades opposite the open ground on HiU's left, had had no close 
fighting, and Reno's two brigades were also in good condition. 
Besides these, he looked for help from Porter's corps, and from 
King's and Ricketts's divisions of McDowell's corps. Ricketts 
could have been with him, but for his blunder in the morning, 
when he took the road to Bristoe on learning that King had 
fallen back to Manassas. Thus, Jackson's attack upon King 



SECOND MANASSAS 207 

had produced the effect of keeping two divisions out of the next 
day's fight. As to Porter, there is much interesting history 
which can only be briefly summarized here. 

Porter^ in the Seven Days, had proved himself not only a 
hard fighter, but a skilful commander. He would have made a 
good leader of an army ; but he had a low opinion of Pope, and, 
in his correspondence with brother officers about this period, did 
not conceal it. It so happened that, under Pope's orders. Porter's 
corps had that morning marched from Bristoe by Manassas for 
Gainesville, Now, at 4.30 p.m., supposing Porter in position at 
Gainesville, Pope sent him peremptory orders to immediately 
attack Jackson's right flank. 

But Porter was not at Gainesville. When, about 11.30 a.m., 
he reached a little stream called Dawkins Branch, about three 
and a half miles short of Gainesville, he found Confederate 
cavalry in his front. He deployed a brigade in line of battle, 
and, advancing a strong skirmish-line, captured some of Long- 
street's scouts. Meanwhile, clouds of dust, extending back 10 
miles to Thoroughfare Gap, indicated that a large force was arriv- 
ing at Gainesville. Stuart, to notify Jackson of his approach, had 
made some cavalry drag brush in the roads. Nevertheless, 
Porter prepared to force his way. He deployed his corps of two 
divisions in two lines, and advanced a brigade across the stream. 
King's division, which was marching in rear of Porter, closed up, 
but remained in column. About this time McDowell came upon 
the field and remonstrated with Porter, saying, " You are too far 
out; this is no place to fight a battle." 

As McDowell ranked Porter, when their troops were together, 
McDowell was in command. Just before meeting Porter, he had 
learned that at 8.45 that morning 17 regiments of Confederate 
infantry and a battery had passed, marching down the Warren- 
ton road toward Groveton, After some reconnoissance, McDowell 
decided to leave Porter where he was, and to take King back to 
a road by which he could reach the left flank of Reynolds's divi- 
sion, now engaged with Jackson's right, Ricketts's division, re- 
turning from its march to Bristoe, was now following King, but 
both divisions were exhausted by from 12 to 18 hours' marchings. 
When McDowell left, with King and Ricketts, Porter considered 



208 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

himself too weak to venture an attack upon the Confederates in 
his front. His force was only between 9000 and 10,000. He 
had no reenforcements at hand and he had in his front Long- 
street's corps of nearly 25,000. His course was proper, and his 
threatening position practically neutraUzed an equal number of 
the Confederates, for D. R. Jones's division of three brigades, 
and Wilcox's of three, were each deployed and held in observa- 
tion of Porter all the afternoon. 

Pope, having sent his order to Porter to attack at 4.30, waited 
a half-hour to allow time for the message to reach Porter, and 
at five ordered Kearny and Reno with their five brigades to 
attack Jackson's left. To finish with Porter first: The 4.30 
order did not reach him until about 6.30. He at once ordered 
his leading division, Morell's, to advance, but before the necessary 
arrangements could be made, darkness had come on, and he was 
compelled to abandon the idea of attacking. For this, and some 
other minor incidents, Pope, soon after the battle, preferred 
charges against Porter. He was tried, and on Jan. 10, 1863, 
was convicted of violations of articles of war, and sentenced to 
dismissal from the army, and to be disqualified from ever again 
holding office under the United States. 

Thus was the Federal army deprived of the services of one among 
its officers of the very highest type. The ex-Federal Confederates 
who had known Porter considered this result as one of the best 
fruits of their victory. The gist of the charges against Porter 
lay in Pope's claim that Longstreet's troops had not reached 
Gainesville until late in the afternoon, and that Porter could 
have fallen upon Jackson's exposed right flank. After the war, 
when official reports of the Confederates were published, the 
actual facts became so notorious that, in 1878, the proceedings 
of the court were reviewed by a board appointed by the Presi- 
dent. They found the facts and recommended the remission of 
Porter's sentence, though condemning the terms in which Porter 
had criticised Pope, in his correspondence above referred to. 
This report of the board was referred to Congress, which took 
no action. Finally on May 4, 1882, President Arthur remitted 
the sentence. 

From this digression let us return to the attack at 5 p.m. on 



SECOND MANASSAS 209 

the 29th, by the two divisions of Kearny and Reno with their 
five brigades. Like the four preceding attacks, it is a predestined 
failure, for it is another case of a boy sent upon a man's errand. 
But, unlike the previous efforts, this gained a temporary success 
over the thin brigades of A. P. Hill, which had repelled all the 
preceding ones, and was now poorly supplied with ammunition. 
Here the thin lines were overrun by the superior numbers, in a 
very gallant and persistent attack. Hill's troops were forced 
back so far that Pope believed that Jackson's left " was doubled 
back upon his centre." He ordered King's division, which 
McDowell had now brought upon the field, to advance down the 
Pike and fall upon Jackson's right, where, too, he was momentarily 
expecting Porter to attack. 

But Hill, though forced back for perhaps 300 yards, was not 
broken, and was still making a desperate fight, when, to his aid, 
came Early's and Lawton's brigades. The Federals were in dis- 
order, and the fresh Confederate line had an easy victory, driving 
the enemy and pursuing them far across the railroad, before it 
could be halted and brought back. Meanwhile, King's division, 
though worn by its march to Manassas and back since 1 a.m. of 
the previous night, had advanced boldly down the Warrenton 
pike, stimulated by Pope's ''flattering tale" that Jackson was 
"doubled back upon his centre." 

Now we must take up the story of Longstreet's corps to ex- 
plain the genesis of the sixth and last combat of the day. Like 
all the preceding, it, too, was made by an insufficient force. Long- 
street, on his arrival, had formed his line, not in prolongation of 
Jackson's, but inchning forward, making a large obtuse angle. 
A few of his guns were pushed to the front, firing upon the left 
of Reynolds's fine, and assisting Jackson's light in keeping 
Reynolds's from coming to close quarters. At the extreme right 
Jones's division was bent back, almost at right angles, to oppose 
a front to Porter's corps, and Wilcox's three brigades were held 
in reserve behind Jones. 

Now that his army was again united, Lee was inclined to en- 
gage at once, but Longstreet asked to be allowed first to make a 
personal reconnoissance. After making one, occupying an hour, 
he reported adversely on account of the easy approach open on 



210 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

his right to large Federal forces reported to be at Manassas. 
Lee was not satisfied with this report, and recurred to the idea 
of attacking down the turnpike. It was now so late in the after- 
noon, however, that Longstreet suggested making only a recon- 
noissance in force, reserving the attack until dawn next morn- 
ing, and to this Lee agreed. 

Accordingly, Hood's and Evans's brigades were ordered to 
advance for the reconnoissance, and Wilcox's division was with- 
drawn from the rear of Jones, as a support to the movement. 

Thus it happened that when King's division advanced, expect- 
ing to find Jackson in retreat, it met Longstreet advancing. The 
fight which ensued was prolonged until 9 p.m. It was fierce 
and bloody, but the first half -hour of it converted King's advance 
into a retreat. He was pursued until he found refuge in the 
heavy lines holding the high ground about Pope's centre, with 
the loss of a gun, several flags, and some prisoners. Longstreet 
then withdrew his attacking brigades back to the ground from 
which they had advanced. It had happened also that, although 
Jackson had been entirely successful on the left, his victorious 
troops, being withdrawn from the pursuit, had not halted at the 
railroad cut, — their line during the day, — but had been carried 
back to a line a short distance in rear, selected by Jackson. 
Thus, on both flanks, the Federals, although defeated, were left 
during the night with deserted battle-fields in their front. They 
discovered the fact before midnight, and this discovery proved 
to Pope a fatal delusion and a snare. Had it been a deliberate 
ruse, it would have been a masterpiece. Pope thought it could 
have but one meaning — that the Confederates were retreating 
toward Thoroughfare Gap. At daybreak he had wired Halleck 
as follows : — 

"We fought a terrific battle here yesterday, with combined forces of 
the enemy, which lasted with continuous firing from dayhght until dark, 
by which time the enemy was driven from the field which we now occupy. 
The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We lost not less than 
8000 killed and wounded, but from the appearance of the field, the enemy 
lost at least two to one. The news has just reached me from the front that 
the enemy is retreating toward the mountains." 

Pope clearly beUeved this story on the insufficient evidence 



SECOND MANASSAS 211 

before him, and this error made him the aggressor next morning 
and cost him the battle, as we shall see. 

The object of the Confederate advance on the afternoon of 
the 29th, as we have seen, was a reconnoissance preparatory to 
an attack at dawn, which Longstreet had suggested as better 
than one so late in the afternoon. Hood and Evans had been 
charged to examine the enemy's positions carefully, and to re- 
port as to the feasibility of the morning attack. About mid- 
night reports were brought, by each, adverse to making it. Upon 
these reports Lee decided to stand his ground for the day, and 
see if the enemy would attack. If he did not, Lee proposed to 
inaugurate a fresh turning movement around Pope's right, during 
the night of the 30 th. His force upon the field, including 2500 
cavalry, was now nearly 50,000. Jackson, reduced by casual- 
ties, had about 17,000. Longstreet had, with R. H. Anderson, 
about 30,000. 

Pope, at last, had united his whole army, except Banks's corps. 
This had hardly recovered from its so-called "victory" at Cedar 
Mountain, and was in charge of the wagon-trains about Bristoe. 
Before daylight orders had been sent withdrawing Porter from 
his isolated position on the extreme left, and bringing him around 
to the centre. And now Pope, believing his victory already half 
won, had massed, almost under his own eye, about 65,000 men and 
28 batteries. Two corps, Sumner's and Frankhn's, of the Army 
of the Potomac, and two extra divisions. Cox's and Sturgis's, — 
in all about 42,000, — were coming from Alexandria, 25 miles off, 
as fast as possible. With these. Pope would have about 107,000 
in the field. Lee also had some reenforcements coming, and 
already at the Rappahannock River. They were the divisions 
of McLaws and D. H. Hill, each about 7000 ; Walker's division 
about 4000; Hampton's cavalry 1500, and Pendleton's reserve 
artillery 1000 — total 20,500. 

Having telegraphed Halleck that the Confederates were re- 
treating, Pope now began to set his army in battle array to press 
the retreat. Some hours were consumed, but they were well 
spent in forming his troops, thus avoiding the isolated efforts of 
the previous day, and arranging for a simultaneous attack along 
the whole fine. Meanwhile, there was some artillery firing at 



212 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

rather long range by each side, and skirmishers in front were 
everywhere in easy range and sharply engaged. 

The Federal Une was short and strong. From its right on 
Bull Run in front of Jackson's left, to its left across the Warren- 
ton pike, near Groveton, was less than three miles. Within this 
space were deployed about 20,000 infantry in the front line, and 
behind it 40,000 more were held in masses to be thrown where 
needed. Lee's line covered at least four miles. Jackson, on the 
left, had proved the strength of his unfinished raihoad as a 
defensive line of battle, and had no wish to change. But, with 
his instinctive desire to mystify his opponent, he had withdrawn 
his men into the nearest woods and hollows, where he kept them 
carefully out of sight. He had had but one reenf or cement from 
Longstreet's corps — a battalion of 18 guns under Col. S. D. Lee, 
which early that morning had taken position on his right flank, 
where it could support the fire of the large battery near his 
centre. Longstreet's line, as before said, was not a prolongation 
of Jackson's, but bent to the front — the two forming a rather 
flat crescent, its right flank overlapping Pope's left considerably. 
The Federal army made a finer display than was often seen on a 
battle-field in the war, being closely concentrated upon ground 
unusually open, and Pope, from one of the hills close in rear of 
the centre, viewed it with pride and confidence. Of his oppo- 
nents he could see httle but a few batteries, supported by Httle 
more than skirmishers; and he so firmly beheved that Jackson 
was already retreating, that he would not be convinced by those 
of his officers who had had evidence of large forces near at hand, 
behind the Confederate skirmish-hnes. A Federal who had been 
captured, and held a prisoner in the Confederate lines during the 
night, but who had escaped, reported that he had overheard 
Jackson's men say that they were going to join Longstreet. 
Porter had sent the man to Pope, with a message discrediting 
the story, and suggesting that he might have been deceived or 
sent as a ruse. Reynolds, on the left, had discovered that the 
Confederate line overlapped the Federal, and had had a nar- 
row escape from capture. Ricketts had fought Longstreet at 
Thoroughfare Gap on the 28th and retreated before his advance ; 
but the tale of the escaped prisoner was credited in preference 



SECOND MANASSAS 213 

to any other theory. About noon a swarm of skirmishers ad- 
vanced along the whole Federal front, and were followed by the 
Federal Hne of battle, arrayed generally, three lines deep in front. 

The Confederate artillery wasted but little fire on the skir- 
mishers. When, however, the triple lines of battle revealed them- 
selves, there happened something for which Pope was not prepared. 
Not only did every Confederate gun open a rapid fire, but above 
their roar could be heard the infantry bugles of Jackson's corps, 
and from the woods a wave of bayonets swept down to the un- 
finished railroad, and now Jackson and Longstreet were united, 
and Pope, with a force only 30 per cent superior, was committed 
to the attack. Possibly the Confederates may have flattered 
themselves that their victories in the six assaults made on the 
previous day would have diminished the ardor of the coming 
attack, but if so, they were to be disappointed. The value of 
disciphne and training was again illustrated, and the battle which 
followed was scarcely surpassed for desperation upon either side 
in the war, Tlie whole weight of the assault fell upon Jackson's 
corps. His men defended themselves with courage and the con- 
fidence inspired by their recent successes. When, at one point 
of the line, the ammunition ran low, men laid down muskets, 
and standing on the railroad embankment, made formidable 
missiles of an abundant outcrop of large pebbles. At length 
Pope's superior force produced such a pressure that Jackson 
called for assistance, and Lee ordered Longstreet to send a division 
of infantry. But Longstreet had discovered that the left flank 
of the attack upon Jackson had now advanced into the reentrant 
angle between his front and Jackson's, so far that its fines of 
battle now presented their flanks and could be enfiladed. He 
befieved that he could most quickly refieve Jackson by a severe 
enfilade fire of artillery. 

Several batteries of artillery were rushed into a suitable posi- 
tion and opened upon the enemy's flank at easy range a raking 
fire which nothing could withstand. Within 15 minutes the 
aspect of the field was changed. 

When Pope had first seen Jackson's corps disclose itself and 
re-occupy its defensive line along the unfinished railroad, he had 
very injudiciously withdrawn Reynolds's division from his ex- 



214 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

treme left and placed it in support of Porter's corps, although 
Milroy's corps, from among his masses in reserve, was equally 
available. In vain, now, were Reynolds and all his other re- 
enforcements advanced to stem the tide of retreat across the 
open meadows, imder the Confederate fire. Porter's triple lines 
had been practically merged into one, as the successive brigades 
came to the support of those in front. The merged forces were 
still pressing forward, and in close proximity to the Confederate 
line, when the flanking fire of the artillery opened, and quickly 
disorganized the attack. Jackson added to the confusion by 
advancing two brigades in a counter-stroke, and Pope's battle 
was lost. Unfortunately for Lee, Pope had not opened his 
battle early enough in the day to allow time for the Confederates 
to win a victory and to reap its full fruits. It was now about 
4 P.M. when Lee, seeing the effects of Longstreet's fire, ordered 
his whole force to be advanced for a counter-stroke. Had the 
Confederate army been a well-organized force, able to bring 
quickly into play its full powers, much fruit might even yet 
have been gathered. 

The objective point aimed at by Longstreet's advance was the 
plateau of the celebrated Henry house, upon which Jackson's 
brigade, "standing like a stone wall," had made his name im- 
mortal 13 months before. 

Around this plateau the regulars and others of the best Federal 
troops, both of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, now made 
desperate stands, appreciating that its possession by the Con- 
federates would cut off the Federal retreat across Bull Run, via 
the pike and the Stone Bridge. Their stand was also aided by 
two circurnstances. First, Jackson's division, now greatly worn 
and reduced by their incessant fighting for three days, and having 
more exposed ground to advance over, were not able to push the 
enemy's retreat as rapidly in the counter-stroke as Longstreet 
could upon the right. Consequently Pope was able to bring 
over some reenforcements to his left flank from his right, and 
his artillery was able to take in flank those of Longstreet's forces 
which led the assault upon the Henry hill. Secondly, three of 
Longstreet's brigades were lost from his attack from looseness of 
organization. Wilcox's, Pryor's, and Featherstoiie's brigades 



SECOND MANASSAS 215 

had been called a division, and Wilcox ordered to command them 
as such. In the progress of the fighting, during the afternoon, 
Pryor's and Featherstone's brigades had become separated from 
Wilcox's, just when it was called for by Longstreet, and carried 
to assist the attack upon the Henry hill. The other two took 
some part upon the right flank of Jackson, but the weight of 
the division as a whole was lost. Drayton's brigade of D. R. 
Jones's division, also without orders, was taken by some im- 
authorized person to oppose a rumored advance of cavalry upon 
our right flank. The rumor proved to be unfounded, but the 
brigade was kept out of the action until the fighting was ter- 
minated by darkness. 

Daylight was shortened by heavy clouds, and a rain which set 
in about dusk and continued during the night and much of the 
next day. Although the firing was kept up quite severely for 
some time after dark, the attack was practically over as soon as 
daylight was gone. For the irregular and disconnected lines, 
though with ample spirit and force to carry the position, had 
time permitted them to envelop it, were paralyzed by the danger 
of firing into each other in the darkness. 

In the Federal army the confusion was very great, as troops 
and trains intermixed groped through the rain, and poured 
across the bridge and along the pike toward Centreville. There 
Franklin's corps had arrived about 6 p.m., only a few hours too 
late to have come upon the field and have saved the day. Upon 
this corps Pope ordered his whole army to concentrate. 

An officer of the regular army, Capt. W. H. Powell, describing 
this night march, wrote in the Century War Book, as follows : — 

" As we neared the bridge we came upon confusion. Men, singly and 
in detachments, were mingled with sutler's wagons, artillery caissons, 
supply wagons, and ambulances, each striving to get ahead of the other. 
Vehicles rushed through organized bodies, and broke the column into 
fragments. Little detachments gathered by the roadside, after crossing 
the bridge, crying out the numbers of their regiments as a guide to scat- 
tered comrades. And what a night it was! Dark, gloomy, and be- 
clouded by the volumes of smoke which had risen from the battle-field." 

Had Longstreet pushed rifled guns to the front, upon the turn- 
pike, and fired at high elevations down its straight course, he 



216 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

might have landed shells in this retreating column as far as the 
Stone Bridge. This would probably have blocked the column 
and added much to the captured property. But the Confederates 
as yet had no artillery organization which could quickly appre- 
ciate and improve all the passing opportunities of a battle-field. 
Indeed, as before stated, the army was only a mass of divisions, 
associated by temporary assignments to Longstreet and Jackson, 
who were themselves only division commanders. 

On the morning of the 31st, Lee lost no time in renewing his 
advance. As the position at Centreville was strong, and had 
been fortified by the Confederates in 1861, he ordered Jackson's 
corps to turn Centreville, crossing Bull Run at Sudley, and 
moving by the Little River turnpike upon Fairfax C. H. 
Stuart's cavalry were to precede Jackson. Longstreet was to 
glean the battle-field and then to follow Jackson. All progress 
was slow on account of the rain and mud. This was the third 
battle within 14 months which had been closely followed by 
heavy rain, — Bull Run, Malvern Hill, and Second Manassas. The 
theory took root that cannonading has rain-making virtue. 

On the 31st Jackson, over wretched roads and through con- 
tinued rain, advanced only about 10 miles, and bivouacked at 
Pleasant Valley on the Little River pike. Longstreet's advance 
reached Sudley Ford, and the care of the battle-field was left to 
the reenforcements from Richmond, which were now coming up. 
On Sept. 1, the march was resumed by Jackson at an early 
hour, and Longstreet followed over the same road. Pope, in a 
despatch to Halleck during the night, had reported his falhng 
back to Centreville, but had still claimed a victory, saying: 
"The enemy is badly whipped and we shall do well enough. 
Do not be uneasy. We will hold our own here." Yet he had 
left 30 guns and 2000 wounded on the battle-field, and had 
ordered Banks at Bristoe Station, in charge of his trains, to 
destroy all supphes and to come to join him at Centreville, with 
his troops, by a night march. With Franklin's, Banks's, and 
Sumner's corps, which arrived early on the 31st, he had now 
30,000 fresh men, but his delay at Centreville was limited to a 
single day. That evening the presence of Stuart's cavalry, 
shelling his trains near Fairfax C. H., became known, and next 



SECOND MANASSAS 217 

morning reports reached him of Jackson's corps on the Little 
River turnpike- 
Finding his position again turned, Centreville was abandoned, 
and a new one ordered to be taken at Fairfax C. H. This 
move practically placed him beyond pursuit. His whole army 
was now united, and too close to its fortified lines to be again 
flanked out of position. And, although there was demoraliza- 
tion in some organizations, yet there were many excellent divi- 
sion and brigade commanders, leading veteran troops so well 
trained and disciplined that their fighting was of the highest 
type. An illustration of this took place late in the afternoon 
of the 1st. Jackson's corps, approaching the junction of the 
Little River and Warrenton pikes, had formed line of battle at 
Ox Hill, with A. P. Hill's division upon the right. Two of Hill's 
brigades, under Branch and Brockenbrough, were sent forward 
to develop the enemy, who were known to be near. A terrific 
thunder storm, with strong wind and blinding rain directly in 
their faces, came on just as this advance was being made. With 
this storm on their backs, Stevens's division of Reno's corps, 
the 9th, charged the approaching Confederates in front and 
flank, and drove them back in much confusion. The division 
making the charge had been engaged on both the 29th and 30th, 
and had been defeated on both days. Its fine behavior and 
hard fighting was the feature which makes this engagement 
notable. It was, under the circumstances, a useless affair. 
There was little chance of either side accomplishing any result 
beyond the killing of a few opponents, with probably equal loss 
to itself. Hill sent strong reenforcements to restore his battle, 
and Kearny's division of the 3d corps came to Stevens's assist- 
ance. Stevens was shot through the head. Kearny, riding into 
the Confederate lines in the dusk, was also shot dead, as he tried 
to escape capture by wheeling his horse and dashing off, leaning 
behind his horse's neck. The fighting on both sides was desper- 
ate and bloody, but the Federals were driven back. During the 
night, the whole Federal army was withdrawn from the vicinity 
of Fairfax, and took refuge within the fortified lines about 
Alexandria. 
Stevens and Kearny were both p^'rominent and distinguished 



218 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

officers. The advantage to the Confederates of their being taken 
off, like the cashiering of Fitz-John Porter, was among the few 
fruits of their victory. Indeed, at the moment when Stevens 
fell, beaming the colors of a regiment which he had taken from 
the hands of a dying color-bearer, the authorities in Washington 
were about to supersede Pope, and place Stevens in command 
of the now united armies of Pope and McClellan. He had 
graduated at the head of Halleck's class at West Point in 1839, 
and Halleck was well acquainted with his mihtary attainments. 
Both Stevens and Kearny were favorites in the old army, had 
served most creditably in Mexico, and both had been severely 
wounded in the capture of the city, Kearny losing his left arm. 
Kearny's body fell into the hands of the Confederates, and be- 
ing recognized, it had been sent the next day, under a flag of 
truce, by Lee, into the Federal Unes with a note to Pope, 
saying: — 

" The body of Gen. Philip Kearny was brought from the field last night, 
and he was reported dead. I send it forward under a flag of truce, think- 
ing the possession of his remains may be a consolation to his family." 

This affair ended the battle. On the morning of Sept. 2 
it was apparent that the enemy had escaped, and Lee allowed 
his whole army to lie in camp and have a Uttle much-needed 
rest. ^Vhile he had fallen short of destroying his greatly superior 
adversaries, he could yet look back with pride upon the record 
he had made within the 90 days since taking command on June 1. 
He had had the use of about 85,000 men, and the enemy had had 
the use, in all, of fully 200,000. 

At the beginning, the enemy had been within six miles of 
Richmond. He was now driven within the fortifications of 
Washington, with a loss in the two campaigns of about 33,000 
men, 82 guns, and 58,000 small-arms. Lee's own losses had 
been about 31,000 men and two guns. 

The critics who had declared that he would never fight were 
forever silenced and pilloried in shame. In the last affair at Ox 
Hill, on Sept. 1, the casualties in A. P. Hill's corps were 39 
killed and 267 wounded, and in Ewell's were 44 killed and 150 
wounded, a total of 83 killed and 423 wounded; 506 total. 



SECOND MANASSAS 



219 



There were no reports in the Federal army of this particular 
affair, but probably the losses were not very unequal. 

The losses of the two armies for the whole campaign are sum- 
marized as follows. No report was made of casualties in the 
Confederate cavalry, which were probably about 100. 



Confederates 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Jackson's Corps 
Longstreet's Corps 


805 
663 


3547 
4016 


35 
46 


4,387 
4,725 


Total 


1468 


7563 


81 


9,112 


Federals 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Army of Virginia 
Army of Potomac 
Ninth Army Corps 
Kanawha Division 


929 

600 

204 

14 


4389 

3013 

1000 

50 


2787 

1151 

319 

42 


8,105 

4,728 

1,523 

106 


Total 


1747 


8452 


4263 


14,462 



Thirty guns and over 20,000 small-arms were collected from 
the field. 

My own share in this campaign was limited to keeping up the 
supply of the ammunition consumed. I had the satisfaction of 
seeing the organization and working of my department stand 
well the test of a severe campaign, and a considerable separa- 
tion from its depots. Both in the artillery and infantry, the 
fighting was incessant and severe, but the supply of ammunition 
never failed, and, at the close of the campaign, without a day's 
delay, the army was prepared to undertake an even more dis- 
tant and desperate adventure. When Lee moved from Gor- 
donsville to cross the Rapidan, I was ordered to follow with 
my reserve ordnance train from near Richmond. I followed as 
rapidly as possible, but could not overtake the army until after 
Chantilly. Then I replenished all expenditures, so that the 
troops advanced into Maryland with everything full. 

Thereafter I kept myself and train in close proximity to Lee's 
headquarters in all the movements, and, with my wagons run- 
ning between our successive positions and Staunton, Va., we were 
able to meet all demands. 



CHAPTER XII 

BOONSBORO OR SoUTH MOUNTAIN, AND HaRPER's FeRRY 

Choice of Moves. Interior Lines. Policy of Invasion. Across the Po- 
tomac. Affairs in Washington. McClellan succeeds Pope. Lee's 
Proclamation. Organizations and Strength. Harper's Ferry Garrison. 
Orders No. 191. The Army Scatters. The Lost Order. Lee Warned. 
Battle of Boonsboro or South Mountain. Longstreet Arrives. The 
Retreat. Crampton's Gap. Franklin Attacks. Jackson before Har- 
per's Ferry. Preparations for Assault. Bombardment and Surrender. 
Borrowed Wagons. Paroles and Colors. Casualties. 

The enemy having taken refuge within lines impregnable to 
assault, Lee had no alternative but to take the offensive else- 
where. He could not afford to sit down before Washington and 
await the enemy's pleasure. 

There were two openings for offensive operations, each with 
some chances of success. The safest would have been to with- 
draw behind the Rappahannock, where he might occupy a strong 
line with one-half of his forces, under Jackson, while the other 
half, under himself and Longstreet, was sent by railroad to 
Chattanooga via Bristol. At the time, in Tennessee, the Con- 
federates were conducting two campaigns aimed at Louisville; 
the design being to drive the Federals from Kentucky. Kirby 
Smith, with an army of about 15,000, from Knoxville,had opened 
the road through Cumberland Gap, and on Aug. 30 had won 
a victory over a Federal force at Richmond, Ky., and on 
Sept. 2 had occupied Lexington. Bragg, with about 30,000 
men, from Chattanooga had moved northward up the Sequatchie 
Valley, and, crossing the Cumberland Moimtains, was, on Sept. 
5, at Sparta, Tenn., turning the Federal position at Murfrees- 
boro, where Buell was in command with about 50,000 men. 

Such a movement by Lee would have been utilizing our 
"Interior Lines," the one game in which the Confederacy had 
an advantage over the Federals. On a small scale it had been 

220 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 221 

played both at Bull Run and in the Richmond campaign; the 
troops from the valley in both cases leaving the Federal armies 
opposite them, and quickly doubling on the point of attack. 

Opportunities to do the same upon a larger scale were re- 
peatedly offered between the Confederate armies before Rich- 
mond and those about Chattanooga. One had already occurred 
in the summer just passed. On May 30, Beauregard had evacu- 
ated Corinth with 52,000 men, and withdrawn to Tupelo, 
Miss. He was not followed, and the Federal army under 
Halleck of 100,000, was dispersed in different directions from 
Arkansas to Cumberland Gap. Beauregard was allowed two 
months of idleness and rest. It would have been possible to 
bring 20,000 of his veterans to Richmond by the 26th of June 
to reenforce Lee for the Seven Days' Campaign. With their 
assistance McClellan should have been destroyed. Then the 
Western troops could have returned, and, if necessary, carried 
large reenforcements with them. Now a second opportunity was 
offered for similar strategy. Others were offered later, as we 
shall see, whenever one of the Confederate armies, from any cause, 
was free from the prospect of an early attack by its opponent. 

On this occasion, the joint campaign of Bragg and Smith in 
Kentucky, and the Maryland campaign, both failed. Had we 
utilized our interior lines, one of them at the least should have 
been made sure. It was hoped, indeed, when the campaigns 
were entered upon, that the Southern sympathies of the Mary- 
landers and Kentuckians would cut real figures in the struggle 
by bringing thousands of recruits to the Confederates, but this 
hope proved vain in both cases. There had been already enough 
observation of the war to destroy its romance, and to make the 
most careless realize what a grave step one would take who 
shouldered a musket under the Starry Cross. Many sympathized 
with our cause, and wished us well. But few were willing to 
abandon homes and take sides before we had shown ourselves 
able to remain in their States for at least a few weeks. 

And this, in the case of Maryland, was utterly out of the question 
for the simple reason that there was no railroad communication 
possible ; and no army large enough to meet the Federal army, 
could support and supply itself by wagon-trains from Staunton, 



222 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



nearly 150 miles away, for any length of time. Whenever, 
therefore, we crossed the Potomac going northward, we were as 
certain to have to recross it coming southward, in a few weeks, 
as a stone thrown upward is certain to come down. 

In a letter to President Davis, on Sept. 2, Lee gave as reasons 




Vicinity of Harper's Ferry 

for the invasion of Maryland that it would reheve the Confeder- 
acy from the presence of hostile armies on her soil; and that 
the position of the army would be favorable for reaping the fruits 
of a victory, if one could be gained. Mr. Davis approved, and 
the campaign was made ; but no victory was gained, nor is it 
easy to see where and how the chances of pursuit would have 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 223 

been improved, had it been. Apparently Kentucky might have 
offered more favorable ones. 

After a rest of a day, on Sept. 4, with Jackson in the lead, 
the army was put in motion for the fords of the Potomac, near 
Leesburg. With the reenforcements which had joined, Lee had 
now about 55,000 men, all in fine spirits and with their cartridge 
boxes full, but otherwise not in the best condition. The dif- 
ferent divisions were still only associated, not formed, into 
corps, and in the matter of shoes, clothing, and food the army was, 
upon the whole, probably worse off during this brief campaign 
than it had ever been before or ever was again. About one-half 
of the small-arms were still the old smooth-bore muskets of short 
range, and our rifled cannon ammunition was always inferior in 
quality. The lack of shoes was deplorable, and barefooted men 
with bleeding feet were no uncommon sight. Of clothing, our 
supply was so poor that it seemed no wonder the Marylanders 
held aloof from our shabby ranks. For rations, we were in- 
debted mostly to the fields of roasting ears, and to the apple 
orchards. Such diet does not compare with bacon and hard- 
tack for long marches, and, before the campaign was over, the 
straggUng from all causes assumed great proportions. Brigades 
were often reduced nearly to the size of regiments, and regiments 
to the size of companies. On Sept. 5 the army began to cross 
the Potomac, and on Sept. 7 the advance reached Frederick. 

It is now to tell of events in Washington City. There was 
great alarm when Pope, with the combined armies of Virginia 
and the Potomac, fell back within the fortifications, almost in a 
state of rout. Col. Kelton of Halleck's staff, sent to find out 
the actual state of affairs, reported that there were 30,000 
stragglers upon the roads. It was said that the money from the 
Treasury was being shipped to New York, and that an armed 
naval vessel, with steam up, was kept near at hand in the Poto- 
mac. Pope, making a virtue of necessity, applied to be re- 
lieved from command. There was no formal order relieving 
him imtil Sept. 5, when he was sent to the Northwest, where 
there were some Indian disturbances; but he was deprived 
of his army on Sept. 2, when McClellan was assigned to the 
defense of Washington, and the command of all the troops 



224 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

engaged in it. As this included the whole of both armies, Pope 
was left without a man. Yet neither Lincoln nor Halleck had 
confidence in McClellan, and there was great reluctance to use 
him. Only the day before he had been instructed that he "had 
nothing to do with the troops engaged in active operations un- 
der Gen. Pope, but that his command was limited to the im- 
mediate garrison of Washington." At that time Pope himself 
had already been adjudged incompetent, and the decision would 
surely have been made to place Stevens in command had he been 
aUve. 

But the death of Stevens, and the disorderly retreat of Pope 's 
forces within the fortifications, had demoraUzed the government. 
McClellan alone was supposed to have the confidence of the 
army. It was the day of his triumph, and one of humiliation 
to both Lincoln and Halleck. 

Yet McClellan was out of place. He would have been an 
excellent chief of staff, but was unfit for the command of an 
army. He was as utterly without audacity, as Lee was full of it. 
His one fine quality was his abihty to organize and discipline. 
He constructed a superb machine, which, being once con- 
structed, would fight a battle with skill and courage if only let 
alone. McClellan, during the Seven Days, let it alone, absenting 
himself as if by instinct. Never but at the battle of Sharpsburg 
was he present on any field, and his presence, by keeping Porter 's 
corps out of the action, made a drawn fight of what would other- 
wise have been a Federal victory, as will duly appear. 

So now, Sept. 2, while Lee's army is resting on the field of 
Ox Hill, McClellan begins to reorganize the 120,000 troops at 
his disposal within the lines of Washington. It is quick and 
easy work, for his own old army composes two-thirds of it. 
By Sept. 7, when Lee's army is concentrated about Frederick, 
McClellan had six corps in the field, holding a fine covering 
Washington. 

Lee, perhaps unfortunately, was not then seeking an action. 
He had issued a proclamation to the people of Maryland, and for 
a few days he wished to observe its effect. It told the Mary- 
landers, briefly, that the liberty of free choice between the 
Union and the Confederacy had been denied them by the United 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 225 

States, and that he had come to assist them in regaining their 
rights, and would respect their decision. It took but a short 
while to show that very few had any interest in the matter. 
When our troops forded the Potomac, the bands playing "Mary- 
land, my Maryland," there was great enthusiasm, but it was 
confined to the invaders. The invaded were conspicuously 
absent, attending to their daily occupations, and evidently not 
ambitious to offer their fertile and prosperous fields for the 
movements and conflicts of armies. 

I think the only real effect of that proclamation was subjective, 
or upon Gen. Lee himself. Necessarily, in it he was compelled 
to appear as a deUverer who had come to free the Marylanders 
from a yoke. A few days later, as will be seen, there was an 
opportunity for him to avoid a great risk of grave disaster by 
withdrawal into Virginia, without serious loss of men or impair- 
ment of prestige, and with richer booty in prisoners, guns, and 
ammunition than he had ever gathered from a battle-field. 

In his decision to stand his ground and fight, his attitude as 
deliverer probably had a large share. 

The organization and strength of the two armies is given 
on pages 226 and 227. As before noted, the Confederate organ- 
ization into corps was slowly developing. What is here given 
is what was reached at the close of the campaign. In its earlier 
stages, there was much independence of action by some divisions. 
This independent communication with headquarters, it will pres- 
ently be seen, resulted in a mishap — the loss of an order of prime 
importance to the issues of the campaign. It is but an illustra- 
tion of how gravest results hang on care in most trifling details. 

It was Lee 's plan to draw the Federal army away from Wash- 
ington before deHvering battle. To do this he contemplated an 
advance into Pennsylvania west of the Blue Ridge. This plan 
was frustrated by the Federal forces at Harper's Ferry and 
Martinsburg, continuing to hold their positions after Lee had 
crossed into Maryland, As they were exposed to capture, he had 
expected them to withdraw. McClellan had desired to withdraw 
them, but Halleck objected that there was then no way by which 
Miles could withdraw. McClellan then suggested that Miles 
should cross the river and occupy Maryland Heights, where he 



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228 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

could defend himself, but the suggestion was not adopted by 
Miles, who felt himself obUged by his orders to hold the village 
itself. As Lee could not advance freely into Pennsylvania with 
Miles 's force so close in his rear, he determined to capture the 
Harper's Ferry garrison. Discussing the matter with Long- 
street, the latter advised against it, saying that it would require 
a wide separation of our divisions, with rivers between them, 
which would be dangerous so near the enemy. Lee, however, 
beheved that it was possible to capture Harper 's Ferry and re- 
unite his army before McClellan could fully apprehend his plans. 

As Jackson took the same view, the enterprise was committed 
to him, and a carefully drawn order was prepared, "No. 191," 
detailing the march of each division. Jackson, with his corps (ex- 
cept D. H. Hill's division) was ordered via Williamsport to 
drive the Federals from Martinsburg into Harper 's Ferry, which 
he would then attack from the south. Walker's division was 
to cross the Potomac below Harper 's Ferry and occupy Loudon 
Heights. McLaws, with his own and Anderson 's divisions, was 
to move by the most direct route and possess himself of Maryland 
Heights, overlooking Harper's Ferry, whence he could with 
artillery, and even with musketry, command the town. 

Longstreet, with the two divisions of D. R. Jones and Evans, 
was to march to Boonsboro and await the return of the forces 
from Harper's Ferry. Finally, D, H. Hill's division was to act 
as rear-guard at Turner's Gap in South Mountain. 

On Sept. 10, the army marched at dayhght. On the road 
Longstreet was ordered to continue his movement to Hagers- 
town, while D. H. Hill, leaving two brigades in Turner's Gap, 
came on to Boonsboro. This change was caused by the collec- 
tion of a force of Pennsylvania militia at Chambersburg. It was 
not formidable, as the regiments refused to leave the State, yet 
its formation materially affected the course of events. For it 
will be seen that this separation of Longstreet by 13 miles from 
D. H. Hill, caused the loss of the position at Turner's Gap. The 
loss of that gap brought on at Sharpsburg the battle which would 
otherwise have probably been fought upon the mountain. 

Meanwhile, there had occurred the mishap already referred to, 
which gave to McClellan an opportunity rarely presented to a 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 229 

general. An official copy of Lee's order No. 191, addressed to 
D. H. Hill, fell into McClellan's hands on Sept. 13 soon after 
his arrival at Frederick. 

The incident occurred from our unsettled organization. D. H. 
Hill 's division had been attached to Jackson 's command upon its 
crossing the Potomac. No order should have issued from Lee's 
office for Hill. Jackson so understood it, and, with his usual 
cautious habit, on receipt of the order, with his own hand made a 
copy for Hill, and sent it. This copy Hill received and carefully 
preserved, and produced it after the war, when the matter was 
first inquired into. But Lee 's office had also prepared an official 
copy for Hill, and this copy serving as a wrapper to three cigars 
was picked up by a private soldier of the 12th corps in an 
abandoned camp near Frederick. When found, it was promptly 
carried to McClellan, reaching him before noon on the 13th. Its 
importance was recognized, and its authenticity proved by the 
fact that the different Confederate divisions had all pursued the 
roads assigned them in the order. Already McClellan had learned 
of the crossing of the Potomac by Walker at Point of Rocks, and 
by Jackson at Williamsport, but he had not xmderstood the 
object. There had been fear that it might mean a dash at the 
lines about Alexandria. Now the whole situation was explained. 
Lee and Longstreet with only 14 brigades were about Boonsboro. 
McLaws and Anderson with 10 brigades were between Harper's 
Ferry and Crampton's Gap, eight miles south of Turner's Gap. 
Jackson, with 14 brigades, was southwest of Harper's Ferry, and 
Walker, with two brigades, was southeast of it, across the 
Shenandoah. By all the maxims of strategy Lee had put it 
in the power of McClellan to destroy his army. He had not only 
divided his force into four parts and scattered them, with rivers 
and mountains between, but he had scattered more than was 
necessary. There was no need to place Longstreet as far away 
even as Boonsboro. A safer movement would have been to 
unite Longstreet with McLaws and Anderson at Crampton 's Gap, 
that it might be more securely held, and the capture of Maryland 
Heights be expedited, and that the distances separating his 
forces should be the least possible. 

McClellan's opportunity was obvious. It was to take quick 



230 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

advantage of the separation and move in between the parts. 
Then to overwhelm each in detail. This could be done by 
forcing the bulk of his army through Crampton's Gap. This 
move would have the further advantage of most speedily rehev- 
ing Harper's Ferry. But just as Pope had lost his campaign by 
moving directly upon Jackson, as he supposed, at Manassas 
Junction, instead of upon Gainesville, where he would have been 
between Jackson and Lee, here McClellan lost his campaign by 
moving directly after Lee upon Turner 's Gap. Even that he did 
with dehberation strangely out of place for the occasion. By 
night marches, over good roads with a good moon, he might have 
attacked and carried both Turner's and Crampton's gaps by 
sunrise on the 14th, for each was then held by only cavalry and a 
single brigade of infantry. 

Fortunately for Lee, a citizen of Frederick whose sympathies 
were with the Confederate cause, was accidentally present at 
McClellan 's headquarters during the afternoon of the 13th and 
heard expressions of gratification at the finding of the order, and 
learned of directions being given for a vigorous advance the 
next morning. With full appreciation of its importance he made 
his way through the Federal Unes, and brought the information, 
after dark, to Stuart, who at once sent it on to Lee, then in 
camp at Hagerstown. Four brigades of Hill's division were at 
different points, from two to five miles west of Turner's Pass. 
They were ordered back, and barely arrived in time to save it 
from being seized by the enemy. Meanwhile, too, Jones's and 
Evans's divisions were ordered to march in the morning to re- 
enforce Hill, and Lee and Longstreet returned with them to 
Turner's Gap. 

It was between three and four o'clock when they reached the 
scene of action, after an oppressively hot and dusty march of 14 
miles. There were eight brigades in the column, Toombs being 
left at Hagerstown to protect the trains. Hill had already had 
severe fighting. Turner's Pass was flanked upon each side by 
secondary passes within a mile, through each of which roads 
reached the crest, and cross-roads connected both with the main 
pike. On the right Garland's brigade had been attacked at 
7 A.M. by a superior force; Gen. Garland, an officer of great 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 231 

promise, had been killed, and his brigade driven back in con- 
fusion, but the enemy did not follow up, and Anderson's bri- 
gade arrived in time to hold the position. D. H. Hill never 
failed to get good fighting out of his veteran division, and 
from 7 A.M. to 3 p.m., without support, he held the Gap success- 
, fully. But two corps of the enemy, the 1st and 9th, comprising 
18 brigades and 18 batteries, were attacking it and gradually 
outflanking Hill's positions. By 3 p.m. they had occupied ground 
on the Confederate left which assured their final success in spite 
of all that could be accompHshed by the eight tired brigades 
newly arrived. These, however, began to chmb the hills from 
the west in support of Hill's five brigades, now much reduced 
by their long conflict. Hill, in his report, says : — 

" Had Longstreet 's division been with mine at daylight in the morning, 
the Yankees would have been disastrously repulsed, but they had gained 
important positions before the arrival of reenforcements. These' came 
up, after a long, hurried, and exhausting march, to defend localities of 
which they were ignorant, and to fight a foe flushed with partial success 
and already holding key points to farther advance. Had our forces never 
been separated, the battle of Sharpsburg never would have been fought." 

On the arrival of the head of Longstreet's column, Evans was 
sent to the left to support Rodes, and Kemper, Jenkins, and 
Picketts were sent to the right at the foot of the mountain, by 
a rough road, to meet a force of the enemy said to be crossing 
the mountain in that direction. After marching a mile and a 
half, the report having been found to be erroneous, they were 
called to hasten to the top of the mountain by obscure by-roads 
and across fields, and on reaching the top they were at once 
sharply engaged. Longstreet writes : — 

"They were put in as they arrived to try to cover the right of Rodes 
and Evans, and fill the intervening space to the turnpike. As they 
marched the men dropped along the road as rapidly as if under severe 
skirmish. So manifest was it that nature was exhausted that no one 
urged them to get up and try to keep their ranks." 

Before their ranks could be formed they were under fire, and 
the action was kept up until darkness finally called its truce 
upon the field. 

At this time both Lee and Jackson were disabled, and com- 



232 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

polled to ride in ambulances. On Aug. 31, Lee, in recon- 
noitring Pope's lines, had dismounted, and was holding his 
horse by the bridle when an alarm of Federal cavalry had 
startled the party, and the general's horse had jerked him to the 
ground, fracturing some of the bones of his right hand. It now 
was carried in a sHng, and he could not handle his reins. Jacksont 
at Frederick had been presented with a fine horse, but the animal 
was not well broken and had reared up and fallen over, bruising 
him so that he, too, was an invalid. 

Lee was now halted at the foot of the mountain, and thither 
Longstreet and Hill repaired as the firing ceased. Hill made a 
report of the situation. Darkness had saved the Confederate 
line from serious disaster. The tired troops and trains could 
not be allowed to rest, but must at once be put in motion to the 
rear. At first Lee designated Keedysville as the point at which 
the troops would halt; but later news reached him that the 
enemy had also gotten possession of Crampton's Gap and he 
changed the order, and directed that the new position should be 
at Sharpsburg, behind the Antietam River, distant from Turner's 
Gap about 10 miles. D. H. Hill's troops were first withdrawn, 
and were followed by the rest of the infantry and artillery. 
Fitz-Lee's brigade of cavalry and Hood's and Whiting's brigades 
of infantry acted as rear-guard to the column. 

My reserve ordnance train, of about 80 wagons, had accom- 
panied Lee's headquarters to Hagerstown, and had also followed 
the march back to Boonsboro. I was now ordered to cross the 
Potomac at Williamsport, and go thence to Shepherdstown, 
where I should leave the train and come in person to Sharps- 
burg. The moon was rising as I started, and about daylight I 
forded the Potomac, imaware of having had a narrow escape 
from capture, with my train, by Gregg's brigade of cavalry. This 
brigade had escaped that night from Harper's Ferry, and crossed 
our line of retreat from Boonsboro. It had captured and de- 
stroyed the reserve ordnance train, of 45 wagons of Longstreet's 
corps. 

It is now necessary to describe what took place at Crampton's 
Gap, where McClellan should have gone in person, as that posi- 
tion was the key-point of the whole situation. Only Franklin's 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 233 

corps of nine brigades was sent there. They might have marched 
on the 13th from their position, three miles east of Jefferson, but 
did not until the 14th. Having only about 10 miles to go, they 
arrived in the forenoon, and at once deployed and formed for 
attack. The Gap offered fairly good positions for defence of its 
eastern outlet, had there been troops enough to hold its flanks; 
but the task imposed upon McLaws, with his four brigades and 
Anderson's six, was beyond his strength. To protect his own 
rear, and to prevent the escape from Harper's Ferry of the 13,000 
men to be besieged there, while he captured the heights above 
them and cannonaded them into a surrender, it was essential 
that he should occupy Pleasant Valley. This lay between, the 
Blue Ridge (here called South Mountain) on the east, and Elk 
Ridge (or Maryland Heights) on the west. The protection of 
his rear required him to hold ia force Crampton's Gap in the 
Blue Ridge, and to observe Brownsville Gap, about a mile south 
of it, and also Solomon's Gap in Elk Ridge opposite on the west. 
At Weverton, where the Potomac breaks through the Blue 
Ridge, five miles from Crampton's, he had to protect against an 
advance from the direction of Washington, and at Sandy Hook, 
where the road from Harper's Ferry comes around South Moun- 
tain into Pleasant Valley, he had to guard against an attack by 
the whole garrison of Harper's Ferry. Besides this, he had to 
send a force along Elk Ridge strong enough to defeat the in- 
trenched brigade which held the extremity, overlooking Harper's 
Ferry, and to hold it while his guns bombarded the town. There 
was thus one point to be attacked, two others to be observed, 
and three to be defended against large forces. The two most 
important points, — Crampton's Gap and Sandy Hook, — were 
over five miles apart. Considering the proximity of the immense 
Federal force, McLaws and Anderson were within the Uon's 
mouth, and that they ever got out of it was no less due to good 
management, than it was to good luck on their part, and mis- 
management by the enemy. 

Holding Crampton's Gap were only Munford's cavalry and 
Mahone's brigade of infantry, under Parham. Cobb's brigade 
and part of Semmes's were near in reserve. From noon on the 
14th until near five o'clock there was sharp skirmishing and 



234 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

artillery fire, while the enemy deployed Slocum's division on his 
right and Smith's on his left. Having, by then, gotten the 
measure of their enemy, and deployed lines which outflanked him 
upon both sides, a handsome charge was made by four brigades, 
— Bartlett's, Newton's, Torbert's, and Brooke's. Of course, 
there could be no effective resistance. The whole Confederate 
line was overwhelmed and driven back in confusion. The re- 
serve endeavored to rally the fugitives, but the small force — 
only about 2200 men in all — were so far outflanked by the 
Federal lines that no stand could be held until darkness put an 
end to the Federal pursuit, the whole Gap being now in their 
possession. 

The battle was well contested, as shown by the losses inflicted 
upon the enemy, 531 killed and wounded. The Confederates 
were fortunate to get off with a loss as reported by Franklin of 
only 400 prisoners and 450 killed and wounded left upon the 
field, and a single gun. 

In the scattered condition of McLaws's command, he was now 
in great danger. His one chance of safety was in an early sur- 
render of Harper's Ferry to afford him an outlet for escape. He 
acted promptly and with good judgment. Drawing the brigades 
of Kershaw, Wilcox, and Barksdale from the forces on South 
Mountain, with the remnants of Semmes, Cobb, and Mahone, he 
threw a fine of battle across Pleasant Valley about a mile and a 
half below Crampton's Gap, with its left flank upon Elk Ridge, 
and its right upon South Mountain. Here he made a bold front 
on the morning of the 15th against Franklin and his whole corps. 
Of course, Franklin, about 12,000 strong, could have run over 
him, and was imder orders, too, to do so. Frankhn was pre- 
paring to undertake the work, when, about eight o'clock, heavy 
firing which had been going on for over two hours at Harper's 
Ferry, suddenly ceased. Franklin correctly interpreted this to 
mean that Miles, at Harper's Ferry, had surrendered, and he 
abandoned his proposed attack. This was a gross blunder. It 
lost an easy opportunity to defeat six of Lee's brigades. One 
can but wonder if McClellan had communicated to Franklin a 
copy of Lee's order No. 191, for, with the knowledge of the situa- 
tion given by that order, it seems impossible that the latter could 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 235 

have remained idle so near a divided enemy for two whole days, 
as he now did on the 15th and 16th, receiving, meanwhile, no 
orders from McClellan. 

McClellan either did not himself appreciate the value of the 
opportunity chance had given him, or did not choose to let 
Halleck know "it. His letters to them seem vague and non- 
committal. He cannot be held blameless for Franklin's small 
performance in view of the opportunity. 

Let us now turn to Harper's Ferry. Jackson, with his three 
divisions under Jones, Lawton, and A. P. Hill, marching from 
Frederick on Sept. 10, had much the longest march to make, 
about 62 miles, nearly double those of McLaws and Walker. He 
made it, however, in good time, his marches being on the 10th, 
14 miles; on the 11th, 20 miles; on the 12th, 16 miles; and on 
the 13th by 11 a.m., 12 miles, which brought him to the Harper's 
Ferry pickets. The other commands reached their destinations 
about the same time, and the next morning, signal parties opened 
wigwag communication between all. 

McLaws had had some fighting to get in position on South 
Mountain, for it had been held by a brigade and two batteries 
under Col. Ford. Ford did not make a good defence and was 
afterward court-martialled and dismissed. 

During the forenoon of the 14th, Walker, on Loudon Heights, 
reported six rifled guns in position, but Jackson ordered him not 
to open fire until McLaws was ready Jackson, before opening 
fire, intended to demand a surrender, and to allow time for non- 
combatants to be removed. Before this could be done, however, 
the sounds of battle at Turner's and Crampton's gaps admonished 
him of the importance of hours, and, about 4 p.m., McLaws being 
prepared, a heavy cannonade was opened and kept up during 
the rest of the afternoon. Its effect, however, was more moral 
than physical. The rifled ammunition of the Confederates was 
decidedly inferior to that of the enemy, many of their shells 
failing to burst, or bursting prematurely, or tumbling ; and even 
the smooth-bore shells often burst near the guns. The part of 
the town near the rivers was within effective range of McLaws 
and Walker, but Bolivar Heights, where the most of the Federal 
force was located, was beyond it. 



236 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Meanwhile, Jackson arranged a direct assault upon Bolivar 
Heights. Ten of Walker's rifles were brought across the 
Shenandoah, about four miles above the town, and found good 
positions to take in rear the Federal left from spurs near the 
river. A. P. Hill's infantry, on Jackson's right, worked down 
the river bank over ground the Federals had thought impassable, 
and found lodgment in rear of the Federal line ; and Hill's artillery- 
established several batteries on the very ridge held by the Federals, 
and in easy range. On the left, near the Potomac, Jones's division 
drove off Federal outposts and also established batteries in 
effective range on commanding hills. 

Opposite the centre, Ewell's division'under Lawton was moved 
up near the works, and its smooth-bores posted for direct fire. 
All was ready by the morning of the 15th, and Jackson had the 
game in his hands. The Federals, indeed, were naturally de- 
pressed. Their affair on Maryland Heights, with McLaws, had 
been discouraging, and now they saw guns being posted to com- 
mand all of their positions. Col. Davis, with about 1200 
cavalry, got permission to make his escape during the night. 
The road to Sharpsburg, on the north bank of the river, was un- 
guarded, save by a picket some four miles out. The cavalry 
crossed on the pontoon bridge and made its escape, riding by 
the picket at a gallop in the moonUght. On their march to 
Hagerstown they had the luck to meet Longstreet's reserve 
ordnance train, as already told, and burned 45 wagons of am- 
munition. This train had a guard, but, unfortunately, it was 
concentrated at the rear, where alone was danger apprehended. 

Before sunrise on the 15th, Jackson opened all his guns from 
seven points, and prepared to storm the Federal fines after a 
severe cannonade. His new positions gave effective enfilade fire 
at fair ranges. Lt. Binney, of Miles's staff, writes in his 
journal : — 

" We are surrounded by enemy's batteries ; they open from Loudon 
Mountain and Loudon farm, Maryland Heights, Charlestown road, 
Shepherdstown road. Nothing could stand before such a raking cannon- 
ade. Col. Miles was everjnvhere, exposing himself to danger with the 
bravest, encouraging his artillerists, and met with many narrow escapes 
from the bursting shells of the enemy. At 8 a.m. our battery officers 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 237 

report their ammunition exhausted. Gen. White meets Col. Miles on 
the crest of heights and consults. , . . The white flag is exhibited, the 
artillery stops firing for about 15 minutes, when the enemy again open 
with a terrific cannonade. . . . Col. Miles and Lt. Binney, aide-de- 
camp, started down the eastern slope of the heights, where every inch of 
ground is being torn up by the enemy's fire. Col. Miles took Lt. 
Binney 's hand and remarked, ' Well, Mr. Binney, we have done our 
duty, but where can McClellan be ? The rebels have opened on us again ! 
What do they mean ? ' Immediately after a shell passed us, striking and 
exploding immediately behind us, a piece of which tore the flesh entirely 
from his left calf, and a small piece cutting his right calf slightly. Lt. 
Binney immediately tied his handkerchief above the knee and called for 
assistance, put him in a blanket, and, obtaining six men, dragged him to 
an ambulance and sent word to Gen. White." 

Col. Miles only survived for a day. A military commission 
which reported upon the circumstances of the surrender severely 
criticised it as premature. It may be said, however, that the 
inmiediate necessity for surrender was, not to escape the fire of 
the artillery, which was so much in evidence, but the charge of 
the infantry which was about to follow. 

The actual casualties of the Federals were 217. The total 
number surrendered was about 12,500. Jackson, in his official 
report, says : — 

"In an hour the enemy's fire seemed to be silenced, and the batteries 
of Gen. Hill were ordered to cease their fire, which was the signal for 
storming the works. Gen. Pender had commenced his advance, when 
the enemy again opening, Pegram and Crenshaw moved forward their 
batteries, and poured a rapid fire into the enemy. The white flag was now 
displayed, and, shortly afterward. Gen. White (the commanding officer, 
Col. D. S. Miles having been mortally wounded), with a garrison of about 
11,000 men, surrendered as prisoners of war. Under this capitulation 
we took possession of 73 pieces of artillery, some 13,000 small-arms, 
and other stores. Liberal terms were granted to Gen. White and the 
officers under his command in the surrender, which, I regret to say, do not 
seem from subsequent events to have been properly appreciated by their 
Government." 

It is interesting to inquire why this criticism? The official 

reports contain two documents which may explain. The first 

is a letter from Gen. White to Gen. D. Tyler at Annapolis, as 

follows : * — 

1 O. R. 27, 801. 



238 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

"General: I have the honor to state that, after capitulating at 
Harper 's Ferry, I was allowed by Gen. A. P. Hill, commanding at that 
post the forces of the enemy, some 24 wagons for the transportation of 
officers' baggage, after my pledge to return them to the enemy's lines. 
I respectfully request, therefore, that the quartermaster be directed to 
forward them back." 

Tyler, however, instead of returning them, forwarded White's 
letter to Halleck's office, calling it a "strange arrangement," and 
asks "shall the wagons be returned, and how?" What Tyler 
saw "strange" in it is not clear; but the tone of the letter sug- 
gests that difficulty was made, which is confirmed by Hill's re- 
port that "the wagons which were loaned to carry off the private 
baggage of the officers were not returned for nearly two months, 
and not until repeated calls had been made for them." 

The second document, by Lt. Bacon, adjutant of D'Utassy's 
brigade, concerns the paroling of the Federals.^ 

A difference arose between Col. D'Utassy and Gen. Branch, 
in charge of the details, as to the meaning of the words 
"will not serve against the Confederate States until regularly ex- 
changed." A pass to the brigade, allowing it to cross the bridge, 
was refused until the matter was adjusted. D'Utassy claimed 
that they might go West and serve against the Indians. The 
question was referred to Gen. A. P. Hill who refused to admit 
that understanding. This was about 9 p.m. About 6 a.m. Lt. 
Bacon reports that he — 

"handed the muster-rolls to Gen. Hill at his headquarters and asked a 
pass for the brigade. Hill asked if the brigade was paroled. I replied, 
evasively, 'I thought so.' He then sat down and wrote a pass, upon 
which we immediately crossed the river, thus giving them the slip. 

" Upon the announcement of the surrender. Col. D 'Utassy ordered the 
colors of all the regiments of our brigade to be conveyed to his head- 
quarters. This was done, and two hours were spent in removing the 
various colors from their staffs and packing them in the Colonel 's private 
trunk. The Adjutant General of Gen. Gregg made several demands 
on me for the colors, where I was engaged on the hill turning over the 
arms. I informed him that they had been sent to our brigade head- 
quarters. He left, but shortly returned, saying that he could not find 
them. I said I regretted it but could not aid him, that he must see my 

iQ.R. 27, 552. 



BOONSBORO AND HARPER'S FERRY 



239 



Colonel. These flags are now in my Colonel 's private trunks in this city. 
These are the simple facts which on my honor as a gentleman I certify 
to." 

A military commission which investigated found nothing that 
called for censure in these matters, and per contra had a complaint 
of its own, as follows : — 

"During the week previous to the evacuation of Maryland Heights 
a Lt. Rouse of the 12th Va. Cav., who had been engaged in a raid 
upon a train from Harper's Ferry to Winchester a short time before, 
was captured and brought into Harper's Ferry. He escaped while 
on the way to the hospital, he pretending to be sick, but was retaken. 
He was paroled, but returned in command of some rebel cavalry on the 
morning of the surrender. The attention of Gen. A. P. Hill was called 
to the fact that Lt. Rouse was a paroled prisoner, but no attention 
was paid to it. Lt. Rouse, on being spoken to about it, laughed at the 
idea of observing his parole." 

The casualties of the campaign are shown in the following 
table : — 

CASUALTIES, SIEGE OF HARPER'S FERRY, SEPT. 13-15, 1862 







Si 
Hi 


Q 

•a 
o 


m 
m 

M 




Sept. 13. McLaws's Div., Md. Hgts. 
" 14. " " , Crampton's Gap 
" 14. Mahone's Brig., Crampton's Gap 
" 14r-15. A. p. Hill's Div., Bol. Hgts. 
" 14-15. Walker's " , Loudon" 


35 

62 

8 

3 

1 


178 

208 

92 

66 

4 


479 
127 


213 

749 

227 

69 

5 


Aggregate 


109 


548 


606 


1,263 


Total Fed., Crampton's Gap 
" , Harper's Ferry 


115 
44 


416 
173 


2 
12,520 


533 
12,737 


Aggregate 


159 


589 


12,522 


13,270 



• The casualties given in Mahone's brigade include those of the 
battle of Sharpsburg, which was not reported separately. No 
reports were made by the Confederate cavalry. 

The Confederate casualties at Boonsboro are not reported 
separately, except Rodes's brigade, which reports: killed 61, 
wounded 151, missing 204, total 522. It was most severely 



240 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



engaged of any, except, possibly, Garland's, whicli was routed 
when he was killed. Garland's losses for the whole campaign 
are given as: killed 86, wounded 440, total 526. 

Livermore's Numbers and Losses in the Civil War estimates 
the totals for the two armies at South Mountain, as follows : -^ 







Force Engaged 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Confederates 
Federals 


17,852 
28,480 


325 
325 


1560 
1403 


800 

85 


2685 
1831 





CHAPTER XIII ■ 

Sharpsburg or Antietam 

McLaws and Jackson Recalled. The Ordnance Train. The Question of 
giving Battle. Confederate Straggling. Ropes's Comments. McClel- 
lan's Pursuit. Lee's Line of Battle. Battle of Hooker's Corps. Hood's 
Counter-stroke. On Jackson's Left. Battle of Mansfield's Corps. 
Battle of Sumner's Corps. Sedgwick Ambuscaded. The Artillery- 
Fighting. Fourth Attack Prepared. French's Advance. Swinton's Ac- 
count. The Bloody Lane. Franklin is Halted. Both Sides Exhausted. 
Pleasanton and Porter. Burnside Advances. Toombs's Good Defence. 
The Bridge Carried. The Advance upon Sharpsburg. A. P. Hill's 
Counter-stroke. Lee in Council. Sept. 18. Faulty position of Fed- 
eral Cavalry. The Pursuit. The Counter-stroke. Captured Ordnance 
Stores. Casualties. 

The surrender of Harper's Ferry had come in the very nick of 
time for the Confederates. Fortunately for them, Frankhn at 
Crampton's Gap, as already told, interpreted the cessation of 
firing as an indication that there was now no use in his attacking 
the enemy in his front. For orders were on the way from Lee 
summoning McLaws to — 

"withdraw immediately from your position on Maryland Heights and 
join us here. If you cannot get off any other way, you must cross the 
mountain. The utmost despatch is required." 

Jackson, too, had been urgently summoned. As soon as the 
terms of capitulation were agreed upon, he ordered Hill to su- 
perintend the paroling of the Federals, cooked two days' rations, 
and set out, with his own and Walker's divisions, at 1 a.m., for 
Sharpsburg, distant 17 miles. By a rapid night march he arrived 
early on the 16th, having forded the Potomac at daylight, at 
Boteler's Ford near Shepherdstown. McLaws extricated him- 
self from Pleasant Valley by coming into Harper's Ferry. Here 
he was much delayed in crossing the pontoon bridge with his 
trains and getting through the crowded streets. It was after 

241 



242 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

dark on the 16th when his tired and hungry troops bivouacked 
within two miles of Shepherdstown. 

At midnight, summoned by Lee, he marched again, and, cross- 
ing the ford before daylight, the head of his column reported to 
Lee about sunrise on the 17th. A. P. Hill's division was detained 
in Harper's Ferry until the morning of the 17th. He marched 
at 7.30 A.M. with five brigades, leaving Thomas's to look after 
the captured property, to remove which Jackson had requested 
Lee to send his chief quartermaster and ordnance officer. 

Thus it happened that, when I arrived at Shepherdstown, about 
noon on the 16th, with my ordnance train, and rode across 
the river and reported to Lee, I was ordered to collect all empty 
wagons and go to Harper's Ferry and take charge of the sur- 
rendered ammunition; bringing back to Sharpsburg all suiting 
our calibres, and sending to Winchester whatever we could not 
use in the field. The prospect of this addition to our supply 
was grateful, for the expenditures had been something, at Boons- 
boro, Crampton's Gap, and Harper's Ferry; and the loss of 
the 45 loads, burned by the cavalry, had been a severe blow at 
such a distance from our base at Culpeper, I was soon on my 
way back, and encamped that night with many wagons not far 
from Harper's Ferry. 

It had been easily within Lee's power, all day on the 15th, to 
cross the river into Virginia, without loss, and to reunite his 
scattered divisions and collect his multitude of stragglers behind 
the Potomac. The more that one studies the situation, the more 
amazed he must be at the audacity which deliberately sought a 
pitched battle in the open field, without a yard of earthworks, 
against a better-equipped army of double his force, and with a 
river close behind him, to be crossed by a single ford, peculiarly 
bad and exposed, in case he had to retreat. A defeat would cer- 
tainly involve the utter destruction of his army. At Manassas, 
at Ox Hill, and even at Boonsboro and Crampton's Gap, he had 
had recent evidence that there was in the Federal army, and, 
especially in the Army of the Potomac, no lack of veteran troops, 
well organized, well led, and capable of strong offence and stub- 
born defence. Let us analyze the conditions, and balance roughly 
the pros and the cons. 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 



243 



The actual number which McClellan brought upon the field of 
Sharpsburg during the battle, he states at 87,164. Besides these, 
Couch's and Humphrey's divisions, 14,000 men, were within a 
day's march and arrived, on the 18th, in time for use either in 
defeat or victory. 









'^. 



/ 



\ 



\Jr- 



'^ 



'<A 






;S!^= 



. ^HiflPK 



-^^ki, 



.A 



^^^. 



?A 



'"^i. 



jf 



'^•/ 



./•/ 



n\ 



Vn- 



ir-^i/ 










/ ""n 



: ) // 

f /- — ' 



•-f--'v 



^. •< / 



PlELD OF ShAEPSBURG 

Lee's force should have been about 55,000 men; but we have 
already referred to the enormous amount of straggling, caused 
by poor discipline, lack of shoes, and hard marches, on the in- 
sufficient diet of green corn and apples. That the effects were 



244 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

not unknown to Lee is shown by the following extracts from 
his letters to President Davis. 

On Sept. 13, from Hagerstown, he wrote : ^ — 

" Our great embarrassment is the reduction of our ranks by straggling, 
which it seems impossible to prevent with our present regimental officers. 
Our ranks are very much diminished, — I fear from a third to one-half of 
our original numbers, — though I have reason to hope our casualties in 
battle will not exceed 5000 men." ^ 

After the battle of Sharpsburg, on Sept. 21, he wrote more 
fully, as follows : — 

"A great many men belonging to the army never entered Maryland at 
all; many returned after getting there, while others who crossed the 
river kept aloof. The stream has not lessened since crossing the Potomac, 
though the cavalry has been constantly employed in endeavoring to arrest 
it. . . . Some immediate legislation, in my opinion, is required, and the 
most summary punishment should be authorized. It ought to be construed 
into desertion in face of the enemy, and thus brought under the Rules 
and Articles of War. 

"To give you an idea of its extent, in some brigades, I will mention 
that on the morning after the battle of the 17th, Gen. Evans reported 
to me on the field, where he was holding the front position, that he had 
but 120 of his brigade present, and that the next brigade to his, that of 
Gen. Garnett, consisted of but 100 "men. Gen. Pendleton reported that 
the brigades of Gens. Lawton and Armistead, left to guard the ford at 
Shepherdstown, together contained but 600 men. This is a woful condi- 
tion of affairs." 

Lawton's brigade had been the largest in the army, and it had 
carried into action at Gaines Mill, on June 27, 3500 men. It has 
seemed incredible to many writers that the small forces men- 
tioned in many of the official reports, as engaged at Sharpsburg, 
could be correctly stated; but I am satisfied from my own 
observations at the time that the following estimate by Col. 
Walter H. Taylor, Gen. Lee's adjutant, is essentially correct. 

Col. Taylor, in his book Four Years with Lee, writes : — 

"The following recapitulation is established upon indisputable and 
contemporaneous authority, being nothing less than the testimony of 
the commanding officers, as shown by their official reports made at the 
time. 

1 O. R. 28, 606. 

^ His losses at Second Manassas were actually 9112. 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 245 

Longstreet's Command 6,262 (9 Brigades). 

Jackson's Command 5,000 (8 Brigades). 

D. H. Hill's Division 3,000 (5 Brigades). 

R. H. Anderson's Division 3,500 (6 Brigades). 

A. P. Hill's Division 3,400 (5 Brigades). 

McLaws's Division 2,893 (4 Brigades). 

J. G. Walker's Division 3,200 (2 Brigades). 



Total Effective Infantry 27,255 (39 Brigades). 

"I cannot verify the estimate made for the cavalry and artillery, viz. 
8000, but I am sure it is rather excessive than the reverse. This would 
make Gen. Lee's entire strength 35,255." 

It must be noted, also, that the Federal equipment was far su- 
perior to that of the Confederates. Not only was their artillery- 
more numerous and with a greater proportion of 20-pounder 
rifles and 12-pounder guns (as against 10-pounder rifles and six- 
pounder guns of the Confederates) and with better qualities of 
projectiles and fuses, but their infantry was almost entirely sup- 
plied with rifled muskets, while the Confederate infantry carried 
about 30 per cent of smooth-bore muskets. 

Per contra. There is a single item, but it is an important one. 
Not only did McClellan brmg upon the field his 87,176 well- 
equipped men, against Lee's 35,255 ragged and poorly equipped ; 
but he brought himself also. Perhaps the anticipation of that 
fact encouraged Lee to risk the odds, and if so, the event justified 
his judgment. McClellan not only fought his battle in detail, 
engaging not more than two of his six corps simultaneously, but 
he held two of them out of the battle almost entirely, — Porter's 
5th corps with 19,586 men, and Franklin's 6th with 12,300. The 
total casualties, in these two corps, 31,886 strong, were but 109 
in the 5th corps and 439 in the 6th, — less than were experienced 
in many single brigades. So when the proper deduction is made 
from the Federal forces for McClellan's presence ; and a fair 
allowance for the disadvantage of the Federals in having to take 
the offensive, all that would otherwise seem incredible about the 
battle disappears ; and it is seen to be both natural and reason- 
able that the game should result in a draw. For the fighting 
was of about 47,000 Federals attacking 35,000 Confederates, 



246 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

under Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet, in a fairly good defensive 
position. 

Next to the comparative forces of the combatants the most 
important feature of the situation was the topography of the 
battle-field which Lee had chosen. It was a fairly good one for 
defence as positions go in a well-settled agricultural country, but 
it was by no means as strong as it is often said to be. The line 
was somewhat over three miles long, from its left flank on the 
Potomac to its right at Burnside's Bridge across the Antietam. 
Its left flank had an excellent position for defence against 
cavalry, and it was held by Stuart's cavalry and artillery success- 
fully against the Federal cavalry which was opposed to it. Thence, 
running southeast about a mile, generally behind fences and 
across open ground, it crossed the Hagerstown pike, and became 
parallel to it and about a quarter of a mile in front of it. At 
this point the Antietam is about a mile away to the eastward, 
winding its way a little west of south. After holding these 
courses for about a mile and a half the turnpike reaches Sharps- 
burg, the Une of battle here being a fourth of a mile in front of 
the village, and a half-mile in rear of the river. Here the pike 
and the line turn more to the east and unite at Burnside's Bridge 
about a mile away. This bridge is over two miles above the 
junction of the Antietam with the Potomac. This flank was the 
weakest part of the line, for the river below was crossable by 
infantry at several points, and the flank was, therefore, practically 
"in the air." 

A strong feature of our centre was that the Antietam cut in 
half the ground over which the enemy must manoeuvre, and 
would more or less embarrass any infantry attack upon it ; but, 
per contra, there were two ugly features: (1) The country 
is a rolling one and the hills near the stream are often 
quite steep, thus giving the enemy fairly close approach under 
cover. (2) Our whole line except the cavalry on the left was 
within range of the enemy's rifle-guns planted along the high 
ridges east of the Antietam, beyond the effective range of our 
guns. Thence, perfectly safe themselves, they practised upon 
us at leisure all day. Hunt, the Federal chief of artillery, de- 
scribes the location of 10 heavy batteries of the reserve artillery, 
and says : — 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 247 

"They overlooked the enemy and swept most of the ground between 
them and our troops. They were well served, especially the guns of 
Benjamin's battery. Their field of fire was extensive, and they were use- 
fully employed all day and so constantly that the supply of ammunition 
for the 20-pounders ran short." 

As to how our artillery fared in opposition, we may judge from 
a remark made to me two months later by Col. S. D. Lee, upon 
my being transferred to the artillery service: "Pray that you 
may never see another Sharpsburg. Sharpsburg was Artillery 
Hell." 

D. H. Hill, in his report, says that he had nearly 50 guns 
available, and writes : — 

"Positions were selected for as many of these guns as could be used, 
but all the ground in my front was commanded by the long-range artillery 
of the Yankees, on the other side of the Antietam, which concentrated 
their fire upon every gun that opened and soon disabled it." 

Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of the field, there 
was one feature of it which should have been conclusive against 
giving battle there. That feature was the Potomac River.' We 
were backed up against it, within two miles, and there was no 
bridge and but a single ford accessible, and that a bad one, 
rocky and deep. On the Maryland side, a mile of hilltops, 
some of them beyond the Antietam, offered sites for rifled guns 
to rake the ford and entirely cut off any retreat, should we meet 
with a reverse. This single feature of the field should have 
been conclusive against giving battle there. I believe that Lee 
would never have done so, had he ever before crossed the ford 
in person. Briefly, the most sanguine hope which Lee could 
reasonably entertain, with his inferior force, was to fight a drawn 
battle, and then safely withdraw what was left of his army. 
Against it he risked its utter destruction, which would have been 
the speedy end of the Confederacy. Ropes, the best critic and 
the best-informed writer upon the war, comments as follows 
upon the situation at this time.^ 

"This decision, to stand and fight at Sharpsburg, which Gen. Lee 
took on the evening of Sept. 14, just after his troops had been driven 
from the South Mountain passes, is, beyond controversy, one of the bold- 

1 Ropes, 2, 349. 



248 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

est and most hazardous decisions in his whole military career. In 
truth, it is so bold and so hazardous that one is bewildered that he 
should even have thought seriously of making it. Nearly the whole 
force which he had on the north bank of the Potomac had been engaged 
that afternoon, in an unsuccessful attempt to hold a defensive position, 
and it had been badly beaten. ... Of his two principal lieutenants, one, 
Longstreet, was opposed to this perilous course. Jackson, however, was, 
as we know, in favor of making a stand at Sharpsburg." 

From a careful study of all the reports upon both sides, not 
only of the text but between the lines, I believe that the course 
of Lee was largely influenced by the hope, and that of 
McClellan by the fear, of events whose improbability surpassed 
that of an earthquake. To McClellan they evidently seemed, 
however, easily possible. So much so, that in explaining why 
he did not renew the battle on Sept. 18th, he was not ashamed 
to give frank expression to his fear as follows : "At that criti- 
cal juncture, I should have had a narrow view of the condition 
of the country, had I been willing to hazard another battle 
with less than an absolute assurance of success. At that 
moment, Virginia 'ost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded, 
the national cause could afford no risk of defeat. One battle 
lost and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army might 
then have marched as it pleased on Washington, Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, or New York." 

If McClellan entertained such fears at the close of the battle, 
must it not have been these fears which made his coming to the 
battle so slow and deliberate as to allow Lee even superfluous 
time to make his escape if he wished? Considering the rare 
opportunity which chance had given him for brilliant and 
decisive work, he displayed little ambition to be at it, and his 
conduct was more suggestive of providing a bridge for a flying 
enemy. 

Lee's hopes were by no means so exaggerated as McClellan's 
fears. He counted upon no hope from Maryland, until his own 
army should have demonstrated its ability to maintain itself 
within the state. He hardly hoped for more than " to detain 
the enemy upon the northern frontier until the approach of 
winter should render his advance into Virginia difficult, if not 
impracticable." But he did entertain hopes of a decisive 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 249 

victory here on a field more remote from a safe place of refuge 
for the enemy than his victories of the Seven Days and of 2d 
Manassas had been. The hope would have been reasonable had 
his army been larger and his armament better, but under all 
the circumstances and conditions it was as improbable of real- 
ization as the chance of an earthquake would have been. He 
did, indeed, win a complete victory over all the infantry which 
the enemy engaged, but their position was more favorable 
to prevent his making a coimter-stroke than was his to resist 
their attack. Their heavy guns across the Antietam gave him 
protection, just as at Fredericksburg the Federal artillery on 
the Stafford heights, afterward in two battles, safely covered the 
Federal infantry on the opposite shore. 

Briefly, Lee took a great risk for no chance of gain except 
the killing of some thousands of his enemy with the loss of, per- 
haps, two-thirds as many of his own men. That was a losing 
game for the Confederacy. Its supply of men was limited ; that 
of the enemy was not. That was not war ! Yet now, who would 
have it otherwise ? History must be history and could not afford 
to lose this battle from its records. For the nation is immortal 
and will forever prize and cherish the record made that day by 
both sides, as actors in the boldest and the bloodiest battle ever 
fought upon this continent. 

Longstreet and D. H. Hill, after their night march from Boons- 
boro, took line of battle in front of Sharpsburg early on the morn- 
ing of Sept. 15. During the morning the news of the surrender 
of Harper's Ferry was received, and gave a different complexion 
to the whole situation. Until that time Lee had contemplated 
crossing the river at Shepherdstown, and he had directed 
Jackson to move to that vicinity to cover the crossing; but 
Jackson replied that he could bring his divisions over to Sharps- 
burg, upon which he was ordered to do so.^ 

On the morning of the 15th McClellan in person started in 
pursuit of Lee from Turner 's Gap with four corps, — the 1st, 2d, 
5th, and 12th, — comprising 33 brigades of infantry. After a 
march of about seven miles he found Lee, with the 14 brigades 
under Longstreet and D. H. Hill, in fine of battle in front of 

1 Ropes, 2, 348. 



250 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Sharpsburg about noon. They scarcely numbered 10,000 infan- 
try, and McClellan must have known that all the remainder of 
Lee 's army was concentrated about Harper 's Ferry. He could 
never wish for a fairer chance to crush an adversary, but he did 
nothing that afternoon or the next morning. During the 16th 
he was joined by the 9th corps, and at 7.30 p.m. he ordered two 
divisions of the 6th corps from Pleasant Valley, under Franklin, 
to join him next day, while the 3d division under Couch was 
ordered to occupy Maryland Heights; for what useful purpose 
it is hard to divine. 

Meanwhile, his plan of battle had been formed. It was to 
send the 1st, 2d, and 12th corps, over 30,000 men, across the 
Antietam above the Confederate lines, to turn their left flank, 
while the 9th corps under Burnside, about 10,000, should attack 
their right at Burnside Bridge as soon as things looked favorable 
above. The 5th and 6th corps. Porter and Frankhn, would be in 
reserve opposite our centre with 31,339 infantry and artillery 
besides a considerable force of cavalry and horse artillery. The 
plan was not a good one, involving as it did a piecemeal beginning. 
The three corps to attack the Confederate left should have been 
under one commander, and should have moved together. In- 
stead, the 1st corps, under Hooker, was started about 2 p.m. on 
the 16th; the 12th corps, under Mansfield, not until 11.30 p.m. 
The 2d corps, under Sumner, was ordered to be ready to march an 
hour before daylight. It was ready, but received no orders. 
After daylight, the battle having opened and the firing become 
heavy, Sumner rode to McClellan 's headquarters to ask for orders, 
and waited an hour or more without being able to see him. 
Orders to advance finally reached him at 7.30 a.m. The sun had 
risen at 5.45 and Hooker had become engaged soon after daylight, 
probably about five o'clock. Sumner had some distance to 
march, and was only able to get into action after 10 a.m. By 
this time, as we shall see. Hooker and Mansfield had been 
wrecked, and Sumner's wreck soon followed. 

When Lee formed his line on the 16th, Jackson 's two divisions 
held the left, between the Hagerstown pike and Stuart's cavalry, 
which held a road nearer the river. Hood's two brigades had 
their left upon the pike, and on their right D. H. Hill's division 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 251 

formed a curve by which the line swept around parallel to the 
pike. Longstreet, with Jones's division and Evans's brigade, 
extended the Une to the Burnside bridge. Walker 's division was 
in reserve behind the extreme right flank. McLaws's, Anderson 's, 
and A. P. Hill's divisions had not yet arrived. Some artillery 
duelling across the Antietam took place, but the first infantry 
affair occurred late in the afternoon, when Hooker 's corps came 
in contact with Hood 's pickets. Hooker 's orders were to attack. 
It is hard to believe that McClellan deliberately sent a single 
corps so far away from prompt support to attack Lee's whole 
army in position, and had daylight lasted, Hooker would probably 
have been overwhelmed that afternoon. McClellan had ridden 
with Hooker in the beginning of his march, and Hooker had 
called his attention to the hazard of sending him so far upon such 
a serious errand. It was probably this remonstrance of Hooker 's 
which moved McClellan to send Mansfield at 11.30 p.m. and to 
order Sumner to be ready to move an hour before dayUght. The 
time of these orders is much more suggestive of a gradually 
developed plan, than of one formulated beforehand, and it 
resulted in four extensive combats instead of in one great battle. 

The engagement in the afternoon between Hood and Hooker 's 
advance was quite sharp. Hood advancing Law's brigade to the 
support of his skirmishers and driving back until dark the 
enemy's advance. In this affair Col. Liddell of 11th Miss. 
and Col. McNeil of the 1st Pa. (Bucktail) Rifles, both distin- 
guished and promising officers, fell mortally wounded. The 
fighting ceased at dark, and pickets were established on each 
side, in such close proximity that they could hear each other 's 
voices. About nine a light rain began to fall and continued 
most of the night. When all was quiet Hood's brigades were 
withdrawn to cook rations, they having been without food, but 
one half ration of meat, for three days. Their positions were 
filled by Lawton's and Trimble's brigades, of Lawton's divi- 
sion (which were in reserve near Jackson's line), with Hays's 
brigade in support. 

At early dawn the fight was renewed, and Hooker's three 
fine divisions advanced in columns of brigades in Une. Double- 
day on the right, Ricketts on the left, and Meade in reserve close 



252 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

behind, — 10 brigades with 10 batteries. The fighting even 
before sunrise had become very severe. In his official report, 
Hooker gives the following incident : — 

" We had not proceeded far before I discovered that a heavy force of 
the enemy had taken possession of a corn-field (I have since learned about 
a 30-acre field) in my immediate front, and from the sun's rays falling 
on their bayonets projecting above the corn, could see that the field was 
filled with the enemy with arms in their hands, standing apparently at a 
'support arms.' Instructions were immediately given for the assemblage 
of all my spare batteries near at hand, of which, I think, there were five 
or six, to spring into battery on the right of this field and to open with 
canister at once. In the time I am writing every stalk of corn in the 
northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have 
been done with a knife, and the slain lay in rows, precisely as they had 
stood in their ranks a few moments before. It was never my fortune to 
witness a more bloody, dismal battle-field. Those that escaped fled in 
the opposite direction from our advance, and sought refuge behind the 
trees, fences, and stone ledges nearly on a line with the Dunker Church, 
as there was no resisting this torrent of death-dealing missives." 

This attack fell principally upon Lawton's and Hays's brigades 
extending from the Hagerstown pike through the corn-field to the 
right. Trimble's brigade, on their right, connected with D. H. 
Hill's division. Hays's brigade had also just been brought up in 
rear of Lawton's as a support. Across the pike, Doubleday's 
division had, at the same time, made a furious attack upon the old 
Jackson division under J. R. Jones. This division, though of 
four brigades, was one of the smallest in the army, Jones reporting 
that it went into action with only 1600 men. Its position, on the 
extreme left, was exposed to the view of, and enfiladed and taken 
in reverse by, the enemy's rifle batteries, across the Antietam, at 
a range of about 3000 yards. Hooker 's troops were well handled ; 
both his infantry and artillery and the full fighting power of his 
whole corps was soon brought into play and skilfully applied. 
The Confederate resistance was desperate, and the slaughter 
upon both sides great ; Lawton and J. R. Jones were both borne 
off wounded within an hour. Jones was succeeded by Starke of 
Louisiana, who "soon after fell pierced by three balls and sur- 
vived but a few moments." Col. Douglas, commanding Law- 
ton 's brigade, was killed, and five out of six regimental com- 
manders, the brigade losing 554 killed and wounded out of 1150. 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 253 

Hays's brigade lost 323 out of 550, including all of his staff and 
every regimental commander. In Trimble's brigade, Col. 
Walker, commanding the brigade, was wounded, with one of his 
staff, and the brigade lost three out of four regimental com- 
manders and 228 men out of 700 present. 

Early's, the remaining brigade of Ewell's division, had been 
sent about dawn to the extreme left, as a support to Stuart's 
cavalry, which occupied a position whence our artillery could 
annoy the flank of Hooker's attack. When Lawton was 
wounded, Early and his brigade were sent for. Leaving the 
13th Va., numbering less than 100 men, with Stuart, at his 
request, Early started back toward the position where he had 
left the other brigades of the division, but soon came upon 
Cols. Grigsby and Stafford, with about 300 men, who were the 
remnant of J. R. Jones's division. He learned that Lawton and 
Hays had also been driven back with great losses, and that only 
a handful were left, who were probably not in condition to go into 
action again. 

The 10 brigades of Hooker had carried the whole Hne held 
in their front by the seven brigades which they had struck, with 
such losses of men and officers, as practically to put the Con- 
federate brigades out of action for the day, and to make a great 
gap in Lee's line from Early's brigade on the left to D. H. Hill's 
line upon the right. In this gap was Hooker's corps, badly 
shaken by the desperate resistance which it had overcome, but 
with the 12th corps just arriving to its support. 

Not far in their front were Hood's two unfortunate brigades 
who had not yet gotten their last night's suppers. When the 
fighting ceased the night before. Hood, moved by the hunger of 
his men, had gone to Lee and asked for two brigades to take his 
place in the line of battle for the night, that he might have time 
to cook. Lee had answered that he would gladly send them, 
but that he had none available. He suggested, however, that 
Hood should see Jackson. Hood rode a long time in search of 
Jackson, and at last found him alone, asleep on the ground at the 
root of a tree. Jackson at once gave the orders which had put 
Lawton 's and Trimble 's brigades in the place of Hood and Law, 
and also sent Hays in support of Lawton ; but he had exacted 



254 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

from Hood a promise that he would come instantly, when called 
to support the line. Hood then rode to find his wagons and bring 
up the rations, but the darkness caused such delay that it was 
already dawn, and the sound of battle was heard in front before 
many of the men had time to do more than to prepare their 
dough. No meat had been issued for several days, and only 
reduced rations of flour. Soon afterward, a staff-officer of 
Lawton's dashed up with the message, "Gen. Lawton's 
compliments, and will you come at once to his support." "To 
arms" was instantly sounded, and the lines formed and marched 
to the front, leaving the half-cooked dough in camp. Near the 
Dunker Church they passed Lawton, being borne to the rear on 
a litter, and here Hood found Hays with about 40 men, whom he 
had ralhed, but all out of ammunition. He suggested to Hays to 
withdraw and collect his men, and replenish ammunition. He 
then launched his two brigades, about 2000 men, under Wofford 
and Law, through the bloody corn-field, already thickly strewn 
with dead and dying. Hood 's brigades had made the successful 
charge at Gaines Mill, which broke through Porter's intrenched 
line, but he wrote in his report that here he "witnessed the most 
terrific clash of arms, by far, that has occurred during the war." 
Hooker was wounded, and the enemy was driven back so far as to 
be forced to abandon some of his guns. 

Meanwhile, Early's brigade on his left, in the long body of 
woods called the West Woods, on the left of the Hagerstown pike, 
was able to hold the enemy at bay and to protect Stuart 's flank. 
When Early left with Stuart but one small regiment of infantry, 
Stuart withdrew from his advanced position to a hill a little 
nearer our line. Here he had 13 pieces of artillery, and was 
able to greatly annoy the Federal infantry near the Hagerstown 
pike. On Hood's right the battle had been held by three bri- 
gades, which D. H. Hill had had near at hand and in reserve, — 
Colquitt 's, Ripley 's, and Garland 's, the last now under MacRae. 
On Hood's left, Lee had sent Walker's two brigades and the 
Ga. brigade of G. T.Anderson, of D. R. Jones's division, which 
he had withdrawn from his right flank, opposite the Burnside 
bridge. 

Mansfield's 12th corps had reenforced Hooker just in time 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 255 

to save the 1st corps from being routed by the counter-stroke, 
given so heavily by Hood and his reenf or cements. Hooker's 
corps had now lost 2590 men and was practically put out of 
action. Meade succeeded to the command of the corps, when 
Hooker was wounded, and he withdrew from the field to a com- 
manding ridge about a mile in rear, where he endeavored to 
collect the remnants, and on which he now estabhshed a battery 
of 30 guns. In his official report, McClellan says that the 1st 
corps — 

"was for the time much scattered and somewhat demoralized," and 
that "there were but 6729 men present on the 18th, whereas, on the 
morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 present for duty in the same corps, 
showing that previous to and during the battle, 6364 men were separated 
from their commands." 

The defeat of Hooker's corps may be considered as ending 
the first affair of the day, but the ending of that, and the begin- 
ning of the second, with Mansfield's 12th corps, somewhat over- 
lapped each other in occurrence. Mansfield had but two divisions 
— ^Williams's with two brigades and Greene's with three. These 
troops had composed Banks 's army in the Valley and under Pope. 
The fight which now followed can scarcely be told in detail. It 
was one continuous exchange of heavy musketry and artillery 
at quarters sometimes as near as fifty yards or less, sometimes in 
woods and sometimes in the open ground; sometimes receding 
and again advancing. Action and reaction, in such affairs, are 
usually not very unequal, and six of the nine Confederate brigades 
now conducting it (MacRae, Ripley, Colquitt, Law, Wofford, and 
Early) had exhausted a part of their strength upon Hooker. 
After nearly two hours of this heavy fighting, with ammunition 
nearly gone and supplied principally with cartridges ob- 
tained from the dead and wounded, — with ranks reduced to 
skeletons, — the gap which Hooker had originally opened again 
yawned, even more widely, and Greene's division had entered it 
and was in possession of the Dunker Church and a portion of 
the woods near it. 

But the 12th corps had now, itself, lost all of its aggressiveness, 
and was glad to pause and await reenforcement. Mansfield had 
been killed early in the action, and his corps now under Williams 



256 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

had sustained a loss of 1746 men out of 8000. Williams's division 
had suffered so severely that it was withdrawn to the rear to rest 
and replenish ammunition. Here may be said to end in a draw 
the second affair. The combatants upon both sides were worn 
out to frazzles, and the firing had ceased entirely. The rem- 
nant of Hood's division was also withdrawn to replenish am- 
munition. The Tex. brigade under Wofford had lost 548 men 
out of 864 carried into action. The 1st Tex. regiment had lost 
45 killed, 141 wounded, and 12 missing from 227. Law's brigade 
had lost 454. 

But this truce was of short duration. From the northwest 
heavy masses of blue, and from the south long lines of gray, were 
marching rapidly toward the fields, already so thickly strewn 
with killed and wounded. A third encounter equally desperate 
and bloody was now to take place over the bodies of slain and 
wounded, friends and foes. At 7.20 a.m. Sumner had, at last, 
received his needlessly delayed orders to advance. If his nine 
brigades of veterans had been put into action along with Mans- 
field's five, they would have made decisive work upon Lee 's left 
flank, and have opened the road to Porter's corps to attack his 
centre. Here McClellan threw away another one of his many 
chances for a decisive victory, though it was by no means his 
last. 

The march of Sumner's columns could be seen from com- 
manding points upon the Confederate lines, and movement was 
also seen in Porter 's corps, suggestive of preparation for assault ; 
several of his battalions crossing the Boonsboro bridge and com- 
ing to the support of his cavalry and horse artillery. Meanwhile, 
Lee was sending to the front his last reserves — McLaws's and 
R. H. Anderson's divisions — which had marched from Harper's 
Ferry at 3 p.m. on the 16th, and arrived near Sharpsburg soon 
after sunrise. These troops had had hard marching in with- 
drawing from Pleasant Valley and passing through Sharpsburg, 
and, on arrival, were allowed a rest of about an hour. By that 
time it was seen that Sumner's attack was imminent, and they 
were ordered to the front. R. H, Anderson's six brigades, 
about 3600 strong, were sent to D, H. Hill's division. But 
Armistead's brigade was presently withdrawn and added to 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 257 

McLaws's division. McLaws's four brigades, about 3000 strong, 
were directed to the woods behind the Dunker Church, under 
the guidance of Hood, who was acquainted with the ground. 

At the time of this lull in the firing, it was, perhaps, a little 
after nine o 'clock. Sumner had been impatient at the three hours' 
delay imposed upon his corps, and, as he hstened to the tremen- 
dous musketry and artillery of the two first combats, he doubt- 
less recalled the field of Seven Pines, where he had arrived in 
time to save the battle. His corps had not fought at 2d Ma- 
nassas, and consequently it was large, numbering in its nine 
brigades over 17,000 men. It came upon the field led by Sedg- 
wick's three brigades in column of brigade front. Sumner rode 
with this division. French's and Richardson's divisions fol- 
lowed in echelon to the left and rear. Before the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, Sumner afterward testified as follows : — 

"On going upon the field I found that Hooker's corps had been dis- 
persed and routed. I passed him some distance in the rear where he 
had been carried wounded, but I saw nothing of his corps at all, as I was 
advancing with my command on the field. There were some troops 
lying down on the left, which I took to belong to Mansfield's command. 
In the meantime Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his corps 
(formerly Banks's), had been thrown into confusion." 

The troops of the 1 2th corps which Sumner saw lying down 

were the remains of Greene's division, about the Dunker 

Church, and it were better for Sumner had they not held ground 

so far in front of their general line. For Sumner did not realize 

that he was now within the Confederate lines, and he continued 

his advance into the woods, leaving the church and Greene's 

forces on his left. The formation of his division was in too close 

order to be safely brought under fire. He should have taken 

greater intervals between his brigades. It is said that they were 

only between 50 and 100 feet apart.^ 

^ When troops are in masses, only the outside men can fire. The out- 
side men are comparatively few, and hence the mass is weak for either 
oflfence or defence, until it can deploy into lines from which every individual 
can fire freely to the front. Hence troops, once broken, become almost 
helpless, and unable to defend themselves. As lines can only fire efficiently 
squarely to the front, or very nearly so, they also are helpless against fire 
coming from the flanks. Flank fire, too, is naturaUy of the most con- 
centrated and fatal character, and troops exposed to it are quickly broken 
and helpless. 



258 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

In this formation he pushed through the rather open woods 
with occasional rocky ledges, and passed, without being aware 
of it, Early's brigade upon his right with the remnants of Jones's 
division under Grigsby and Stafford; and on his left, he passed 
the remnants of Walker's two brigades, who were holding in 
front of Greene's troops about the church. Early, himself 
unseen by reason of a ridge between them, moved down par- 
allel to Sedgwick's march, leaving Grisby and Stafford behind, to 
hold his rear against some troops in echelon behind Sedgwick's 
right, who seemed disposed to follow. As soon as Early passed 
the ridge which had concealed him, he opened fire upon the flank 
of Sedgwick 's column. This was in such close formation that it 
could not deploy an opposing front. Just at this time the head 
of the column emerged from the woods on the far side, and found 
itself presenting its left front angle to McLaws's division, which 
was deploying from column into hne of battle within close range. 
Sedgwick had practically marched into an ambuscade. 

McLaws opened fire quickly from a front of a brigade and a 
half. The remaining brigades came into line at double-quick 
and soon poured a terrific fire, taking Sedgwick's column so 
obhquely that it could not be effectively replied to. At the same 
time the remnants of Walker 's two brigades lined up against the 
left flank of the column, now almost helpless between converg- 
ing fires. ■ 

It has rarely happened that heavier losses have been incurred 
more rapidly. Sedgwick himself was wounded, with Dana, one 
of his brigadiers, and the losses of the division were 2210. It is 
stated by Ropes that Sedgwick's loss was all suffered "in a very 
few minutes." In endeavoring to meet the flank fires, the rear 
brigade was ordered to face about. Fortunately, this order was 
understood by the brigade to mean a rearward march which 
was soon begun, and was hastily followed by the other brigades. 
The Confederates followed in pursuit, and once more the tide of 
battle swept across the ghastly corn-field, and the adjacent open 
ground between the Dunkard or West wood, and an East 
wood about 700 yards east of its northern end. Some of the 
brigades of D. H. Hill's left joined in the counter-stroke, and the 
Federals were driven to the shelter of their strong hne of artillery 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 259 

in front of the North wood, which bounded the open fields to the 
northward. McLaws pushed his assault much too far, for his 
numbers were too light to hope for any great result, and the 
favorable ground enabled the enemy's artillery to punish severely 
all open exposures. Thus, McLaws lost 1103 out of 2893 carried 
into action in his four brigades, — Kershaw's, Semmes's, Barks- 
dale's, and Cobb 's, — an average of 39 per cent. These losses oc- 
curred mostly in the pursuit after Sedgwick, and mostly befell 
within two hours. At the same time that Sedgwick was driven 
back, Greene's men about the Dunker Church were also forced 
back to the Federal guns, leaving the Confederate line practi- 
cally the same that it had been in the morning, although now 
held only by scattered fragments and almost entirely destitute 
of artillery. 

In each of these three affairs the division batteries had been 
effectively fought against the enemy's infantry, but gradually 
they had nearly all been put out of action. As an illustration of 
their experiences, and of the condition of our line at this time, 
McLaws, in his report, says : — 

"Capt. Read's battery had been placed in position on the right of 
the woods which we had entered, and did most excellent service, but it 
was exposed to such a severe fire Gen. Kershaw ordered it back, after 
losing 14 officers and men and 16 horses. Another battery, Capt. 
Carlton's, which I had ordered into position in the woods in front of 
Gen. Ransom's brigade, was so severely cut up in a short time by the 
direct and cross-fire of numerous batteries, that I ordered it to retire. . . ." 

This finished the third affair of the day, though there were 
still upon the field Sumner's two other large divisions to be reck- 
oned with, equal in strength to the whole of the 12th corps ; and, 
in addition, there could be seen across the Antietam, but moving 
to support the attack upon our left, the 6th corps under Franklin. 
It was plain that a fourth and even more terrible struggle was to 
come, but it befell principally over new ground bordering the 
scene of the previous fighting upon the east, and extending 
southward. Here the division of D. H. Hill held the saHent east 
of the Hagerstown pike where our line of battle changed direction 
and became parallel to the pike. The ground was open and 
moderately rolling and had but one good feature for defence. 



260 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

This was a sunken road, an excellent thing when it has the right 
direction, perpendicular to the enemy's line of approach, but a 
dangerous trap if the enemy caA obtain an enfilading position"! 
The salient outUne here involved this danger. 

In the second affair of the day, as has been told, D. H. Hill had 
sent three of his five brigades forward to support the flank of 
Hood's attack, and these brigades (Colquitt's, Ripley's, and 
Garland's) had remained holding advanced ground about the 
Roulette house, a few hundred yards in front of the sunken road 
before referred to. Here they had already suffered severe 
losses. 

When Sedgwick 's division was driven back and hardly pressed, 
Sumner had sent word to French and Richardson to attack, in 
order to make a diversion. From his position in echelon, on 
Sedgwick's left and rear, French soon came into collision with 
D. H. Hill's advanced brigades. These made a stubborn defence 
for a while, but their front was narrow and on its exposed right 
flank was Garland's brigade, which, on the 14th, had been 
routed and badly cut up at Turner's Gap. Hill reports: — 

"Garland's brigade (Col. MacRae commanding), had, been much 
demoralized by the fight on South Mountain, but the men advanced with 
alacrity, secured a good position, and were fighting bravely when Capt. 
Thompson, 5th N.C., cried out, 'They are flanking us.' This cry spread 
like an electric shock along the ranks, bringing up vivid recollections 
of the flank fire at South Mountain. In a moment they broke and fled to 
the rear ; Col. MacRae, though wounded, remained on the field all day and 
succeeded in gathering up some stragglers and personally rendered much 
efficient service. The 23d N.C. of this brigade was brought off by the 
gallant Lt.-Col. Johnston and posted by my orders in the old road already 
described. Ripley 's brigade had united with Walker 's and fallen back 
with it behind the ridge to the left of this road and near to it. We had 
now lost all the ground wrested from the enemy, and were occupying the 
position held in the morning ; but three of my brigades had been broken 
and much demoralized, and all of the artillery had been withdrawn from 
my front." 

Out of 10 field-officers in Colquitt's brigade, which had fought 
after the giving way of Garland's brigade until its ranks were 
nearly mingled with the enemy's, four were killed and six 
wounded. 

Hill now had left in the sunken road only two of his original 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 261 

five brigades, — G. B. Anderson, comparatively fresh, and Rodes 
wh(^ had been severely engaged at Boonsboro, losing one-third of 
his force. Here Hill received the united attacks of both French 's 
and Richardson's divisions, and for some time successfully 
repulsed them. He was aided by R, H. Anderson 's division — 
"some three or four thousand men," Hill reports, which had 
taken position in his rear. Anderson was soon severely wounded, 
and no one seems to have exercised active command of the 
division after he left the field, nor are any reports published of 
the division or any of its brigades or regiments, except the 
casualties. These, in the five brigades of Wilcox, Mahone, 
Pryor, Featherstone, and Wright, amounted to 1430 killed, 
wounded, and missing, — over one-third of the force engaged. 
Swinton describes the conflict at this period, as follows : — 

"The action here was of a very animated nature, for Hill, being re- 
enforced by the division of Anderson, assumed a vigorous offensive, and 
endeavored to seize a piece of high ground on the Union left with the view 
of turning that flank. This manoeuvre was, however, frustrated by the 
skill and promptitude of Col. Cross of the 5th N.H., Caldwell's brigade, 
who, detecting the danger, moved his regiments toward the menaced point. 
Between his command and the Confederate force there then ensued a 
spirited contest, each endeavoring to reach the high ground, and both 
delivering their fire as they marched in parallel lines by the flank. The 
effort to flank on the right was handsomely checked by Brooke, French, 
and Barlow — the latter of whom changing front, with his two regiments, 
obliquely to the right, poured in a rapid fire, compelhng the surrender of 
300 prisoners with two standards." 

When this fighting had lasted perhaps an hour, the Federals 
had gradually brought in the whole of French's and Richardson's 
divisions, and extended their lines. At last they reached a 
position from which a portion of the sunken lane could be 
enfiladed. This being reported to Rodes by the Lt.-Col. of the 
6th Ala., he was directed to throw his right wing back and 
out of the road. Rodes reports : — 

"Instead of executing the order he moved briskly to the rear of the 
regiment and gave the command, 'Sixth Alabama about face; forward 
march.' Maj. Hobson of the 5th, seeing this, asked if the order was in- 
tended for the whole brigade. He said, 'Yes,' and thereupon the 5th 
and the other troops on their left retreated. I did not see their retrograde 



262 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

movement until it was too late to rally them ; and for this reason : Just 
as I was moving on I heard a shot strike Lt. Berney, Aide, who 
was immediately behind me. Wheeling around, I found him falling, and 
that he had been struck in the face. He found that he could walk, after 
I raised him. ... As I turned to the brigade I was struck heavily by a 
piece of shell on the thigh. At first I thought that the wound was serious, 
but, finding upon examination that it was slight, I turned toward the 
brigade, when I discovered it, without visible cause to me, retreating in 
confusion. I hastened to intercept it at the Hagerstown road. I found 
though that with the exception of a few men, . . . not more than 40 in all, 
the brigade had disappeared from this portion of the field. This small 
number, together with some Mississippians and North Carolinians, about 
150 in all, I rallied and stationed behind a small ridge leading from the 
Hagerstown road." 

When, by this misunderstanding between Rodes and Lt.- 
Col. Lightfoot, Rodes's brigade abandoned this sunken road, 
— ever since known as "The Bloody Lane/' — Lee's army 
was ruined and the end of the Confederacy was in sight. 
Even the rank and file in the 5th corps, looking on from across 
the Antietam, saw and appreciated the situation. "Now is the 
time " was a general comment. McClellan, from his headquarters 
at the Fry house, looked on, but he did not come and he issued 
no order. The gap left by Rodes was speedily filled by the en- 
couraged Federals, and now the whole lane was enfiladed, and the 
slaughter which took place in it strewed it with dead and wounded, 
probably as thickly as has ever been seen in this country. G. B. 
Anderson's brigade, next on the left, attempted to stay the tide, 
but Anderson was killed, and, in the rout which followed, the 
supporting troops of R. H. Anderson's division were involved, 
and only small squads of stragglers could be rallied at scattered 
points in the rear. The Confederates had, however, exacted 
severe penalties from French and Richardson. Neither suffered 
to quite the extent that Sedgwick had done, though each of them 
lost heavily and Sumner himself had much of his ardor cooled. 
Richardson lost 1165, and was himself mortally wounded. 
French lost 1750. 

But the danger to the Confederates now lay in the presence 
on the field of Franklin, with Slocum's and Smith's divisions of 
the 6th corps of about 6000 each, fine troops and well com- 
manded. Frankhn, too, was anxious to attack. Already he 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 263 

had sent one brigade, Irwin's, to the rehef of Greene, when he 
was pursued out of the Dunkard woods, and this brigade found 
work enough to do to suffer 342 casualties. Another brigade, 
Hancock's, though not seriously engaged, — 

"formed as support to two of Gen. Sumner's batteries, then severely- 
pressed by the enemy, drove away his skirmishers who had already ad- 
vanced close to the batteries, and occupied some buildings and fences 
in front of his position. This brigade was the means of saving the two 
batteries." 

But, just as Franklin was about to attack, Sumner met him, 
and, being the ranking officer, he ordered the attack postponed. 
Meanwhile, however, under the personal direction of Richardson 
himself and of Barlow commanding two regiments in Caldwell's 
brigade, the battle was kept up by the troops already engaged, 
who were encouraged by their recent success and were quite 
disposed to follow it up. But there were no fighters in the 
Confederate army capable of more desperate and pertinacious 
defence than Longstreet and D. H. Hill. The latter's official 
report thus briefly summarizes what followed : — 

"Col. Bennett of the 14th, and Maj. Sellers of the 30th N.C. regiment 
rallied a portion of their men. There were no troops near to hold the 
centre except a few hundred rallied from various brigades. The Yankees 
crossed the old road which we had occupied in the morning and occupied 
a corn-field and orchard in advance of it. They had now got within a few 
hundred yards of the hill which commanded Sharpsburg, and our rear. 
Affairs looked very critical. I found a battery concealed in a corn-field, 
and ordered it to move out and open upon the Yankee columns. This 
proved to be Boyce's S.C. battery. It moved out most gallantly, al- 
though exposed to a direct and reverse fire from the long-range artillery 
across the Antietam. A caisson exploded, but the battery unlimbered, 
and with grape and canister drove the enemy back. [Boyce fired 70 
rounds of canister, and lost 19 men and 15 horses.] I was now satisfied that 
the Yankees were so demoralized that a single regiment of fresh men could 
drive the whole of them in our front across the Antietam. 

" I got up about 200 men who said they would advance to the attack 
if I would lead them. We met, however, with a warm reception, and the 
little command was broken and dispersed. Maj . Hobson and Lt. I. M. 
Goff of the 5th Ala. acquitted themselves handsomely in this charge. Col. 
Alfred Iverson, 20th N.C, Col. D. H. Christie, 23d N.C, Capt. Garret, 5th 
N.C, Adjt. J. M. Taylor and Lt. Isaac E. Pearce of the same regiment 



264 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

had gathered up about 200 men, and I sent them to the right to attack the 
Yankees in flank. They drove them back a short distance, but were in 
turn repulsed. These two attacks, however, had a most happy effect. 
The Yankees were completely deceived by their boldness, and induced 
to believe that there was a large force in our centre. They made no 
further attempt to pierce our centre." These details give an instructive 
lesson in the value of pertinacity ; Longstreet with his staff helped man 
two guns of the Washington Artillery and materially aided in the result. 

While Richardson's advance was still being pushed, Pleasanton 
advanced about three brigades of cavalry and four batteries 
across the Antietam, by the Boonsboro bridge. The batteries 
crowned the hills upon our side and opened fire, supported by the 
cavalry, and by a regiment of regulars deployed as skirmishers. 
Presently the line was reenforced by three more batteries of the 
5th corps and Buchanan's brigade of regulars. These troops felt 
of our line quite heavily, the pressure coming upon Evans's bri- 
gade and parts of the brigades of Wilcox, Featherstone, and Pryor 
of R. H. Anderson's division, and G. T. Anderson of D. R. Jones's 
division. D. H. Hill, himself on foot (having had three horses 
killed under him during the morning) and carrying a musket, 
led some of these troops which he had rallied. S. D. Lee's 
battalion of artillery was also now back upon the field with 
ammunition replenished, and this demonstration was presently 
driven back under cover of the hills bordering the Antietam. 

Pleasanton, who appreciated the opportunity, called for re- 
enforcements, but McClellan had started on a visit to his right 
flank, and had ordered two brigades of regulars of the 5th corps 
to follow him. The absence of these brigades prevented Porter 
from complying with Pleasanton's request. So his demonstra- 
tion was abandoned, and his troops and artillery were with- 
drawn, having suffered something over 100 casualties. 

When McClellan reached the field on his right, he conferred 
with Sumner and Franklin. The latter urged a renewal of the 
attack, but Sumner advised against it, and McClellan took his 
advice. Franklin was ordered simply to stand on the defensive. 
The two brigades of regulars brought over from the centre were 
marched back. Thus, McClellan's expedition to the right at a 
critical time saved the shattered Confederate lines from two 
assaults by fresh troops, on their left and on their centre, just 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 265 

at the time when Burnside was beginning to get in serious work 
upon their right. The battle was now practically finished upon 
the Federal right and centre, and finished in a draw. We may 
now turn to their left. 

In his final report, dated Aug. 4, 1863, McClellan writes that 
he sent an order to Burnside to carry the bridge in front of him 
at 8 A.M., but in his preliminary report, Oct. 15, 1862, he 
says the order was communicated at 10 a.m. Burnside's report, 
dated Sept. 30, gives the same hour. Gen. Cox, who had 
charge of the initial operations, in his report, dated Sept. 
23, gives the hour as 9 a.m., and all the circumstantial evi- 
dence bears this out as correct. The immediate defence of 
the bridge was made by Toombs with the 2d, 20th, and 56th 
Ga. regiments, about 600 men, supported by Richardson's, 
Eshleman's, and Eubank's batteries. His infantry was partially 
covered by a thin wood, but the ground, sloping toward the 
stream, gave little shelter from the enemy's fire. 

Burnside's corps comprised four divisions of two brigades each, 
averaging about 1500 men to each brigade. Rodman's division 
was sent to the extreme left, to make its attack upon a ford a 
half mile below the bridge, where a reentrant angle gave the 
Federals a strong attack. There was here only a Confederate 
picket. 

The other Federal divisions were under cover opposite the 
bridge, with abundant artillery on the hills. When the orders 
to attack were received, the artillery fire, of which there had 
been some all the morning, was redoubled, and skirmishers were 
pushed forward close to the stream. Crook's brigade was directed 
to approach as nearly as possible, unobserved, and then to make a 
dash for the bridge. But Crook missed his direction, and when 
he came near the stream he found himself somewhat above the 
bridge, and under such a heavy fire that he could not approach 
closer. He took what cover he could get and opened fire on the 
Confederate position. So the first Federal effort was a failure. 

A second effort was soon organized to be made by Sturgis's 
division. Sturgis sent two regiments from Nagle's brigade, 
covered by the fire of the rest of this brigade and of Ferrero's 
brigade. Their hot reception by Toombs's Georgians checked 



266 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

the adyance before they could reach the bridge, and the second 
effort was also a failure. 

Meanwhile, more urgent orders from McClellan were coming to 
Burnside, and being reiterated by him to his subordinates as the 
battle upon the Federal right grew more desperate. Of course, 
Toombs's three regiments and three batteries, fighting without 
intrenchments, and in the open country along the Antietam, 
could not hope to do more than merely to delay four divisions 
with eight or ten batteries. By this time the enemy had dis- 
covered all our weak points, and their own strong ones, and 
Toombs's ammunition was getting low, for he could not re- 
plenish under the enemy's fire. Moreover, Rodman's division 
had already driven off the picket force at the ford below, and 
Toombs knew that it would soon appear in his rear. He had, 
however, not only saved three precious hours, but he had put 
up a fight which had so exhausted, both the energy and am- 
munition of his adversary, as to entail upon them the loss of 
three hours more, before they would be across the bridge and 
prepared to begin their attack on our right. 

During all these six hours, A. P. Hill would be marching rapidly. 
It was said that on this march he stimulated laggards with the 
point of his dress sword. For his third attack. Cox took two 
regiments, marching by the flank, side by side. The regiment 
on the right was left in front ; and the one on the left was right 
in front. Crook, too, organized five companies of the 28th 0. 
to cross at a ford opposite his position, a short distance above 
the bridge. About 1 p.m. the charge was made. Toombs knew 
that his game was played, and all that remained to make it a 
perfect success was to safely withdraw his men. He did this 
with combined skill and good luck. He gave the enemy a fare- 
well volley, ran safely to the rear, replenished his ammunition, 
got together parts of his brigade which had been detached, and 
took an active part in the final assault of the day, which drove 
the enemy to cover in the valley of the Antietam. 

Rodman had gotten over, practically without opposition, be- 
fore the charge upon the bridge, and Crook had carried the ford 
above the bridge, at the same time with the charge. The losses on 
either side in this affair are not given; but the total killed and 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 267 

wounded for the whole day, in the three Georgia regiments, was 
217, about 38 per cent. But they had saved the day, for, while 
the Federals were crossing the Antietam, A. P. Hill forded the 
Potomac. 

Having crossed the bridge, Burnside's first task was to secure 
his possession of it, against any counter-stroke, by bringing over 
a number of batteries. With these he crowned the adjacent 
heights, while his infantry deployed under their crests. Mean- 
while came urgent orders from McClellan to press his advance. 
But the three brigades of Nagle, Ferrero, and Crook, which had 
been engaged, reported their ammunition as nearly exhausted. 
Sturgis also reported Nagle and Ferrero as too exhausted physi- 
cally to be fit for an immediate advance. On this Willcox's divi- 
sion, with an ammunition train, was ordered across the creek, 
and Willcox reheved Sturgis in the advance. These arrange- 
ments just consumed the time remaining in which an advance 
could have been opposed only with four of Jones's brigades, under 
Drayton, Garnett, Walker, and Kemper, and the fragments of 
earlier battles which could be rallied in the rear. 

Wilcox's division formed the right wing of the line of battle, 
and Rodman's the left ; Cox's division gave Crook's brigade to 
support Willcox, and Scammon's to support Rodman^ while 
Sturgis in reserve held the heights near the bridge. At 4 p.m. 
the advance was made in handsome style, somewhat to the right 
oblique, so as to envelop the village of Sharpsburg. In front 
of tMs village it struck Jones's four brigades, which had been held 
all day unengaged, but exposed to the enemy's rifle fire across 
the Antietam. Though now scarcely numbering 2000 men, they 
made a desperate fight, as the casualties upon both sides attest ; 
but the long Federal lines gradually overlapped their narrow 
fronts and the Federal progress, though slow, was sure. The 
Confederates hurried to oppose them with all the artillery and 
the fragments of infantry which could be drawn from their left, 
many of those going being already wounded. Before the advanc- 
ing troops of A. P. Hill appeared upon the scene, the leading 
Federals had crossed the brook running east from the town into 
the Antietam, and were well up on the slope of Cemetery Hill, 
while others occupied the eastern part of the village. 



268 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

It had been about 3 p.m., when A. P. Hill coming up from the 
ford with his five brigades, had first reported in person to Lee. 
Getting information as to localities from D. R. Jones, he formed 
three brigades on the right of Jones and advanced to the attack. 
The other two brigades (Pender and Brockenbrough) were placed 
on his extreme right looking to a road coming from across the 
Antietam at its mouth. One of his batteries, under Mcintosh, 
which had been sent ahead to the relief of Jones, had been left 
unsupported as Jones was driven back. The guns had fired 
canister until the enemy's line was within 60 yards, when the 
limbers and caissons were withdrawn, leaving the guns in the 
hands of the enemy. 

Meantime, in the enemy's oblique advance a gap had opened 
between Willcox on the right and Rodman on the left, now be- 
come the rear. In fact, the movement had converted the line 
into a formation of brigades in echelon, and the interval between 
Willcox and Rodman had widened as Willcox, over less exposed 
ground, had advanced more rapidly. Now, having gained a 
foothold on the edge of Sharpsburg, he had stopped his advance 
to bring up his ammunition wagons. 

Rodman had found the enemy extending to his left and was 
passing, on his extreme left, some fields of high corn, which cut 
off his view upon that flank. The four Confederate brigades ad- 
vanced to the attack in the order from the left, — Toombs, Archer, 
Branch, and Gregg, — not in a continuous line, but with intervals 
of from 100 to 300 yards between them, which enabled them to 
overlap both of the Federal flanks. 

Gregg's brigade on the right, having replenished their tattered 
wardrobes from the blue Federal uniforms captured at Harper's 
Ferry, were at first mistaken for friends, and approached to 
close quarters through the high corn before they opened fire. 
The weight of the attack fell upon the three brigades under 
Rodman, say 4500 men. The Confederates probably numbered 
2700, but the attack was furious, and, enveloping both flanks, it 
was successful from the first. Rodman was killed early in its 
progress. Among the Confederates, Branch was killed and 
Gregg wounded. Mcintosh's guns were recaptured, and the 
whole Federal line, although resisting, was forced back toward 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 269 

the Antietam. Cox at once ordered forward Sturgis's division, 
to support the Hne, and also sent orders to Willcox to withdraw 
his three brigades from the vicinity of Sharpsburg to the place 
where his division had formed, under cover near the river. With 
the assistance of Sturgis the Confederate pursuit was finally 
checked, but not until all the ground over which the enemy had 
advanced had been recovered, and the approach of night had at 
last put an end to the battle. 

As darkness enveloped the scene, the Confederates, worn and 
exhausted by eight days of marching and fighting, dropped down 
where they stood to sleep and could scarcely be roused even to 
eat the cooked rations brought up from their camps in the rear. 

When all was quiet, the division commanders met where Lee 
had taken his position on the road near the village, and made 
their separate reports of the condition of their commands. 

Without exception all reported heavy losses and the men ex- 
hausted, and all considered it necessary to withdraw from the 
field diu-ing the night. Lee, alone, was in no wise moved. He 
had read McClellan's inmost soul and knew he was not to be 
feared. Without a word of explanation or asking advice from 
either Jackson or Longstreet or any one else, he directed all to 
collect their stragglers, strengthen their lines, and be prepared 
to renew the battle in the morning. 

When the morning dawned, disclosing the opposing skirmishers 
in easy range, and the hostile guns nowhere out of range, but no 
shot being fired on either side, the Confederates drew long breaths 
of relief. Many men already half understood McClellan, but 
Lee alone had read him thoroughly and speculated boldly upon 
the knowledge. Indeed, when the advancing hours of the fore- 
noon had made it certain that McClellan did not intend to attack 
that day, Lee recurred to a proposed plan of the day before to 
turn McClellan's right, and he abandoned it reluctantly only 
after careful reconnoissance by Col. S. D. Lee, on learning of the 
peculiar strength and heavy preparation of the enemy at that 
point. 

Now there was nothing left to do but to recross into Vir- 
ginia. That afternoon the orders were given and the trains were 
started. Soon after dark the movement of the troops began, 



270 MILITARY "MEMOIRS 

and when the sun was two hours high on the morning of the 19th, 
everything was safely across. Gen. Walker, in an account of 
the battle in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, writes: — 

" Detained in superintending the removal of a number of the wounded 
of my division, I was among the last to cross the Potomac. As I rode 
into the river I passed Gen. Lee sitting on his horse in the stream, 
watching the crossing of wagons and artillery. Returning my greeting, 
he inquired as to what was still behind. There was nothing but the 
wagons containing my wounded, and a battery of artillery, and I told 
him so. 'Thank God,' I heard him say, as I rode on." 

In offering battle on the 18th Lee had everything to lose and 
nothing to gain ; McClellan, on the contrary, in accepting battle, 
would have had everything to gain both for himself and his 
cause, and nothing to lose. He had 24,000 men who had not 
been seriously engaged, and 12,000 more near enough to come 
into the battle before noon. Couch's division, 6000 strong, 
recalled from its useless expedition to Maryland Heights, re- 
joined the army early in the morning on the 18th, and Meade's 
division, 6000 strong, arrived by 11 a.m. It is strange but true 
that, with 36,000 fresh men at hand, neither McClellan nor any of 
his six corps commanders, except Franklin, approved the idea of 
an attack. Ropes says that Franklin alone — 

"recognized the importance of the high ground held by Stuart and 
desired to begin by driving him and his artillery from it." 

This point was indeed one of the key-points of Lee's line, but 
the dominant feature of the whole situation was the fact that Lee 
was fighting with his back to a river, which he could not have 
crossed under fire. McClellan fought with a safe retreat assured 
to him, in case of disaster, by the Antietam in his front and the 
powerful artillery on the hills behind it. The battle-field is 
unique, among the fields of the war, in offering all the prizes to 
the Federals and all the risks to the Confederates. To Mc- 
Clellan it was the opportunity of a lifetime. 

One other feature of this battle is worthy of special note as 
unique. McClellan concentrated his powerful cavalry and horse- 
artillery force, not upon either flank, and especially not upon his 
left flank where were great opportunities for it, but at his centre, 
where it would have been in the way of his infantry, and where 



SHARPSBURG (5r ANTIETAM 271 

the ground was much cut up with fences and cultivation. On 
his right it might have been able to drive Stuart from his com- 
manding hill. On his left, from which direction he should 
have expected Jackson 's troops, it might have crossed the bridge 
over the Antietam near its mouth. Where it was, it was super- 
fluous. 

When, on the morning of the 19th, it was discovered that Lee 
had retreated, a brigade of cavalry was ordered in pursuit and 
was soon followed by Porter's corps. I have before, in the 
account of the battle of Malvern Hill, spoken of our reserve 
artillery under the command of Pendleton, and not attached to 
any division. It had been left in Richmond, when Lee with 
Jackson and Longstreet advanced against Pope. After Mc- 
Clellan was withdrawn from the James, it marched with D. H. 
Hill's division, and joined the army in Maryland on Sept. 8. 
On the 10th and 11th it marched to Hagerstown, with Long- 
street's corps, and on the 14th returned with it to Boonsboro. 
That night, when the army was put in motion for Sharpsburg, 
Pendleton was ordered to take the reserve artillery across the 
Potomac at Williamsport, and distribute it to guard the fords of 
the Potomac at that point, and below to Shepherdstown. Hence 
it happened that on the morning of the 19th the hills on the 
Virginia side of Boteler's Ford were being held by 15 light rifle 
guns, and 19 smooth-bores of Pendleton's reserve, while 10 other 
smooth-bores were held close by. 

In his advance to the river Pleasanton's cavalry picked up 
167 stragglers, one abandoned gun, and one color. When he 
approached the river he was opened upon by Pendleton's ar- 
tillery. Gibson 's, Tidball 's, and Robertson 's batteries of horse 
artillery, 18 guns, went into action and replied so effectively 
as to silence most of the Confederate guns and also to run off 
all camps and wagon-trains in sight near the river. 

After two hours of this, the Federal cavalry and its artillery 
were relieved by the arrival of the 5th corps, by which the affair 
was kept up until night. The canal bank along the river on the 
Maryland side served the purpose of a parapet, and enabled the 
enemy to aid their artillery fire with a heavy fire of musketry 
against the Confederate guns and sharp-shooters on the Virginia 



272 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

side, where there was but Uttle cover. During the afternoon this 
combined fire compelled the abandonment of several guns. 
Seeing this, the 4th Mich, forded the stream and took pos- 
session of four of them. After dark this regiment was with- 
drawn, but early on the 20th Porter started to cross the two 
divisions of Morell and Sykes, and a brigade of cavalry. 

Meanwhile, Pendleton during the night had found Lee and 
reported, and Lee had ordered Jackson to send back his nearest 
division. This was A. P. Hill's. Fortunately, Hill moved 
early, and, forming in two lines of battle, he approached the ford 
before Porter had gotten more than a half of his men across. 
Porter, informed that a large force was approaching, decided to 
withdraw, and did so with but little loss. One regiment, however, 
the 118th Pa., was thrown into confusion and driven over 
a steep descent and across the river under fire, losing 269 men. 
The total losses reported by the Federals for this affair were 363. 
A. P. Hill reported 30 killed and 231 wounded. Pendleton re- 
ported three killed and four wounded of his reserve artillery. 

I have already told of my being sent on the 16th to Harper's 
Ferry to remove the captured ordnance stores and to bring what 
was available for use to Sharpsburg. I sent to Winchester 
49 field-pieces and 24 mountain howitzers, and quite a lot of 
artillery ammunition not suitable for our calibres. Of what was 
suitable the supply was small, except of canister. There was 
also a fair amount of small-arm ammunition. Much of it had 
been brought from the depots, and unloaded along Miles 's in- 
trenchments, ready for use. While gathering this in the after- 
noon from Bolivar Heights, I could see the smoke of the conflict 
and the incessant bursting in the air of shells and shrapnel over 
the field where Burnside made his advance and was beaten back 
by A. P. Hill. I could not tell how the fight was going, but at 
that time no Confederate expected anything' less than victory. 
I was until late at night despatching wagons to Winchester, and 
to the ford near the battle-field. I finished the work next morn- 
ing, and returned to the vicinity of the ford in the afternoon. 
Here I found orders to await the army, which would recross 
the river that night, and here the next morning we received a 
liberal shelling from the enemy's horse batteries across the 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 



273 



river, which perforated some of our wagons, but did no other 
harm. 

The Confederate casualties by brigades are given below from 
the War Records as far as tb By appear. Also, in a second table, 
the Federal casualties are distributed among the different actions. 

CONFEDERATE CASUALTIES. MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 



Brigades 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


r Kershaw 
McLaws's ■ Semmes 
Div. 1 Cobb 

. Barksdale 


107 
56 
76 
35 


455 

274 
318 
272 


6 

43 

452 

4 


568 
373 
846 
311 


Total 


274 


1319 


505 


2098 


R.H.Anderson's 
Div. 


>■ Wilcox 

Armistead 

Mahone 

Pryor 

Featherstone 
I Wright 


34 
5 

8 
48 
45 
32 


181 
29 
92 
285 
238 
192 


29 
1 
127 
49 
36 
34 


244 
35 
227 
382 
319 
258 


Total 


172 


1017 


276 


1465 


D. R. Jones's 
Div. 


' Toombs 

Drayton 

Garnett 

Jenkins 

Kemper 
. Anderson, Geo. T. 


16 

82 
30 
27 
15 
8 


122 
280 
199 
196 
102 
80 


22 
179 
32 
12 
27 
6 


160 
541 
261 
235 
144 
94 


Total 


178 


979 


278 


1435 


Walker's 5 Manning 
Div. 1 Ransom 


140 

41 


684 
141 


93 
4 


917 
186 


Total 


181 


825 


97 


1103 


Hood'sff^ff^'^d 
^'^- (Artillery 


69 
53 

4 


417 

390 

19 


62 
25 


548 

468 

23 


Total 


126 


826 


87 


1039 


Evans's Brigade 


40 


185 


65 


290 


S. D. Lee's Art. 
Washington Art. 


11 

4 


75 

28 


2 


86 
34 


Agg. Longstreet's Corps 


986 


5254 


1310 


7550 



274 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



Brigades 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 




986 


5254 


1310 


7550 


' Lawton 


106 


447 


21 


574 


Ewell's Trimble 


27 


203 


8 


238 


Div. 1 Early 


IS 


167 


9 


194 


I Hays 


45 


289 


2 


336 


Total 


196 


1106 


40 


1342 




' Branch 


24 


154 


4 


182 




Archer 


22 


161 




183 


A. P. Hill's 1 


Gregg 


38 


188 


2 


228 


Div. ■{ 


Pender 
Field ' 


12 


103 




115 




Thomas ^ 










Total 


96 


606 


6 


708 


' Winder 


11 


77 




88 


J. R. Jones's J Johnson, B. T.-'' 


36 


116 




152 


Div. Taliaferro 


41 


132 




173 


I Starke 


81 


189 


17 


287 


Total 


169 


514 


17 


700 




r Ripley 


110 


506 


124 


740 




Garland 


46 


210 


187 


443 


D. H. Hill's 


Rodes 
Anderson 


111 


289 


225 


625 


Div. 


64 


299 


202 


565 




Colquitt 


129 


518 


184 


831 




I Hill's Art. 


4 


30 


3 


37 


Total 


464 


1852 


925 


3241 


Reserve Artillery 


3 


4 




7 


Cavalry 


10 


45 


6 


61 


Agg. Jackson's Corps 


938 


4127 


994 


6059 


Grand Aggregate Confed. 


1924 


9381 


2304 


13,609 



* Field's not engaged. 
- Thomas's brigade absent. 

^ Johnson made no brigade report, but losses have been estimated to 
conform to the division report. 



SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 275 

FEDERAL CASUALTIES. MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 



Cavalry Affairs, Sept. ^-20 
Boonsboro or South Mountain, Sept. 14 
Crampton's Pass, Sept. 14 
Harper's Ferry, Sept. 14-15 
Sharpsburg, Sept. 16-18 
Shepherdstown Ford, Sept. 20 

Grand Aggregate, Federal 



Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


12 


52 


20 


325 
113 


1,403 
418 


85 
2 


44 

2,708 

71 

3,273 


173 

9,549 

161 


12,347 
753 
131 


11,756 


13,338 



Total 



84 

1,813 

533 

12,564 

12,410 

363 

27,767 



The casualties among general and field-officers were unusually 
heavy. Among the Federals' commanding corps were Rend and 
Mansfield killed, and Hooker wounded. Commanding Divisions 
or Brigades were, killed : Richardson, Rodman, Goodrich, and 
Miles. Among the wounded were Hatch, Hartsufi", Sedgwick, 
Crawford, Dana, Weber, Wainwright, Gallagher, Barlow, and 
Tyndale. 

Among the Confederate generals were, killed : Garland, G. B. 
Anderson, Branch, Starke, and Douglas. Among the wounded 
were Lawton, R. H. Anderson, Wright, Ripley, J. R. Jones, and 
MacRae. 



CHAPTER XIV 

Fall of 1862 

Political Situation. Lincoln orders Advance. A Confederate Raid. 
Lincoln Dissatisfied. Condition of Confederates. Reorganization. 
Lee moves to Culpeper. McClellan succeeded by Burnside. Plan of 
Campaign Changed. Burnside's Strength. Lee's Strength. Sumner 
at Falmouth. Non-arrival of Pontoons. Surrender Demanded. 
Earthworks Erected. Jackson Arrives. Burnside's Plan. Marye's 
Hill. Building the Bridges. The Bombardment. The Crossing 
Made. Dec. 12. The Plan Changed. Jackson's Line. Franklin 
Advances. Gibbon supports Meade. Meade strikes Gregg. The 
Counter-stroke. Jackson's Proposed Attack. Casualties. On the Fed- 
eral Right. The Formations. French and Hancock. Charge. How- 
ard Charges. Sturgis Charges. Sunken Road Reenforced. Griffin's 
Charge. Humphreys's First Charge. Humphreys's Second Charge. 
Humphreys's Report. Tyler's Report. Getty's Charge. Hawkins's 
Account. A Federal Conference. Dec. 14, Sharp-shooting. 
Dec. 15, Burnside Retreats. Flag of Truce. Casualties. New 
Plans. The Mud March. Burnside Relieved. 

After the battle of Sharpsburg, rest, reorganization, and sup- 
plies were badly needed by both armies, and, as the initiative 
was now McClellan's, he determined not to move until he was 
thoroughly prepared. Lincoln had two months before drawn 
up his Emancipation Proclamation and was waiting for a vic- 
tory to produce a favorable state of feeling for its issuance. 
Sharpsburg was now claimed as a victory, and, on Sept. 22, the 
Proclamation was issued, freeing all slaves in any State which 
should be in rebelhon on the coming Jan. 1. This was supposed 
to be a war measure, though nothing could have been more void 
of effect than it proved. McClellan did not approve of the 
Proclamation, and he let his sentiments on the subject be known, 
although he issued a very proper order to the army, deprecating 
political discussion. His attitude, however, alienated him from 
the administration, and the party in power in Washington. 

A few days after the battle, Lincoln had visited the army, and, 

276 



FALL OF 1862 277 

on parting from McClellan, had expressed himself as entirely- 
satisfied, and had told McClellan that he should not be forced to 
advance until he was ready. But when two weeks had passed^ 
during which great quantities of supplies of all kinds were rushed 
to the army by every channel, McClellan on Oct. 7 received 
instructions to " cross the Potomac and give battle to the 
enemy, or drive him south. The army must move now while 
the roads are good." 

On receipt of this, McClellan conferred with his chief quarter- 
master, who thought that sufficient supplies would be on hand 
within three days. Meanwhile, on Oct. 10 a fresh trouble arose. 
Stuart with 1800 cavalry and Pelham's battery had been sent 
by Lee upon a raid. Fording the Potomac, some 15 miles above 
Williamsport, at dawn on the 10th, by dark Stuart reached 
Chambersburg, where he burned a machine-shop, many loaded 
cars, and a supply depot, paroled 285 sick and wounded Fed- 
erals, and gathered about 500 horses. Next morning he moved 
to Emmitsburg, and thence below the mouth of the Monocacy, 
where he recrossed the Potomac, on the forenoon of the 12th. 
The distance travelled had been 126 miles, of which the last 80 
from Chambersburg were accomplished without a halt. 

An epidemic of foot-and-mouth disease was prevaiUng at this 
time among the enemy's cavalry,^ and the desperate efforts to 
intercept Stuart, made with reduced forces, put much of it out 
of condition for active service until they could get some rest and 
several thousand fresh horses. Pleasanton had made a march 
of 55 miles in 24 hours, part of the distance across the moun- 
tains by very bad roads, and Averill's brigade had travelled 
200 miles in four days. Stuart's loss was but one man wounded, 
and his conduct of the expedition was excellent. Yet the raid 
risked a great deal in proportion to the results accompHshed. 
It might easily have happened that the whole command should 
be captured. But the incident contributed largely to McClellan's 
delay, and to the growing dissatisfaction of the government with 
his conduct.^ 

* The same disease, "sore tongue and soft hoof," was complained of by- 
Lee on Nov. 7 to the Sec. of War, as affecting his cavalry. 

^ This was the second occasion, within four months, on which Stuart had 
ridden entirely around McClellan's army. Col. R. B. Irwin tells of the effect 



278 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Mr. Lincoln had allowed McClellan to decide whether his 
advance should be up the Shenandoah Valley, or east of the 
Blue Ridge, but expressed a preference for the latter route. 

McClellan, however, had decided to take the Valley route, for 
fear of Lee's advancing into Md. and Pa. if it was left un- 
covered. Both Lincoln and Halleck thought his fears ground- 
less and his caution excessive. Neither of them beheved the 
Confederate army to be as immense as McClellan reported, and 
both knew that if the Federals needed supplies the Confederates 
needed them much more. In Lincoln's practical style, he often 
made pertinent suggestions to McClellan and would sometimes 
mingle with them a touch of sarcasm. He wrote that if Lee 
" should cut in between the Army of the Potomac and Washing- 
ton, McClellan would have nothing to do but to attack him in 
the rear." Soon after Stuart's raid, he suggested that " if the 
enemy had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry would 
not be so likely to make raids north of it." And on Oct. 25, he 
telegraphed McClellan in reply to a despatch about sore-tongued 
and fatigued horses, " Will you pardon me for asking what the 
horses of your army have done, siuce the battle of Antietam, that 
fatigues anything?" 

On Oct. 26, McClellan put his army in motion, 19 days after 
his receipt of the President's order. By this time he was willing 
to adopt the line of advance east of the Blue Ridge, as the stage 
of water in the Potomac River now made all fords impracticable. 
The crossing was made at Berhn, about 10 miles below Harper's 
Ferry. Pontoon bridges were laid, and the army crossed over 
rather leisurely, the last of it, Franklin's corps, on Nov. 1 and 2. 

We will now return to the Confederates, who, since Sharps- 
burg, have been resting and recuperating between Winchester 
and Bunker Hill. 

of this raid on the mind of President Lincoln, in the following anecdote : — 
"When the President seemed in unusually high spirits and was convers- 
ing freely, some one (I think De Kay) suddenly asked, 'Mr. President, what 
about McClellan ? ' Without looking at his questioner, the President drew 
a ring upon the deck with a stick or umbrella, and said quietly, ' When I was 
a boy we used to play a game, three times round and out. Stuart has been 
around him twice; if he goes around him once more, gentlemen, McClellan 
will be out.'" 



FALL OF 1862 



279 



Our base of supplies was now Staunton, more than 100 miles 
distant, but over fairly good roads. Our trains were actively at 
work, bringing ammunition, food, and clothing, and gradually 
our condition approached the normal. But the supply, even of 
wagons, was Umited, and, as late as Oct. 20, 55 were wanted 
for the reserve ordnance train of Longstreet's corps, and 41 for 
that of Jackson. 

Meanwhile, as important as reequipment, a thorough reorgani- 
zation took place, and at last we became an army rather 
than a collection of brigades, divisions, and batteries. In Oct. 
Longstreet and Jackson were made lieutenant-generals, and 
major-generals and brigadiers were promoted and our 1st and 2d 
army corps were formed, following the example of the Fed- 
erals nearly a year before. 

The formation of our batteries into battalions was also carried 
forward, but rather slowly. A large proportion of oxu* guns were 
but 6-Pr. and 12-Pr. howitzers, which the enemy had now dis- 
carded as too light. There are no returns showing our different 
varieties of small-arms, but that we still had men armed with 
flintlocks is shown by the return of 13 picked up on the field 
after the battle of Fredericksburg. 

The organization, when completed, stood as follows, the 
strength being given from the returns of Nov. 20, 1862. 

ORGANIZATION OF ARMY OF NORTHERN VA., NOV., 1862 



1st Corps, Longstreet's 



Division 


Brigades and Artillekt 


Present 
FOR Duty 


McLaws's 


Kershaw's, Barksdale's, Cobb's, Semmes's, 

Cabell's Battalion 
Artillery, 4 Batteries, 18 Guns 


7,898 


Anderson's 


Wilcox's, Mahone's, Featherstone's, 

Wright's, Perry's 
Unorganized Artillery, 4 Batteries, 18 Guns 


7,639 


Pickett's 


Garnett's, Kemper's, Armistead's, Jenkins's, 

Corse's 
Unorganized Artillery, 3 Batteries, 14 Guns 


7,567 



Total 



28,104 



280 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



1st Corps, Longstrebt's (Continued) 



Division 


Bbiqadbs and Artillbrt 


Present 
FOB Duty 


Hood's 


Total carried forward 
Law's, Robertson's, Anderson's, Ben- 

ning's 
Unorganized Artillery, 3 Batteries, 14 Guns 


28,104 
7,334 


Walker's 


Ransom's, Cooke's, No Artillery 


3,855 


Reserve Artil- 
lery 


Alexander's Battalion. 6 Batteries, 

26 Guns 
Washington Artillery. 4 Batteries, 9 

Guns 


623 


Total 


5 Divisions, 20 Brigades 
24 Batteries, 99 Guns 


34,916 



2d Corps, Jackson's 



Ewell's 


Lawton's, Early's, Trimble's, Hays's, 

Latimer's Battalion 
6 Batteries, 26 Guns 


7,716 


D. H. HiU's 


Rodes's, Dole's, Colquitt's, Iverson's, Ram- 

seur's 
H. P. Jones's Battalion, 5 Batteries, 22 Guns 


6,944 


A. P. Hill's 


Field's, Gregg's, Thomas's, Lane's, Archer's, 

Pender's 
Walker's Battalion, 7 Batteries, 28 Guns 


11,554 


Taliaferro's 


Paxton's, J. R. Jones's, Warren's, Pendle- 
ton's 

Brockenbrough's Battalion, 5 Batteries, 
22 Guns 


5,478 


Total 


4 Divisions, 18 Brigades, 23 Batteries, 
98 Guns 


31,692 


Stuart's 
Cavalry 


Brigades, Hampton's, Lee F., Lee, W. H. F., 

Jones's, W. E.; Pelham's Artillery 
5 Batteries, 22 Guns 


9,146 


Pendleton's 
Reserve 
Artillery 


Brown's Battalion, 6 Batteries 
Cutt's Battalion, 3 Batteries 
Nelson's Battalion, 3 Batteries 
Total 36 Guns 


718 


Aggregate 


38 Brigades Infantry, 4 Brigades Cavalry, 
63 Batteries, 255 Guns 


76,472 



FALL OF 1862 281 

On Oct. 27 Lee moved with Longstreet's corps and 
Pendleton's reserve arty, toward the eastern slope of the Blue 
Ridge. My reserve ordnance train moved on the 29th via 
Nineveh, Front Royal, Chester Gap, Gaines's Cross-roads and 
Sperryville, and encamped at Culpeper on Nov. 4. Lee, in 
person, had already arrived there. A few days after I was placed 
in command of the battalion of artillery which had been com- 
manded by Col. S. D. Lee, who was now promoted brigadier- 
general and sent to Vicksburg. My successor as chief of ord- 
nance was Col. Briscoe G. Baldwin, who served with great success 
until the surrender at Appomattox. 

Meanwhile, an important event was on foot. We have seen 
the lack of cordiality between McClellan and the President, and 
the growth of mistrust of the latter 's intention to prosecute the 
active offensive campaign desired. On Oct. 27 he had telegraphed 
the President urging the necessity of filling the old regiments 
with drafted men " before taking them into action again." The 
tone of his letters had long been unsatisfactory, and this expres- 
sion kindled into flame the growing suspicion that he was simply 
preparing new excuses for delay. Immediately on reading the 
message Lincoln showed himself ready to meet the issue by 
wiring back : — 

Now I ask a distinct answer to the question, " Is it your purpose not 
to go into action again until the men now being drafted in the States are 
incorporated into the old regiments ? " 

McClellan read between the lines the threat conveyed, and 
backed squarely down. He promptly explained that the 
offensive despatch was the inadvertence of an aid, and promised 
to " push forward as rapidly as possible and endeavor to meet 
the enemy." Indeed, the Confederates noted, during the next 
week, the unwonted vigor of his advance. There were constant 
sharp skirmishes, and the enemy got possession of the two 
lower gaps in the Blue Ridge, Snicker's and Ashby's, and held 
the outlet of Manassas Gap. McClellan's headquarters were 
advanced to Rectortown. His cavalry occupied Warrenton, and 
it was evident that he would soon cross the Rappahannock. 
Then, suddenly, his activity ceased, and from Nov. 9 to the 17th, 
the Federal army laid quietly in its camps. His backdown had 



282 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

come too late. He had been removed from the command on 
Nov. 7, and Burnside substituted in his place. 

McClellan's promises of Oct. 27 might have satisfied President 
Lincoln, but there were strong influences now determined upon 
a change, and which wanted not only the head of McClellan, but 
that of Porter. On Nov. 5 the President wrote an order authoriz- 
ing Halleck, in his own discretion, to relieve McClellan, and to 
place Burnside in command of the army. Porter was also to 
be relieved from the command of the 5th corps, and to be 
succeeded by Hooker. 

On the same date these formal orders were prepared and 
signed by Halleck, but they were not promulgated for two 
days. 

The designation of Burnside to succeed McClellan was a great 
surprise to old army circles, both in the Federal and Confederate 
armies ; and was, perhaps, an unpleasant one to Burnside him- 
self. He was popular, but not greatly esteemed as a general. 
He had commanded a brigade at the first battle of Bull Run, 
but had in no way risen above, even if he reached, the average 
of the brigade commanders. He had later had the luck to com- 
mand the expedition to the N.C. Sounds, where his overwhelming 
force easily overcame the slight resistance that it met. This 
gained him the prestige, in newspapers and political circles, of 
successful independent command. As commander of a corps, 
he was one of the four next in hne for promotion — Burnside, 
Hooker, Sumner, and Franklin. 

The older officers dreaded Hooker's appointment. By many 
he was thought utterly unfit, though a brave man and a hard 
fighter. Moved by the wishes of his friends, Burnside was 
brought to accept the command rather than see it go to Hooker. 

McClellan was not unprepared for the blow, and he met it 
gracefully and did all in his power to commend his successor to 
the confidence of the army. He had not, however, anticipated 
that he was to be relegated to private life, but had supposed 
that he would be transferred to some command in the West. 
But no other command was ever offered him. A few days later 
Burnside submitted to the President his plan for the campaign, 
and it was approved, though reluctantly. McClellan's plan had 



FALL OF 1862 



283 



been to interpose between Lee's divided forces. Already he was 
not far from such a position. From Longstreet's corps to Jack- 
son's was over 40 miles by the roads across the mountains, and 
McClellan's forces were within 20 miles of either. But Lee 
could have delayed a march upon either, and, by falling back, 
might unite his two corps, behind the Robertson River, before 
accepting battle. 

This had been Lee's plan, if the threat of Jackson's position 
upon the Federal flank should fail to prevent their advance. 

Burnside's organization was as follows : — 



Grand Divs. 


Corps 


Divisions 


Brigades 


Artillery 


Right Grand 
Division 


2d Corps 
Couch 


Hancock 

Howard 
French 


Caldwell, Meagher, 

Zook 
Sully, Owen, Hall, 
Kimball, Palmer, An- 
drews 


8 Batteries 


Sumner 


9th Corps 
Willcox 


Sturgis 
Getty 


Poe, Christ, Leasure 
Nagle, Ferrero 
Hawkins, Harland 


6 Batteries 


Centre Grand 
Division 


3d Corps 
Stoneman 


Birney 

Sickles 
Whipple 


Robinson, Ward, 

Berry 
Carr, Hall, Revere 
Piatt, Carroll 


9 Batteries 


Hooker 


5th Corps 
Butterfield 


Griffin 
Sykes 
Humphreys 


Barnes, Sweitzer, 

Stockton 
Buchanan, Andrew, 

Warren 
Tyler, AUabach 


8 Batteries 


Left Grand 
Division 


1st Corps 
Reynolds 


Doubleday 

Gibbon 

Meade 


Phelps,Rogers,Gavin, 

Meredith 
Root, Lyle, Taylor 
Sinclair, Magilton, 

Jackson 


11 Batteries 


Franklin 


6th Corps 

W.F.Smith 


Brooks 

Howe 

Newton 


Torbert, Cake, Rus- 
sell 

Pratt, Whiting, Vin- 
ton 

Cochrane, Devens, 
Rowley 


11 Batteries 




6 Corps 


18 Divisions 


51 Brigades 


53 Batteries 



284 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Burnside began his campaign with a blunder. He adopted 
Richmond as his objective, instead of Lee's army. The latter 
was within a day's march of him, and its wings were separated 
by two days' march. Here was an opportunity for a skilful 
commander, but Burnside decided to make Fredericksburg a 
base, and to move thence upon Richmond. On Nov. 15, he 
turned his back upon Lee and marched for Fredericksburg. 
Meanwhile, he had made some important changes in his organiza- 
tion, by the formation of three grand divisions out of his six 
corps in order to lessen the routine duties of his office.^ 

Besides the .troops shown above, the right grand division com- 
prised two brigades of cavalry and a battery, and each of the 
others, one brigade of cavalry and a battery. There was also an 
artillery reserve of 12 batteries, an engineer brigade with the 
pontoon train, and an escort and a provost guard of infantry 
and cavalry. 

On Dec. 10, the return of the army showed "present for 
duty, " as follows : — 

Right Grand Division, Sumner . . . 31,659 

Centre Grand Division, Hooker . . . 40,396 

Left Grand Division Franklin . . 46,897 . . 118,952 
The Artillery comprised 374 guns. 

Besides these troops there were two corps, the 11th, with 
15,562 present for duty, under Sigel; and the 12th,' with 12,162, 
under Slocum, which Burnside called his reserve grand divi- 
sion. These troops, under command of Sigel, were on the march 
to Fredericksburg, but they did not arrive until after the 
battle. 

Besides these, there were 51,970 holding the line of the Potomac 
above Washington, and the fortified lines about the city and 
Alexandria, with 284 guns of position, and 120 field-pieces. 
Thus, all together, there were available for use against Lee and 
to protect the capital, 198,546 men and about 900 guns. 

On the same day, Dec. 10, Lee's return showed his present 

for duty, by divisions, as follows : — 

* This organization was not kept up by Burnside's immediate successors, 
but under Grant in 1864 something equivalent was developed in separate 
armies and in large corps. 



FALL OF 1862 



285 



1st Corps, Longstkeet 


Strength 


2d Corps, Jackson 


Strength 


Anderson's Division 
Hood's Division 
McLaws's Division 
Pickett's Division 
Ransom's Division 
Reserve Artillery 


7,639 
7,334 

7,898 

7,567 

3,855 

623 


Ewell's Division 
A. P. Hill's Division 
D. H. Hill's Division 
Jackson's Division 
Reserve Artillery- 


7,716 

11,554 

8,944 

5,005 

473 


Total 2d Corps 


33,692 


Total 1st Corps 


34,886 


Total two Corps 


68,578 



Adding Pendleton's reserve artillery, 718, Stuart's cavalry, 
9146, and 41 general staff, we have Lee's aggregate, 78,483, and 
about 250 guns. This was practically the largest army which 
Lee ever had in the field. Possibly, during the Seven Days, 
more troops were near Richmond, but, being organized only in 
divisions, or in independent brigades and batteries, and thus 
less easy to handle, they constituted a much less powerful 
army. 

As before stated, on Nov. 15, Burnside commenced his move- 
ment upon Fredericksburg, Sumner's grand division leading the 
way. Already his cavalry had made reconnoissances which had 
attracted attention, and Lee, on the 15th, had sent a regiment 
of cavalry, one of infantry, and a battery to reenforce four com- 
panies of infantry and a battery already at Fredericksburg. 
Orders were also sent to destroy the railroad from Fredericks- 
burg to Acquia Creek. On the 17th it was learned that gun- 
boats and transports had entered Acquia Creek, on which 
W. H. F. Lee's brigade of cavalry was despatched in that direc- 
tion, and Stuart was ordered to force a crossing of the Rappa- 
hannock and reconnoitre toward Warrenton. This was done on 
the 18th, and the enemy's general movement was discovered. 
A part of Longstreet's corps was put in motion on the 18th, and 
the remainder followed next day. 

Sumner's corps arrived at Falmouth on the 17th, and an 
artillery duel ensued, across the river, rashly provoked by the 
Confederates, who had orders to oppose any force attempting to 
cross. It really came near inducing the enemy to cross, though 
under orders from Burnside not to do so. For under the superior 



286 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

metal of the Federals, the Confederate gunners were driven from 
their guns. There was a ford in the vicinity, and the tempta- 
tion was strong to come over for them, but the existence of 
orders prevented its being done. 

For Burnside had feared that Lee would overwhelm any small 
force which should cross before he was prepared to support it. 
Lincoln and Halleck, indeed, had only consented to the move- 
ment via Fredericksburg with the understanding that the army 
should possess itself of the heights opposite the town by crossing 
the river above and coming down. Burnside had dehberately 
changed this plan, after starting on the march. After the battle, 
his personal responsibility for the changed result was brought 
home to him unpleasantly. 

Swinton asserts that Burnside — 

"did not favor operating against Richmond by the overland route, but 
had his mind turned toward a repetition of McClellan's movement to the 
Peninsula ; and in determining to march to Fredericksburg he cherished 
the hope of being able to winter there upon an easy base of supplies, and 
in the spring embarking his army for the James River." 

The three weeks' delay between his arrival and his crossing the 
river suggests the lack of definite plans. At first the delay was 
attributed to the non-arrival of pontoon trains. These trains 
had been ordered on Nov. 6 from Rectortown to Washington 
City. This order failed to reach Berlin until the 12th. 

Sumner was anxious to cross, and asked Burnside if he might 
do so without waiting for pontoons, "if he could find a ford." 
He had found the ford before he made the request, but Burn- 
side's inchnations were adverse to a battle and he could not be 
beguiled. 

So the small Confederate force held the town until the 20th, 
when Longstreet arrived with McLaws's division, and was followed 
the next day by the remainder of the corps. 

On the 21st Sumner sent a formal demand for the surrender 
of the town, basing it upon the statement that his troops had 
been fired upon from under cover of the houses, and that mills 
and manufactories in the town were furnishing provisions and 
clothing to the enemy. He demanded an answer by 5 p.m., and 
said that if the surrender was not immediate at nine next 



FALL OF 1862 287 

morning, he would shell the town, the intermediate 16 horn's 
being allowed for the removal of women and children. 

This note, only received by the Mayor at 4.40 p.m., was 
referred to Longstreet, who authorized a reply to be made that 
the city would not be used for the purposes complained of, but 
that the Federals could only occupy the town by force of arms. 
Mayor Slaughter pointed out that the civil authorities had not 
been responsible for the firing which had been done, and, further, 
that during the night it would be impossible to remove the non- 
combatants. During the night Sumner sent word that in con- 
sideration of the pledges made, and, in view of the short time 
remaining for the removal of women and children, the batteries 
would not open as had been proposed. 

But the letter left it to be inferred that the purpose to shell 
was only postponed, and Lee, who had now arrived, advised the 
citizens to vacate the town. This advice was followed by the 
greater part of the population. It was pitiable to see the 
refugees endeavoring to remove their possessions and encamp- 
ing in the woods and fields, for miles around, during the un- 
usually cold weather which soon followed. 

This incident is responsible for the existence of most of the 
earthworks, which, at the time of the battle, contributed largely 
to the repulse of the enemy's assaults upon Marye's Hill. Great 
sympathy, of course, was felt for the citizens, and Lee, immedi- 
ately after his arrival, ordered batteries to be erected, from which 
the enemy's positions, upon the hills commanding the town from 
the north, could be repHed to by our rifled guns, in case of their 
shelling the town. Lee at first had not intended to give battle 
at Fredericksburg, but had proposed after delaying the enemy 
to fall back behind the North Anna River, and to dehver his 
battle there. Both he and Jackson objected to the position at 
Fredericksburg that the river, with the commanding positions 
on the north bank, could always afford a safe retreat to a beaten 
enemy, as the Antietam had done at Sharpsburg. This was un- 
doubtedly true, as was soon afterward proved when the battle 
took place. At the North Anna the enemy, if defeated, might 
be successfully pursued and some fruits of victory be gathered. 

But the position at Fredericksburg soon began to show its 



288 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

good points, and as the country behind the Rappahannock was 
able to supply some subsistence which would otherwise be lost, 
it was decided to give battle at Fredericksburg, against Jackson's 
protest. 

Burnside's pontoons arrived on Nov. 25. By this time a few 
earthworks showed upon the Confederate hills, and led him to 
delay, and to reconnoitre the river for a flank movement. Above 
Fredericksburg the country was hilly and wooded. The river 
was narrow, and there were several fords. These features would 
have made a crossing easy to accomplish by a surprise. Below 
the town the river widened, and the country opened. Yet Burn- 
side adopted that flank for his movement, and began his prepara- 
tions to cross at Skinker's Neck, 12 miles below Fredericksburg, 
where the river was over 1000 feet wide. 

Lee discovered his preparations, and as Jackson's corps had 
arrived from the Valley about Nov. 29, it was moved to the 
right, and observed the river as far as Port Royal, 18 miles below. 
Jackson had not left Winchester until Nov. 22, five days after 
Sumner's arrival at Falmouth. His troops had marched 150 
miles in 10 days, but Lee and Jackson had both presumed largely 
on Burnside's want of enterprise in allowing, for even a few days, 
150 miles to separate the two corps. Lee had given no express 
orders to Jackson, but as late as Nov. 19, had written him to 
remain in the Valley as long as his presence embarrassed the 
enemy, but to keep in view that the two corps must be united 
in order to give battle. 

The Federal army was supplied with balloons. McClellan had 
used them on the Peninsula, but during Pope's campaign, and 
in Md., they had not been seen, although the open character of 
the country would have often exposed and embarrassed the most 
important movements of the Confederates, had balloonists been 
on the lookout. Now, the balloons reconnoitring the country 
about Skinker's Neck, discovered Jackson's camps, and Burn- 
side knew that his designs were disclosed. The discovery sug- 
gested an alternate piece of strategy. If he could cross at 
Fredericksburg, and rapidly push a force around Lee's right at 
Hamilton's Crossing, he might interpose between the forces about 
Skinker's Neck and those in front of Fredericksburg. The press- 



FALL OF 1862 289 

ure upon him to fight was great, and on Dec. 10 the orders 
were issued for a crossing that night. The programme was as 
follows : — 

Two bridges were to be thrown across the river at the upper 
end of the town, one bridge at the lower end, and two about a 
mile below the town. Where the bridges were in pairs, one was 
for the use of artillery and one for infantry. The pontoon trains 
were to arrive opposite the chosen sites at 3 a.m., and unload the 
boats and material. By daylight this was to be finished and the 
boats placed in the river. The bridges were then to be built in 
from two to three hours. In length they would be from 400 to 
440 feet. The weather was unusually cold, the thermometer 
being 24 degrees above zero. The ice in the river was about an 
inch thick. The bridges would be concealed from Confederate 
fire by the town. On the north bank, 179 Federal guns were 
put in position during the night, to cover the crossing, and it 
was beheved that they could instantly silence any musketry fire 
from the opposite bank. 

There had been ample time for the construction of formidable 
earthworks and abattis, had Lee originally intended to receive 
battle there. Probably 30 pits had been made, each for a single 
gun, but in few places had any protection for infantry been 
provided, except upon the river bank in front of the town. This 
portion of the line was under charge of McLaws, who had care- 
fully located every sharp-shooter with reference to his protec- 
tion and his communications. Elsewhere there was httle prepa- 
ration of any sort. 

There was, however, one natural feature which proved of great 
value. The Confederate hne occupied a range of low hills nearly 
parallel to the river and a few hundred yards back from the 
town. The Telegraph road, sunken from three to five feet 
below the surface, skirted the bottom of these hills for about 
800 yards, until it reached the valley of Hazel Run, into which 
it turned. This sunken road was made part of the line of battle 
for McLaws's infantry. It not only formed a parapet invisible 
to the enemy until its defenders rose to fire over it, but it afforded 
ample space for several ranks to load and fire, and still have 
room behind them for free communication along the line. In 



290 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

easy canister range, nine guns on the hills above could fire over 
the heads of the infantry. This position was known as Marye's 
HiU. 

The crossing had been expected for some days, and orders 
given for two signal guns, whenever it was attempted. On the 
10th Burnside's army was ordered to cook three days' rations, 
and the news was quickly conveyed to Lee, being shouted across 
the river to one of our pickets. At 2 a.m., the pickets reported 
that pontoon trains could be heard on the opposite bank, and 
at 4.30 A.M. the building of the bridges commenced. The signal 
guns were fired about 5 a.m., and the different brigades and 
batteries, already alert, quickly took positions in the early dawn. 
The day was calm and clear except for a peculiar smoky haze or 
dry fog which now prevailed in the forenoons for several days. 
In the early hours it limited vision to a range of scarcely 100 
yards, but, as the sun rose higher, it faded and disappeared by 
noon. 

The sharp-shooters along the river front had reserved their fire 
until after the discharge of the signal guns. They then opened 
upon the bridge builders, who could now be dimly seen, and 
soon drove them off the bridges with some loss. A heavy fire 
of infantry and artillery was opened in reply, upon the Con- 
federate rifle-pits, under which they became silent. After a 
half -hour's fire, the bridge builders made a fresh attempt; but 
their appearance provoked fresh volleys from Barksdale, whose 
brigade was holding the city, and again the bridges were cleared. 
Several efforts of this sort were made during the morning, all 
resulting similarly, and the casualties in the Engineer brigade, 
which had the work in charge, ran up to near 50. 

At the site selected for Franklin's crossing about a mile below 
the city, there was no opposition, for there was no shelter for 
even a Confederate skirmish-line. The bridges here were finished 
by 11 a.m. Franklin, however, was ordered not to cross until 
the resistance at the town had been overcome. Here, by 11 a.m., 
the Engineer brigade had abandoned the task of building bridges 
under fire. When this state of affairs was reported to Burn- 
side, he ordered every gun in range of the city to fire 50 rounds 
into it. Probably 100 guns responded, and the spectacle which 



FALL OF 1862 291 

was now presented from the Confederate hilltops was one of the 
most magnificent and impressive in the whole course of the war. 

The city, except its steeples, was still veiled in the mist 
which had settled in the valleys. Above it and in it incessantly 
showed the round white clouds of bursting shells, and out of 
its midst there soon rose three or four columns of dense black 
smoke from houses set on fire by the explosions. The atmosphere 
was so perfectly calm and still that the smoke rose vertically in 
great pillars for several hundred feet before spreading outward 
in black sheets. The opposite bank of the river, for two miles 
to the right and left, was crowned at frequent intervals with 
blazing batteries, canopied in clouds of white smoke. 

Beyond these, the dark blue masses of over 100,000 infantry 
in compact columns, and numberless parks of white-topped 
wagons and ambulances massed in orderly ranks, all awaited 
the completion of the bridges. The earth shook with the thunder 
of the guns, and, high above all, a thousand feet in the air, hung 
two immense balloons. The scene gave impressive ideas of the 
disciplined power of a great army, and of the vast resources of 
the nation which had sent it forth. 

Under cover of this storm of shell, the Federal bridge builders 
again ventured upon their bridges and tried to extend them, 
but the artillery fire had been at random into the town, 
and not carefully aimed at the locations of the sharp-shooters. 
Consequently, these had not been much affected, and presently 
the faint cracks of their rifles could be heard, between the re- 
ports of the guns. The contrast in sound was great, but the 
rifle fire was so effective that, again, the bridges were deserted. 
Indeed, the promiscuous fire of bombardments seldom accom- 
plishes any result. Carnot, in his Defence of Strong Places, says 
that they "are resorted to when effective means are lacking." 
No citizen was reported injured, though many left the town 
only after firing began in the morning, and some remained during 
the whole occupation by the Federals. 

Presently Gen. Hunt, chief of artillery, suggested an expedient. 
There were 10 pontoon boats in the water along the north shore. 
On the southern shore the sharp-shooters, a httle back from the 
high brink of the river, could only see the farther half of its 



292 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

width. Hunt proposed that troops should make a rush and fill 
the boats. These should then be rowed rapidly across to the 
shelter of the opposite shore, where the men could disembark 
under cover. A lodgment once made, other troops could follow, 
until a force was accumulated which could capture the rifle-pits. 

This sensible course, which should have been the one first 
adopted in the morning, under cover of the fog, was now tried. 
Four regiments, the 7th Mich., the 19th and 20th Mass., and the 
89th N.Y., volunteered for the crossing. The first boats suffered 
some casualties, but were soon safe under shelter of the bank. 
Other instalments followed, and the Confederates, appreciating 
that their game was up, and that the bridges below the town 
were already available, began to withdraw. The pontoniers 
now returned to their work, and the bridges were completed. 
Some skirmishing took place in the streets, and a few were cut 
off and captured. But the defence had practically gained the 
entire day, for although a division of the 6th corps crossed in 
the afternoon, it was subsequently recalled, all but one brigade, 
left to guard the bridge-heads during the night. 

This delay robbed Burnside's strategy of its only merit. It 
had been his hope to find Lee's army somewhat dispersed, as 
indeed it had been; D. H. Hill's and Early's divisions having 
been at Skinker's Neck and Port Royal, 12 to 22 miles away. 
But they were recalled on the 12th and reached the field on the 
morning of the 13th after hard marching. The casualties suffered 
by the Confederates engaged in this defence were 224 killed and 
wounded and 105 missing. Of the Federal losses, separate re- 
ports were made only of the Engineer brigade, engaged upon the 
bridge work. This lost 50 killed and wounded, and Hancock 
reported the loss of 150 in two regiments which had supported 
the Engineers. 

The night was quite cold, the thermometer falling to 26 degrees. 
While this is not extreme for this latitude and season, it caused 
great suffering among the troops from the South, generally thinly 
clad, and for some months far from raihoad transportation. 
Especially was this the case on the picket-lines where fires were 
forbidden. Kershaw reported it "a night of such intense cold as 
to cause the death of one man, and to disable temporarily others." 



FALL OF 1862 293 

The whole of the 12th was occupied in crossing two grand 
divisions. Sumner crossed the 2d and the 9th corps by the 
upper bridges and occupied the town. Franklin crossed the 
1st and 6th corps by the lower bridges and occupied the plain 
as far out as the Bowling Green road, a half mile from the river, 
and the same distance in front of the wooded range of hills oc- 
cupied by Jackson's corps. Much has been said of the strength 
of the Confederate position upon the hills overlooking the plateau 
of the valley, with its sunken road in front of Marye's Hill. The 
Federal position was even a stronger one, against any attack by 
the Confederates. The dominating hills and plateaus of the 
north bank, with its concave bend at Falmouth and unUmited 
positions for artillery, protected by the wet ditch, as it were, of 
the river in front, practically constituted a fortress, with the 
plains of the south bank as its glacis. The Bowling Green road, 
along their middle, running between high banks on each side, 
made a powerful advanced work, and the low bluffs near the 
river made a second line. The Confederate Hne, also concave in 
its general shape and dominating the plains between, was strong 
against assaults in front, but neither flank was secure against 
being turned. Its right especially was in the air at Hamilton's 
Crossing, and Burnside planned to attack this flank. 

Franklin's grand division had been strengthened for that pur- 
pose by three divisions assigned to his support. One of them, 
Burns's, of the 9th corps, was already across the Rappahannock 
and on the left of Sumner, separated from Franklin's right 
only by Deep Run, across which bridges had been laid. The 
other two were Sickles's and Birney's divisions of the 3d corps, 
of Hooker's grand division, which was still upon the north side, 
but close to the bridges, in readiness to cross. With these troops, 
Franklin had nearly 60,000 men. During the afternoon of the 
12th, Franklin had urged that these two divisions should be 
brought over during the night, and that preparations should be 
made for an advance at dayhght. Burnside promised to order 
it, but the order was not given until the next morning. 

He apparently lacked confidence in himself and shrank back 
from his own plans as the moment of execution drew near. 
Franklin had been informed that Burnside would give the final 



294 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

order which should put his force in motion. About 7 a.m. on 
the 13th an order came, but it was not at all the order expected. 
It made no reference to the plans of the day before, but ordered 
Frankhn to "keep his whole command in position for a rapid 
movement down the old Richmond road." Then he was to 
"send out, at once, a division, at least, to seize, if possible, the 
height near Capt. Hamilton's on this side of the Massaponax, 
taking care to keep it well supported and its Une of retreat open." 

The order went on to tell Franklin what Sumner was to be 
doing at the same time. He was also to send "a division or more 
up the Plank road to its intersection with the Telegraph road, 
where they will divide with the view of seizing the heights on 
both of these roads." Then the order set forth what he hoped 
to accompHsh. "Holding these two heights, he hopes will 
compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between them." 
It is enough to say that this change from a single attack with 
full force upon our right, to two weak and isolated attacks on 
the right and left, lost the battle. Being ordered to send "at 
least a . division," Franklin designated the 1st corps under 
Reynolds for the attack upon the height at Hamilton's Crossing. 
Meade's division was to lead, closely followed and supported by 
Gibbon; Doubleday's was to protect the left flank of the ad- 
vance, which was threatened by Stuart's artillery. Franklin 
would have also sent a portion of the 6th corps, but it had been 
placed in position for the attack first planned, and time would 
have been lost by a change. 

The Confederate right flank was not well prepared to stand 
the coming shock in view of the long warning it had had. The 
fact was that Jackson's troops had been in observation of the 
river below, and had only arrived upon the field on the 12th. 
Previously this flank had been held only by Hood's division, and 
during its stay, little probability of attack had been foreseen. 
Consequently, Hood made but two works of preparation. On 
the edge of the woods, overlooking the railroad, a trench had 
been dug long enough to hold a brigade and a half ; and through 
the thick wood 500 yards in the rear, a road had been cleared, 
affording communication behind the general line which occupied 
the wooded hills. 



FALL OF 1862 295 

On the 12th A, P. Hill was placed in front, to cover about a 
mile and a half of line with his six brigades. On the extreme 
right he posted 14 guns, and supported them with half of Brocken- 
brough's brigade. No other position for artillery offered along 
the front until the left of the division was reached. Here 12 
guns were advanced north of the railroad, and 21 more were 
placed upon a low, open hill, south of the road some 200 yards to 
the left and rear, supported by Pender's brigade. The wooded 
hills between these positions were held by the four remaining 
brigades, but no two of them connected with each other. On 
the right, the other half of Brockenbrough's and Archer's brigade 
occupied the trenches which had been built by Hood. Archer's 
left rested on a swampy portion of the wood overgrown with 
underbrush, and it had carelessly been assumed to be impass- 
able. Maj. Von Borcke, a German officer on Stuart's staff, had 
suggested felling it, but it was not thought worth while. On 
the far side of this swamp. Lane's brigade took up the line ; the 
gap between it and Archer's being about 500 yards. 

Beyond Lane was another considerable gap to his left and 
rear, where Pender's brigade was supporting the 12 and 21 guns 
before referred to. Behind Lane, about 400 yards, was Thomas's 
brigade. The remaining brigade of the division, Gregg's, was 
placed in the military road opposite the swamp and gap between 
Archer and Lane. 

If we call this disposition of Hill's troops one of two lines, a 
third line was formed by the divisions of Early and Taliaferro — 
Early on the right — a short distance in rear, and a fourth one by 
the division of D. H. Hill in rear of that. Burnside was losing 
one of the advantages of his superior force by concentrating it 
upon too short a front. He was hemmed in on the left by 
Massaponax Creek, and was confined to a front attack. With 
only a mile and a half to defend and with about 30,000 infantry 
in hand, covered by the woods from accurate artillery fire, 
Jackson was very strong. With this understanding of the posi- 
tions and forces the result might have been predicted. The 
faulty disposition of A. P. Hill's division, with two gaps in his 
front line, would surely allow to the enemy a temporary success. 
But the strong reserves close at hand were enough to restore the 



296 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

battle, and even induce a counter-stroke. The counter-stroke, 
however, must be driven back with loss when it ventures out 
into the plain. With this foregone result of the game set 
forth, we may now briefly describe the moves by which it 
was played on the left, before taking up the independent bat- 
tle to be fought out during the whole afternoon by the Federal 
right. 

During the night of the 12th, the ground was frozen, and the 
movements of artillery could be plainly heard through the fog, 
even before dawn brought the music of bands and commands of 
officers all strangely muffled but clearly audible in the still air. 
We were now about to measure our strength with the largest 
and best-equipped army that had ever stood upon a battle-field 
in America. But our own army was better organized and stronger 
than ever before, and now, finding itself concentrated at exactly 
the right moment, it was as confident and elated as if the vic- 
tory had already been won. 

About 10 A.M., the gradual clearing of the mist began to reveal 
the plain, and the Federal skirmishers and guns began to feel 
for our positions. Our own guns took little or no part in this 
preliminary firing, saving themselves for the approach of the 
hostile infantry. This was not long delayed, Meade's division 
of three brigades taking the lead, supported by Gibbon's divi- 
sion, a little in rear on its right flank, and Doubleday's on its 
left. Some delay ensued in their crossing the Bowling Green 
road, owing to the hedges and ditches lining it, which had to be 
made passable for the artillery, and here the Confederates first 
took the aggressive. From across the Massaponax " the gallant 
Pelham," as he was called by Lee in his report to Richmond for 
the day, opened an enfilading fire upon the Federal lines with 
two guns which he had advanced within easy range. Meade 
replied with 12 guns, and one of Doubleday's batteries assisted. 
Pelham frequently changed his position, but kept up his fire for 
nearly an hour untfl ordered by Jackson to withdraw, one gun 
having been disabled. 

The advance was now resumed until within easy range, when 
a furious cannonade was opened upon the Confederate line, and 
maintained for nearly an hour. To this oiu" guns made little 



FALL OF 1862 297 

reply, but both the artillery and infantry, concealed in the 
woods, suffered a good many casualties. 

It was now about 11.30 a.m., and Meade's infantry again 
advanced and were soon within 800 yards of the Confederate 
batteries. These opened with the 47 guns in position upon the 
two flanks, and eight more sent out from Pendleton's reserve 
to Pelham. Under this fire the Federal advance was checked, 
and portions of the Une, which received the brunt of it, were 
driven back. Meanwhile, fresh guns were added to the Federal 
line. The artillery duel raged for over an hour, when the Con- 
federate fire ceased, the enemy's infantry being no longer in 
sight, and the Confederate guns low in ammunition. 

Upon this check, Gibbon's division was sent to Meade's sup- 
port and formed in column of brigades on Meade's right flank. 
Meade had two brigades in his front line, and his remaining 
brigade in a second line in close support. Doubleday's division 
was moved up nearer behind Meade's left, and engaged with 
Stuart's skirmishers and artillery across the Massaponax. 
Birney's and Newton's divisions of the 3d and 6th corps were 
also sent forward to the Bowling Green road to support the 
attack, which Meade, at 1 p.m., was about to renew with Gibbon 
on his right. So the assault had a front of three brigades, and 
was three lines deep behind the right brigade; two lines deep 
behind the centre brigade, and only one line deep on the 
left. 

The Confederate artillery fire at once reopened, but in weaker 
force than before, owing to its losses and expenditures, and the 
attacking forces were soon within musket range. Crashes of 
infantry now swelled the roar to the proportions of a great 
battle, mingling with a similar tumult which had now broken 
out in front of Fredericksburg. The battle was now on in its 
full force at two points, nearly five miles apart. Franklin's part 
in it was of the shortest duration, and will be first told. 

Gibbon's division on Meade's right overlapped the left flank 
of Lane's brigade, and came in front of the 33 guns on A. P. Hill's 
left. The 12 in advance had to be withdrawn to escape capture, 
but Gibbon's three brigades were able to do no more than to 
fight their way up to the railroad with the loss of 1267 men ; the 



298 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

two foremost brigades being successively broken and reenforced 
by the brigade following. 

On Meade's extreme left, his 3d brigade, under Gen. C. F. 
Jackson, found the artillery fire from the 14-gun battery on 
Hill's right so effective that it abandoned the direct advance, 
and, incHning to the right, it moved behind Meade's other 
brigades and took part in their fight, which has now to be de- 
scribed. 

The marshy woods before referred to, which filled the wide 
gap between Archer and Lane, extended in a long triangle to 
the front across the railroad. The march of Meade's division 
brought its right brigade into this wood, where the men found 
themselves free from the Confederate artillery fire. Not only 
were they hidden from view, but they were too far to the left for 
the guns on the right flank, and too far to the right for the guns 
on the left flank. It was this immunity from fire which brought 
C. F. Jackson's brigade into the woods, and thus formed Meade's 
division into a column of three brigades. This column, without 
firing a shot or meeting a picket, made its way entirely through 
the woods, until it fell upon Archer's left flank and Lane's right 
flank, turning each, and capturing about 300 prisoners. Archer's 
men were so taken by surprise that some of his troops were 
caught with their arms stacked. Two regiments were quickly 
routed, and it was said that they were fired on as they retreated 
by their own comrades, who beheved them to be deserting their 
posts without cause. 

But the other regiments of Archer's brigade held firmly, repuls- 
ing the enemy by the help of the troops on their right. Lane's 
brigade, attacked in front by Gibbon's division and its right 
flank turned by Meade's through the unoccupied gap, was forced 
back in the woods, until Thomas's brigade came to its support. 
This soon restored the fine. Of Meade's three brigades, the 
leading one was drawn into these separate fights upon each flank, 
while the second brigade continued to push forward. In this way 
it advanced unseen and unmolested for 500 yards, when it came 
upon the brigade of Gregg at rest in the so-called mihtary road. 
Meade immediately opened a hot fire. Gregg could not realize 
that a Federal brigade could be so far within our fines. He 



FALL OF 1862 299 

rushed in front of Orr's regiment, beating up the muskets of men 
who were firing and caUing out that they were firing on friends, 
until he fell mortally wounded. This was the culmination of 
the Federal attack, and its collapse came quickly. 

Orr's regiment was broken, but the rest of the brigade stood 
firm, and changed front to meet the Federal advance. The 
latter were already in confusion when Lawton's brigade came 
to reenforce Gregg, and the enemy was driven back rapidly. 
Hoke's brigade was also sent to the assistance of Archer, and 
Early's brigade to support Lane and Thomas. The whole Fed- 
eral advance was driven from the woods and pursued out into 
the plain. The troops of Archer, Lane, and Thomas, or por- 
tions of them, joined in the counter-stroke, and the whole of 
both Meade's and Gibbon's divisions were involved and car- 
ried along with the retreat. But there was no adequate debouch- 
ment from the dense woods for rapid advance, and when the 
Confederates, disorganized by the pursuit, met the fresh troops 
of the enemy, the advance was checked, and, unpursued, it fell 
back to the line of the railroad. Indeed, the whole advance 
beyond the railroad had been unwise. Its only result would 
surely be the loss of the most daring of the pursuers. And the 
loss of such men from a brigade is Uke the loss of temper from 
a blade.* 

The Federals made no further effort on their left during the 
day, and distant sharp-shooting, with intermittent artillery, was 

* In illustration, I quote from the report of Col. Evans, commanding 
Lawton's brigade, as follows : — 

"I cannot forbear to mention in terms of unqualified praise the heroism 
of Capt. E. P. Lawton, Asst. Adjt.-Gen. of the brigade, from the beginning of 
the advance until near the close of the fight, when he received a dangerous 
wound, and was unavoidably left in the open plain where he fell. Cheering 
on the men, leading this regiment, or restoring the line of another, encourag- 
ing officers, he was everywhere along the whole line, the bravest among the 
brave. Just as the four regiments emerged from the neck of woods referred 
to, his horse was shot under him, and, in falling, so far disabled him that 
thousands, less ardent or determined, would have felt justified in leaving 
the field; but limping on he rejoined the line again in their advance toward 
the battery, but soon received the wound with which he fell." 

The wound unfortunately proved mortal. Gen. Burnside, a few days 
later, generously returned the body to the Confederate lines, giving it an 
escort of honor from the hospital across the river. 



300 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

now the only activity until near sundown, which occurred about 
4.45. 

Burnside, at 1 p.m., had sent orders to Franklin to attack with 
the 6th corps on the right of Gibbon, and at 2 p.m. had repeated 
the order urgently and explicitly. But about this time Meade 
and Gibbon were driven back, and pursued, and put so completely 
out of action that fresh divisions had to replace them. When 
his left had been made secure, Franklin thought it too late to 
organize a fresh attack. 

Jackson had noted within the Federal lines movements of 
troops and artillery with which they were preparing themselves 
to resist further attack. He had misinterpreted them, and 
supposed them to be preparations for a renewed assault. His 
appetite for battle had not been satisfied, and seeing the heavy 
force at the enemy's disposal, he could not believe that they 
would be content with an affair of only two or three divisions. 
He accordingly waited to receive the expected assault, and 
finally, when it did not materialize, he determined to take the 
offensive himself. Apparently, he did not yet fully appreciate 
that the enemy's position was practically a citadel. But he 
fortunately discovered it in time. Wliile his assault was being 
prepared, he had indulged in some prehminary cannonading, 
which had put the enemy fully on the alert. In his official re- 
port, he writes : — 

"In order to guard against disaster the infantry was to be preceded by 
artillery, and the movement postponed imtil later in the evening, so 
that, if compelled to retire, it would be under the cover of night. Owing 
to unexpected delays the movement could not be gotten ready untU late 
in the evening. The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood 
100 yards when the enemy's artillery reopened, and so completely swept 
our front as to satisfy me that the' proposed movement should be aban- 
doned." 

A. P. Hill's division, which bore the brunt of the fighting on 
the 13th, out of 11,000, lost 2122 men. Early's, which came to 
his support, lost 932 out of 7500. The other divisions lost less 
than 200 each, principally from the heavy artillery fire which 
the enemy threw into the woods. Meade's division, out of 5000, 
lost 1853, and Gibbon lost 1267. So the casualties of the two 



FALL OF 1862 



301 



fighting divisions on each side were nearly balanced; the Con- 
federate loss being 3054 out of about 18,500 engaged, and the 
Federal, 3120 out of about 10,000 engaged. 

We will now take up affairs at Fredericksburg. In his plans 
on the 12th, Burnside had not proposed a direct attack from the 
town, but on the 13th, as already told, had directed Sumner to 
prepare to assault Marye's Hill with at least two divisions, but 




OF 



SCAJ.E OHF. iUCtf •JO HUE 
— 1 — ( — 1 1 J I « i- i . ■ 



he was not to advance until Burnside gave the order. At first he 
proposed to give it only when Franklin had gotten possession 
of the hill at Hamilton's Crossing; but about 10.30, becoming 
impatient, he delayed no longer. 

The selection of the point of attack immediately opposite the 
town was perhaps influenced by the shelter afforded the troops 
within the town. But it was a fatal mistake. The most ob- 
vious, and the proper attack for the Federal right, was one turn- 



302 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ing the Confederate left along the very edge of the river above 
Falmouth, supported by artillery on the north bank which could 
enfilade and take in reverse the Confederate left flank. This 
attack is indicated by the concave north bank of the river, and 
it offered the easiest proposition to the Federals of the whole 
topography, 

Sumner's grand division numbered about 27,000 on the field. 
Hooker's grand division had not yet been brought across the 
river, except the two divisions supporting Franklin. The other 
four (Whipple of the 3d corps, and Griffin, Sykes, and Humphreys 
of the 5th) were held near the upper bridges, and were all brought 
across during the day. They numbered about 26,000. Burn- 
side's position during the battle was at the Phillips house, on a 
commanding hill a mile north of the river. Lee made his head- 
quarters on a hill, since called Lee's Hill, overlooking Hazel 
Run and the eastern half of the field in front of the town. 
Two 30-Pr. Parrott rifles were located in pits on this hill, and 
were used with good effect upon the enemy advancing from the 
lower part of the town, until one exploded at its 39th round, 
and the other at its 54th. 

Here Lee and Longstreet stood during most of the fighting, 
and it is told that, on one of the Federal repulses from Marye's 
Hill, Lee put his hand upon Longstreet's arm and said, ''It is 
well that war is so terrible, or we would grow too fond of it." 

Sumner's advance from the town began about noon. With 
skirmishers in front, French moved his brigades by parallel streets, 
and, crossing on bridges the little canal (about 20 feet wide and 
four feet deep) some 300 yards from the town, they formed suc- 
cessively for the attack in a considerable sheltered area, between 
the canal and the low bluff of a plateau which extended to the 
front some 400 to 500 yards from the sunken road at the foot 
of Marye's Hill. 

The three brigades of French formed in the order — Kimball, 
Andrews, Palmer. In close support came Hancock with Zook, 
Meagher, and Caldwell. Howard's division was also brought 
out from the town as a further support. There was no special 
difficulty in coming from the town and getting under cover in 
the sheltered area above described, although it was done under 



FALL OF 1862 303 

fire of our artillery. The real trouble would lie in advancing 
about 400 yards across the plateau to the sunken road. There 
was no intervening abattis or ditch, but there were some small 
houses, gardens, and fences, affording some shelter, but break- 
ing the continuity of the ranks. These two divisions numbered 
about 9000 men. 

The front line of the Confederate defence was held by three 
Ga. regiments in the sunken Telegraph road, the 18th, 24th, and 
Phihp's legion of Cobb's brigade. The 24th N.C. of Ransom's 
held an infantry trench, which extended from the Telegraph to 
the Plank road. 

On the crest of the hill above the road were four 12-Pr. guns, 
two 12-Pr. howitzers, and three 10-Pr. rifles, comprising the three 
batteries of the New Orleans Washington artillery under Col. 
Walton. On the left of the Plank road were four guns of Maurin's 
battery, in pits, and, at Stansbury's house, Parker's battery of 
Alexander's battalion, with four guns, found positions during the 
afternoon to fire upon the enemy's right flank. His left flank 
was also partially exposed to the fire of the two Parrotts on Lee's 
Hill. The infantry in the sunken road and ditch numbered at 
the commencement of the action only about 2000 ; but in sup- 
port behind Marye's Hill were about 7000 more, most of whom 
were brought into action later. 

As each of the six brigades at short intervals was advanced 
over the crest of the plateau, it met the Confederate fire. Kim- 
ball's brigade led, and no brigade during the day advanced 
farther, and but few as far. But he was wounded, and his brigade 
repulsed with a loss of 520 men within 20 minutes. Andrew's 
brigade followed, and was likewise driven back with the loss of 
342. Palmer, who came next, lost 291. The whole loss of the 
division (including its artillery which fired from the edge of the 
town) was 1160. About this time Ransom, seeing preparations 
for further attack, reenforced his line by Cooke's brigade. The 
27th N.C. took position in the sunken road, and the 15th, 46th, 
and 48th occupied the crest of the hill, giving a second tier of 
infantry fire. 

The remnants of French's division, extending to right and 
left, took shelter in shght undulations and kept up fire both at 



304 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

the Confederate guns and infantry, Hancock's division soon 
followed French's and with a similar experience, but more pro- 
longed and bloody. His leading brigade, Zook's, lost 527. The 
second, Meagher's, lost 545, and the third, Caldwell's, lost 952. 
The loss of the division was 2032. The battle at this point had 
developed into a fearful example of successive attacks by small 
forces; the same vicious game which had lost 2d Manassas and 
Sharpsburg. But Burnside was now obstinate, and was order- 
ing in fresh troops upon each of his two battle-fields. The turn 
of Howard's division came next. He had been at first directed 
to attack upon his right of the Plank road, and was preparing to 
do so, when Hancock called for supports, and Howard was 
diverted to the same field. His leading brigade, Owen's, did 
not push its assault so far as to be broken by the Confederate fire, 
but laid down where it could find a little cover. It was able here 
to hold its position until relieved after nightfall. His losses 
were 258. Howard's second brigade was Hall's, which was sent 
upon its charge somewhat to the right of the ground covered by 
the preceding charges. He was broken, rallied, charged again, 
and was again driven back, when he also f oimd shelter, halted his 
command, and held on imtil night, having lost 515 men. 

Howard's third brigade was Sully's, which was kept in reserve, 
and two regiments sent to reenforce Owens, and one to Hall. 
The losses in this brigade reached 122. Howard's entire loss 
was 914. Couch's whole corps had now been practically wrecked 
with a loss of 4114 men, in fighting eight separate battles with 
his nine brigades, against a force not half his size, all within 
four hours. 

Next to the left of Couch's corps was the 9th-, under Willcox. 
Sturgis's division of two brigades was on its right, occupying the 
lower portion of the city. Next came Getty's division of two 
brigades under cover of the bluffs at the mouth of Hazel Run. 
Burns's division of three brigades on the left connected with 
Frankhn at Deep Run, and was under his orders. During the 
day Burns went across Deep Run to Franklin's support. 

When French's division was advanced, Sturgis was ordered to 
support it upon its left. He threw forward Dickenson's battery 
and Ferrero's brigade. The battery received a heavy fire from 



FALL OF 1862 305 

guns on and near Lee's Hill, and was soon disabled and with- 
drawn, Dickenson being killed. Ferrero advanced from the lower 
part of the city to the left of the ground over which French and 
Hancock had fought. He did not have the canal to cross, as it 
terminated near the railroad. He met a severe fire, however, 
and finding depressions of ground in which his troops could get 
cover, his brigade occupied them for the rest of the day and fired 
from 60 to 200 rounds per man at the Confederate Unes and 
batteries. 

Sturgis's second brigade, imder Nagle, about an hour later, 
was ordered to support Sturgis's on the left. After some delay 
in crossing ravines, this brigade also found cover somewhat to 
Ferrero's rear, which it occupied and joined in the fire upon the 
Confederate Unes until dark. 

Ferrero's casualties were 491 and Nagle's 500. About 3 p.m., 
Ferrero having asked for reenforcements, and Griffin's division 
having reported as support to the 9th corps, Barnes's brigade, 
of that division, was sent in over the same ground that Ferrero 
had traversed. This brigade also made a gallant advance, but 
finally took cover with the loss of 500. 

Meanwhile, Whipple's division of the 3d corps, of two brigades, 
which had been placed at the upper end of the town to guard 
the right flank, having no enemy close in front, sent Carroll's 
brigade to support Sturgis. Griffin placed Sweitzer's brigade 
on the right of Carroll, and sent forward the two brigades sup- 
porting them with Stockton's brigade, the last of his division. 

This charge of Griffin's was the eleventh separate effort made 
up to this time. But the infantry fire met was now being con- 
stantly increased, the Telegraph road affording the opportunity. 
Cobb had been killed and Cooke, soon after, severely wounded 
early in the affair. On the latter event, Kershaw with his bri- 
gade was ordered up, and about the same time. Ransom brought 
up the remaining three regiments of his brigade. Some of these 
troops doubled upon those already in the sunken road, imtil 
there were six ranks. These were effectively handled by Ker- 
shaw in person. Others took the best partial cover they could 
find about the top and slopes of the hill, whence their fire con- 
tributed to that from the sunken road. There the six ranks 



306 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

fired successive volleys from each rank, with only a few seconds' 
intervals. A regiment from Jenkins's brigade was also advanced 
down the right bank of Hazel Run, reenforcing a company of 
sharp;^hooters which had been doing fine service all day upon 
the enemy's flanks. 

Under this increased fire Griffin's charge differed but little in 
its results from those immediately preceding it. The men ad- 
vanced as far as they could find some partial protection, and there 
they laid down. Carroll's brigade here lost 118; Sweitzer's 
222; and Stockton's 201. It was now nearly four o'clock and 
there came a comparative lull in the conflict. But Hooker 
was under orders to attack with his whole force, and he had yet 
intact Humphreys's and Sykes's divisions of the 5th corps. Even 
before Griffin's charge. Hooker had looked at the field, and be- 
come so convinced that the Confederate line could not be carried, 
that he had sent an aid to Burnside to say that he advised 
against attack. The answer came that the attack must be made. 
Hooker, however, considered it a duty to his troops to make a 
fuller explanation, and endeavored to dissuade Burnside from 
what he was sure would be a hopeless effort. Burnside still 
insisted that the position must be carried before night. 

Hooker, accordingly, returned and began to prepare for the 
attack by advancing as many batteries as could be located on the 
edge of the town, and even sending two. Hazard's and Frank's, 
across the canal, where they opened with a range of less than 300 
yards. 

While these preparations were going on, the troops holding 
the hollows and undulations in front, where they had found shelter 
when the charges had been repulsed, reported that the Confed- 
erates were withdrawing from their positions. This report was 
quickly spread and reached Couch, who said to Humphreys, 
"Hancock reports the enemy is falHng back. Now is the time 
for you to go in." * 

> This false impression doubtless arose from seeing the nine guns on the 
crest of Marye's Hill limber up, and leave the hill. When the lull in the 
firing occurred, Walton had requested Alexander's battalion to relieve his 
guns, which had nearly exhausted their ammunition. Nine fresh guns were 
quickly moved up. Walton's guns were withdrawn to give clear roads, and 
the reliefs replaced them at a gallop. These movements were seen by the 
enemy and thought to be the beginning of a retreat. 



FALL OF 1862 307 

Humphreys's division was composed of two brigades, Alla- 
bach's and Tyler's, and it went into action 4500 strong. It 
was already under urgent orders to attack, Allabach's brigade 
was in front, and Tyler's in motion to get upon its right flank. 

Now, without waiting for Tyler, Humphreys ordered AUa- 
bach to advance, and, throwing themselves in front, he and 
AUabach led the charge. In about 200 yards they reached the 
continuous line now formed of the fragments of the preceding 
charges, lying down where they could find cover. Here, in spite 
of all their efforts, Allabach's troops also laid down and began 
to fire. Humphreys could now see the Confederate line, and 
appreciated that it was so covered that fire against it was of little 
effect. With some difficulty and delay he succeeded in check- 
ing the fire of his men, got them on their feet, and again started 
to advance. Up to this point his fine had had partial cover, but 
now for 150 yards there was none. They advanced for 50 yards 
and then broke, a part stopping with the line of renmants, and 
the remainder were rallied near the canal. 

Tyler's brigade after a httle delay was formed in a double line 
of battle on the left of Allabach's position. It had first moved 
to the right, but there met enfilading fire of artillery, and it was 
withdrawn to the left. Humphreys joined it and ordered the 
charge to be made with the bayonet alone, and that the men 
should pass directly over the fine of those lying down. 

Meanwhile, as sundown approached, Burnside's orders had 
grown urgent that the position should be carried before dark. 
Getty's division of the 9th corps, two brigades, from the left on 
Hazel Run, was ordered to assault, but no steps were taken to 
have it simultaneous with that of Humphreys. 

Had there been time, Humphreys, from his experience with 
Allabach, would have preferred to first clear his path of the line 
of men lying down, already spoken of. Not only were they 
physically much in the way, but even more were they a moral 
obstacle. A repulsed line, which is not ready to join in a fresh 
assault, does not at all Hke a new fine to pass over it, for it seems 
a reflection upon their courage. They are apt to do all they can 
to discourage and obstruct the newcomers, and the latter can- 
not fail to appreciate that an advance, leaving a large force 



308 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

behind, is very liable to receive fire from the rear, intended to 
go over their heads, but likely to land a good many bullets in 
their backs. And, even if this does not happen, a false alarm 
of "fire from the rear," is almost sure to occur. 

Under the conditions confronting him, Humphreys's charge 
was utterly hopeless, and should never have been made. But 
it illustrated a high type of disciplined valor, and, but for the 
men lying down, might have crossed bayonets with the Con- 
federates, The six ranks of seasoned veterans in the road, 
however, could scarcely have been overcome by those who 
would arrive. 

With all its officers in front, led by Humphreys and Tyler, and 
with a loud hurrah, which was a signal to our guns on the hill 
to put in rapid work from full chests of canister, Tyler's brigade 
now made a rapid advance under what, in his official report, 
Humphreys called "the heaviest fire yet opened, which poured 
upon it from the moment it first rose from the ravine." They 
came in two lines, quite close together, and without firing a shot, 
A more beautiful charge is not recorded in the annals of the Army 
of the Potomac. 

Its experiences, as told in the official reports both of Hum- 
phreys and Tyler, are instructive, Humphreys writes : — 

"As the brigade reached the masses of men referred to, every effort 
was made by the latter to prevent our advance. They called to our men 
not to go forward, and some attempted to prevent by force their doing so. 
The effect upon my command was what I apprehended. . . , The line was 
somewhat disordered, and, in part, was forced to fall into a column, 
but still advanced rapidly. The fire of the enemy's musketry and artil- 
lery, furious as it was before, now became still hotter. The stone wall 
was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head and flanks of the column. 
Officers and men were falling rapidly, and the head of the column was at 
length brought to a stand when close up to the wall. Up to this time 
not a shot had been fired by the column, but now some firing began. It 
lasted but a minute, when, in spite of all our efforts, the column turned and 
began to retire slowly, I attempted to rally the brigade behind the natu- 
ral embankment, so often mentioned, but the united efforts of Gen. Tyler, 
myself, our staffs, and the other officers could not arrest the retiring mass. 
My efforts were the less effective, since I was again dismounted, my sec- 
ond horse having been killed under me. . . . Our loss in both brigades 
was heavy, exceeding 1000 in killed and wounded, including in the number 



FALL OF 1862 309 

officers of high rank. The greater part of the loss occurred durmg the brief 
time they were charging and retiring, which scarcely occupied more than 
10 or 15 minutes for each brigade." 

Tyler's report says : — 

"The brigade moved forward, in as good order as the muddy condition 
of the ground on the left of my line would admit, until we came upon a 
body of officers and men lying flat upon the ground in front of the brick 
house, and along the slight elevation on its right and left. Upon our ap- 
proach the officers commanded halt, flourishing their swords as they 
lay, while a number of their men tried to intimidate our troops by crying 
out that we would be slaughtered, etc. An effort was made to get them out 
of the way, but failed, and we marched over them. When we were within 
a very short distance of the enemy's line, a fire was opened on our rear, 
wounding a few of my most valuable officers, and, I regret to say, killing 
some of our men. Instantaneously the cry ran along our lines that we 
were being fired into from the rear. The column halted, receiving at the 
same time a terrible fire from the enemy. Orders for the moment were 
forgotten, and a fire from our whole line was immediately returned. An- 
other cry passed along the line, that we were being fired upon from the rear, 
when our brave men, after giving the enemy several volleys, fell back." 

Besides suffering from the infantry fire of their own men in the 
rear, the Federal column, or portions of it, also believed that 
the Federal artillery above Falmouth, which kept up a constant 
long-range fire with their heavy rifles upon the Confederate 
position, had mistaken locaUties and was landing its projectiles 
in the Federal ranks. Couch writes of this charge of Hum- 
phreys's division, as follows, in the Century Magazine: — 

"The musketry fire was very heavy and the artillery fixe was simply 
terrible. I sent word several times to our artillery on the right of Fal- 
mouth that they were firing into us and were tearing our men to pieces. 
I thought they had made a mistake in the range, but I learned later that 
the fire came from the guns of the enemy on their extreme left." 

This fire came from Parker's battery, of my battalion, located 
near the Stansbury house. The losses in Allabach's brigade were 
officially reported as 562, and those in Tyler's as 454. 

The attacks by these brigades were the twelfth and thirteenth 
separate charges of the day, and there was still one to follow. 

Getty's division, comprising Hawkins's and Harland's brigades, 
received orders to attack about the same time that Humphreys 
was arranging his attack. Being near the mouth of Hazel Run, 



310 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

they had farther to advance before reaching the field, and only 
arrived upon it after Tyler was repulsed. They had not been 
engaged during the day, but had suffered some casualties from 
premature explosions of Federal shell fired from the hills across 
the river. Hawkins's brigade led, advancing by right of com- 
panies as far as the railroad, where the brigade line was re- 
formed and a fresh start taken, directed at the southern ex- 
tremity of Marye's Hill. Harland's brigade was to follow in 
similar formation. 

In view of the lateness of the hour, this charge was even more 
hopeless than any of the preceding. Hawkins had protested 
against it before starting, but the orders were explicit. By the 
time that the division crossed the railroad, it was so dark that 
distinct vision was limited to a few hundred feet. The first 
portion of the march was unobserved by the Confederates, and 
the fine rapidly advanced until it came to marshy ground, 
through which ran a ditch to Hazel Run. Here they opened 
fire, and their position was defined to the Confederates by the 
flashes of their muskets, and infantry and artillery replied from 
Marye's Hill, from across Hazel Run, and from guns upon Lee's 
Hill. They crossed the ditch, however, and had advanced 
quite close to the sunken road, when suddenly the infantry in it 
opened fire, and, at the same time, fire was opened upon them 
from the right and rear by the line of Federals lying down, in 
front of whom their advance from the left had brought them. 
Hawkins thus describes the scene : — 

"When the brigade arrived at this cut [ditch] it received an enfilading 
fire from the enemy's artillery and infantry, but, notwithstanding, the 
plateau on the other side was gained, the left of the line advancing till 
within about 10 yards of a stone wall, behind which a heavy infantry force 
of the enemy was concealed, which opened an increased artillery and in- 
fantry fire, and, in addition to this, the brigade received the fire of the 
83d Pa. Volunteers and of the 20th Me. Volunteers who were on 
the left of Gen. Couch's line, which our right had overlapped. This 
firing from all quarters, and from all directions, I should think, lasted about 
seven minutes, when I succeeded in stopping it and then discovered that 
the greatest confusion existed. Everybody, from the smallest drimimer 
boy up, seemed to be shouting to the full of his capacity. After consider- 
able exertion, comparative quiet and order were restored, and the com- 
mand re-formed along the canal cut [ditch]. I then reported to you for 



FALL OF 1862 311 

further orders, and you ordered the command withdrawn, and placed in its 
former position in the town." 

Getty not only showed good judgment in withdrawing Haw- 
kins's brigade on the first opportunity, but he had done 
even better with Harland's brigade, for he halted it near the 
railroad, and did not permit it to participate in the charge. 
Sykes's division was also held in reserve on the edgfe of the town, 
behind Humphreys, and at 11 p.m. was sent across the canal, 
where it relieved the remnants of all of the brigades which had 
made their advances from that quarter. 

The Confederate fire soon ceased when the flashes of the 
enemy's guns no longer gave targets. The losses in Hawkins's 
brigade had been 255, in Harland's they were 41. 

Among the Confederates, no one conceived that the battle was 
over, for less than half our army had been engaged, only four out 
of nine divisions. It was not thought possible that Burnside 
would confess defeat by retreating. 

Burnside himself, however, was far from having given up the 
battle, and, though many prominent officers advised against it, he 
determined to renew the attack at dawn. He proposed to form 
the whole 9th corps into a column of regiments and to lead it in 
person upon Marye's Hill. 

He came across the river after the fighting ceased, gave the 
necessary orders, and returned to the Philhps house about 1 a.m. 
He found there waiting for him Hawkins, who had made the last 
charge, and who had now come at the request of Willcox, Hum- 
phreys, Meade, Getty, and others to protest against the pro- 
posed attack, and to give information about the situation, which 
it was supposed that Burnside did not possess. A long conference 
ensued in the presence of Sumner, Hooker, and FrankHn, the 
commanders of the three grand divisions. On their unani- 
mous advice, verbal orders were sent countermanding the pro- 
posed assault. Before these could be delivered, many preparatory 
movements were under way. And while they were in progress, 
a courier bearing orders which disclosed Burnside's plan, becom- 
ing lost in the darkness, wandered up to our picket-fine. He was 
captured, and his orders were found and taken to Longstreet and 
Lee. Notice was at once sent along our fines, with instructions 



312 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

to extend and strengthen our intrenchments, and to make all 
necessary preparations of ammunition, water, and provisions, 
which was vigorously set about with no suspicion that Burnside 
would disappoint us. 

So on the 14th, when, at dawn, the Confederates stood to arms, 
they looked and listened in vain for signs of the fresh assaults 
which the cajJtured order had led them to expect. About 10 
o'clock, the morning fog began to lighten, and a vicious sharp- 
shooting sprang up. Sykes's regulars were now in our front, and 
the guns from the Stafford hills kept up a slow target practice at 
our lines, to which we made no reply. 

The day passed without serious hostilities. During the after- 
noon some of their shells prematurely exploding, caused orders 
to be issued not to fire any more at our position about Marye's 
Hill. 

During the night of the 14th, we received ammunition from 
Richmond, and Longstreet authorized a moderate fire on the 
15th, to suppress the sharp-shooting. During the night, also, we 
had located two guns on our left where they could enfilade 
the sheltered position, in front of the canal, from which the 
Federal attacks had come. 

So, on the 15th, our position was agreeably improved. A few 
shots, raking the depressions in which the enemy had so far 
found shelter, routed the picket reserves. A single shot into a 
loopholed brick tannery on the Plank road, silenced it, and for 
the rest of the day nothing annoyed us, and we worked openly at 
our defences. 

The night of the 15th was dark and rainy, with high wind 
from the south, preventing us from hearing noises from the 
enemy's direction. During the night Burnside safely with- 
drew across the river. Commencing his movement at 7 p.m., 
his whole enormous force was across in 12 hours of a stormy 
night. It was a great feat, and its successful performance, un- 
molested, under our guns, reflects badly upon the vigilance of 
the Confederates. It should have been suspected, discovered by 
scouts, and vigorously attacked with artillery. 

On the morning of the 15th, both Hooker on the right and 
Franklin on the left had appHed to Burnside for permission to 



FALL OF 1862 



313 



send a flag of truce and recover the wounded in their respective 
fronts. It seems that Hooker's request was refused, for no flag 
was here shown. But on Frankhn's front an informal arrange- 
ment was made by which all picket firing ceased, and the Federal 
ambulances and burial parties were allowed to remove the dead 
and wounded in front of our pickets, and our own men brought 
forward and delivered those who had fallen within our lines. 
On the 16th, when the city was evacuated, very few of the 
wounded who had fallen on the 13th in front of the town 
were found alive. 

The Federal guns were, generally, still in position on the hills 
on the north side, and a few spiteful shells were thrown by 
them in the farly hours, but, before noon, the pickets of both 
sides were peacefully reestablished. 

The whole action resolved itself into two separate offen- 
sive battles by the Federals, one on their right and one on their 
left, with some unimportant skirmishing in the centre. The 
forces present or near at hand on each field, and the losses, may 
be divided about as follows : — 





Federal 

Right 

Attack 


Federal 
Centre 
Skirmish 


Federal 

Left 
Attack 


Aggregate 


Federal 


Forces 

Losses 


51,623 

7,817 


13,735 
383 


39,337 
4,447 


104,695 
12,647 


Confederate 


Forces 
Losses 


20,043 
1,589 


14,901 
305 


43,569 
3,415 


78,513 
5,309 



Whatever may be said of Burnside's strategy or tactics, he was 
not deficient in moral courage. Although well aware that most 
of his generals were in a despondent mood, he determined within 
a very few days to make a fresh effort. He had his cavalry 
reconnoitre the river below Fredericksburg, and then decided to 
cross in that direction. 

On Dec. 26 he ordered three days' cooked rations, and 10 
days' rations in the wagons, with beef cattle, forage, and ammu- 
nition, all to be prepared to move at 12 hours' notice. His cav- 
alry advance was already in motion for a raid within the Con- 



314 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

federate lines, when he received a message from President Lincohi 
forbidding any movement without his being previously informed. 
This interference broke up his plan. Some of the generals had 
communicated it to the President with adverse criticisms. 

Not discouraged, however, he soon devised another, and, 
doubtless, a better one. He proposed to cross the river at 
Banks Ford, only about four miles above Fredericksburg, mak- 
ing at the same time demonstrations at several points, both 
above and below. His losses at Fredericksburg had been more 
than repaired by the arrival within reach of the 11th and 12th 
army corps, some 30,000 strong, under Sigel. There had been 
good weather since the battle and the roads were in fair order. 
He had visited Washington and sought the approval of the 
President and War Department, but had found them reluctant 
to give it, being influenced by the general distrust of Burnside's 
ability among the principal officers of his army. 

To bring the matter to an issue, Burnside tendered his resig- 
nation, to be accepted "in case it was not deemed advisable for 
him to cross the river." He then returned and hurried his prepa- 
ration. On Jan. 20, he put his army in motion. Positions 
for 184 guns had been selected, covering the approaches to the 
points chosen for crossing, and roads had been found and opened 
as secretly as possible. But, nevertheless, the Federal activity 
had been noted, especially at Banks and United States fords, 
and, on the 19th, Lee sent a brigade to strengthen our pick- 
ets there. As the distances were not great from the Federal 
camps before Fredericksburg to the positions about Banks 
Ford, most of their guns were able to reach their positions by 
the night of the 20th. About dark on that day, a violent rain- 
storm set in, which continued all that night and the two follow- 
ing days. The pontoon trains in rear of the guns had farther to 
go, and were unwieldy to handle. Many troops and trains were 
still far from their destinations, and now every road became a 
deep quagmire, and even small streams were impassable tor- 
rents. Although desperate efforts were made all during the 
night to get the pontoons to the river, when morning dawned, 
not enough for a single bridge had arrived, and five bridges 
were required. 



FALL OF 1862 315 

Swinton writes of the situation, as follows : — 

" It would have been judicious in Gen. Burnside to have promptly aban- 
doned a situation that was now hopeless. But it was a characteristic 
of that general's mind (a characteristic that might be good or bad accord- 
ing to the direction it took) never to turn back when he had once put his 
hand to the plough ; and it had already, more than once, been seen that 
the more hopeless the enterprise, the greater his pertinacity. The night's 
rain had made deplorable havoc with the roads, but Herculean efforts were 
made to bring pontoons enough into position to build a bridge or two withal. 
Double and triple teams of mules were harnessed to each boat, but it 
was in vain. Long stout ropes were then attached to the teams, and a 
hundred and fifty men put to the task on each. The effort was but little 
more successful. Floundering through the mire for a few feet, the gang of 
Lilliputians, with their huge ribbed Gulliver, were forced to give over, 
breathless. Night arrived, but the pontoons could not be gotten up, 
and the enemy's pickets, discovering what was going on, jocularly shouted 
their intention to 'come over to-morrow and help build the bridges.' 

"Morning dawned upon another day of rain and storm. The ground 
had gone from bad to worse, and now showed such a spectacle as might 
be presented by the elemental wrecks of another deluge. An indescrib- 
able chaos of pontoons, vehicles, and artillery encumbered all the roads 
— supply wagons upset by the roadside, guns stalled in the mud, ammuni- 
tion trains mired by the way, and hundreds of horses and mules buried 
in the liquid muck. The army, in fact, was embargoed. It was no longer 
a question of how to go forward — it was a question of how to get back. 
The three days' rations, brought on the persons of the men, were ex- 
hausted, and the supply trains could not be moved up. To aid the return, 
all the available force was put to work to corduroy the rotten roads. Next 
morning the ai?my floundered and staggered back to the old camps, and 
so ended a movement that wiU always live, in the recollection of the army, 
as the 'Mud March,' and which remains a striking exemplification of the 
enormous difficulties incident to winter campaigning in Va." 

Burnside's plan had been a good one, and his army, with the 
11th and 12th corps, had numbered on Jan. 20, 152,516 present 
for duty, besides 45,239 in the defences of Washington. But for 
the rain-storm — the "Act of God" — he certainly had reason- 
able ground to hope for success. But he was not disposed to 
lay the whole blame upon the storm. He had been greatly dis- 
satisfied with Franklin, and his conduct of his command, at the 
battle of Fredericksburg, and he now keenly resented hostile 
criticisms which had injured him in estimation of the President. 

From the scene of the Mud March he went direct to Washing- 



316 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ton, with an order in his pocket for the President to approve, or 
else to accept, his resignation. He made the issue boldly, first 
with Hooker, and next with Franklin, and his principal officers. 
The proposed order dismissed from the army Hooker, Brooks, 
and Newton, commanding divisions, and Cochrane, commanding 
a brigade in the 6th corps ; and it relieved from f m-ther duty with 
the army, Franldin, Smith, commanding the 6th corps, Sturgis, 
commanding a division, and Ferrero, a brigade in it, and Taylor, 
Franklin's Asst. Adjt.-Gen. 

Lincoln felt kindly to Burnside and respected him, but he had 
now more confidence in Hooker, who had won the sobriquet of 
"Fighting Joe," and much general popularity, both in the army 
and in the newspapers, with his fine bearing and frank manners. 
So Lincoln met the issue and suppressed the order, relieved 
Burnside from the command, and gave it to Hooker on Jan, 25. 
None of the other proscribed officers were disturbed, except 
Franklin, who was placed on waiting orders and afterward trans- 
ferred to La. 



CHAPTER XV 

Chancellorsville 

Winter Quarters. Rations Reduced. Hays's Louisiana Brigade. Offi- 
cers' Servants. Hooker's Reorganization. Confederate Organization. 
Hooker's Plan of Attack. Lee's Proposed Aggressive. Hooker 
Crosses. Hooker's Fatal Mistake. Lee's Prompt Action. The 
Wilderness. Hooker Advances. Lee's Advance. Hooker Retreats. 
Hooker Intrenches. Lee Reconnoitres. Lee's Plan of Attack. 
Jackson's March. The Movement Discovered. Sickles Advances. 
Jackson Deploys. Jackson Attacks. Colquitt's Blunder. Dowdall's 
Tavern. Casualties. At Hooker's Headquarters. Defensive Meas- 
ures. Jackson Pauses. A Cannonade. Wounding of Jackson. 
Stuart in Command. Formation for Attack. Sickles's Midnight 
Attack. Hooker's Interior Line. Hooker abandons Hazel Grove. 
Stuart Attacks. Assaults Repulsed. Hazel Grove Guns. Federals 
Withdraw. Lee and Stuart Meet. Sedgwick's Advance. Wilcox 
on Taylor's Hill. Assaults Renewed. Early falls Back. Salem 
Church. Casualties. Early's Division. Lee organizes an Attack. 
Sedgwick driven Across. 

Soon after the battle of Fredericksburg, Lee placed his army 
in winter quarters. Jackson was extended along the river, be- 
low the town, as far as Port Royal, his own headquarters being 
au a hunting lodge on the lawn of a Mr. Corbin, at Moss Neck, 
11 miles below Fredericksburg. Longstreet was encamped from 
a little above Fredericksburg to Massaponax Creek. Lee estab- 
lished his headquarters in a camp a short distance in rear of Ham- 
ilton's Crossing. Most of the artillery was sent back to the 
North Anna River for convenience of supply. My own battalion 
occupied a wood at Mt. Carmel church, five miles north of Han- 
over Junction, the horses being sheltered in an adjoining pine 
thicket. On the occasion of Burnside's Mud March, we marched 
about halfway to Fredericksburg, but were then allowed to 
return. The infantry generally did not leave their camps, as 
there was nowhere any fighting. 

317 



318 ■ MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Although so near to Richmond, the army was inadequately 
clothed, shod, and fed, in spite of Lee's earnest efforts. As far 
back as April 28, 1862, the meat ration had been reduced from 
12 to 8 ounces, and a small extra allowance of flour (two 
ounces) was given. It was claimed that but for this reduction, 
the supply of meat would not have held out throughout the fall. 
On Jan. 23, 1863, a further reduction was ordered, by the com- 
missary-general, to four ounces of salt meat with one-fifth of a 
pound of sugar. Lee wrote of the situation on March 27 : — 

"The men are cheerful, and I receive but few complaints, still I do not 
consider it enough to maintain them in health and vigor, and I fear they 
will be unable to endure the hardships of the approaching campaign. 
Symptoms of scurvy are appearing among them, and, to supply the 
place of vegetables, each regiment is directed to send a daily detail to 
gather sassafras buds, wild onions, garlic, lamb's quarter, and poke sprouts; 
but for so large an army the supply obtained is very small." 

Some idea of the situation is given in the following extracts 
from a letter of a staff-officer of Hays's La. brigade to his rep- 
resentative in Congress : — 

"Among 1500 men reported for duty there are 400 totally without 
covering of any kind for their feet. These men, of course, can render no 
effective service, as it is impossible for them to keep up with the colimin 
in a march over frozen ground. There are a large number of men who have 
not a single blanket. There are some without a particle of underclothing, 
having neither shirts, drawers, nor socks, while overcoats, from their 
rarity, are objects of curiosity. 

"The 5th regiment is unable to drill for want of shoes. The 8th regi- 
ment will soon be unfit for duty from the same cause ; and indeed, when 
shoes are supplied, the men will be unable to wear them for a long while, 
such is the horrible condition of their feet from long exposure.- 

"This destitution, in the way of clothing, is not compensated by close 
shelter or abundant food, for the troops have no tents, and are almost 
totally unprovided with cooking utensils for the petty rations they re- 
ceive. . . . 

"Troops from other States are supplied, indeed, in a great degree by 
individual contributions from their homes, while we of Louisiana have 
received nothing whatever, since the fall of New Orleans, with the excep- 
tion, I believe, of a company of the 9th regiment." 

Troops from the more distant States suffered many more pri- 
vations, both in food and clothing, than those near home. 



CHANCELLORSVILLE ' 319 

Some of the State governments also did much toward the cloth- 
ing of their own troops, and private families, too, sent largely 
both of food and clothing to their members in the armies. 

Without such help, Confederate officers would often have suf- 
fered for food. Early in the war, officers received no rations, 
but were allowed to purchase from the commissaries, for them- 
selves and servants. But as rations became scarce, the privi- 
lege of purchase was taken away, and a ration was given each 
officer. Nothing, however, was allowed for a servant. There- 
after, officers had to divide with their servants and supply the 
deficiency as best they could. 

Personally, my mess received constant supplies of bacon and 
peas from our country homes in S.C. and Ga., and other articles 
giving the most nourishment in the least space. 

Our scarcities were due entirely to insufficient railroad trans- 
portation. Before the war, our roads had but a light traffic. 
They were now loaded with a very heavy one, and as cars, en- 
gines, and rails wore out, they could not be replaced. When 
complaint was made to the commissary-general of insufficient 
supplies, he would answer, "Stop running passenger trains, and 
I can run more freight trains and supply you." 

The great need of rations for the coming summer led the War 
Dept. to send Longstreet with two divisions for a cam- 
paign in the vicinity of Suffolk. Its object was to collect forage 
and provisions from counties near the Federal lines. The cam- 
paign was not initiated by Lee, and he thought that one division 
would have been sufficient, as the result showed. For the Kttle 
fighting done was unnecessary, being initiated by the Confeder- 
ates. And, although Lee at Chancellorsville repulsed Hooker's 
attack, it was poor policy to take the risk of battle against enor- 
mous odds, with one-fourth of his infantry absent. 

As might have been expected, under the difficult circumstances 
attending our transportation either by wagon or by rail, Pickett's 
and Hood's divisions could not be gotten back in time for the 
battle, and our victory was the product of lucky accident com- 
bined with sublime audacity, desperate fighting, and heavy losses. 

Hooker proved himself a good organizer. When placed in 
command, the army was much discouraged and desertions were 



320 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



numerous. Hooker abolished the grand divisions; devised a 
system of furloughs as a check to desertion ; improved the trans- 
portation and supply departments, and organized his cavalry 
into a corps. In addition, he instituted the system of badges, 
showing at a glance the corps and division to which the wearer 
belonged. It was simply a piece of flannel, sewed on the top of 
the cap, whose shape designated the corps, and its color the divi- 
sion. A circle indicated the 1st corps; a trefoil the 2d; a loz- 
enge the 3d; a Maltese cross the 5th; a Latin cross the 6th; a 
crescent the 11th; and a star the 12th. These shapes cut from 
red flannel were worn by the 1st divisions ; from white flannel by 
the 2d ; from blue flannel by the 3d, and from green flannel by 
the 4th divisions, should there be so many. Discipline, drill, and 
instruction were well maintained, supplies of all kinds abundantly 
furnished. The spirit of the men revived with the consciousness 
of their immense superiority in numbers and equipment, and it 
was with good show of reason that Hooker spoke of his army 
when it took the field, as "the finest army on the planet." His 
organization was as follows, with the strength of each corps pres- 
ent for " duty equipped " on April 30. 



Corps 


Divisions 


Brigades 


Artillery 


1st 

Reynolds 

16,908 


Wadsworth 

Robinson 

Doubleday 


Phelps, Cutler, Paul, Meredith 
Root, Baxter, Leonard 
Rowley, Stone 


Batts. 
10 


Guns 
52 


2d 
Couch 
16,893 


Hancock 

Gibbon 

French 


Caldwell, Meagher, Zook, Brook 
Sully, Owen, Hall 
Carroll, Hays, MacGregor 


8 


48 


3d 

Sickles 
18,721 


Birney 

Berry 

Whipple 


Graham, Ward, Ha5niian 
Carr, Revere, Mott 
Franklin, Bowman, Berdan 


9 


54 


5th 
Meade 
15,724 


Griffin 

Sykes 

Humphreys 


Barnes, McQuade, Stockton 
Ayres, Burbank, O'Rorke 
Tyler, AUabach 


8 


42 


6th 
Sedgwick 

23,667 


Brooks 
Howe 

Newton 
Burnham 


Brown, Bartlett, Russell 

Grant, Neill 

Shaler, Brown, Wheaton 

Burnham 


9 


54 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 



321 



Corps 


Divisions 


Brigades 


Artillery 


11th 

Howard 

12,977 


Devens 

Von Steinwehr 
Schurz 


Von Gilsa, McLean 
Buschbeck, Barlow 
Schimmelpfennig, Krzyzanowski 


Batts. 
6 


Guns 
36 


12th 

Slocum 

13,450 


Williams 
Geary 


Knipe, Ross, Ruger 
Candy, Kane, Greene 


5 


28 


Cavalry 
Stoneman 

11,544 


Pleasonton 
Averell 
Gregg 
Reserve Brig. 


Davis, Devin 
Sargent, Mcintosh 
Kilpatrick, Wyndhara 
Buford 


5 


22 


1,610 
2,217 




Artillery Reserve 
Provost Guard 


12 

2 


58 
10 



8 Corps, 23 Divisions, 64 Brigades, 133,711 Men, 74 Batteries, 404 Guns 

The nearest Confederate return is for March 21. It is not en- 
tirely complete for the artillery and cavalry, but, estimating for 
them, Lee's organization and strength at that date was as follows : 



1st Corps, Longstreet's, March 31, 1863 



Divisions 


Strength 


Brigades 


Batts. 


Guns 


Anderson's 
McLaws's 


8,232 

8,567 

850 


Wilcox, Wright, Mahone, Posey, 

Perry 
Wofford, Semmes, Kershaw, 

Barksdale 
Corps' Reserve Artillery 


4 

4 
10 


18 

18 
36 


2 Divisions 


17,649 


9 Brigades 


18 


72 



2d Corps, Jackson's 



A. P. Hill's 


10,400 


Heth, Thomas, Lane, McGowans, 










Archer, Pender 


6 


26 


Rodes's 


9,632 


Rodes, Colquitt, Ramseur, Doles, 










Iverson 


4 


18 


Early's 


8,243 


Gordon, Hoke, Smith, Hays 


4 


18 


Colston's 


6,629 


Paxton, Jones, Warren, Nichols 


4 


18 




900 


Corps' Reserve Artillery 


9 


83 


4 Divisions 


35,795 


19 Brigades 


27 


118 


600 


General Reserve Artillery 


6 


26 



322 MILITARY MEMOIRS 



Cavalry 



Divisions 


Strength 


Brigades 


Batts. 


Guns 


Stuart 


2,400 


Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee 


3 


12 



2 Corps, 7 Divisions, 30 Brigades, 56,444 Men, 54 Batteries, 228 Guns 

Allowing for about 3500 reenforcements during the month of 
April, Lee's whole force was about 60,000, of whom some 57,000 
were infantry and artillery. Of these arms Hooker had about 
122,000. 

Each commander planned to take the initiative. Hooker 
knew that he had double Lee's infantry, and great superiority 
in artillery, and he desired only to get at Lee away from breast- 
works. On April 13 he ordered Stoneman's cavalry upon a raid 
to Lee's rear, which expedition was to be the opening of his cam- 
paign. A rain-storm on the 14th, lasting 36 hours, halted the 
movement, after its leading brigade had forded the Rappahan- 
nock. The brigade was recalled, having to swim horses across 
the fast-rising river, and two weeks elapsed before the movement 
could be renewed. It was intended that Stoneman should de- 
stroy the railroads, which would force Lee to retreat. Stoneman 
should then harass and delay him as he fell back, pursued by 
Hooker. 

Lee's proposed campaign was another invasion; this time of 
Pa. He could neither attack Hooker, nor even threaten his 
rear across the Rappahannock. But he could again sweep 
the Valley and cross the Potomac; and beyond, both Lee 
and Jackson imagined great possibilities.^ Three months later 
the opportunity offered, and Lee put it to the test ; but his great 
lieutenant, Jackson, was no longer at the head of his 2d corps. 

On April 29, Lee found himself anticipated by Hooker's 
having, the night before, laid pontoon bridges across the Rappa- 
hannock, below Deep Run, at the site of Franklin's crossing in 

* Between Jan. and April, 1863, Jackson had his chief engineer, Maj. 
Hotchkiss, prepare a remarkable map of the country from Winchester to the 
Susquehanna, compiled from county maps of Md., Va., and Pa. It was 
on a large scale, and noted farmhouses, with names of occupants. It was used 
by Lee on the Gettysburg campaign, and has been reproduced on smaller scale 
in the O. R. Atlas, Plate CXVI. 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 323 

Dec. Hooker had commenced his movement, on the 27th, by 
going with the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps to cross the Rappa- 
hannock at Kelly's Ford, above the mouth of the Rapidan, 27 
miles from Fredericksbm-g. A picket, at this point, was driven off, 
a pontoon bridge laid, and the whole force, about 42,000 men, 
was across the river on the 29th, when the 6th corps, under Sedg- 
wick, was crossing in front of Jackson. Hooker immediately 
pushed his force by two roads from Kelly's to Germanna and Ely's 
fords of the Rapidan — about 11 miles off, and, on arriving, the 
troops forded, although the water was nearly shoulder deep. 
The fording was kept up all night by light of large bonfires, and 
the next morning the march to Chancellorsville, six miles away 
was resumed. 

Meanwhile, two divisions of the 2d corps had moved up from 
Fredericksburg to United States Ford, where they laid a pontoon 
bridge about noon on the 30th. By 9 p.m. they had crossed and 
united with the 5th, 11th, and 12th corps at Chancellorsville. 
No resistance had been encountered anywhere, but that of picket 
forces. Hooker, in 84 hours, had covered about 45 miles, cross- 
ing two rivers, and had estabUshed a force of 54,000 infantry and 
artillery upon Lee's flank at Chancellorsville.^ Hooker was 
naturally elated at his success, and issued an order to his troops, 
congratulating them, and announcing that now — 

" the enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his 
defences, and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction 
awaits him." 

And, indeed, if a general may ever be justified in enumerating 
his poultry while the process of incubation is incomplete, this 
might be an occasion. He was on the left flank and rear of Lee's 
only strong position with a force fully equal to Lee's, while an- 
other equal force threatened Lee's right. And somewhere in 
Lee's rear — between" him and Richmond — was Stoneman 
with 10,000 sabres, opposed only by two regiments of cavalry, 

^ Hooker's men carried eight days' rations. Three days' full rations, cooked, 
were in the haversacks; five days' bread and groceries in the knapsacks, and 
five days' beef on the hoof. The total weight carried by each man, including 
60 rounds of ammunition, was 45 pounds. But few wagons were brought 
across the Rappahannock. Most of the reserve ammunition was carried 
by pack mioles, coupled in pairs and driven in trains. 



324 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

tearing up the railroads and waiting to fall upon Lee's flank 
when he essayed the retreat which Hooker confidently expected 
to see. He had said to those about him that evening : — 

" The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the 
Potomac. They may as well pack up their haversacks and make for 
Richmond, and I shall be after them." 

But Hooker had made one mistake, and it was to cost him 
dearly. He had sent off, with Stoneman, his entire cavalry force, 
except one brigade. This proved insufficient to keep him in- 
formed of the Confederate movements, even though their efforts 
were supplemented by many signal officers with lookouts and 
field telegraphs, and by two balloons. 

It was during the morning of the 30 th, that Lee learned that 
Hooker had divided his army, and that one-half of it was already 
at Chancellorsville, while most of the remainder was in his front. 
By all the rules of war, one-half or the other should be at once 
attacked, and as Sedgwick's was the nearest, and Lee's whole 
force was already concentrated, Jackson at first proposed to at- 
tack Sedgwick, Lee, however, thought the position impregnable, 
and Jackson, after careful reconnoissance, came to the same 
conclusion. Orders were then at once prepared to march and 
attack Hooker before he could move from Chancellorsville. 
Early with his division, Barksdale's brigade, Pendleton's artillery 
reserve, and the Washington artillery, in all about 10,000 men, 
were left to hold the Unes before Fredericksburg. These covered 
about six miles, and the force averaged about one man to each 
yard, and nine guns to each mile. About midnight on the 30th, 
Jackson marched from Hamilton's Crossing with his three re- 
maining divisions, under A. P. Hill, Rodes, and Colston. He 
was joined on the road in the morning by Lee with the remaining 
brigades of McLaws, and by Anderson's division, and Alex- 
ander's battalion of artillery. 

Jackson's three divisions numbered about 25,000, Anderson's 
division about 8000, and three brigades of McLaws about 6000. 
Thus, Lee had in hand nearly 40,000 men, with which to attack 
Hooker at Chancellorsville, where Hooker now had four corps — 
the 3d, 5th, 11th, and 12th — and two divisions of the 2d; a total 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 325 

effective of about 72,000 infantry and artillery, and was intrench- 
ing himself. 

Chancellorsville was situated about a mile within the limits 
of a tract called the Wilderness. It stretched some 12 or 
14 miles westward along the Rapidan and was some 8 or 10 
miles in breadth. 

The original forest had been cut for charcoal many years before, 
and replaced by thick and tangled smaller growth. A few clear- 
ings were scattered at intervals, and a few small creeks drained it. 
Chancellorsville was merely a brick residence at an important 
junction of roads, with a considerable clearing on the west. 
Three roads ran toward Fredericksburg : the old Turnpike most 
directly ; the Plank road to its right, but uniting with the Turn- 
pike at Tabernacle Church — about halfway; the River road to 
the left, by a roundabout course passing near Banks Ford of the 
Rappahannock. 

Hooker's Hne of battle ran from Chancellorsville, about two 
miles northeastward to the Rappahannock, covering United 
States Ford. Westward it covered the Plank road for about 
three miles, ending in a short offset northward, Intrenchment 
was quickly done by cutting abattis, or an entanglement, in 
front, and throwing up sHght parapets, or piling breastworks 
of logs. About 11 A.M., however. Hooker prepared to resume his 
advance, and ordered the 5th and 12th corps to move out on the 
three roads toward Fredericksburg and estabUsh a line in the 
open country beyond the Wilderness. Griffin's and Humphreys's 
divisions of the 5th were sent down the River road, on the left, 
Sykes's division down the Turnpike in the centre, and the 12th 
corps, under Slocum, down the Plank road on the right. 

Meanwhile, Lee and Jackson disposed Anderson's division 
for an advance, covering both the Pike and the Plank roads. 
Wilcox's and Mahone's brigades, with Jordan's battery of Alex- 
ander's battahon, moved upon the former; Wright's, Perry's, 
and Posey's brigades, with the remainder of Alexander's battahon, 
on the latter. McLaws's division moved by the Pike, and Lee, 
with Jackson's three divisions, followed the Plank road. Thus 
the two armies were marching toward each other on these two 
roads, while on the River road two of the Federal divisions were 



326 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

marching toward Banks Ford, which was at this time unde- 
fended, although some intrenchments had been erected there. 
The possession of Banks Ford by Hooker would shorten the dis- 
tance between Chancellorsville and his left wing imder Sedg- 
wick, by several miles. 

The advancing forces first came into collision on the Pike. 
Sharp fighting followed, Semmes's brigade coming up on the 
left of Mahone and bearing the brunt of it against Sykes's 
regulars. Sykes's orders had been, however, only to advance 
to the first ridge beyond the forest, and he maintained his 
position there, though menaced by the extension of the Con- 
federate lines beyond his flank, until orders were received from 
Hooker to withdraw to the original position within the forest. 
Similar orders were also sent to Slocum on the Plank road, 
and to GrifRn and Humphreys who had advanced, nearly five 
miles down the River road, entirely unopposed, and who were 
within sight of Banks Ford when the orders for the counter- 
march reached them. Slocum's corps had not become seriously 
engaged, but its skirmishers had been driven in and its right flank 
threatened by Wright's brigade. This advanced upon the Une 
of an unfinished railroad, which, starting from Fredericksburg, 
ran through the Wilderness generally a mile or two south of the 
Plank road. 

Up to the moment of the withdrawal of his troops. Hooker's 
campaign had been well planned and well managed, and its 
culmination was now at hand in the open field — as he had de- 
sired. He could scarcely hope for more propitious circumstances, 
and, by all the rules of the game, a victory was now within his 
grasp. His lieutenants received the order to fall back with sur- 
prise and regret. The advance, upon both the Plank road and 
the Pike, had cleared the forest and reached fairly good posi- 
tions. An officer was sent to Hooker to explain and request 
permission to remain, but he returned in a half-hour, with 
the orders repeated. 

Hooker has been severely blamed for these orders, subverting 
all the carefully prepared plans only published to the army that 
morning. It is interesting to learn the cause. Reports from 
the balloons and signal officers had informed him of the march 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 327 

of a force toward Chancellorsville, estimated at two corps. 
Rumors had also been brought by deserters, the night before, 
that Hood's division had rejoined Lee, coming from Suffolk, but 
Hooker's information from Fortress Monroe should have shown 
that to be impossible. There is no sign of any hesitation upon 
his part until 2 p.m. At that hour he wired Butterfield, his 
chief of staff, at Falmouth : — 

"From character of information have suspended attack. The enemy 
may attack me, — I will try it. Tell Sedgwick to keep a sharp lookout, 
and attack if he can succeed." 

This despatch makes clear Hooker's mind. He reaUzed from 
the rapid manner of Lee's approach, and from the sounds of 
battle already heard, both on the Pike and the Plank road, that 
Lee meant to attack. He had confidently expected Lee to re- 
treat without a battle, and finding him, instead, so quick to take 
the aggressive, he lost his nerve and wished himself back on the 
line he had taken around Chancellorsville, where he would enjoy 
the great advantage of acting upon the defensive. He had seen 
in Dec. the enormous advantage which even shght breastworks 
could confer, and now he saw the chance of having his battle a 
defensive one behind intrenchments. It was surely the safest 
game to play, and Hooker is fully justified in electing to play it. 
No remonstrances shook his confidence in the least. He said to 
Couch, — 

"It is all right, Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him. He 
must fight me on my own ground." 

Orders were given to intrench, and work was at once begun 
with abundance of men and tools, and it was pushed during 
most of the night. Couch says, — 

"At 2 A.M. the corps commanders reported to Gen. Hooker that 
their positions could be held; at least so said Couch, Slocum, and 
Howard." 

Indeed, no better field fortification can be desired than what 
it was the quickest to build in the Wilderness. A wide belt of 
dense small growth could be soon felled in front of shallow ditches, 
with earth and log breastworks. Any charging line is brought to 



328 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

a halt by the entanglement, and held under close fire of musketry 
and canister, while the surrounding forest prevents the enemy 
from finding positions to use his own artillery. 

So the corps commanders, responsible only for the front of their 
own Unes, might truly report that their positions could be held. 
Yet the line, as a whole, may have a weak feature. This was the 
case here. Its right flank "rested in the air," and was not even 
covered by a curtain of cavalry. 

Hooker, however, was not entirely blind to this weakness of 
his line. He inspected it early next morning. May 2, and ordered 
changes and enjoined vigilance which might have saved him from 
the surprise of the afternoon, had he not, Uke Pope in his cam- 
paign of the previous fall, failed to fathom the boldness of Lee's 
designs even after discovering the Confederate movements. 

Lee appreciated that Hooker's withdrawal into the Wilderness 
was not forced, but to fortify and concentrate. He could, there- 
fore, lose no time in finding how and where he might attack. 
Until nightfall the skirmishes were pushed forward everywhere, 
in order to locate the exact position of the enemy. 

The result is briefly given in Lee's report, as follows : — 

"The enemy had assumed a position of great natural strength, sur- 
rounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, 
in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees 
felled in front so as to form an almost impenetrable abattis. His artillery 
swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached 
from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods." 

Hooker had, indeed, manoeuvred Lee out of his position with- 
out a battle. There was now nothing left but to attack the 
greatly superior force in the impregnable position, or to attempt 
a retreat already dangerously delayed. But presently there came 
some more cheerful news. Fitzhugh Lee, who held the extreme 
left of our cavalry, had also reconnoitred the enemy, and had 
discovered that his right flank was in the air. 

The one chance left to Lee was to pass undiscovered entirely 
across the enemy's front and turn his right flank. The enterprise 
was of great difficulty and hazard. To try it and fail meant 
destruction. For the army, already divided, must now be further 
subdivided, and the largest fraction placed in a position whence 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 329 

retreat would be impossible. Only a very sanguine man could 
even hope that 15 brigades, with over 100 guns, could make a 
march of 14 miles around Hooker's enormous army without being 
discovered. The chance, too, must be taken of aggressive ac- 
tion by the enemy at Fredericksburg or Banks Ford, even if 
Hooker himself did nothing during the eight hours in which the 
flanking force would be out of position in a long defile through 
the forest. 

But no risks appalled the heart of Lee, either of odds, or posi- 
tion, or of both combined. His supreme faith in his army was 
only equalled by the faith of his army in him. The decision to 
attack was quickly made and preparations begun. Wilcox's 
brigade was ordered to Banks Ford to hold the position. This 
precaution was well taken, for after midnight of the 1st, 
Hooker ordered Reynolds's corps to leave Sedgwick and join the 
army at Chancellorsville. Reynolds started at sunrise and 
marched by Banks Ford, where he expected to find a bridge. 
But, as has been told. Griffin's and Humphreys's divisions, after 
being within sight on the afternoon of the 1st, had been recalled. 
Wilcox, at dawn on the 2d, had occupied the trenches. So Rey- 
nolds, arriving after sunrise and seeing Confederates in possession, 
continued his march on the north side, and crossed at United 
States Ford. 

Anderson's four remaining brigades, with McLaws's three, 
were ordered to intrench during the night. Jackson, with his 
three divisions, his own artillery, and Alexander's battalion of 
Longstreet's corps, were assigned to make the march through the 
Wilderness and turn Hooker's right. 

Lee himself would remain with McLaws's and Anderson's 
troops, and occupy the enemy while the long march was made. 
Cheering was forbidden, and stringent measures taken to keep 
the column closed. Fitz-Lee, with his cavalry, would precede the 
infantry and cover the flank. Two hours after sunrise, Lee, 
standing by the roadside, watched the head of the column march 
by, and exchanged with Jackson the last few words ever to pass 
between them. Rodes's division led the column, Colston's divi- 
sion followed, and A. P. Hill's brought up the rear. 

The sim rose on May 2 a few minutes after five, and set at 



330 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

6.50 P.M. The moon was full that night. The march led by a 
cross-roads near the Catherine Furnace, thence southward for 
over a rqile and then southwestward for two miles before turning 
west and striking the Brock road within another mile. At the 
cross-roads, the Une of march was nearest the Federal lines and 
was most exposed. Here the 23d Ga. regiment of Colquitt's 
brigade, Rodes's division, was left to cover the rear. 

When the hne of march reached the Brock road, it turned south- 
ward for about a mile, and then, almost doubling back upon it- 
self, it took a woods road running a trifle west of north, nearly- 
parallel to the Brock road itself, and coming back into it about 
three miles north of the point at which it was first entered. This 
made a route two miles longer than would have been made by 
turning northward when the Brock road was first reached. And 
as this part of the road was farthest of all from the enemy (over 
three miles), and in the densest woods, it would seem that two 
miles might have been saved, had there been time and opportu- 
nity for reconnoissance. 

Where the Brock road crossed the Plank road, the column 
halted, while Fitz-Lee took Jackson to the front to a point whence 
he could see the Federal lines, with arms stacked, in bivouac 
behind their intrenchments, and utterly unconscious of the 
proximity of an enemy. Until that moment it had been uncer- 
tain exactly where Jackson would attack. But he now saw that 
by following the Brock road about two miles farther he would get 
upon the old turnpike, beyond the enemy's flank, and could take 
it in the rear. So the march was at once resumed to reach that 
position. But Paxton's brigade of Colston's division was here 
detached and placed with the cavalry, in observation on the 
Plank road, and did not rejoin its division imtil near midnight. 

The head of the column made about two and a half miles an 
hour, the rear about one and a half, for in spite of all efforts the 
column lost distance. During the day there were three halts 
for rest of perhaps twenty minutes each. There were no ve- 
hicles except the artillery, ambulances, and ammunition wagons. 
These, marching each behind its division, made the column 
10 miles in length, of which the infantry occupied over six. 
The head, marching at about 6 a.m., reached the deploying point 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 331 

on the turnpike by 4 p.m. The distance had proven greater than 
anticipated, and time was now of priceless value. 

Meanwhile the movement, though misunderstood, had been 
detected by the enemy.^ About a mile southwest of Chancellors- 
ville was a settlement called Hazel Grove, on a cleared ridge. 
From this ridge, about 8 a.m., Birney, of Sickles's corps, discovered 
a column of infantry, trains, and artillery passing his front. He 
brought up a battery and opened on the train at a range of 1600 
yards, throwing it into much confusion, and compelhng it to find 
other routes around the exposed point. Jackson sent a battery 
to reply and check the enemy from advancing. Sickles came to 
Birney's position and observed Jackson's column. His official 
report says : — 

"This continuous column — infantry, artillery, trains, and ambulances 
— was observed for three hours, moving apparently in a southerly direc- 
tion toward Orange C. H., on the O. & A. R. R. or Louisa C. H. on the 
Va. Cen. The movement indicated a retreat on Gordonsville, or an attack 
upon our right flank — perhaps both, for if the attack failed, the retreat 
would be continued. 

"I hastened to report these movements, through staff-officers, to the 
general-in-chief, . . . to Maj. -Gen. Howard and also to Maj. -Gen. Slocum, 
inviting their cooperation in case the general-in-chief shoiild authorize 
me to foUow up the enemy and attack his columns. At noon I received 
orders to advance cautiously toward the road followed by the enemy, and 
attack his columns." 

Sickles advanced Birney's division, which engaged an outpost 
on the flank and captured a regiment, the 23d Ga. Tlie two rear 
brigades, under Thomas and Archer, with Brown's battahon of 
artillery, were halted for an hour in observation, but were not 
engaged, and then followed on after the column. They were 
only able to overtake it, however, after night. 

It was about 4 p.m. when the head of Jackson's column began 
its deployment on both sides of the Plank road, beyond Hooker's 
right, in the tangled forest; and it was nearly 6 p.m. when eight 

^ Jackson's celebrated march around Pope had also been discovered by 
the enemy as soon as it was begun, but had also been misunderstood — 
doubtless for a similar reason. No one could conceive that Lee would de- 
liberately plan so unwise a move as this was conceived to be — dividing his 
army vmder the enemy's nose. 



332 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

of the 12 brigades now in his column, had formed in two lines of 
battle, and one of the remaining four in a third line. 

Meanwhile Sickles, though now unopposed in front, had 
brought up Whipple's division of his own corps, and, having 
asked for reenforeements, had also received Barlow's brigade 
from the right flank of the 11th corps, Williams's division of the 
12th corps, and three regiments of cavalry and some horse artil- 
lery under Pleasonton. Posey's brigade held the left flank of 
Lee's hne of battle in Hooker's front, while Jackson conducted the 
j9anking movement. Posey had a strong force of skirmishers 
in front, which became hotly engaged with the left flank of Sickles's 
advance, when it engaged Jackson's rear-guard. While bringing 
up their reenforeements, the Federals made several efforts to 
carry Posey's position, but were always repulsed. Sickles then 
planned to outflank and surround it, but he had been so slow 
that, before he was ready to act, Jackson had attacked, and 
Sickles was hastily recalled. 

Otherwise there might have been a strange spectacle. Sickles 
might have routed Anderson at the same time that Jackson was 
routing Howard. For he was on Anderson's flank with over 
20,000 infantry, a brigade of cavahy, and some horse artillery. 
He wandered off, however, to the south and west, for miles, 
where there was no enemy before him. 

Along the front of Lee's hne the six brigades present of Ander- 
son's and McLaws's divisions, aided by their artillery, had spent 
the day in more or less active skirmishing and cannonading with 
the enemy. Where the enemy showed a disposition to advance, 
the Confederates were well satisfied to he quiet and repel them, 
as on the left in front of Posey. But on the Confederate right 
the Federal skirmish-line, under Col. Miles, being strongly posted 
and showing no disposition to advance, it was wise to be mod- 
erately aggressive and keep the enemy in hopes of an attack. 
Kershaw and Semmes did this handsomely throughout the day, 
though the threat of Sickles's movements caused Lee to draw his 
troops to his left, and reduce his right to less than a full hne. 

About 6 P.M., the sun being then about one hour high, Jackson 
gave the signal to Rodes to move forward. His brigades were in 
the following order from left to right: Iverson, O'Neal, Doles, 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 333 

and Colquitt, with Ramseur's brigade 100 yards in rear of Col- 
quitt on the right. Colston's three brigades formed in hne with 
Ramseur, and in the following order from the left : Nichols, Jones, 
Warren. About half of each division was on each side of the 
pike, and two Napoleons of Breathed's horse artillery stood 
in the pike ready to follow the skirmishers. Two hundred yards 
iDehind Colston, A. P. Hill had deployed Pender on the left of the 
pike. Lane, McGowan, and Heth were coming in column 
down the pike. Archer and Thomas were following, but some 
miles behind. Jackson had made his play so far with fair success, 
and he now stood ready with over 20,000 men to surprise How- 
ard's 13,000. He was sure of an important victory, but the 
fruits to be reaped from it would be limited for two reasons. 

1st. Two brigades were some hours behind, for Archer, 
without orders, had taken them to protect the rear. 2d. There 
were now but two hours of dayUght left, and only in daylight can 
the fruits of victories be gathered. The question is suggested 
.whether or not time had been anywhere lost unnecessarily. It 
would seem that 12 hours should not be needed to march 14 miles 
and form 20,000 men in Une of battle. Briefly, it may be said, 
that with good broad roads, or with troops formed, ready to 
march at the word, and disciplined to take mud holes and ob- 
structions without loss of distance, two hours could have been 
saved. But none of these conditions existed. Especially was 
time lost in the morning in getting the column formed. 

Rodes reports it about 8 a.m. before the start was made. 
Further on, his report notes, "a delay was caused by an endeavor 
on our part to entrap some Federal cavalry." There may have 
been, during the morning, lack of appreciation of the value, even 
of the minutes, in an enterprise of the character now on foot, 
and an inadequate idea of the distance to be covered. 

Some time was also lost in deploying Pender's brigade in the 
third line just before the charge was ordered. It would have 
saved a half -hour of great value to have ordered the charge as soon 
as the 2d line was formed, and allowed A. P. Hill's division to 
follow Rodes and Colston in column from the first, as they 
actually did at last. For, after advancing some distance through 
the tangled undergrowth, Pender's brigade was brought back to 



334 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

the road and placed at the head of the column for the rest of the 
advance. 

It was nearly 6 p.m. when the signal for the advance was given 
by a bugle, and taken up and repeated for each brigade by bugles 
to the right and left through the woods. But the sounds seem 
to have been smothered in the forest, for the Federal reports make 
no mention of them. Their first intimation of anything unusual 
was given by wild turkeys, foxes, and deer, startled by the long 
lines of infantry and driven through the Federal camps. Tlien 
came shots from the Federal pickets, and then the guns on the 
turnpike opened and were soon followed by Confederate volleys 
and yells, impressing upon the enemy the fact that an overwhelm- 
ing force had surprised them. Nevertheless, a gallant effort at 
resistance was made. The extreme right of the Federals was held 
by Von Gilsa's brigade of foiu- regiments, about 1400 strong, 
which was formed, a half facing south and half facing west. 
They stood to fire three volleys, but by that time the Confederate 
lines were enveloping their flanks, and enfilade and reverse fire 
was being opened upon them. Only prompt flight could save the 
brigade from annihilation. After the third volley the brigade 
very wisely took to its heels and made its escape with a loss of 
264 killed, wounded, and captured. Two guns with Von Gilsa 
were also captured. The next brigade to the left, McLean's, en- 
deavored to change front. But it did not take long for the stern 
facts of the situation to become clear to every man of the brigade. 
As the canister fire of the Confederate guns was added to the 
enfilade fire of the Confederate infantry, this brigade also dissolved 
into a mass of fugitives, and two more guns, serving with them, 
were captured. But that they had fought well is shown by their 
losses, which were 692 out of about 2500. Tlie division com- 
mander and four out of five regimental commanders were killed 
or wounded. 

For a while, now, the fight degenerated into a foot race. 
Howard's original force of 13,000 had been reduced to 10,000 
by the sending of! of Barlow's large brigade. Of the 10,000, in a 
half-hour 4000 had been routed. The Confederates, recognizing 
the importance of pushing the pursuit, exerted themselves to the 
utmost. The lines broke into the double-quick wherever the 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 335 

ground was favorable, stopping only to fire at fugitives, or when 
completely out of breath. The horse artillery kept nearly 
abreast, and directed its fire principally at the Federal batteries 
which endeavored to cover the retreat. Some of these were 
fought gallantly, and some were overrun and captured. More 
might have been, and more prisoners taken, but for a blunder by 
Colquitt. His brigade was on the right of the front line, and its 
advance was least obstructed either by woods or the enemy. 
It could have moved most rapidly, and might have narrowed 
the enemy's avenue of escape. 
Jackson's instructions had been explicit. Rodes's report says : — 

"Each brigade commander received positive instructions which were 
well understood. The whole line was to push ahead from the beginning, 
keeping the road for its guide. . . . Under no circumstances was there 
to be any pause in the advance." 

Ramseur's brigade was ordered to move in rear of Colquitt's 
and to support it. Colquitt, early in the advance, halted to in- 
vestigate a rumor of a body of the enemy on his right flank, 
which proved to be a small party of cavalry. He delayed so 
that neither his brigade or Ramseur's rejoined the Une imtil late 
at night. 

Thus two brigades, by disregard of instructions and without 
need, were kept entirely out of action during the whole afternoon. 
So it happened that five of Jackson's 15 brigades (Thomas, 
Archer, Paxton, Colquitt and Ramseur) were missing from his 
line of battle during the whole afternoon, and, as A, P. Hill's 
four remaining brigades were not deployed until after dark, only 
six brigades were in the attack and pursuit of the 11th corps: 
to wit, Rodes, Doles, and Iverson of Rodes's division, and Jones, 
Warren, and Nichols of Colston's division. The great advantage 
of the Confederates lay in their being able to bring the centre 
of their line of battle against the flank of the enemy's fine. This 
overwhelmed the two right brigades in a very short while, as 
we have seen, and the fine pushed rapidly on, hoping to over- 
whelm the succeeding brigades likewise, one at a time. 

The next division was Schurz's of two brigades, in line of battle 
along the Plank road, with two batteries which took positions and 
fired on the approaching Confederates. Schurz endeavored to 



336 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



form at right angles to their approach, but the mass of fugitives 
with wagons, ambulances, beef cattle, etc., entirely overwhelmed 
some of his regiments, and only two or three isolated ones were 
able to march in good order, and, facing about, to fire from time 
to time at their pursuers. 

Next, at DowdalFs tavern, was a line of rifle-pits at right angles 
to the Plank road, and aheady occupied by Buschbeck's brigade 
of Von Steinwehr's division, the last of Howard's corps — its 
companion brigade. Barlow's, being away with Sickles. Three 
or four batteries were here established upon the line, and to it 
were rallied numbers of fugitives. At last an organized resist- 
ance was prepared. When the Confederates approached, in 
very scattered shape, they met a severe fire, and the advance was 
checked. Had Colquitt here been on the Confederate right 
with his and Ramseur's brigades, an opportunity was offered for a 
large capture. It might have been accomphshed by the force 
at hand with a little delay. But they were already flushed with 
victory and would not be denied. After a sharp fight of perhaps 
20 minutes, Colston's second line merged into the first, and the 
two lines pushed forward everywhere. The Federal artillery 
foresaw the end and fled, five guns being too late and captured. 
Buschbeck followed in fairly good order, but preceded by a 
stampede of troops and trains, principally down the Plank 
road, though a part diverged to the left by a road to the White 
House, called the Bullock road. 

The casualties in Schurz's division were 919. In Buschbeck's 
brigade were 483. The total loss of Howard's corps was : killed. 





Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Schimmelpfennig 

Krzyzanowski 

Buschbeck's 


84 
45 
26 


215 

277 
229 


120 

178 
228 


419 
500 
483 


Total 


155 


721 


526 


1402 



217; wounded, 1221; missing, 974; total, 2412; only about 
20 per cent of the corps. 

It was a very trifling loss, compared with what it might 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 337 

have been had all of Jackson's troops been upon the field, and had 
his orders been strictly observed. 

The casualties of the Confederates are not known, their re- 
turns consolidating all separate actions together. 

Much undeserved obloquy was heaped upon the 11th corps for 
their enforced retreat. No troops could have acted differently. 
All of their fighting was of one brigade at a time against six. 
With the capture of the Buschbeck position, the fighting of the 
day practically ceased. The Confederate troops were at the 
limit of exhaustion and disorganization. Daylight was fading 
fast, and commands badly intermingled. The pursuit was kept 
up, however, for some distance, although the enemy was no 
longer in sight. A few hundred yards beyond the Buschbeck 
position, the Plank road entered a large body of forest, closing on 
both sides of the road for nearly a mile before the open Chan- 
cellorsville plateau is reached. At the entrance of the wood a 
single Federal gun, with a small escort, was formed as a rear- 
guard, and followed the retreat to Chancellorsville without seeing 
any pursuers. 

A notable case of acoustic shadows occurred during this action. 
Sickles, some two and a half miles away, heard nothing of the 
attack upon Howard until word was brought him, which he at 
first refused to believe. At 6.30 p.m.. Hooker sat on the veranda 
of the Chancellorsville house in entire confidence that Lee was 
retreating to Gordonsville and that Sickles was "among his 
trains." Faint sounds of distant cannonading were at first 
supposed to come from Sickles. Presently, an aid looking down 
the road with his glass suddenly shouted, ''My God ! here they 
come." All sprang to their horses and, riding down the road, met, 
in a half-mile, the fugitive rabble of Howard's corps, and learned 
that Jr,ckson, with half of Lee's army, had routed the Federal 
flank. Had there been some hours of daylight. Hooker's posi- 
tion would have been critical. For Lee and Jackson were now 
less than two miles apart, and between them were of infantry 
less than two divisions; Geary's of the 12th corps in front of 
Lee, and two brigades of Berry's of the 3d, near the path of 
Jackson. 

But darkness puts an embargo upon offensive operations in a 



338 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

wooded country. Troops may be marched during the night, 
where there is no opposition, but the experiences of this occasion 
will illustrate the difficulty of fighting, even when the moon is at 
its best. The night restored to the Federals nearly all the ad- 
vantages lost during the day. Hooker acted promptly and 
judiciously. Urgent recalls were sent for Sickles and his entire 
force. His advance had gone two miles to the front and was 
preparing to bivouac, when orders overtook it. It did not 
reach the field until after 10 p.m. 

The force first available against Jackson was the artillery 
of the 12th corps, for which a fine position was offered along the 
western brow of the Chancellorsville plateau, south of the 
Plank road. This position was known as Fairview, and it 
now became the key-point of the battle. In front of it the 
open ground extended about 600 yards to the edge of the forest. 
A small stream, between moderate banks at the foot of the 
plateau, offered shelter for a strong line of infantry in front of 
the guns. Here, within an hour, was established a powerful 
battery of 34 guns, and during the night all were protected by 
parapets. The position was essentially like the Confederate 
position at Marye's Hill before Fredericksburg, but on a larger 
scale. The forest in front offered no single position for a Con- 
federate gun. 

Only from one point could it be assailed by artillery. Across 
the stream in front, about 1000 yards obfiquely to the left, was 
the small settlement called Hazel Grove, occupying some high 
open fields, from which, as has been told, Birney had that 
morning discovered Jackson's march. Hazel Grove offered ex- 
cellent positions for attacking the Fairview fines, but Hazel 
Grove was itself within the Federal lines, and, about sundown, was 
occupied by a few cavalry with some artillery of the 3d cor;3s, and 
some miscellaneous trains.* 

1 Two small collisions had occurred just before the close of the fighting 
between some of these troops and small bodies of Jackson's men still making 
their way forward. The 8th Pa. Cav. had been ordered to Howard, 
and at the Plank road it suddenly met a column of infantry in pursuit of 
Howard's fugitives. The cavalry received a volley emptying about 30 
saddles and turning the regiment back. Meanwhile, about 200 of Doles's 
brigade, under Col. Winn of the 4th Ga., had stampeded the trains at Hazel 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 339 

The only Federal infantry near at hand when the fugitives 
reached Chancellorsville were Carr's and Revere's brigades of 
Berry's division of the 3d corps. These brigades were formed 
in line of battle in the forest north of the Plank road, with their 
left resting on the guns at Fairview, Here they promptly 
set to work to intrench themselves in the forest across the 
Plank road, and to cut an abattis in front. They were soon 
reenforced by Hays's brigade of French's division of the 2d corps, 
and later by Mott's, the remaining brigade of Berry's division, 
which had been guarding bridges at United States Ford. 

Meanwhile, as darkness fell, the Confederate pursuit died out 
upon entering the forest beyond the open lands about Dowdall's 
tavern. The cessation was not voluntary on Jackson's part, but 
it was necessary that Rodes's and Colston's divisions should 
be re-formed, and that Hill's division should take the lead. It 
had followed the pursuit, marching in column, and was in 
good order and comparatively fresh. The other divisions were 
broken, mingled, and exhausted, and several brigades were far 
behind. During the long pause in the advance, while Hill's 
brigades filed into the woods to the right and left, and the dis- 
organized brigades were withdrawn to re-form, Jackson im- 
patiently supervised and urged forward the movements. It is 
possible that he proposed to push his attack down the Bullock 
road which, a short distance ahead, diverged to the left, toward 
the river, instead of following the Plank road to Chancellorsville, 
as he had said to Hill: "Press them. Hill! Press them! Cut 
them off from United States Ford." It would, however, have 

Grove, and had been heavily cannonaded by the Federal batteries. They 
had, however, found shelter and suffered no loss. The affairs were insignifi- 
cant, and are only referred to here because absurd exaggerations of Pleas- 
onton's Federal reports have been accepted by many reputable authors. 
A Federal writer. Col. A. C. Hamlin, historian of the 11th corps, has pub- 
lished the fullest and most accurate account yet produced of the history of 
that evening, including the wounding of Stonewall Jackson, from either 
Confederate or Federal sources. He made many visits to the field in com- 
pany with the most prominent living actors, and has carefully compared the 
official reports, both of Federal and Confederate officers. No future student 
of this battle can afford to be ignorant of his story. — The Battle of Chancel- 
lorsville. By A. C. Hamlin, historian, 11th Army Corps. Bangor, Me. 
Published by the author, 1896. 



340 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

been an error to make such a diversion, for the attack would 
have met an overwhelming force. Its only hope of success was 
to reunite with Lee at Chancellorsville with the least delay. 
Meanwhile, partaking of the impatience of Jackson, his chief 
of artillery. Col. Crutchfield, pushed some guns forward on the 
Plank road, and opened a random fire down it toward Chancel- 
lorsville, now less than a mile away. 

It was an unwise move, for it provoked a terrific response 
from the 34 guns now in position upon Fairview plateau. The 
Plank road was now crowded with troops and artillery in column, 
and the woods near it were full of the reorganizing brigades. 
Under such a fire, even in the dim fight of the rising moon, great 
confusion soon resulted, and although actual casuafities were few, 
it became necessary to discontinue our fire before order could be 
restored and the formation of the fine of battle be resumed. 

Lane's N.C. brigade was at the head of Hill's division. One 
regiment, the 33d, was deployed and sent some 200 yards ahead 
as skirmishers, and the other four formed line of battle with the 
centre on the Plank road in the following order from left to right : 
28th, 18th, 37th, 7th. The BuUock road here diverged to the 
left, toward United States Ford, but the enemy was evidently 
close in front, and Jackson said to Lane, " Push right ahead. Lane. 
Right ahead." 

While the formation was still in progress, Jackson, followed by 
several staff-officers and coiu-iers, rode slowly forward upon an 
old road, called the Mountain road, which left the Bullock to its 
left near the Plank road, and ran parallel to the latter, about 
80 yards distant, toward Chancellorsville.^ 

Up this road the party advanced for 100 or 200 yards, but 
not passing the 33d N.C. skirmish-fine. They then halted and 
fistened for a while to the axes of the Federals, cutting abattis 
in the forest ahead. Beyond the Plank road, the Federal troops 
who had been off with Sickles were now returning, and were 
slowly working their way to reoccupy some breastworks which 

1 Most accounts have stated that this ride was along the Plank road, but 
careful investigation by Col. Hamlin, and the testimony of the most compe- 
tent living witnesses, make it clear that this ride, and the shooting of Jackson, 
both took place in the Mountain road, which is now almost obliterated by the 
forest. 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 341 

had been built the night before in the forest south of the Plank 
road. Between their skirmishers and those of the 33d N .C. on their 
side of the Plank road, there suddenly began some firing. The 
fire spread rapidly in both directions, along the picket-lines, and 
was presently taken up by Federal regiments and lines of 
battle in the rear. Jackson, at the head of his party, was 
slowly retracing his way back to his line of battle, when this 
volley firing began. Maj. Barry, on the left of the 18th N.C, 
seeing through the trees by the moonlight a group of horsemen 
moving toward his line, ordered his left wing to fire. Two of 
the party were killed, and Jackson received three balls; one in 
the right hand, one through the left wrist and hand, and one 
shattering the left arm between shoulder and elbow. 

The reins were dropped, and the horse, turning from the fire, 
ran into overhanging Hmbs which nearly unhorsed him; but, 
recovering the rein, he guided into the Plank road where Capt. 
Wilbourn of his staff helped him off. Meanwhile, the enemy 
had advanced guns to their skirmish-line, and presently began to 
sweep the Plank road with shell and canister. A litter was 
brought and Jackson placed in it, but a bearer was shot, and 
Jackson fell heavily on his wounded side. With great diffi- 
culty he was finally gotten to an ambulance, which already held 
his chief of artillery. Col. Crutchfield, with a shattered leg. 

During the night Jackson's left arm was amputated, and the 
next day he was taken in an ambulance via Spottsylvania, to a 
small house called Chandler's, near Guinea Station. For a few 
days his recovery was expected, but pneumonia supervened, and 
he died on May 10. In his last moments his mind wandered, 
and he was again upon the battle-field giving orders to his 
troops: ''Order A. P. Hill to prepare for action. Pass the in- 
fantry to the front. Tell Maj. Hawks — " There was a pause 
for some moments, and then, calmly, the last words, ''Let us 
pass over the river, and rest under the shade of the trees." 

Jackson's fall left A. P. Hill in command, but Hill was himself 
soon disabled by a fragment of shell, and sent for Stuart. Rodes 
ranked Stuart, but the latter was not only best known to the 
army, but was of great popularity, and Rodes cheerfully acqui- 
esced. His whole career, until his death at Winchester, Sept. 



342 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

19, '64, was brilliant, and justifies the belief that he would 
have proven a competent commander, but, as will be seen, Stu- 
art's conduct, upon this occasion, was notably fine. A little before 
dark, Stuart, with Jackson's consent, had taken his cavalry and 
a regiment of infantry and started to attack the camps and 
trains of the enemy near Ely's Ford. He had reached their 
vicinity and was forming for the assault, when one of Jackson's 
staff brought the message of recall. He ordered the command 
to fire three volleys into the nearest camp and then to withdraw, 
while he rode rapidly back — about five miles — and took com- 
mand between 10 and 11 p.m. 

There was but one course to take — to make during the night 
such preparation as was possible, and, at dawn, to renew the 
attack and endeavor to break through the enemy's line and 
unite with Lee at Chancellorsville. The wounding of Crutch- 
field had left me the senior artillery officer present, and I was 
sent for, and directed to reconnoitre, and to post before dawn as 
many guns as could be used. I spent the night in reconnoissance 
and, beside the Plank road, could find but one outlet through the 
forest, a cleared vista some 200 yards long and 25 wide, through 
a dense pine thicket, opening upon a cleared plateau held by the 
enemy. This plateau afterward proved to be the Hazel Grove 
position, and I concentrated near it several batteries. In his 
Life of Stuart, Maj. McClellan, his adjutant, writes: — 

"Col. Alexander's reconnoissance convinced Stuart that Hazel Grove 
was the key to the Federal line, and to this part of the field Stuart 
directed a large share of his personal attention on the morning of the 3d." 

One of Jackson's engineers was sent by a long detour and found 
Lee before dayhght and explained to him Stuart's position and 
plans, that he might, during the action, extend his left and seek 
a connection with our right. During the night, the brigades in 
rear rejoined, and the three divisions were formed for the attack 
in the morning, with Hill's division in front, Colston's in a second 
fine, and Rodes's in a third. 

Two brigades on Hill's right were placed obliquely to the rear, 
to present a front toward that flank. The positions of the differ- 
ent brigades are roughly shown thus : — 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 343 



Thomas 


Pender 




Lane 




Heth McGowan 






1 


Archer 


Nichols 


Paxton 


^ 
M 


Warren Jones 


Iverson 


Rodes 


a 


Ramseur, Doles, Colqu 



When Hooker found that the Confederate attack had come 
to a standstill in front of the Fairview Une, with Sickles near 
Hazel Grove upon its right flank, he ordered Sickles to move for- 
ward by the moonlight, and attack. Birney's division, in two 
lines with supporting columns, about midnight, advanced from 
Hazel Grove upon the forest south of the Plank road and in front 
of the Fairview position. The left wing of this force grazed the 
skirmishers of McGowan and struck the right flank of Lane's 
brigade, of which two and a half regiments became sharply 
engaged. But the whole Federal advance glanced off, as it 
were, and, changing its direction, it turned toward the Federal 
line in front of Fairview, where it approached the position of 
Knipe's and Ruger's brigades of Wilhams's division of the 12th 
corps. 

Hearing their noisy approach, and believing them to be Con- 
federates, the Fairview guns and infantry opened fire upon the 
woods, while the approaching lines were still so distant that they 
were unable to locate their assailants, and supposed the fire to 
come from the Confederate line. And now for a long time, for 
one or perhaps two hours, the Confederates Ustened to a suc- 
cession of furious combats in the forest in their front, accom- 
panied by heavy shelling of the woods, volleys of musketry, and 
a great deal of cheering. Our pickets and skirmish-lines were 
forced sometimes to lie down or seek protection of trees from 
random bullets, but we had no other part in it. It extended 
northward sometimes even across the Plank road. And the 
official reports of many Federal officers give glowing accounts 
of the repulse of desperate Confederate attacks, and even of the 
capture of Confederate guns. These stories were founded on the 
finding of some Federal guns, which had been abandoned in one 
of the stampedes of the afternoon. 

Col. Hamlin's book, above referred to, says: — 



344 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

" Some of the reports of this midnight encounter are missing, and their 
pubhcation will throw much light on the details. On the Federal side it 
was undoubtedly a mixed-up mess, and some of the regiments complain of 
being fired into from the front and from both flanks. ... At all events, 
after reading the reports of Gen. Sickles at the time, and his statement a 
year afterward to Congress . . . the brilliant array of gallant troops in the 
moonlight . . . the bold attack . . . the quick return of one of the columns 
to be stopped by the bayonets of the 63d Pa. . . . the advance of the other 
column deflecting to the right, until it met Gen. Slocum in person . . . 
certainly there is occasion for a slight smile on the part of the reader. 
And this smile may be lengthened on reading the story of Gen. De Tro- 
briand, who was a participator, or the account left by Col. Underwood of 
the 23d Mass., who returned from the depths of the wilderness in time to 
witness and describe the ludicrous scene." 

Hooker had little cause for apprehension after darkness had 
come to his rehef, yet the shock to his overconfidence had been 
so severe that his only new dispositions were defensive. Yet he 
had over 60,000 fresh troops present, while Lee had on the east 
but about 16,000 and on the west about 24,000. 

His first care was to order the intrenchment of an interior 
line, upon which he could fall back in case Stuart forced his way 
through to a junction with Lee. A short line was quickly se- 
lected, of great natural strength, behind Hunting Run on the 
west, and behind Mineral Spring Run on the east, with both 
flanks resting on the river and covering his bridges. This line 
will be more fully described and referred to later. It took 
in the White House, some three-fourths of a mile in the rear of 
Chancellorsville, and was probably the strongest field intrench- 
ment ever built in Va. Next, Hooker sent orders to Sedgwick 
at 9 P.M., as follows : — 

"The major-general, commanding, directs that you cross the Rappahan- 
nock at Fredericksburg on receipt of this order, and at once take up your 
line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect with him, and 
will attack and destroy any force you may fall in with on your road. 

" You will leave all your trains behind, except pack trains of your am- 
munition, and march to be in the vicinity of the general at daylight. You 
will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by Gen. Lee, and 
between you and the major-general, commanding, he expects to use him up. 
Send word to Gen. Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure 
not to fail." 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 345 

These orders were good, and would have insured victory, had 
they been carried out. And Hooker took a further precaution, 
most desirable whenever important orders are issued. He 
despatched a competent staff -officer, Gen. Warren, his chief 
engineer, to supervise their execution. Unfortunately for him, 
however, under the conditions it proved impossible to exe- 
cute the orders within the time set, as will be told later. Here 
it is only necessary to note that Sedgwick was never able to get 
near Chancellors ville. 

Even as the field stood, with or without the arrival of Sedg- 
wick, the battle was still Hooker's, had he fought where he stood. 
But about dawn he made the fatal mistake of recalling Sickles 
from the Hazel Grove position, which he was holcUng with Whip- 
ple's and Birney's divisions, and five batteries. There has 
rarely been a more gratuitous gift of a battle-field. Sickles had 
a good position and force enough to hold it, even without re- 
enforcements, though ample reenforcements were available. 
The Federal fine was longer and overlapped ours on its right, 
and our only opportunity to use artillery was through the nar- 
row vista above referred to, which was scarcely sufficient for 
four guns, and had but a very restricted view. 

Had Stuart's attack been delayed a little longer, our right 
flank might have marched out upon Hazel Grove plateau with- 
out firing a shot. A Federal battery, supported by two regi- 
ments, had been designated as a rear-guard, and it alone occupied 
the plateau when our advance was made, though the rear of the 
retiring column was still near. 

Stuart's men, when the lines were finally formed, got from 
two to three hours' rest before dawn. About that time, cooked 
rations were brought up. Before the distribution, however, 
was finished, Archer's and McGowan's brigades were moved for- 
ward, from their retired positions as the right flank, to straighten 
the fine. They soon came upon a picket-line of the enemy, and 
sharp firing began. Stuart, without waiting further, ordered 
the whole fine to the attack. 

Archer's brigade, about 1400 strong, in advancing through 
the pine thickets, drifted to the right, and gradually opened a 
gap between it and McGowan's brigade, emerging from the 



346 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

forest alone, and in front of the enemy's rear-guard. A sharp 
action ensued, while Archer extended his right and threatened the 
enemy's rear, forcing the battery to retreat. He then charged 
and captm-ed 100 prisoners, and forced the abandonment of four 
of the guns. 

He attempted to push his advance much farther, but was 
checked by the fire of the enemy's artillery and of the rear brigade, 
Graham's, of Sickles's column. After two efforts, reaUzing that 
his force was too small, and leaving one of his captured guns, he 
fell back to Hazel Grove ridge, about 6.30 a.m. This was now 
being occupied rapidly by our guns. Thus, so easily that we did 
not at once reaUze its great value, we gained space for our 
batteries, where we soon found that we could enfilade the enemy's 
adjacent lines. 

Meanwhile, the first assault had been made along the whole line 
by Hill's division. The enemy's advanced line crossed the Plank 
road and was held by Williams's division of the 12th corps, 
Berry's of the 3d corps, and Hays's brigade of the 2d corps. In 
rear of the front line was a second line near the edge of the forest. 
Across the small stream and along the edge of the elevated pla- 
teau, their artillery had been strongly intrenched during the 
night, making a third line. The two divisions from Hazel Grove, 
with their four batteries, were brought up in rear of the forces 
already holding the front to the west. This whole front from 
north to south was scarcely a mile and a quarter long. It was 
defended by about 25,000 men, and it was being attacked by 
about an equal number. The Confederates, however, had the 
hot end of the affair, in having to take the aggressive and ad- 
vance upon breastworks protected by abattis and intrenched 
guns. 

In his first assault, however, Hill's division, now commanded 
by Heth, after a terrific exchange of musketry, succeeded in 
driving the Federals from the whole of their front line. They 
followed the retreating enemy, and attacked the second line, 
where the resistance became more strenuous. On the extreme 
right, Archer's brigade had now fallen back to Hazel Grove, 
where it remained, supporting the guns now taking position there. 
This left McGowan's flank uncovered, and a Federal force at- 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 347 

tacked it, and drove it back to the captured line. This uncov- 
ered Lane's brigade, and it was also forced to fall back. On the 
left of the Plank road, the advance of Thomas beyond the ene- 
my's first line met both a stronger second line and a flank at- 
tack, his left being in the air. After an hour's hard fighting, the 
whole line was forced back to the captured breastworks, with 
severe losses. It was clear that extreme efforts would be needed 
to drive the enemy from his position, Stuart ordered 30 addi- 
tional guns to Hazel Grove, and brought forward both the 
second and third lines, putting in at once his last reserves. It 
would be useless to follow in detail the desperate fighting which 
now ensued and was kept up for some hours. The Federal 
guns on the Fairview heights were able to fire over the heads of 
two fines of infantry, and other batteries aided from the new 
position in which Hooker had now established the 1st, 2d, and 
5th corps. This was so near on our left that Carroll's and 
McGregor's brigades of the 2d corps, with artillery, were sent 
forward to attack our flank, and were only repulsed after such 
fighting that they lost 367 men. With the aid of our second and 
third fines, fresh assaults were made on both sides of the Plank 
road, and now the enemy's second lines were carried. But his 
reserves were called upon, and again our fines were driven back, 
and countercharges south of the road again penetrated the gap 
between McGowan and Archer. Paxton's brigade was brought 
across from the north and restored the situation at a critical 
moment, Paxton, however, being killed. Some of our brigades 
were now nearly fought out, the three divisions being often 
massed in one, and the men could only be moved by much exam- 
ple on the part of their officers. Stuart himself was conspicuous 
in this, and was everywhere encouraging the troops with his 
magnetic presence and bearing, and singing as he rode along the 
lines, "Old Joe Hooker, won't you come out the Wilderness." 
There can be no doubt that his personal conduct had great 
influence in sustaining the courage of the men so that when, at 
last, our artillery had begun to shake the Federals' lines, there 
was still the spirit to traverse the bloody ground for the fourth 
time and storm the Fairview batteries. 

Guns had been brought to Hazel Grove from all the battalions 



348 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

on the field — Pegram's, Carter's, Jones's, Mcintosh's, and Alex- 
ander's, Perhaps 50 guns in all were employed here, but less 
than 40 at any one time, as guns were occasionally relieved, or sent 
to the rear to refill. Their field of fire was extensive, being an 
oblique on both the enemy's artillery and infantry. Some 
ground having been gained on the Plank road, Cols. Jones and 
Carter had also been able to establish 10 rifle guns there, which 
enfiladed the Plank road as far as the Chancellorsville house. 

About nine o'clock, the Federal artillery fire was perceptibly 
diminished. Many of their guns were running short of ammu- 
nition, and fresh ammunition was not supplied. Sickles asked 
for it, and for reenforcements, but none were sent. It would 
seem that Hooker preferred to lose the Chancellorsville plateau 
entirely, and fall back into his new position, which was hke a 
citadel close at hand, rather than risk fighting outside of it. 

At Stuart's last charge, the Federal lines yielded with but 
moderate resistance. The guns in the Fairview intrenchments 
abandoned them, and fell back to the vicinity of the Chancellors- 
ville house. 

The guns at Hazel Grove moved forward across the valley and 
occupied the deserted Federal positions, here making connec- 
tion with Anderson's division which Lee was extending to his 
left to meet them. They were soon joined by Jordan's bat- 
tery of my own battahon, which had been serving with 
Anderson. 

The enemy, driven out of their fortified lines, attempted to 
make a stand near the Chancellorsville house, but it was a brief 
one. There were no breastworks here to give shelter, and their 
position was now so contracted that our guns from three direc- 
tions crossed their fire upon it. Hooker, in the porch of the 
Chancellorsville house, was put hors de combat for two or three 
hours by a piece of brick torn from a pillar by a cannon-shot. 
No one took command in his place, and for a while the army 
was without a head. Meanwhile, McLaws and Anderson had 
seen the enemy withdrawing from their fronts and pressed for- 
ward at the same time that Stuart's infantry crowned the 
plateau from the west. Some prisoners were cut off and cap- 
tured on each flank, and a few guns also fell into our hands, but, 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 349 

as a whole, the enemy's withdrawal was orderly and well managed, 
and with less loss than might have been expected. One sad 
feature of the occasion was that the woods on the north of the 
road were set on fire by shells, and the dry leaves spread the fire 
rapidly, although the trees and undergrowth did not burn. 
Efforts were made to remove the wounded, but the rapid spread 
of the fire prevented, and some of the wounded of both armies 
were burned. 

About 10 A.M., Lee, advancing with McLaws's division, met 
Stuart with Jackson's corps near the site of the Chancellorsville 
house, now only a smoking ruin, for our shells had set it on fire. 
It was, doubtless, a proud moment to Lee, as it was to the troops 
who greeted him with enthusiastic cheering. 

Lee, by no means, intended the battle to end here. Both in- 
fantry and artillery were ordered to replenish ammunition and 
renew the assault, but there came news from the rear, which 
forced a change of programme. Sedgwick's corps had broken 
through the flimsy line in front of it, and was now moving up 
the Plank road. With all his audacity Lee could not venture 
to attack five corps intrenched in his front, while Sedgwick came 
up in his rear. 

The story of events at Chancellorsville must now pause, as 
the action there paused, while that is told of Sedgwick's venture 
against Lee's rear. 

Hooker had sent urgent orders the night before to Sedgwick 
to come to his help, and a staff-officer, Warren, to supervise 
their execution. But Sedgwick, though already on the south 
side of the river, which Hooker did not seem to know, was three 
miles below Fredericksburg, near the scene of Franklin's cross- 
ing in Dec. He had been under orders to advance toward Rich- 
mond on the Bowling Green road, and had disposed his troops 
accordingly. 

To advance up the Plank road, it was necessary to march to 
Fredericksburg and force the Confederate fines on Marye's Hill. 
These lines were held from Taylor's Hill to the Howison house, 
about three miles, by only two brigades, Barksdale's and Hays's, 
with a small amount of artillery. The regiments were strung 
out in single rank, the men sometimes yards apart, and with 



350 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

wide intervals at many places between regiments. On Marye's 
Hill, two regiments, the 18th and 21st Miss., with six guns of the 
Washington Arty, and two under Lt. Brown of Alexander's 
Bat., were distributed from the Plank road to Hazel Creek, 
about a half-mile. 

Sedgwick had marched at midnight with a good moon, but 
his progress was slow, for the Confederate pickets annoyed it. 
By daylight he was in Fredericksburg, and his batteries from 
both banks of the river and from the edge of the town opened 
on the Confederates. Sedgwick had been informed by Hooker 
that the Confederate force left at Fredericksburg was very small, 
and, without delay, he sent forward four regiments from Wliea- 
ton's and Shaler's brigades to charge the works in front of Marye's 
Hill. It was sending a boy on a man's errand. The Con- 
federate infantry reserved its fire until the enemy were within 
40 yards, when they opened and quickly drove them back. 
A second assault was made, but with similar result. Sedgwick 
was now convinced that a heavy force confronted him, and he 
waited for Gibbon's division of the 2d corps. This had just 
crossed from Falmouth, and it made an effort upon the extreme 
Confederate left. It proved futile on account of the canal along 
the front at that part of the field, which was defended by three 
regiments of Hays's brigade of Early's division, hurried there 
by Early on seeing the enemy's preparations. 

Soon afterward, Wilcox's brigade came to the scene from 
Banks Ford, where it had been in observation on the 2d. At 
dawn on the 3d, Wilcox noted that the enemy's pickets on the 
north side were wearing haversacks, and correctly guessed that 
the forces opposite were leaving for Chancellorsville. He was 
preparing to march in the same direction, when a messenger 
brought word of the advance of Gibbon's division. There- 
upon leaving a picket of 50 men and two guns in observation at 
Banks Ford, Wilcox marched to Taylor's Hill. 

About 10 A.M., Gibbon having reported that an attack on our 
extreme left was impracticable, and Howe's division, making no 
progress east of Hazel Run, Sedgwick had no recourse but to 
renew his attack upon Marye's Hill by main force . He accordingly 
prepared a much stronger assault than that of the morning. 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 351 

Newton's division, supported by Burnham's brigade, was to 
attack Marye's Hill, while Howe's division assaulted Lee's Hill 
beyond Hazel Run. 

This force numbered about 14,000 men, with an abundant 
artillery. Across Hazel Creek were seven guns of Cutt's and 
Cabell's battahons, and the two remaining regiments of Barks- 
dale's brigade and one La. of Hays's brigade. 

About 11 A.M., both Newton and Howe renewed the assault, 
Newton advanced rapidly through the fire of the few Con- 
federate guns, but recoiled soon after the infantry opened, 
although Barksdale's Une was so thin that it scarcely averaged 
a man to five feet of parapet. Some of the Federal regiments, 
however, suffered severely, and a number of killed and wounded 
were left near the Confederate line. 

This, by a strange piece of good nature on the part of one of 
our best officers, proved our undoing. When Newton's Une was 
beaten back, the firing on both sides nearly ceased, and some 
Federal officer sent forward a flag of truce. No Federal report 
mentions this incident. The flag was probably sent by only a 
brigade commander, for the fighting, by Howe's division, across 
Hazel Run, was kept up without cessation. Col. Griffin of the 
18th Miss, received the flag. The officer bearing it asked to be 
allowed to remove his dead and wounded in Griffin's front. 
Without referring to his brigade commander. Griffin granted the 
request, and, still more thoughtlessly, allowed his own men to 
show themselves while the wounded were being dehvered. The 
enemy, to their great surpHse, discovered what a small force was 
in their front. 

They lost Httle time in taking advantage of the information. 
The action was reopened, and now a charge was made with a 
rush, and the enemy swarmed over our works. The Mississippians 
had no chance to escape, but fought with butts of guns and bayo- 
nets, and were mostly captured, with the loss of about 100 killed 
and wounded. The casualties in Newton's division and Burn- 
ham's brigade, in the whole battle, were about 1200, of which 
probably 900 fell in this affair. All of the guns on the hill were 
captured, Brown's section last of all, firing until surrounded. 

Meanwhile, Howe's division had a full mile to traverse before 



352 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

reaching the Confederate hnes. Instead of a charge, their 
progress was a slow advance under cover of heavy artillery fire. 
Before they reached the Confederate line, Newton's division had 
made its second charge and was in possession of Marye's Hill. 
Thereupon, Early, who was in command, ordered the withdrawal 
of his whole division, and the formation of a new line of battle 
across the Telegraph road, about two miles in the rear. Here 
he concentrated Gordon's, Hoke's, and Smith's brigades, with the 
remnants of Barksdale's. Hays's brigade had been cut off with 
Wilcox, and these two brigades were in position to delay Sedg- 
wick in advancing upon the Plank road toward Chancellorsville. 
But Hays, under orders from Early, crossed the Plank road 
before Sedgwick had made any advance. Wilcox then took 
position with four guns across the Plank road, and delayed the 
enemy's advance as much as possible, while he fell back slowly to 
Salem Church, where he had been notified that McLaws would 
meet him with reenf or cements. He reached this point about 3 
P.M., meeting there Wofford's, Semmes's, Kershaw's, and Ma- 
hone's brigades, under McLaws. The five brigades rapidly 
formed a single Une of battle across the Plank road. Wilcox's 
brigade held the centre, with the 14th and 11th Ala. on the left 
of the Plank road, and the 10th and 8th on the right. The 
9th Ala. was in reserve a short distance in rear of the 10th. 
Four guns were posted across the Plank road, and a company 
of infantry was put in Salem Church, and one in a schooUiouse a 
short distance in front. Kershaw's brigade was on the right 
of Wilcox, and Wofford on right of Kershaw; Semmes's brigade 
was on Wilcox's left, and Mahone's brigade was on the left of 
Semmes. 

In front of the line of battle stretched a fringe of dense young 
wood, some 200 yards wide, and beyond that, for perhaps a half- 
mile, were open fields, which extended with a few interruptions 
on each side of the Plank road back to Fredericksburg, about 
four miles. Sedgwick had been delayed over four hours in trav- 
ersing that distance. 

About 4.30 P.M., Sedgwick estabhshed a battery 1000 yards in 
front of Wilcox, and opened fire. The Confederate artillery was 
nearly out of ammunition, and after a few rounds it was with- 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 353 

drawn. Encouraged by this, the Federals now sent forward 
Brooks's divison, formed across the road in two lines, with New- 
ton's division in the same formation upon Brooks's right. 

Now ensued one of the most brilliant and important of the 
minor affairs of the war. McLaws had reached the field and 
assumed the command, but credit is also due to Wilcox, who had 
delayed many times his number for several hours, and gained 
time for reenf or cements to arrive. 

The story of the battle may be told very briefly. North of the 
road, opposite the 14th and 11th Ala., was Torbert's Jersey brigade 
under Brown, in a double Hue. On the south, opposite the 8th, 
9th, and 10th Ala., was Bartlett's brigade, one of the best in the 
Federal army, which boasted that it had never been repulsed, and 
had never failed to hold any position it was ordered to occupy. 

The strength of the Confederate position consisted in the 
thick imdergrowth which completely hid their Unes, lying down 
on the crest of a shght ridge in rear of the woods. These were 
held by skirmishers during the enemy's approach across the 
open. When the artillery was withdrawn, it left a gap of about 
50 yards between the 11th Ala., on the left of the road and 
the 10th on the right. Bartlett's brigade advanced gallantly 
through the severe skirmish fire, fought through the strip of 
woods, drove the company from the church, and cut off the one 
in the schoolhouse. Pushing on and overlapping the left of the 
10th Ala., they enfiladed it, broke its Une, and drove it back in 
confusion. The 8th Ala., under Lt.-Col. Herbert, on the right of 
the 10th, however, did not break, but threw back its three left 
companies, and brought an enfilade fire on the enemy's further 
advance. The 9th Ala., being in reserve a httle in rear of the 
10th, rose from the ground, and, giving the enemy a volley, 
charged them and drove them back. 

Brown's brigade, on the opposite side of the road, had a wider 
body of woods to cross, and had not advanced as far as Bartlett. 
But when Bartlett was driven back, Wilcox's whole brigade 
joined in the counter-stroke. Bartlett's first fine was followed so 
rapidly that the prisoners in the schoolhouse were liberated, and 
the rush of the fugitives and the quick pursuit overwhelmed the 
second line, giving it no chance to make a stand. 



354 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Across the Plank road, Semmes's two right regiments, the 10th 
and 51st Ga., joined the 14th and 11th Ala., and these four regi- 
ments, meeting the Jersey brigade in the woods, drove it back in 
such a direction that the fugitives from each side of the Plank 
road converged upon the road. The Confederates in pursuit said 
that they had never had such crowds to fire upon. The pursuit 
was dangerously prolonged, but fortunately the enemy contented 
himself by checking it, and the Confederates then slowly withdrew. 
Long-range firing, however, was kept up until night. 

Bartlett's brigade reported a loss in this attack of 580 officers 
and men out of less than 1500 men. Brown's brigade reported 
a loss of 511. Brooks, commanding the division, said in his offi- 
cial report : — 

"In this brief but sanguinary conflict this division lost nearly 1500 
officers and men. Col. H. W. Brown, commanding the Jersey brigade, 
was severely wounded ; and Col. Collet, 1st N.J., Col. G. W. Town, and 
Lt.-Col. HaU, 95th Pa., were killed." 

Wilcox's brigade lost 75 killed, 372 wounded, and 48 missing, 
a total of 495. The losses of Semmes's brigade are included with 
the campaign losses. One of its regiments, however, the 10th 
Ga., reports for this day: 21 killed, 102 wounded, and 5 missing, 
a total of 128 out of 230 present. In the morning at Chancellors- 
ville, this regiment had received the surrender of the 27th Conn., 
which had been on picket and was cut off by the capture of 
Chancellorsville. During this charge it also captured over 100 
prisoners. While this action was going on. Early had formed 
line of battle to resist an advance of the enemy upon the Tele- 
graph road, and was bringing up his extreme right from Hamil- 
ton's Crossing. It was about night when his whole division was 
concentrated. 

The enemy was holding Gibbon's entire division idle in Freder- 
icksburg, guarding the pontoon bridges to Falmouth. Had 
Gibbon moved up on Sedgwick's flank to Banks Ford, his 
division would have counted for something in the next day's 
affairs. His force was just what Sedgwick needed to enable him 
to hold his ground. 

Returning now to Chancellorsville, we have to note a move- 
ment which involved an unfortunate Confederate delay on the 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 355 

next day — a delay which enabled Sedgwick's corps to escape 
scot-free from a position which should have cost him all his ar- 
tillery and half his men. The River road, from Chancellorsville 
to Fredericksburg via Banks Ford, was left unoccupied when 
Hooker took refuge in his fortified lines on the morning of the 3d. 
Anderson, with his three remaining brigades, — Wright's, Perry's, 
and Posey's, — was sent at 4 p.m. to watch that road, and threaten 
the enemy upon that flank. Two hours after sunrise on the 4th, 
Heth arrived with three brigades to reheve Anderson, who was now 
ordered to proceed to Salem Church, about six miles, and report 
to McLaws, which he did about noon. This sending Anderson to 
reenforce McLaws might have been done the afternoon before. 
He would then have been on hand at the earliest hour for the 
joint attack upon Sedgwick, on the 4th, which is now to be de- 
scribed. 

The events of the morning of the 4th had been as follows : No 
communication had been received by Sedgwick from Hooker, 
and he was still under orders to come to Chancellorsville. But 
at an early hour, movements of Early's troops were discovered 
in his rear, and, instead of advancing, Sedgwick had deployed 
Howe's division perpendicular to the Plank road facing to his 
rear, and stretching to the river above Banks Ford, where 
pontoon bridges had been laid the afternoon before. Sedgwick's 
scouts had reported that "a column of the enemy, 15,000 
strong, coming from the direction of Richmond, had occupied 
the heights of Fredericksburg, cutting him off from the town." 
He at once abandoned all idea of taking the aggressive, and only 
wished himself safely across the river. But he did not dare to 
attempt a crossing, except under cover of night. His lines were 
too long, and were weak in plan, as they faced in three directions, 
— east, south, and west. But he dared not venture a change, for 
fear of precipitating an attack. When at last he received a 
despatch from Hooker, its noncommittal advice was not en- 
couraging. It said : — 

"Everything snug here. We contracted the lines a little and repulsed 
the last assault with ease. Gen. Hooker wishes them to attack him to- 
morrow, if they will. He does not desire you to attack them again in 
force, unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too 



356 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep 
up eommunication with Gen. Benham at Banks Ford and Fredericksburg. 
You can go to either place if you think it best to cross. Banks Ford would 
bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better 
than falling back to Fredericksburg." 

A little later Hooker sent another message, urging Sedgwick, if 
possible, to hold a position on the south bank, to which Sedg- 
wick replied : — 

"The enemy threatens me strongly on two fronts. My position is bad 
for such attack. It was assumed for attack, not for defence. It is not 
improbable that the bridges at Banks Ford may be sacrificed. Can you 
help me strongly if I am attacked?" 

No answer to this inquiry appears, and Sedgwick stood on the 
defensive, awaiting nightfall. Meanwhile, early in the morning, 
Early's division, with Barksdale's brigade, had moved down upon 
Marye's Hill, which they found held by a picket force only, and 
easily occupied. An advance was attempted into Fredericks- 
burg, but it was found with barricades across the streets held by 
one of Gibbon's brigades, supported by two other brigades and a 
number of guns on the north bank. Early then sent to communi- 
cate with McLaws and endeavor to arrange a joint attack upon 
Sedgwick, but received information that Anderson's division was 
coming, and was himself sent for to meet Lee. 

Before leaving Chancellorsville that morning, Lee had examined 
Hooker's hnes with the view of assaulting at once, but their 
strength made it imprudent to do so while Sedgwick was still 
south of the river. So he next set out to dispose of Sedgwick, 
that he might then concentrate his whole force to attack Hooker. 

Probably no man ever commanded an army and, at the same 
time, so entirely commanded himself, as Lee. This morning was 
almost the only occasion on which I ever saw him out of humor. 
It was when waiting the arrival of Anderson, with his three 
brigades from the River road, after being reheved by Heth. 
Anderson was in no way to blame for the delay, but he should 
have been relieved the afternoon before, which would have 
let him move during the night. 

Some delay was inevitable, as Sedgwick's peculiar rectangular 
formation was not readily understood. It was about .three 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 357 

miles in extent, and occupied high ground, with a wide, open valley 
in its front, forcing a development of our line of nearly six miles 
to cover its three fronts. An entire day would have been none 
too much to devote to the attack, if the fruits of victory were to 
be reaped. Although Lee urged all possible speed, it was 6 p.m. 
when the advance commenced. Sunset was at seven. Dark- 
ness fell before the lines could be gotten into close action. In 
the dusk, two of Early's brigades, Hoke's and Hays's, fired into 
each other by mistake, and were thrown into confusion. Both 
had to be withdrawn and re-formed. The enemy was, however, 
forced back to the vicinity of Banks Ford, and had there then 
been daylight to bring up our batteries, there might have been 
large captures. Upon McLaws's front, ranges were marked by 
daylight for firing upon Banks Ford and some guns were kept 
firing all night. But all that was possible amounted only to 
annoyance. It was again illustrated that afternoon attacks 
seldom reap any fruits of victory. 

It was with great elation on the morning of the 5th, that our 
guns fired the last shots across the Rappahannock at Sedg- 
wick's retreating columns. But orders, soon received from head- 
quarters, indicated that our commander was not yet satisfied. 
Early's division and Barksdale's brigade were directed to remain 
in observation at Banks Ford and Fredericksburg, — which 
had also been evacuated by Gibbon's division during the 
previous night, — while all the rest of the army was ordered 
to return to the front of Hooker's fines near Chancellorsville, 
which Lee intended to assault on the morrow with his whole 
force. 

What was known of the enemy's position gave assurance that 
the task would be the heaviest which we had ever undertaken. 
Hooker now had his entire army concentrated, and, allowing 
for his losses, must have had fully 90,000 men to defend about 
five miles of breastworks. These he had had 48 hours to prepare, 
with all the advantages for defence which the Wilderness offered. 
Lee would scarcely be able to bring into action 35,000 under all 
the disadvantages imposed by the Wilderness upon the offensive 
and by two streams which on the southeast and northwest cov- 
ered three-fourths of the enemy's front. Behind these streams 



358 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

both flanks rested securely upon the river. The attack would 
have to be made everywhere squarely in front, and our artillery 
would be unable to render any efficient help. When, upon the 6th, 
we found the Unes deserted and the enemy gone, our engineers 
were amazed at the strength and completeness of the enemy's 
intrenchments. Impenetrable abattis covered the entire front, 
and the crest everywhere carried head-logs imder which the men 
could fire as through loopholes. In rear, separate structures 
were provided for officers, with protected outlooks, whence they 
could see and direct without exposure. 

Four of Hooker's corps had suffered casualties averaging 20 
per cent, but three, the 1st, 2d, and 5th, had scarcely been en- 
gaged. It must be conceded that Lee never in his Ufe took a 
more audacious resolve than when he determined to assault 
Hooker's intrenchments. And it is the highest possible compli- 
ment to the army commanded by Lee to say that there were 
two persons concerned who beheved that, in spite of all the odds, 
it would have been victorious. These two persons were Gens. 
Lee and Hooker. For Hooker was aheady hurrying his prepara- 
tions to retreat during the coming night. Clearly, this decision 
was the mistake of his Ufe. 

During the afternoon of the 5th, there came on one of the 
remarkable storms which on many occasions closely followed 
severe engagements. The rainfall was unusually heavy and 
continued long after dark, converting roads into quagmires, 
rivulets into torrents, and causing great discomfort to man and 
beast. But its occurrence was advantageous to the Confederates, 
as it prevented their pressing upon the enemy's impregnable hne, 
and it hurried the efforts of the Federals to cross the river, as 
rapidly rising waters overflowed the approaches to their bridges. 
Before the rain, I had found positions for several guns close upon 
the river-bank, partly around a bend below the Federal left, 
giving an oblique fire upon some of their batteries. During the 
night we constructed pits, and, at early dawn, were putting the 
guns in them, when we were suddenly fired upon by guns square 
upon our own flank and across the river. A heutenant had his 
ankle smashed, some horses were killed, and some dismounted 
limber chests were exploded, before all could be gotten under 



CHANCELLORSVILLE 359 

cover in the pits. From these we could make no reply, as they 
faced Hooker's lines, and we could only lie close and wait for 
more daylight. This revealed that the enemy had abandoned 
his works during the night and recrossed the river. To retahate 
I brought up seven other guns, under cover of a wood, and engaged 
the enemy for a half -hour, inflicting ''some loss in killed and 
wounded," as reported by Gen, Hunt, with no further loss to 
ourselves, but the wheel of a gun. Finding by then that the 
battle was over and no enemy left on our side of the river, the 
guns were gradually withdrawn and camps were sought in 
another severe rain-storm, which came up about 5 p.m. and lasted 
far into the night.^ 

The battle made by Stuart on the 3d, has rarely been sur- 
passed, measured either by the strength of the lines carried or 
by the causalties suffered in so brief a period. In Colston's 
division four brigades lost eight brigade commanders, three killed 
and five disabled. Three out of six of the division staff fell. In 
Pender's brigade of Heth's division, six out of ten field-officers 
were killed or wounded. Our brigades rarely came to the field 
2000 strong, and casualties of 600 to a brigade were rarely 
reached even in battles prolonged over a day. Here within six 
hours, five of the 15 brigades lost over 600 in killed and wounded 
each : Lane's N.C. brigade losing 786 ; Colston's N.C. and Va. 
losing 726; Pender's N.C, 693. 

The battle of Chickamauga is generally called the bloodiest of 
modern battles. The losses given by Livermore are 22 per cent 
in the Federal army and 25 per cent in the Confederate, in 
two days' fighting. Jackson's three divisions had a paper 
strength of 26,661, and their losses were 7158, about 27 per 
cent. They were, doubtless, over 30 per cent of the force 
actually engaged. The losses in the 3d and 12th Federal corps, 
which composed the principal part of our opponents, were 
less, as they fought behind breastworks. Their strength 
on paper was 32,171. Their losses were 4703, being about 15 

* A reminiscence of that night is the finding of our camp in the heaviest of 
the rain and blackest of the darkness by a lost ambulance carrying a Virgin- 
ian colonel, whose leg had been amputated on the field. He was taken out 
and fed, slept on the crowded floor of our tent, and next morning was 
started for a hospital in fine spirits in spite of his maimed condition. 



360 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



per cent of the paper strength and probably 18 per cent of 
the actual. 

Had Gen. Lee been present on the left, during the Sunday 
morning attack, and seen Stuart's energy and efficiency in han- 
dling his reserves, inspiring the men by his contagious spirit, and 
in the cooperation of artillery, with the infantry, he might have 
rewarded Stuart on the spot by promoting him to the now 
vacant command of Jackson's corps. Ewell, who did succeed 
Jackson, was always loved and admired, but he was not always 
equal to his opportunities, as we shall see at Gettysburg. 
Stuart's qualities were just what were needed, for he was young, 
he was not maimed, and he had boldness, persistence, and 
magnetism in very high degree. Lee once said that he would 
have won Gettysburg, had he had Jackson with him. Who so 
worthy to succeed Jackson as the man who had successfully 
replaced him on his last and greatest field ? 

CONFEDERATE CASUALTIES 



Commands 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Stren. 


S.C. Kershaw's Brig. 
Miss. Barksdale's " 
Ga. Semmes's " 
Ga. Wofford's 

Cabell's Battn. A 


12 
43 

85 

74 

5 


90 
208 
492 
479 

21 


2 

341 

26 

9 

2 


104 
592 
603 
562 

• 28 




McLaws's Div. 


219 


1,290 


380 


1,889 


8,800 


Ala. Wilcox's Brig. 
Va. Mahone's " 
Miss. Posey's " 
Ga. Wright's '' 
Fla. Perry's 


72 
24 
41 
25 
21 


372 
134 

184 

271 

88 


91 
97 
65 


535 
255 
290 
296 
109 




Anderson's Div. 


183 


1,049 


215 


1,485 


8,500 


Washington Arty. 
Alexander's " 
Hardaway's " 


4 
6 

1 


8 
35 
12 


33 
21 


45 
62 
13 




Total Res. " 


11 


55 


54 


120 




Total 1st Corps 


413 


2,394 


687 


3,494 





CHANCELL ORS VILLE 



361 



CONFEDERATE CASUALTIES {Continued) 



Commands 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Stren. 


Hd. Qrs., 2d Corps 
Hd. Qrs., 1st Div. 

Va. Heth's Brig. 

S.C. McGowan's " » 

Ga. Thomas's 

N.C. Lane's 

Ala. Archer's " 

N.C. Pender's 


2 

2 

44 

46 

21 

161 

44 

116 


3 

2 
259 
402 
156 
626 
305 
577 


7 

121 
16 
68 


5 
4 
303 
455 
177 
908 
365 
761 




A. P. Hill's Div. 


436 


2,330 


212 


2,978 


10,400 


Ala. Rodes's Brig. 
Ga. Doles's 
Ga. Colquitt's " 
N.C. Iverson's 
N.C. Ramseur's " 


90 

66 

9 

67 

151 


538 
343 
128 
330 
529 


188 
28 

312 
73 

108 


816 
437 
449 
470 

788 




Rodes's Div. 


383 


1,868 


709 


2,960 


9,600 


Ga. Gordon's Brig. ^ 
Va. Smith's " ' 
N.C. Hoke's " ^ 
La. Hays's " * 
Early's Rept. adds 


16 
11 
35 
63 
11 


145 

75 
195 
306 
117 


500 


161 
86 
230 
369 
628 




Early's Div. 


136 


838 


500 


1,474 


8,200 


Va. Paxton's Brig. * 
" Garnett's " » 
N.C. Colston's (Va.) 
La. Nicholls's ^ 


54 

52 

128 

47 


430 
420 
594 
266 


80 


484 
472 
802 
313 




Colston's Div. 


281 


1,710 


80 


2,071 


6,600 


Artillery, 2d Corps 


26 


124 






150 


Total 2d Corps 


1,262 


6,870 


1,501 


9,633 


35,800 


Lee, F., Cav. Brig. 
Pelham's Arty. 


4 
4 


7 
6 


8 


11 

18 




Grand Total 


1,683 


9,277 


2,196 


13,156 


56,444 



^ From Report of Surgeon Guild, excluding slightly wounded and 
missing. 



362 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 
FEDERAL CASUALTIES 



Commands 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Strength 


Reynolds's Div. 
Robinson's " 
Doubleday's " 


1 

7 
1 


15 
42 
23 


2 

6 

38 


18 
55 
62 




Total 1st Corps 


9 


80 


46 


135 


16,908 


Hancock's Div. 
French's " 


78 
63 


445 
506 


601 
119 


1,124 

688 




Two Divs. 2d Corps 


141 


951 


720 


1,812 


16,893 


Birney's Div. 
Berry's " 
Whipple's " 


119 
148 
111 


925 

1,037 

682 


563 
244 

289 


1,607 
1,429 
1,082 




Total 3d Corps 


378 


2,644 


1,096 


4,118 


18,721 


Griffin's Div. 
Sykes's 
Humphreys's " 


17 
27 
25 


108 
167 
197 


13 

91 
55 


138 

285 
277 




Total 5th Corps 


69 


472 


159 


700 


15,724 


Deven's Div. 

Steinwehr's " 
Schurz's 


61 

27 
129 


477 
248 
496 


432 
244 
298 


970 
519 
923 




Total 11th Corps 


217 


1,221 


974 


2,412 


12,927 


WilHams's Div. 
Geary's " 


135 
125 


801 
637 


676 
444 


1,612 
1,206 




Total 12th Corps 


260 


1,441 


1,121 


2,822 


13,450 


Deven's Brig. Cav. 


8 


35 


98 . 


141 




Total about Chancellors- 
ville 


1,081 


6,844 


4,214 


12,140 




Gibbon's Div., 2d Corps 
Brooks's " 6th " 
Howe's " 6th " 
Newton's " 6th " 
Burnham's " 6th " 


8 

203 

91 

98 

93 


90 
923 
697 
605 
395 


12 
366 
502 
307 
310 


110 

1,492 
1,290 
1,010 

798 




Total 6th Corps 


485 


2,620 


1,485 


4,590 


23,667 


Total about Fredericksburg 


493 


2,710 


1,497 


4,700 




Grand Total 


1,574 


9,554 


5,711 


16,804 





CHAPTER XVI 

Gettysburg: the First Day 

High Tide. Opportunity Open. Suggestion made. Invasion. Special 
Feature. Feature Impossible. Reorganization. Armament. Lee 
Moves. Brandy Station. Ewell in Valley. Captured Property. 
Hooker Moves. Lincoln Suggests. Lee in Valley. Stuart proposes 
Raid. Conditional Consent. Stuart's Raid. Carlisle. Results of 
Raidi Across the Potomac. Hooker Relieved. Chambersburg. Re- 
turn of Scout. Orders. Chance Encounter. Hill to Gettysburg. 
Meade's Movement. Reynolds to Gettysburg. Battle Opens. Archer 
Captured. Rodes Arrives. Early Arrives. Lee orders Pursuit. Ewell 
stops Pursuit. Lee Confers. The Enemy's Line. Best Point of 
Attack. Longstreet's Arrival. Federal Arrivals. 

A PAUSE of four weeks after the battle of Chancellorsville to 
prepare for an aggressive counter-stroke, was, perhaps, the period 
of highest tide in Confederate hopes among all the vicissitudes 
of the war. The campaign which ensued, culminating at Gettys- 
burg, is generally accepted as the turning-point of Confederate 
fortunes. I think it may be held that each summer campaign 
in Va. marked a Confederate crisis. That is to say, that de- 
feat in any one of them would have been followed by the col- 
lapse of its government, within less than another 12 months, 
while a victory would assure it only of that much of life. More 
than that was impossible as long as the war spirit ruled the 
North, and this was certainly the case in 1863. 

A year later, however, there did come a period of very great 
Federal discouragement, due to a succession of severe losses. 
At the same time, there occurred a crisis in the military situation, 
which threatened an ignominious termination to Grant's cam- 
paign, the greatest campaign of the war. This was saved by a 
brilliant piece of Federal strategy, which is to be told of in due 
course. In it will be found the real crisis — the story of the 
passing of the last hope of Confederate success. It was not 

363 



364 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

lost upon any field of battle, either of offence or of defence. 
It was a victory of strategy and not one of arms. 

It was now for Lee to take the offensive — a role appeaUng 
strongly to his disposition. The defensive was to invite the 
enemy to accumulate his resources to the point at which their 
very weight would crush us. But, for a brief period, we enjoyed 
a choice of the field of action. It was a fatal mistake that in 
this choice we failed to utiUze the single advantage in the game 
of war, which the Confederacy enjoyed. 

We occupied the "Interior Lines," and could reenforce from 
one flank to the other, across our country, more quickly than 
the enemy could discover and follow our movements by round- 
about routes. Only by such transfers of her armies could the 
South ever hope to face her adversaries with superior, or even 
with equal, numbers — by demanding double duty of her regi- 
ments, fighting battles with them alternately in the east and in 
the west. In Lee we had a leader of phenomenal ability, could 
this policy have been once adopted under his direction. Here in 
May, 1863, was presented a rare opportunity to inaugurate what 
might be called an "Army on Wheels" within the Confederate 
lines, as distinguished from an Army of Invasion beyond them. 
The situation was this. Grant was investing Vicksburg with 
60,000 men, and we were threatened with the loss of the Missis- 
sippi River, and of 30,000 men at Vicksburg under Pemberton. 
At Jackson, Miss., Johnston, with scarcely 24,000 men, was 
looking on and begging vainly for reinforcements. 

At Murfreesboro, Tenn., Bragg, with about 45,000 Confederates, 
confronted Rosecrans with about 84,000. Neither felt strong 
enough for the aggressive, and the whole spring and summer 
passed idly. At Knoxville were about 5000 Confederates under 
Buckner, and there were also scattered brigades in southwest 
Va. and eastern N.C., from which reenforcements might be 
drawn. In this state of affairs, Longstreet, with Hood's and 
Pickett's divisions, arrived in Petersburg, under orders to rejoin 
Lee at Fredericksburg. Hooker had just been driven across 
the Rappahannock, and his army was soon to lose largely from 
the expiration of terms of service of many regiments. 

Nothing aggressive was probable from him for many weeks. 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 365 

Longstreet's veteran divisions, about 13,000 strong, could have 
been placed on the cars at Petersburg and hurried out to Bragg, 
via Lynchburg and Knoxville. Johnston's 25,000 from Jackson, 
and Buckner's 5000 from Knoxville, could have met them. With 
these accessions, and with Lee in command, Rosecrans might 
have been defeated, and an advance made into Ky,, threatening 
Louisville and Cincinnati . If anything could have caused Grant's 
recall from Vicksburg, it would have been this. Surely the 
chances of success were greater, and of disaster less, than those 
involved in our crossing the bridgeless Potomac, into the heart 
of the enemy's country, where ammunition and supplies must 
come by wagons from Staunton, nearly 200 miles, over roads 
exposed to raids of the enemy from either the east or the west. 
In this position, a drawn battle, or even a victory, would still 
leave us compelled soon to find our way back across the 
Potomac. 

Longstreet ^ tells of his having suggested to Secretary Seddon 
such a campaign against Rosecrans, and he also suggested it to 
Lee on his arrival at Fredericksburg. Mr. Seddon thought Grant 
could not be drawn from Vicksburg even by a Confederate 
advance upon the Ohio River. To this Longstreet answered that 
Grant was a soldier and must obey orders if popular alarm forced 
the government to recall him. At that time Davis was sanguine 
of foreign intervention, and the Emperor Napoleon was per- 
mitting a French firm to build some formidable ironclads for the 
Confederate navy. These might have accomplished some re- 
sults, had not the issue of the Gettysburg campaign induced the 
Emperor to withdraw his consent to their delivery. 

Lee recognized the strong features of the proposed strategy, 
and took a day or two to consider it. But he finally decided 
upon an invasion of Pa. He was averse to leaving Va. him- 
self, and also to any division of his army. Both he and Jackson, 
ever since the failure of the Md. campaign, had longed to try it 
once more, and Jackson had had prepared during the winter 
and spring the remarkable map, already mentioned (p. 322), 
covering the whole scene of the coming campaign. In the dis- 
cussion with Longstreet, it was assumed that the strategy of the 

^ Manassas to Appomattox, p. 327. 



366 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

campaign should be such as would force the enemy to attack 
our army in position. Jackson had once said, and it was ever 
afterward an article of our steadfast faith and confidence, "We 
sometimes fail to drive the enemy from position, but they 
always fail to drive us." 

Lee fully appreciated the over-anxiety of the enemy for the 
safety of Washington, and proposed, for this occasion, a special 
feature, which he hoped would play upon and exaggerate these 
fears. Two of Pickett's five brigades had been temporfirily left, — 
Jenkins's at Petersburg, and Corse's at Hanover Junction. Lee 
proposed that when his column of invasion crossed the Potomac, 
these two brigades, reenforced by whatever could be drawn 
from lower Virginia and the Carolinas, should form a column 
commanded by Beauregard, who should come from Charleston 
for the purpose. This column, with some parade of its inten- 
tion, should advance from Culpeper and threaten Washington. 
Hooker's army would have been drawn by Lee north of the 
Potomac. The prestige of Beauregard's name would doubtless 
exaggerate the numbers in his command, and Lee hoped that 
the sudden danger might lead the enemy to call troops from the 
West, particularly if his army could win a battle north of the 
Potomac. The weak feature was that Lee did not have under 
his own control the troops which he desired to move. Davis 
had, indeed, proposed to him to control all troops on the Atlantic 
slope ; but Lee insisted even on being relieved of the department 
south of the James, under D. H. Hill. He did not take the War 
Dept. into his confidence at first, hoping to accompHsh his 
purpose by gradual suggestion and request. The process was 
too slow, and the result was unfortunate. Only on June 23 
from Berry ville, Va., did he fully explain to the President his 
wishes. On the 25th, from Williamsport, he followed the 
matter up with two letters, urging "the organization of an 
army, even in effigy, under Beauregard, at Culpeper C. H." 
Meanwhile, some demonstrations by the enemy from the York 
River had excited apprehensions at Richmond, and neither 
Corse's or Jenkins's brigades were sent forward, as had been 
planned. 

A reply was despatched on June 29, saying, — 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 367 

"This is the first intimation the President has had that such a plan 
was ever in contemplation, and, taking aU things into consideration, he 
cannot see how it can by any possibiUty be carried into effect." 

Explaining the difficulty of protecting the railroads near Rich- 
mond, the letter even suggested that Lee spare some of his own 
force to better protect his own communications. This caution 
was not excessive. The messenger carrying this letter to Lee 
was captured on July 2, by a raid upon our rear, and, its im- 
portance being recognized, it was hurried to Meade and delivered 
to him on the field of Gettysburg at 4.10 a.m. on July 4. At 
that hour there was some uncertainty in the Union councils as 
to their best policy. The facts given in the captured letter of 
the difficulties of the Confederates, and the impossibility of Lee's 
receiving any reenforcements, doubtless increased Meade's con- 
fidence in all his later movements. The letter was considered 
of such importance that the officer who brought it, Capt. Ulric 
Dahlgren, was compHmented and promoted. 

In May our army was reorganized into three corps, each com- 
prising three divisions of infantry, generally of four brigades each, 
and five battalions of artillery, averaging 16 guns each. Ewell 
succeeded Jackson in command of the 2d corps, and A, P. Hill 
took command of the new 3d corps. He had been an excellent 
division commander, and done conspicuous fighting and march- 
ing in the previous campaigns.^ It has already been said that 
Stuart would have made a more active and efficient corps com- 
mander than Ewell. 

1 D. H. Hill also had strong claims for promotion. He had done as much 
hard fighting as any other general, and had also displayed great ability in 
holding his men to their work by supervision and example. But at this time 
he was not with the army, and was in command of the important department 
south of the James. He was a North Carolinian, and was very acceptable 
to the State authorities, who objected if too many North Carolinians were 
taken to Va., leaving N.C. exposed to Federal raids. There was an earnest- 
ness about D. H. Hill's fighting which was like Jackson's at its best. Had 
opportunity come to him, he must have won greater fame. His individual- 
ity may be briefly illustrated by an official indorsement placed upon the 
application of a soldier to be transferred from the infantry to the band. 

" Respectfully forwarded, disapproved. Shooters are more needed than 
tooters." 



368 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Reorganized, the army stood as follows : — 
1st Corps. Longstreet 



Divisions 


Strength 


Brigade Commander 


Batts. 


Guns 


McLaws 

Pickett 
Hood 

Arty. Battns. 


7,311 

5,200 
7,720 

1,000 


Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes, 

Wofford 
Garnett, Kemper, Armistead 
Law, Robertson, Anderson, G. T. 

Benning 
Cabell, Bearing, Henry, Walton, 

Alexander 


21 


84 


Totals 


21,231 


11 Brigades, 5 Battns. Arty. 


21 


84 



2d Corps. Ewell 



Early 

Johnson 

Rodes 

Arty. Battns. 


6,943 
5,564 
8,454 

1,000 


Hays, Smith, Hoke, Gordon 
Stuart, Walker, Nichols, Jones 
Daniel, Doles, Iverson, Ramseur, 

O'Neal 
Jones, Latimer, Carter, Brown, 

Nelson 


21 


84 


Totals 


21,961 


13 Brigades, 5 Battns. Arty. 


21 


84 



3d Corps. A. P. Hill 



Anderson 

Heth 

Pender 
Arty. Battns. 


7,440 

7,500 

6,800 
1,000 


Wilcox, Wright, Mahone, Perry, 

Posey 
Pettigrew, Brockenbrough, Archer, 

Davis 
Perrin, Lane, Thomas, Scales 
Lane, Garnett, Poague, Mcintosh, 

Pegram 


20 


80 


Totals 


22,740 


13 Brigades, 5 Battns. Arty. 


20 


80 




65,932 


3 Corps, 9 Divisions, 37 Brigades, 
15 Battns. Arty. 


62 


248 


Stuart 
Cavalry 


10,292 


Hampton, Robertson, Jones, 
F. Lee, Jenkins, W. H. F. Lee 
Imboden 
1 Battn. Arty. 


6 


24 


Totals 


10,292 


1 Division, 7 Brigades 


6 


24 


Aggregate 


76,224 


3 Corps, 10 Divisions, 44 Brigades, 
16 Battns. Arty. 


68 


272 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 



369 



The figures given are the returns of the "Officers and men 
present for duty" on May 31. No later return was made before 
the battle. 

Similarly, for the Federal army, the table below gives the 
"Officers and men present for duty" on June 30, the last return 
before the battle. To arrive at the forces actually engaged, 
deductions must be made from these figures in both armies for 
sick, guards, and details. This deduction Livermore averages 
at seven per cent for Infantry and Artillery and 15 per cent 
for Cavalry. 

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. PRESENT FOR DUTY, JUNE 30, '63 



Corps Strength 


Divisions 


Brigades 


Artillery 


1st Corps 

Reynolds 

10,355 


Wadsworth 

Robinson 

Rowley 


Meredith, Cutler 

Paul, Baxter 

Biddle, Stone, Stannard 


Batts. 
5 


Guns 
23 


2d Corps 

Hancock 

13,056 


CaldweU 

Gibbon 

Hays 


Cross, Kelley, Zook, Brook 
Harrow, Webb, Hall 
Carroll, Smyth, Willard 


5 


24 


3d Corps 
Sickles 
12,630 


Birney 
Humphreys 


Graham, Ward, De Trobriand 
Carr, Brewster, Burling 


5 


30 


5th Corps 
Sykes 
12,211 


Barnes 

Ayres 

Crawford 


Tilton, Sweitzer, Vincent 
Day, Burbank, Weed 
McCandless, Fisher 


5 


26 


6th Corps 

Sedgwick 

15,710 


Wright 
Howe 

Newton 


Torbert, Bartlett, Russell 

Grant, Neill 

Shaler, Eustis, Wheaton 


8 


48 


11th Corps 
Howard 
10,576 


Barlow 

Steinwehr 

Schurz 


Von Gilsa, Ames 
Coster, Smith 

Schimmelpfennig, Krzyzan- 
owski 


5 


26 


12th Corps 

Slocum 
8,597 


Williams 
Geary 


McDougall, Lockwood, Ru- 

ger 
Candy, Cobham, Greene 


4 


20 


2,568 


Tyler 


Artillery Reserve 


21 


110 



370 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



Corps Strength 


Divisions 


Brigades 


Artillery 


2,580 




Engineers, Provost Guard's 

Escorts 






100,283 


7 Corps, 19 Divisions, 51 Brigades, Infan- 
try and Artillery 


58 


312 


Cavalry Corps 
Pleasonton 
14,973 


Buford 
Gregg, D. 
Kilpatrick 


Gamble, Devin, Merritt 
Mcintosh, Huey, Gregg, J. 
Farnsworth, Custer 


9 


50 


115,256 


8 Corps, 22 Divisions, 59 Brigades 


67 


362 



The Confederate infantry by this time were about nine-tenths 
armed with the rifled musket, muzzle loading, mostly of calibre 
.58, but some of calibre .54. Their artillery was now, also, all 
organized into battalions, usually of four-gun batteries each. 
Each corps had five of these battalions. One of these served 
with each of the three divisions, and the remaining two con- 
stituted a corps reserve, under command of the senior artillery 
officer, who began to be called, and to act, as chief of artillery of 
the corps. 

The general artillery reserve, which had been commanded by 
Pendleton, was broken up, on the organization of the 3d corps, 
and it was never reestablished. Pendleton, however, was re- 
tained as chief of artillery. It is worthy of note that this 
artillery organization of a few batteries with each division, and 
a reserve with each corps, but with no general reserve for the 
army, was the first of the kind ever adopted by any foreign 
army, and that it was subsequently copied by Prussia and 
Austria after 1866, and by France after 1870, and later by 
England. But, although our reserve under Pendleton had 
never found the opportunity to render much service, its being 
discontinued was due to our poverty of guns, not to dissatisfac- 
tion with the system. And the fine service at Gettysburg by 
the Federal reserve of 110 guns, under Hunt, would seem to 
demonstrate the advantage of such an organization in every 
large army. 

On Wednesday, June 3, Lee began the delicate operation of 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 371 

mancBuvring Hooker out of his position behind the Rappahan- 
nock by a movement of the 1st and 2d corps toward Culpeper. 
Hood and McLaws marched on the 3d, Rodes on the 4th, and 
Early and Johnson on the 5th. Longstreet's reserve — the 
Washington Artillery with eight guns, and my own with 26 — 
marched on the 3d. On the 5th, the enemy, having discovered 
that something was on foot, crossed a small force over the Rap- 
pahannock, at the old position near the mouth of Deep Run. 
On this, Lee ordered Ewell's corps to halt and await develop- 
ments. But on the 6th he became satisfied that nothing serious 
was intended, and Ewell was ordered to proceed. In the after- 
noon, Lee himself left Fredericksburg for Culpeper. Hill's corps 
now stood alone in front of Hooker's entire army. 

Meanwhile, Hooker had sent Buford's and Gregg's divisions of 
cavalry, supported by Russell's and Ames's brigades of infantry, 
to attack Stuart's camps near the Rappahannock. A severe 
cavalry battle resulted on the 9th, near Brandy Station. The 
enemy's attack was a surprise, and the isolated Confederate 
brigades, first encountered, were so roughly handled that help 
was called for from the infantry and artillery. My own battahon 
and an infantry force were sent to the field, but reached it too 
late. The enemy, having obtained the information which was 
the object of his expedition, withdrew across the Rappahannock 
under cover of his infantry brigades, with loss of three guns and 
907 men. Stuart's loss was 485. 

On June 10, Ewell's corps left Culpeper for the Valley. Rodes 
moved to Berryville, while Early and Johnson advanced upon 
Winchester, and, on the 13th and 14th, drove Milroy's forces 
into the city. Preparations were made to storm the fortified line 
at dawn on the 15th, an enterprise which might easily have been 
disastrous, had they been well defended. But Milroy saw his 
communications threatened, and did not wait for the attack. 
About dawn, his retreating forces were struck in the flank near 
Stephenson's depot by Steuart's and the Stonewall brigade, and 
were routed with the loss of about 2400 men and 23 guns. Rodes's 
division, going by Berryville, had driven the enemy from that 
point on the 13th, and on the 14th had captured Martinsburg 
late in the afternoon, taking five guns and many stores. Most 



372 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

of the enemy escaped under cover of darkness, though the pur- 
suit was pushed until late at night. On the 15th, starting at 
10 A.M., Rodes reached Williamsport at dark and at once crossed 
three brigades and three batteries over the Potomac. The 
marches made by Ewell's whole corps in this swoop upon Mil- 
roy, and the fruits of victory secured, compare well with the 
work of the same corps under Jackson 13 months before. 
Early and Johnson, advancing upon Winchester, made 70 miles 
in three days. Rodes speaks of his march to Wilhamsport ris — 

"the most trying march we had yet had; most trying because of the 
intense heat, the character of the road (stony and dusty) and the increased 
number of barefooted men in the command." 

He goes on to say : — 

" It was not until this day that the troops began to exhibit unmistak- 
able signs of exhaustion, and that stragglers could be found in the line 
of march, and even then none but absolutely worn-out men fell out of 
the line. The whole march from Culpeper to Wilhamsport, which was an 
extremely rapid one, was executed in a manner highly creditable to the 
officers and men of the division. A halt at Williamsport was abso- 
lutely necessary from the condition of the feet of the unshod men. Very 
many of these gallant fellows were stiU marching in ranks with feet bruised, 
bleeding, and swollen." 

Of the fruits gathered by the victory, Lee reports, — 

"More than 4000 prisoners, about 30 pieces of artillery, 250 wagons, 
400 horses, 20 ambulances, and a lot of ammunition, etc." 

Besides these captures of military material, large quantities of 
cattle, provisions, and suppUes of all kinds useful to the army 
were now to be collected in the fertile farming country, into 
which the army had penetrated. 

Stringent orders were issued, forbidding the taking of private 
property except by duly authorized officers, giving formal 
receipts in all cases, that the owners might have no difficulty 
in establishing claims and receiving payment at fair prices. 

On June 13, as EwelFs corps approached Winchester, Long- 
street being at Culpeper, and Hill still opposite Fredericksburg, 
Hooker put his army in motion from Falmouth for Manassas. 
Before Lee began his movement, Hooker had anticipated it, and 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 373 

had proposed in that event to cross the Rappahannock and inter- 
pose between Lee's flanks. It was, doubtless, his proper move, 
and would have forced Lee to recall Longstreet and Ewell and 
have broken up his campaign. But it had been decided, soon / 
after the battle of Chancellorsville, in a council between Mr. 
Lincoln, Halleck, and Stanton, that Hooker should never again 
be intrusted with the conduct of a battle. He could not be at 
once removed on account of the support of politicians who desired 
CO have Secretary Chase succeed Mr. Lincoln as President. This 
party, with the active aid of Chase, had placed Hooker in his 
position by turning the scale in his favor, when the choice was 
between Hooker and Meade, as successor to Burnside. They 
still supported Hooker strongly, and a dead-lock was only averted 
by Chase's friends consenting to a change of the commander in 
case Hooker should voluntarily resign. 

The secret of Chase's interest lay in the fact that Hooker had 
pledged himself not to become a candidate for the Presidency, 
should he win a great victory. 

Meanwhile, as he was not to be allowed to fight, both Halleck 
and Lincoln refused his sensible proposition to cross the Rappa- 
hannock, and Lincoln wrote him the oft-quoted advice, — 

"not to be entangled on the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence, 
and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to gore 
one way or kick another." 

Now that Lee's army was stretched out over a line more than 
100 miles long, even Lincoln saw that a wonderful opportunity 
was flaunted in the face of the Federals, He now wrote to 
Hooker in quite a different spirit : — 

"If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the 
Plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal 
must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?" 

Hooker would have only been too glad to try, but Stanton 
and Halleck were on guard over him, and practically the Army 
of the Potomac was bound hand and foot, and Lee was free to 
work his own will, unmolested, until Hooker should be forced to 
tender his resignation. 
Hooker's movement toward Manassas was at once followed by 



374 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Hill's marching for Culpeper on the 14th, and, on the 15th, 
Longstreet marched from Culpeper to take position east of the 
Blue Ridge, while Hill passed in his rear and crossed the moun- 
tains to Winchester via Front Royal. When Hill was safely in 
the Valley, Longstreet also entered through Ashby's and Snicker's 
gaps, and about the 20th the two corps were united. 

The cavalry had acted as a screen in front of Longstreet during 
this advance, and, in this duty, had severe encounters with the 
enemy at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, losing in them over 
500 in killed, wounded, and missing. 

About June 22, as Hill and Longstreet drew near the Potomac, 
ready to cross, Stuart made to Lee a very unwise proposition, 
which Lee more unwisely entertained. It was destined to have 
an unfortimate influence on the campaign. Stuart thus refers 
to the matter in his official report : — 

"I submitted to the commanding general the plan of leaving a brigade 
or so in my present front, passing through Hopewell or some other gap 
in the Bull Run Mountains, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his 
main body and Washington, and cross into Md., joining our army north 
of the Potomac. 

"The commanding general wrote authorizing this move, if I thought it 
practicable, and also what instructions should be given the two brigades 
left in front of the enemy. He also notified me that one column would 
move via Gettysburg, and the other via Carlisle, toward the Susquehanna, 
and directed me, after crossing, to proceed with all despatch to joia the 
right (Early) of the army in Pa." 

In view of the issues at stake, and of the fact that already he 
had been deprived of two promised brigades (Corse's and Jen- 
kins's), it was unwise even to contemplate sending three brigades 
of cavalry upon such distant service. When one compares the 
small beneficial results of raids, even when successful, with the 
risks here involved, it is hard to understand how Lee could have 
given his consent. 

Hooker's Chancellorsville campaign had been lost by the 
absence of his cavalry, and Lee's Gettysburg campaign was 
similarly compromised. Lee, however, acquiesced, only attach- 
ing the condition that Longstreet could spare the cavalry from 
his front, and approved the adventure. Longstreet, thus sud- 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 375 

denly called on to decide the question, seems not to have appre- 
ciated its importance, for he decided it on the imaginary ground 
that " the passage of the Potomac by our rear would, in a measure, 
disclose our plans." 

Accordingly, about midnight of June 24, Stuart, with Hamp- 
ton's, W. H. F. Lee's, and Fitz-Lee's brigades, six guns, and 
some ambulances, marched from Salem, for the Potomac River. 
Making a circuit by Brentsville, Wolf Run shoals, Fairfax 
('. n. and Dranesville, he crossed the Potomac at Rowser's 
Ford at midnight of the 27th, about 80 miles by the route 
travelled. The ford was barely passable. The water came on 
the saddles of the horses and entirely submerged the artillery 
carriages. These were emptied and the ammunition carried 
across by hand. Here the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal was cut. 
Next morning at Rockville, a train of wagons eight miles long 
was captured, and 400 prisoners were taken and paroled. In 
saving a large number of wagons, instead of burning them, and 
in delaying 12 hours to parole his prisoners, instead of bringing 
along the officers and letting the men go, Stuart committed fatal 
blunders. The Federal authorities refused to recognize the paroles 
(though they were given at the earnest solicitation of the cap- 
tured officers), and all the paroled were at once returned to duty. 
The delay caused to subsequent marches by the long wagon-train, 
and the embarrassment of protecting it, was responsible for the 
loss of time which made, on the whole, a sad failure of the ex- 
pedition. On the 29th, the Baltimore and Ohio R.R. was crossed 
and torn up at Hood's Mills. At Westminster about 5 p.m., a 
squadron of Federal cavalry was routed, and the head of the 
column bivouacked that night midway between Westminster and 
Littletown. Had it here followed the direct road, via Littletown 
to Gettysburg, only about 16 miles away, it could have occupied 
Gettysburg before 11 a.m. on the 30th, where it would have 
found itself in good position in front of Lee's army, then con- 
centrating at Cash town. It might, however, have had a severe 
fight with Buf ord's two brigades of cavalry, which arrived in the 
afternoon, just in time to anticipate Pettigrew's brigade of 
Heth's division, which had been directed to visit Gettysburg in 
quest of shoes. 



376 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

This incident will be referred to again. It is mentioned here 
only to show how near Stuart's expedition came to a happy issue 
on June 30. Had it done so, Lee's army would have occupied 
some strong position between Cashtown and Gettysburg, and 
the onus of attack would have been upon the Federals, as had 
been the plan of the campaign. 

But his orders led Stuart toward the Susquehanna, so he pro- 
ceeded north to Hanover, which was reached at 10 a.m. on the 
30th. Here he had a sharp skirmish with Kilpatrick's cavalry. 
Hampered by his 125 captured wagons, he turned squarely to the 
right, and, making a detour by Jefferson, he reached Do^ 3r on 
the morning of July 1, crossing during the night the road on 
which Early's division had marched on the 30th from York to 
Heidlersburg. Here he learned that Early had gone toward 
Shippensburg. Stuart was practically lost, and had to guess in 
which direction he should go to find Lee's army. Lee was now 
beginning the battle of Gettysburg, 25 miles off to the south- 
west. Stuart's report says: — 

" After as little rest as was compatible with the exhausted condition 
of the command, I pushed on for Carlisle [25 miles to the northwestl, 
where I hoped to find a portion of our army." 

He arrived before Carhsle in the afternoon. His rations were 
now entirely exhausted. He desired to levy a contribution, but 
learned that a considerable force of mihtia was ambushed in 
the town, "with a view to entrap him on his entrance." He 
invested the town, threw in some shells, and burned the United 
States Cavalry barracks. "The whereabouts of our army," he 
says, "was still a mystery, but during the night I received a 
despatch from Lee that the army was at Gettysburg [about 30 
miles south] and had been engaged this day." The investment 
was abandoned, and the column headed for Gettysburg, where 
it arrived that afternoon "just in time to thwart a movement of 
the enemy's cavalry upon our rear." . . . 

The expedition had occupied eight days, and had traversed in 
that time about 250 miles. Meanwhile, Lee had been exceed- 
ingly impatient. W^ien Stuart, at last, reported in person, late 
in the afternoon of the 2d, although Lee said only, " Well, General, 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 377 

you are here at last," his manner impUed rebuke, and it was so 
understood by Stuart. 

He, however, is scarcely to be blamed for suggesting the raid. 
Had he wasted no time paroling prisoners and saving wagons, 
his raid might have been successful, as raids go, for his whole 
casualties were but 89 killed, wounded, and missing. But the 
venture was a strategic mistake, for it resulted in the battle's 
being one of chance collision, with the Confederates taking the 
offensive. v.^hereas the plan of the campaign had been to fight a 
defensive battle. 

Hili .crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on June 23, and 
Longstreet began crossing at Williamsport on the 24th. Hooker 
was not far behind, for he crossed at Edward's Ferry on the 25th 
and 26th, and moved to the vicinity of Frederick. Here he 
threatened Lee's rear through the South Mountain passes, if he 
moved north, and, at the same time, covered Washington. 
Hooker had, meanw^hile, been placed in command of the troops 
at Washington (some 26,000 men), and at Harper's Ferry, where 
there were about 11,000. It was a wise order, but under the 
poHcy of not allowing Hooker to fight, it was but a sham, as he 
soon discovered. He attempted to draw 15,000 men from the 
Washington lines, as his whole army was now in front of the 
city, but Halleck refused to allow it. He then proposed to 
throw a strong force across the mountains upon Lee's rear, and, 
for this purpose, he ordered the 11,000 under French at Harper's 
Ferry to unite with the 12th corps, which was to lead the move- 
ment. Again Halleck interposed. He refused the troops on 
the absurd ground that "Maryland Heights have always been 
regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much labor 
and expense has been incurred in fortifying them." 

Hooker appealed in vain to Stanton and Lincoln, pointing out 
the folly of holding so large a force idle. Then Hooker realized 
that he had lost the support of the government, and tendered 
his resignation June 27. It was just what Stanton and Halleck 
had been seeking, and was no sooner received than accepted, 
and prompt measures adopted to relieve him, lest the armies 
should come into collision with Hooker still in command. 

Meade succeeded Hooker. He was an excellent fighter, but 



378 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

too lacking in audacity for a good commanding general. He 
was also of cross and quarrelsome disposition, and unpopular 
with his leading officers. 

Duplicate orders, reUeving Hooker and installing Meade, were 
sent that afternoon by Hardie, Stanton's chief of staff. He 
delivered the order to Meade about midnight, while Hooker was 
still in ignorance how his proffered .resignation was being re- 
ceived, Meade protested, and begged to be excused in favor of 
Reynolds, who was the favorite of the army. But he was com- 
pelled to accompany Hardie on a ride to Hooker's quarters, some 
miles away, to deliver the order superseding him. Hooker had 
hoped for a different outcome. He acquiesced gracefully, but 
the scene was a painful one. 

Meanwhile, Lee, with Longstreet and Hill, had reached Cham- 
bersburgand bivouacked in its neighborhood from June 27 to the 
29th. The Federal army had now been across the Potomac for 
three days, but Lee was not yet informed, and he now became 
anxious to hear from his cavalry. An additional large brigade 
coming from W. Va., under Imboden, should have joined him 
here, but it had not yet arrived. It had been delayed in its ap- 
proach by destroying the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal about 
Hancock. A very essential part, also, of Stuart's proposed 
programme had not been carried out. 

This was that two of his five brigades should cross into Md. 
with Lee and continue on his right flank, to screen it and observe 
the enemy. Longstreet had specially directed Stuart to let 
Hampton's brigade be one of these, with Hampton in command 
of both. This was not convenient, and Stuart had left Robert- 
son's and Jones's brigades, with Robertson in command. Also, 
he had failed to make Robertson understand what was expected 
of him. The result was that Robertson and his two brigades re- 
mained in Va. until brought over by Lee's order on July 2} 

To gain information, Stuart had designed to have two efficient 
scouts operating within the enemy's line, but accident had 

* This failure to carry out Lee's orders indicates a staff insufficient to 
keep him in touch with what was taking place. A notable feature of the 
coming battle will be found in the number of important events which 
seemed to happen without any control for the Commander-in-Chief. 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 379 

prevented in both cases. Mosby, one of them, had failed to 
reach Stuart, at his crossing of the Potomac, owing to an enforced 
change of Stuart's line of march. Stringfellow, the other, had 
been captured. Lee, therefore, on June 28, still believed that 
Hooker's army had not yet crossed the Potomac, and, to hurry 
Hooker up, he issued orders for an advance, the next day, of all 
his forces upon Harrisburg. 

But there was still one scout, Harrison, within the Federal 
Unes. Longstreet had despatched him from Culpeper, three 
weeks before, to go into Washington and remain until he had 
important information to communicate. 

With good judgment and good fortune he appeared about mid- 
night on the 28th, with the news that Hooker had crossed the 
Potomac, and had been superseded by Meade. He was also 
able to give the approximate locations of five of Meade's seven 
corps, three being near Frederick and two near the base of South 
Mountain. 

This news caused an immediate change in Lee's plans. He 
was specially anxious to hold Meade east of the Blue Ridge, and 
not have him come into the Valley behind us — the movement 
which Hooker had brought on his own resignation by seeking to 
make. To forestall this, Lee's plan had long been formed to 
concentrate his own army somewhere between Cashtown and 
Gettysburg, in a strong position where it would threaten at once 
Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. The enemy, he hoped, 
would then be forced to attack him. His report states that, — 

"the march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it 
would have been had the movements of the Federal army been known." 

Accordingly, on the 29th, orders were sent, countermanding 
those of the day before and directing movements which would 
concentrate the three corps at Cashtown, eight miles west of 
Gettysburg. There was no urgency about the orders, which 
indicates that Lee had not yet selected any particular site for 
his coming battle. Meade, however, very soon after taking com- 
mand on the 28th, had selected a position, Parr's Ridge, behind 
Pipe Creek, on the divide between the waters of the Potomac 
and Chesapeake Bay. Here he, too, hoped to fight on the 



380 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

defensive. It would have been safe play, but not so brilliant as 
what Hooker had proposed, or as what Lee himself had used 
with Pope in Aug., 1862. 

On June 29, Hill moved Heth's division from Fayetteville to 
Cashtown, about 10 miles. Heth heard that shoes could be 
purchased in Gettysburg, and, with Hill's permission, authorized 
Pettigrew's brigade to go there next day and get them. On the 
30th, Pender's division followed Heth's from Fayetteville to 
Cashtown, and was followed by Longstreet with Hood and 
McLaws f rom Chambersburg as far as Greenwood, about 11 miles- 
Here they bivouacked about 2 p.m. Lee accompanied this march, 
and also bivouacked at Greenwood. Pickett's division was left 
at Chambersburg to guard the rear until Imboden's cavalry 
should arrive, and Law's brigade was detached from Hood's 
division and sent to New Guilford C. H., a few miles south 
of Fayetteville, until Robertson's cavalry should relieve it. On 
the 30th, Ewell's corps, having received the orders from Lee, 
also marched toward Cashtown, the place of rendezvous. 

Meanwhile, Pettigrew, on approaching Gettysburg, found 
Buford's cavalry just occupjdng it, upon which he withdrew 
about five miles and bivouacked. 

Previously, everything had moved favorably for the Con- 
federates' strategy. Now, Stuart was still unheard from, Robert- 
son and Imboden were still behind, and four brigades of infantry 
were detained waiting for them. Lee knew approximately the 
enemy's position, however, and his own three corps were con- 
verging by easy marches upon Cashtown, near which village he 
proposed to select his ground and await an attack. 

Meade's army was equally near Pipe Creek, where he hoped to 
be able to play the same game. But a chance collision suddenly 
precipitated a battle, unforeseen and undesired by either party. 

Hill's report describes how it began : — 

" On arriving at Cashtown, Heth, who had sent forward Pettigrew's 
brigade to Gettysburg, reported that Pettigrew had encountered the enemy 
at Gettysburg (principally cavalry), but in what force he could not deter- 
mine. A courier was then despatched with this information for the 
general commanding, and with orders to start Anderson early. Also to 
Ewell informing him, and that I intended to advance the next morning, 
and discover what was in my front." 






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GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 381 

Thus Hill's movement to Gettysburg was made of his own 
motion, and with knowledge that he would find the enemy's 
cavalry in possession. Ewell was informed of it. Lee's orders 
were to avoid bringing on an action. 

Like Stuart's raid, Hill's venture is another illustration of an 
important event allowed to happen without supervision. Lee's 
first intimation of danger of collision was his hearing Hill's guns 
at Gettysburg. He was much disturbed by it, not wishing to 
fight without the presence of his cavalry to gather fruit in case of 
victory. 

On July 1, of his nine divisions, Pickett's was in bivouac at 
Chambersburg. The other eight, except Law's brigade, were all 
in motion toward Gettysburg, Ewell having at an early hour 
ordered Rodes and Early to diverge to that point from the roads 
they were pursuing, toward Cash town. Unfortunately, six of 
the divisions, and the trains and the reserve artillery of all three 
corps, were concentrated upon the turnpike from Fayetteville 
to Gettysburg. Anderson's division, followed by the 3d corps 
trains, had started soon after daylight from Fayetteville. Here 
they had halted, but Lee, passing, had ordered them on to 
Gettysburg, following Heth and Pender, who had marched from 
Cashtown at 5 a.m., and become engaged at Gettysburg about 10. 

Soon after Anderson had passed Greenwood, Hood and 
McLaws were starting to follow, when they encountered John-' 
son's division of the 2d corps cutting in from the left, with the 
trains and reserve artillery of that corps. Lee, who was riding 
with Longstreet at the head of his infantry, directed that he 
should halt until these had all passed. This column occupied 
about 14 miles of road, and it delayed Longstreet's infantry until 
4 P.M. In the morning, Longstreet's orders had been only to go 
as far as Cashtown, but later orders were sent for all troops to 
come to Gettysburg. 

It was now the fourth day since Meade had relieved Hooker. 
Harper's Ferry had been evacuated. Of its 11,000 troops, 7000 
under French were brought to Frederick, and 4000 escorted to 
Washington the artillery and stores of the post. 

Meade knew that Ewell's corps was between York and Car- 
hsle, and, on the 29th, put his whole army in motion in that 



382 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

direction, encamping that night on a line extending from 
Emmitsburg to Westminster. On the 30th, his advanced corps 
moved forward within a few miles of Gettysburg on his left, to 
Littletown in the centre, and toward Manchester on his right. 

He now fomid that Lee was withdrawing and concentrating 
near Cashtown. He wrongly ascribed this to his own advance 
from Frederick, and pubUshed orders on the 30th, saying : — 

"The General believes he has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, 
and now desires to look to his own army, and assume position for offensive 
or defensive, as occasion requires, or rest to the troops. It is not his de- 
sire to wear the troops out by excessive fatigue and marches, and thus 
imfit them for the work they will be called upon to perform." 

In fact, Lee did not know that Meade had moved at all, and 
his own movement eastward was really inspired by apprehension 
for his own communications, aroused by Hooker's action before 
he had been superseded. 

Although Meade had selected his proposed line of battle 
behind Pipe Creek, and now announced his intention to rest his 
troops, he still, on the 1st, ordered a further advance of each of 
his seven corps, as follows : The 5th corps was ordered to 
Hanover; the 6th corps to Manchester; the 12th corps to Two 
Taverns; the 3d corps to Emmitsburg, and the 1st and 11th 
' corps to Gettysburg. 

These advances were not intended to bring on a battle, but to 
cover the position selected, allowing space in front to delay the 
enemy's, approach and give time for preparation. The instruc- 
tions to Reynolds, who was in command on the left, were not 
to bring on a general engagement. 

But, though both Meade and Lee had cautioned their lieutenants 
to this effect, it was precipitated by Hill's initiative and Reynolds's 
wilhng concurrence. In the first collision of the day, Reynolds's 
leading division, by good handling, got decidedly the best of 
the affair, giving the Federals quite a taste of victory. Lee had 
been very uneasy as the roar of the distant battle increased, but 
when, later, the arrival of Ewell had turned the scale, and he, 
reaching the field, saw the Federals routed and prisoners taken 
by the thousand, it became simply impossible for him to hold 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 383 

back his hand. And not only impossible, but then unwise, for 
a great opportunity was undoubtedly before him. He ordered 
it seized "if possible," and for the rest of the afternoon rested in 
the belief that efforts were being made, being misled by Ewell's 
not informing him that the pursuit had been abandoned before 
his orders to push it were given. 

The course of the battle had been as follows : About 10 a.m., 
the advance of Heth's division became engaged with Buford's 
cavalry, between one and two miles in front of Gettysburg. 
Buf ord, with his horse artillery, sought to detain the enemy until 
Reynolds's corps (seven brigades), which he knew was ap- 
proaching, could come to his assistance. By 11 o'clock, how- 
ever, he was forced to withdraw to the left, where he took 
position, and during the rest of the day protected the left flank 
of the Federals. As Buf ord withdrew, Wadsworth's two brigades 
became engaged with Davis and Archer, 

Davis, on the left, overlapped Cutler on the Federal right and, 
of course, soon drove back his right wing along with Hall's 
battery, all of which were withdrawn without severe loss. But, 
on the Confederate right, Archer's brigade was overlapped by 
Meredith's, which struck it on the flank and captured Archer 
and several hundred prisoners. This blow to Archer relieved 
Cutler's brigade, which, changing front to its left, was able to 
cut off and capture two regiments of Davis's brigade which had 
advanced in pursuit of Cutler's right, and taken position in the 
cut of an unfinished railroad north of the Chambersburg Pike. 

Almost at the moment of his victory, however, Reynolds was 
killed. He was an excellent soldier and was well known to have 
been the choice of the army to replace Hooker. 

Meanwhile, Cutler was now reenforced by Rowley's division 
of the s^^me corps, which extended its fine farther to the right. 
Robinson's division also approached and was held in reserve 
near by. Later, as the engagement grew more severe, it was 
also put into the battle. 

Meanwhile, Hill had formed Pender's division in line of battle 
in rear of Heth, but it was held in reserve for some time, as 
Heth about noon received a reenforcement by the arrival of 
Rodes's division, on his left flank, coming in from Middletown. 



384 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

About the same time, also, the head- of the ll.th corps, under 
Howard, arrived at Gettysburg, and Howard succeeded Reynolds 
in command of the field. He halted Steinwehr's division, two 
brigades, on Cemetery Hill, as a reserve, and advanced Schurz 
and Barlow to the front. With these he formed Hne to cover 
the approaches from the north as far east as Rock Creek. This 
disposition was bad. The force was small for so long a Une, 
and its right flank was in the air near the Heidlersburg road, by 
which Early was now drawing near. 

For a while, however, the Federal forces were superior in num- 
bers at the actual points of contact, where only Rodes's and 
Heth's divisions were yet engaged. And, whether from discipline 
or from the inspiration of home, the fighting done by the Federal 
brigades was of the best type. At this period some Confederate 
brigades were seriously crippled. Heth's di\dsion, which had 
already suffered severely in Archer's and Davis's brigades, now 
lost heavily in Pettigrew's by a musketry combat at very close 
quarters. It won the affair, but the brigade was scarcely a half 
brigade for the rest of the battle. 

Iverson's brigade was exposed to a severe flank fire and lost 
three regiments. In his report, Iverson says : — 

"When I saw a white handkerchief raised, and my line of battle still 
lying down in position, I characterized the surrender as disgraceful. But 
when I found afterward that 500 of my men were left lying dead and 
wounded on a line as straight as a dress parade, I exonerated the sur- 
vivors and claim for the brigade that they nobly fought and died with- 
out a man running to the rear." 

It is needless to detail the fighting when Early's division 
advanced upon the right of the 11th corps; and when Pender 
reenforced Heth against the 1st corps. The enemy was forced 
back, and an advance of the Confederate line swept forward 
into the city. About 5000 prisoners were captured, and fugitives 
could be seen in disorganized masses passing over the hills in the 
rear. 

It was now about three o'clock.^ 

* The time and the condition of affairs are given in Hancock's report, as 
follows: "At 3 P.M. I arrived at Gettysburg and assumed the command. 
At this time the 1st and the 11th corps were retiring through the town, closely 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 385 

Sunset was about 7.30, twilight was long, and the moon was 
full. There was dayhght enough, and force enough at hand, to 
follow the pursuit and at least to carry Cemetery Hill, from which 
one of the two reserve brigades, Coster's, had been withdrawn. 

Soon after two o'clock, Lee had arrived on Seminary Ridge, 
and seen the defeat of the enemy and their retreat over Cemetery 
Hill. His first impulse was to have the pursuit pushed and he 
sent his Adjt.-Col. W. H. Taylor, to instruct Ewell accordingly. 
Unfortunately, he took no steps to see that the order was obeyed. 

Taylor gives the following account : — 

" Gen. Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg and 
up the hills beyond. He then directed me to go to Gen. Ewell, and to say 
to him that from the position which he occupied, he could see the enemy 
retreating over those hills without organization and in great confusion, 
that it was only necessary to press 'those people' in order to secure posses- 
sion of the heights, and that, if possible, he wished him to do this. 

"In obedience to these instructions I proceeded immediately to Gen. 
Ewell, and delivered the order of Gen. Lee, and after receiving from him 
some message for the commanding general in regard to the prisoners 
captured, returned to the latter and reported that his order had been de- 
livered. Gen. Ewell did not express any objection or indicate the existence 
of any impediment to the execution of the orders conveyed to him, but 
left the impression upon my mind that they would be executed. ... " * 

After reading this circumstantial statement, it is hard to un- 
derstand Ewell's conduct. Not only did he fail to renew the 
pursuit which he had previously stopped, but, by apparent 

pursued by the enemy. The cavalry of Buford was occupying a firm position 
on the plain to the left of Gettysburg, covering the rear of the retreating corps. 
The 3d corps had not yet arrived from Emmitsburg. Orders were at once 
given to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill with skirmishers oc- 
cupying that part of the town immediately in our front. The position just 
on the southern edge, overlooking the town and commanding the Emmits- 
burg and Taneytown roads and the Baltimore Turnpike, was already par- 
tially occupied on my arrival by direction of Gen. Howard. Some difficulty 
was experienced in forming the troops of the 11th corps, but by vigorous 
efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy 
from any serious assault on the position." 

It will presently appear that the enemy was not deterred by the Federal 
line, but was halted by Ewell without orders, and was deliberately kept 
halted even after orders to attack "if possible" had arrived, and remained 
halted all the rest of the afternoon, 

1 Four Years with Lee, p. 95, 



386 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

acqmescence and sending messages about prisoners captured, he 
seems to have intentionally misled Lee into the beUef that his 
orders were being obeyed, while the rare opportunity sUpped 
rapidly away. There could not be a more striking illustration, 
either of the danger of giving any important orders in any con- 
ditional form, or of failing to follow up all such orders, with some 
supervision. When the firing gradually died out instead of 
being renewed, Lee took no action. 

Meanwhile, Johnson's division, closely followed by Anderson's, 
had reached the field, and was ordered by Ewell to pass the town 
and occupy Gulp's Hill, a half-mile to the east. Ewell's report 
says : — 

"Before Johnson could get up, the enemy was reported moving to out- 
flank our extreme left, and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers 
in that direction." 

The skirmishers turned out to be our own men. Before this 
was discovered, it was sunset, and the hill about that time was 
occupied by Wadsworth's Federal division. Ewell, however, 
was not informed of this, and was again about to despatch 
Johnson on his errand when orders arrived from Lee to draw 
his corps to the right. He rode to see Lee and persuaded him 
to let the expedition be made. It was a most unfortunate deci- 
sion, as will presently appear, for it fatally extended Lee's left 
flank. About midnight, Johnson's division was moved around 
the base of Gulp's Hill and a reconnoitring party ascended, but 
found the enemy in possession. No one ordered the division to 
be carried back to the right, where it could have been of much 
service in subsequent operations, and where Lee had intended 
it to be. It was far too weak to attack the strong position of 
the enemy on Gulp's Hill, and its communication with the rest 
of the army was long, roundabout, and exposed to the enemy's 
view. But the division was allowed to remain until the end of the 
battle, and, as long as it remained absent, the task before the 
remainder of the army was beyond its strength. 

During the afternoon, Longstreet had joined Lee on Seminary 
Ridge overlooking the town, and had noted the position being 
taken by the enemy. He had said to Lee : " We could not call 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 387 

the enemy to a position better suited to our plans. We have 
only to file around his left and secure good ground between 
him and his capital." 

To his surprise, Lee had answered, "If he is there to-morrow, 
I shall attack him." 

Longstreet replied, "If he is there to-morrow, it will be be- 
cause he wants you to attack him." 

Later in the afternoon Lee rode forward to arrange a renewal 
of the attack upon Cemetery Hill from the town at dayhght 
next morning. He held a long conference with Ewell, Early, and 
Rodes, who urged, instead, that Longstreet should attack the 
enemy's left flank. No one of those present had more than a 
very vague idea of the character and features of the enemy's 
line, and it is therefore not surprising that this advice, though 
very plausible in view of the success of former flank movements, 
was here the worst possible. 

The enemy's line, though taken hurriedly upon the natural 
ridges overlooking the open country, which nearly surrounded it, 
was unique both in character and strength. In plan it nearly 
resembled a fish-hook, with its convexity toward us, forcing upon 
our line a similar shape with the concavity toward them. Their 
lines were the interior and shorter, being scarcely three miles in 
length, giving abihty to reenforce at any point by short cuts 
across the interior area. Our exterior fines were about five miles 
in length, and to move from point to point required long, round- 
about marches, often exposed to the enemy's view. Their force 
would allow 25,000 infantry and 100 guns for each mile of line. 
Ours would allow but 13,000 infantry and 50 guns per mile. 
Their flanks were at once unassailable and unturnable. Their 
left, which was the top of the fish-hook shank, rested on Big 
and Little Round Top mountains; and their right, which was 
the "point" of the "fish-hook," was on Gulp's Hill over Rock 
Creek. Both flanks presented precipitous and rocky fronts, 
screened from artillery fire by forest growth, and the convexity 
of the line was such that the two flanks approached and each was 
able to reenforce the other. The shank of the fish-hook ran 
north, nearly straight, for about two miles from Little Round 
Top to Cemetery Hill, where the bend began. The bend was 



388 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

not uniform and regular, but presented a sharp salient at the 
north, and on the east a deep reentrant around which the line 
swept to reach Gulp's Hill, and pass around it nearly in an S. 

This salient upon Cemetery Hill offered the only hopeful "point 
of attack upon the enemy's entire line, as will more fully appear in 
the accounts of the different efforts made at various places during 
the battle. It would be too much to say that an attack here 
on the morning of July 2 would have succeeded. But it is not at 
all too much to say that no other attack was possible at that 
time which would have had near as good chance of success, yetr it 
was deUberately discarded, and Lee's conference closed with the 
understanding among all those present that Longstreet should 
attack in the morning upon the enemy's left. It was this which 
gave rise to the mistaken charges made after Lee's death that 
Longstreet had disobeyed orders in not attacking early on the 2d. 

No orders whatever were given Longstreet that night. Before 
sunset, he had ridden back from his interview with Lee to meet 
his troops, who, about 4 p.m., marched from near Greenwood with 
orders to come to Gettysburg, 17 miles. About midnight they 
bivouacked four miles from the field. Marching again at dawn 
on the 2d, they arrived near the field between 6 and 8 a.m. His 
reserve artillery (the Washington artillery and Alexander's bat- 
talion), which was ordered to follow the infantry from Green- 
wood at midnight, was much detained upon the road by passing 
trains, and did not reach the field until 9 a.m. 

Law's brigade of Hood's division, recalled from New Guilford 
C. H., did not rejoin its division until noon on the 2d, having 
marched at 3 a.m., and covered by that time about 20 miles. 
Pickett's division was also upon the road, having marched 
from Chambersburg at 2 a.m. It made 22 miles and encamped 
within three miles of Gettysburg at 4 p.m., reporting its presence 
to Lee. 

The most important occurrence of the evening had been 
Meade's wise decision to abandon his plan of offering battle be- 
hind Pipe Creek, and to concentrate upon the position at Gettys- 
burg, which Hancock had recommended. He was most anxious 
to fight upon the defensive, and he knew that Lee, having a 
taste of victory, was not one to recoil from further offensive 



GETTYSBURG: THE FIRST DAY 389 

efforts. So, although reports during the afternoon had been 
discouraging, the march of all the corps had been hastened to 
find the defensive battle-field ; and their arrivals upon it had been 
about as follows : — 

Geary's division of the 12th corps had arrived about 6 p.m. and 
was placed on the left of the Federal fine by Hancock. Wil- 
liams's division of the same corps bivouacked near Rock Creek 
Bridge that night. 

The advance of the 3d corps came upon the field about simset. 
Durirtg the night, or early in the morning, the entire corps ar- 
rived. 

The 2d corps, having come from Taneytown, also reached the 
field soon after nightfall, and was all at hand in the morning. 

The 5th corps, marching from Hanover at 7 p.m., arrived on 
the field, 14 miles, at 8 a.m. on the 2d. 

The 6th corps, from the Union right at Manchester, arrived 
about 2 P.M., after a march of about 32 miles in 17 hours. 

At 8 A.M. of the 2d, therefore, practically the whole of both 
armies was upon the field except Pickett's division and Law's 
brigade of the Confederates, and the 6th corps of the Federals. 



CHAPTER XVII 

Gettysburg: Second Day 

The Situation. Lee decides to Attack. The Attack to be on our Right. 
Longstreet's Flank March. Sickles 's Advance. Meade foresees Sickles's 
Defeat. Progressive Type of Battle. Hood proposes Flank Move- 
ment. Formation and Opening. Hood's Front Line. Fight on Little 
Round Top. Hood's Second Line. McLaws badly Needed. Kershaw 
and Semmes. Artillery Fighting. Barksdale and Wofford. An- 
derson's Division. Wilcox's Brigade. Wilcox asks Help. Why No 
Help was Given. Lang's Brigade. Wright's Brigade. Wright carries 
the Stone Wall. Wright's Retreat. Reenforcements for Sickles. 
Ayres's Division. Confederate Situation. The Artillery Engaged. 
Ten More Brigades in Sight. Crawford's Advance. Ewell's Co- 
operation. The Afternoon Cannonade. Johnson's Assault. Early's 
Attack. Federal Account. Rodes's Failure to Advance. Rodes's 
New Position. Rodes's Summary, Second Day. 

LoNGSTREET, riding ahead of his approaching troops, met Lee 
upon Seminary Ridge about dawn on July 2. Daylight dis- 
closed the enemy in his position overlooking the town, and it 
was apparent that he was intrenched and w^as offering us the 
privilege of taking the offensive. Lee was far from disposed 
to decline the offer. Col. Long, of his staff, reports that he 
advised Lee during the night, — 

"At present only two or three corps of the enemy are up, and it seems 
best to attack before they are greatly strengthened." 

But, as a matter of fact, 43 of the 51 Federal brigades of in- 
fantry were upon the ground at 8 a.m. and occupying the strong 
position already described. Four of Lee's 37 infantry brigades 
were absent; four more (Johnson's division), were out of position 
east of Culp's Hill, and the lack of cavalry required the use of 
part of his remaining infantry upon each flank to protect from 
surprise. Wlien, at nine o'clock, the arrival of Longstreet's 
reserve artillery was reported, it must be admitted that there 
was little to be hoped for from any immediate attack then 
possible. 

390 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 391 

Lee however had decided to make one. He had said to Hood 
soon after the latter's arrival : " The enemy is here. If we don't 
whip him he will whip us." He had sent staff-officers to each 
flank and was awaiting their reports. Longstreet's only sug- 
gestion had been a turning movement, and taking a position 
threatening the enemy's rear. Lee seems to have doubted that 
this would force the enemy to attack. He feared being manoeu- 
vred out of position, and perhaps forced back across the Poto- 
mac without any opportunity of fighting. It was a reasonable 
fear, now that the Federal army had drawn near, and could 
much restrict his foraging for supplies. This was a risk insepa- 
rable from campaigns of invasion, and it evidently seemed a 
much greater one now, than when the campaign was being 
decided upon. Not fully appreciating the strength of the 
enemy's position, and misled by the hope that a large fraction 
of the Federal army was out of reach, Lee had determined to 
strike, and only hesitated as to the best point to attack. About 
nine o'clock, he rode to the left and conferred again with Ewell 
and Early, who again discouraged attack in their own front, and 
urged that it be by Longstreet on the right. About 10 he 
returned, and presently received the report from Long and 
Pendleton who had reconnoitred on the right. 

About 11 A.M., his orders were issued. Anderson's division 
of Hill's corps was directed to extend Hill's fine upon Seminary 
Ridge to the right, while Longstreet with Hood's and McLaws's 
divisions should make a flank march to the right and pass beyond 
the enemy's flank, which seemed to extend along the Emmits- 
burg road. Forming then at right angles to this road, the at- 
tack was to sweep down the enemy's line from their left, being 
taken up successively by the brigades of Anderson's division as 
they were reached. Ewell's corps, holding the extreme left, was 
to attack the enemy's right on hearing Longstreet's guns. Long- 
street was directed, in his march, to avoid exposing it to the view 
of a Federal signal station on Little Round Top Mountain. 

Meanwhile, on the arrival of Longstreet's reserve artillery 
in the vicinity of the field, I had been placed in charge of all the 
artillery of his corps, and directed to reconnoitre the enemy's 
left and to move some of the battahons to that part of the field. 



392 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

This had been done by noon, when three battahons, — my own, 
Cabell's and Henry's — were located in the valley of Willoughby 
Run awaiting the arrival of the infantry. Riding back presently 
to learn the cause of their non-arrival, the head of the infantry 
column was found halted, where its road became exposed to the 
Federal view, while messages were sent to Longstreet, and the 
guide sought a new route. The exposed point had been easily 
avoided by our artillery, by turning out through a meadow, 
but after some delay there came orders to the infantry to counter- 
march and take a road via "Black Horse Tavern." This in- 
cident delayed the opening of the battle nearly two hours. It is 
notable, both as illustrating the contingencies attending move- 
ments over unfamiliar ground, and also the annoyance which 
may be caused an enemy by the use of balloons to overlook his 
territory. It hardly seems probable, however, that in this 
instance the delay influenced the result of the battle. The same 
may be said, too, of a prehminary delay in Longstreet's begin- 
ning his march to the left after Lee's order at 11 a.m. Long- 
street's official report says, — 

"Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, 
I delayed until Gen. Law's brigade joined its division." 

The history of the battle seems to justify this delay (Longstreet 
calls it 30 minutes), as without Law's brigade our first attack 
must have been dangerously weak. 

Meanwhile, an important change had occurred in the enemy's 
position. Until noon, their main line had run nearly due south 
from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top, while a strong skir- 
mish-line only was held upon the Emmitsburg Pike, for about a 
mile from Cemetery Hill, to a cross-road at the Peach Orchard. 
About noon, the movements of the Confederates toward the Fed- 
eral left were noted, and Sickles, whose corps held that flank, sent 
forward from the Peach Orchard a small reconnoitring force. It 
encountered Wilcox's brigade, and was driven back with severe 
loss, but not before it had discovered the approach of Long- 
street's column. This being reported to Sickles, he unwisely 
ordered an advance of his whole corps to hold the ground about 
the Peach Orchard. He probably had in mind the advantage 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 393 

given the Confederates at Chancellorsville in allowing them the 
occupation of the Hazel Grove plateau. But it was, nevertheless, 
bad tactics. It exchanged strong ground for weak, and gave the 
Confederates an opportunity not otherwise possible. They 
would be quite sure to crush the isolated 3d corps. If their 
attack was properly organized and conducted, it might become 
possible to rush and carry the Federal main hne in the pursuit 
of the fugitives. 

Meade, however, having seen Hooker's movement, at once 
visited the ground, and, after conferring with Sickles, ordered 
his return to his original position. Before the movement could 
be begun, however, Longstreet's guns had opened, and it was 
unwise to attempt a withdrawal '.mder fire. Meade saw the 
danger, and with military foresight prepared to meet it with 
every available man. There was not during the war a finer 
example of efficient command than that displayed by Meade on 
this occasion. He immediately began to bring to the scene 
reinforcements, both of infantry and artillery, from every 
corps and from every part of his line. As will be seen in the 
account of the fighting, he had engaged, or in hand on the field, 
fully 40,000 men by the time that Longstreet's assault was re- 
pulsed. 

On the other hand, it must be said that the management of the 
battle on the Confederate side during this afternoon was conspicu- 
ously bad. The fighting was superb. But there appears to have 
been little supervision, and there was entire failure everywhere 
to conform to the original plan of the battle, as it had been in- 
dicated by Lee. Offensive battles are always more difficult of 
control than defensive, and there were two special difficulties on 
this occasion. First, was the great extent of the Confederate 
lines, about five miles — and their awkward shape, making inter- 
communication slow and difficult. Second, was the type or char- 
acter of the attack ordered ; which may be called the echelon, or 
progressive type, as distinguished from the simultaneous. The 
latter should be the type for any battle in the afternoon. Battles 
begun by one command and to be taken up successively by others, 
are always much prolonged. We had used this method on four 
occasions, — at Seven Pines, Gaines Mill, Frazier's Farm or 



394 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Glendale, and Malvern Hill, — and always with poor success. 
Our effort this afternoon will be seen to be a monumental failure. 
General instructions were given to each corps commander, but 
much was left to their discretion in carrying them out. More than 
one fell short in performance. 

It was about 3 p.m. when Hood's division, in the advance, crossed 
the Emmitsburg road about 1000 yards south of the Peach 
Orchard. The enemy's artillery had opened upon us as soon 
as our approach was discovered, and we presently replied. 
Hood's division crossed the road and formed in two lines, Rob- 
ertson and Law in front, with Law on the right; Anderson and 
Benning 200 yards in rear, with Benning on the right. 

While this formation was taking place, scouts reported that Big 
Round Top Mountain was unoccupied and that an open farm 
road around it led to unguarded supply trains and hospitals. 
Hood and Law earnestly urged upon Longstreet that instead 
of making the direct attack, he should pass around the 3d corps, 
seize Big Round Top, and fall upon the trains. Longstreet 
replied that Lee had ordered the direct attack, and it must be 
made without delay. 

It is not likely that the movement proposed by Hood would 
have accomplished much. Already our line was dangerously 
extended, and to have pushed one or two divisions past the 3d 
corps and around the mountain would have invited their de- 
struction. Had our army been more united and able to follow 
up the move in force, it might have proved a successful one. Not 
by assaulting the enemy in his chosen position where his whole 
army stood, as it were, in a circle back to back, but by threaten- 
ing his communications while covering our own. It might easily 
have resulted in our being able to secure a position which would 
force the enemy to take the aggressive. Had Johnson's division 
been brought back from its isolated position, and had Lee been 
present to hear the report brought by Hood's scouts, the whole 
subsequent history of the battle might have been changed. 

Meanwhile, McLaws's division had been formed, west of and 
parallel to the Emmitsburg road, with Kershaw on the right 
supported by Semmes, and Barksdale on the left supported by 
Wofford. In front of Kershaw, Cabell's battahon of artillery 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 395 

was engaged with 18 guns; and in front of Barksdale were 18 
of my own battalion. Ten guns, also of Henry's battalion, were 
engaged across the Emmitsburg road. The remaining 8 guns 
of my own battalion were held close by, to follow the infantry 
promptly in any advance, and the Washington artillery with 
10 guns, by Longstreet's order, were held in reserve in rear. 

Thus, about 3.45 p.m., 36 guns were in action against the Peach 
Orchard, and the enemy's adjacent lines and 10 guns against the 
enemy's left. The ranges were generally between 500 and 700 
yards. After this cannonade had continued for perhaps 30 
minutes. Hood received the order to advance. 

Following the initiative prescribed by Lee, Longstreet, Hood, 
and McLaws all made progressive attacks. Hood at first ad- 
vanced only his front line. McLaws was about to advance upon 
Hood's left very soon after, when Longstreet halted him. He 
was held back for about an hour, during which Hood's second line 
was sent in, and both lines suffered severely. Then McLaws 
advanced both lines of his right wing, Kershaw and Semmes; 
and, after a further interval of at least 20 minutes (long enough 
to cause severe loss to Kershaw's exposed left), Barksdale and 
Wofford followed. There were thus four partial attacks of two 
brigades each, requiring at least an hour and a half to be gotten 
into action; where one advance by the eight brigades would 
have won a quicker victory with far less loss. 

When Hood's first line commenced the advance. Law, on the 
right, overlapped the Federal left. On the left Robertson was 
greatly overlapped by the Federal line. Law, obliquing still 
farther to his right, hoping to turn the Federal flank, a gap 
opened between Robertson and himself. The 4th and 5th Tex., 
on Robertson's right, trying to dress upon Law, were drawn 
entirely away from Robertson, and attached themselves to Law's 
brigade. This brigade became divided, in the rough ground it 
traversed, into two bodies. The two regiments on the right, the 
15th and 47th Ala. with a few of the 4th and 5th Tex., swung 
still farther to the right, meeting no enemy, and, crossing Plum 
Run, they ascended the side of Big Round Top. Then, wheeling 
to the left, they crossed the depression between Big and Little 
Round Top and finally found the enemy in position on the 



396 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

top of the latter. Quite a sharp action ensued, which may be 
described here, out of its order in time, as it was entirely isolated. 

Three companies of the 47th Ala. were detached and left on 
picket at the foot of the mountain. The remaining force was but 
about 500 men under the command of Col. Gates of the 15th Ala. 
The mountain had been partially occupied in the morning by the 
3d corps, but was vacated when they moved to the front. About 
4 P.M., Gen. Warren, seeing the deployment of our lines, had 
brought up Vincent's brigade of Barnes's division of the 5th 
corps. Swinton has written that a foot-race occurred for the 
commanding position, and that a desperate hand-to-hand fight 
with bayonets and clubbed muskets took place for a half-hour 
between "Hood's Texans" and Vincent's men. 

None of the official reports on either side are consistent with 
this story. There was some sharp fighting and Vincent was 
killed, but Gates's small and isolated force was soon outflanked 
and compelled to retreat to the foot of the mountain. It was 
not pursued, and, at the foot, it built breastworks of rocks which 
it held all night and part of the next day. The total casualties 
reported for the battle by the 15th Ala. were: 17 killed, 54 
wounded, and 90 missing, total 161. Maj. Campbell of the 47th 
reported "about one- third of his whole number of men were 
killed and wounded." The losses of Vincent's brigade for the 
battle were 352. 

Hood's front line had, meanwhile, been reduced, by Gates's 
divergence to Big Round Top, to less than seven regiments in 
two isolated bodies. Law, on the right, had the 4th, 44th, and 
48th Ala., and parts of the 4th and 5th Tex. Robertson, on the 
left, had only the 1st Tex. and 3d Ark. His left flank, too, was 
in the air, and was much overlapped by the Federal line. It 
could make no progress, but maintained a position under very 
severe fire of artillery and infantry, which, within the first half- 
hour, severely wounded Hood. Law succeeded to the command 
of the division. 

His part of the brigade had made more progress, but already 
reenforcements sent by Meade were reaching the enemy and 
Law's advance was checked. He ordered in the second line, 
using Benning's brigade to reenforce his own, and Anderson to 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 397 

extend Robertson on his left. Law thus describes the advance 
of his reenf orced line in an article in Battles and Leaders : — 

"The ground was rough and difficult, broken by rocks and boulders, 
which rendered an orderly advance impossible. Sometimes the Federals 
would hold one side of the huge boulders on the slopes until the Confed- 
erates occupied the other. In some cases my men, with reckless daring, 
mounted to the top of the large rocks in order to get a better view and to 
deliver their fire with greater effect. . . . 

"In less than an hour from the time we advanced to the attack, the 
hill by Devil's Den, opposite our centre, was taken with three pieces of 
the artillery that had occupied it. The remaining piece was run down 
the opposite slope by the gunners, and escaped capture." 

During all this time, however, McLaws's division was stand- 
ing idle, though Barksdale was begging to be allowed to charge, 
and McLaws was awaiting Longstreet's order. Even when 
prolonged by Anderson's Georgians, the Texans' line was still 
so overlapped by the Federals that it could not advance. Law, 
placing his two brigades on the defensive on the captured hill, 
now came to the left and made a strong appeal to Kershaw for 
help. This was referred to McLaws and probably to Longs treet, 
for now the order was given for the advance of Kershaw sup- 
ported by Semmes. But, by some unaccountable lack of appre- 
ciation of the situation, Barksdale, Wofford, and all the brigades 
of Anderson's division are still left idle spectators of the combat, 
while Hood's division is wearing itself out against superior 
numbers in strong position. Lee seems not to have been near. 
This was unfortunate, for his whole field of battle had been 
waiting all day and was still waiting for Longstreet's battle to 
be developed; and here it was being begun, in the progressive 
manner which had been ordered, but with unwise deliberation. 
Longstreet, of course, is responsible, but every commanding 
officer takes great risks when he leaves such important move- 
ments without supervision. It was especially unfortunate in 
this case, because advancing Kershaw without advancing Barks- 
dale would expose Kershaw to enfilade by the troops whom Barks- 
dale would easily drive off. Few battle-fields can furnish ex- 
amples of worse tactics. 

Kershaw was put in motion by a signal. Cabell's guns, in his 
front, were ordered to pause in their firing, and then to fire three 



398 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

guns in rapid succession. At the signal the men leaped the wall 
in their front and were promptly aligned by their company 
officers. Kershaw writes, in Battles and Leaders : — 

"The brigade moved off at the word with great steadiness and precision, 
followed by Semmes with equal promptness. Longstreet accompanied 
me in this advance on foot as far as the Emmitsburg road. All the field 
and staff officers were dismounted on account of the many obstacles in 
the way. 

"When we were about the Emmitsburg road I heard Barksdale's 
drums beat the assembly and knew then that I should have no immediate 
support on my left about to be squarely presented to the heavy force of 
infantry and artillery at and in rear of the Peach Orchard." 

As such a position would be speedily ruinous, Kershaw directed 
the three regiments on his left to wheel to the left and to charge 
the batteries in rear of the Orchard, while with the right wing he 
continued the movement to the aid of Hood's division. Thus 
this brigade was also separated into two parts. Kershaw moved 
with the right wing, and presently, finding his right regiment, 
the 7th S.C., beginning to overlap one on its left, he halted his 
line and ordered the 7th to move by the right flank. By some 
misunderstanding the order was shouted to the left, and was 
overheard by the left wing, who supposed it was an order for 
themselves to move by the right flank. 

Kershaw's narrative continues : — 

"After passing the building at Rose's, the charge of the left wing was 
no longer visible from my position, but the movement was reported to 
have been magnificently conducted until the cannoneers had left their 
guns and the caissons were moving off, when the order was given by some 
unauthorized person to 'move by the right flank,' and was immediately 
obeyed by the men. The Federals returned to their guns and opened on 
these doomed regiments a raking fire of grape and canister at short dis- 
tance which proved most disastrous, and for a time destroyed their use- 
fulness. Hundreds of the bravest and best men of Carolina fell victims 
of this fatal blunder." 

Meanwhile our own artillery fire had been kept up without 
intermission for what seemed more than two hours, though I 
know of no one who timed it. The range was very close, and the 
ground we occupied gave little shelter except at few points for 
the hmbers and caissons. Our losses both of men and horses 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 399 

were the severest the batteries ever suffered in so short a time 
during the war. Moody's battery had four 24-Pr. howitzers and 
two 12-Pr. guns on a rocky slope, and the labor of running the 
guns up after each recoil presently became so exhausting that, 
with Barksdale's permission, eight volunteers from a Miss, regi- 
ment were gotten to help the cannoneers. Two of this de- 
tachment were killed and three severely wounded. Fickling's 
battery of four 12-Pr, howitzers had two of them dismounted, 
and forty cannoneers killed or wounded. 

At last the 10 guns of Jordan and Woolfolk which had been 
held in reserve were sent for, but just as they arrived Barksdale's 
brigade made its advance, and was soon followed by Wofford's, 
which Longstreet also accompanied in person. While the in- 
fantry was passing, my four batteries, which had been engaged 
in the cannonade, were gotten ready, and the whole six followed 
the charge of the infantry, and came into action in and about 
the Peach Orchard.^ 

Barksdale's brigade advanced directly upon the Peach Or- 
chard. Wofford's inchned somewhat to the right and went to 
the assistance of Kershaw and Semmes, striking the flank of the 
Federals opposing them. The enemy was driven back with 
severe loss and followed across the Wheat Field and on to the 
slopes of Little Round Top. Barksdale had made an equal ad- 
vance upon our left. But by this time the reenforcements 
which Meade was hurrying from every part of the Federal line 
began to swarm around our mixed-up brigades. Barksdale was 
killed, Semmes mortally wounded, and our Unes were slowly 
forced back. Another partial attack had spent its energy upon 
a task impossible for so small a force. 

Under the orders, Anderson's division was to take up the 
attack next after McLaws, so that the delay in starting Barksdale 
delayed also Wilcox's brigade on his left, Wilcox's report states 
that "the cannonading continued until 6.20 p.m. when McLaws's 

* As we advanced we saw a number of prisoners being sent to the rear, 
passing a rail fence across our path. Maj. Bearing, commanding the battal- 
ion attached to Pickett's division was with us, and he shouted an order to 
the prisoners to "move those rails." Never was an order executed with 
more alacrity. Every prisoner seemed to seize a rail, and the fence dis- 
appeared as if by magic. 



400 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

troops advanced to the attack." There was again much delay, 
due to the fact that Wilcox had not been previously located at 
the position from which his charge should be made. This re- 
quired a flank movement to the left of 400 or 500 yards over 
ground obstructed by stone and plank fences. The 8th Ala. 
was even hurried into the charge in column of fours. Proper 
preparation of the line during the long delay might have saved 
much time and permitted Wilcox's brigade to cover Barksdale's 
exposed left. 

Wilcox made a briUiant charge, and was soon followed in 
echelon on the left by Perry's brigade under Lang, and Lang 
was similarly followed by Wright's brigade. These two charges 
followed with the least delay of any during the affair. But each 
brigade was formed in a single line and without support, each 
advanced with its left flank in the air, intervals of time and 
space intervened even between these attacks, and each was 
finally and separately repulsed with severe loss. The two re- 
maining brigades of the division, Posey's and Mahone's, were 
withheld from the assault. I will describe briefly the action of 
each brigade. 

Wilcox first encountered skirmishers in front of the Emmits- 
burg pike with a line of infantry and batteries along the pike. 
These fell back before his musketry fire, leaving in the road two 
guns whose horses had been killed. Beyond the pike the ground 
sloped gradually some 600 yards to a ravine fringed with small 
trees in rocky ground. Beyond the ground rose rapidly some 200 
yards to a ridge, crowned with numerous batteries and held by the 
enemy in force. Wilcox's report gives his strength as about 1200, 
and thus describes his advance : — 

" When my command crossed the pike and began to descend the slope 
they were exposed to an artillery fire from numerous pieces both from the 
front and from either flank. Before reaching the ravine at the foot of 
the slope two lines of infantry were met and broken, and driven pell-mell 
across the ravine. A second battery of six pieces here fell into our hands. 
From the batteries on the ridge above referred to, grape and canister were 
poured into our ranks. This stronghold of the enemy, together with his 
batteries, were almost won when still another line of infantry descended the 
slope in our front, at a double quick, to the support of their fleeing com- 
rades, and for the defence of the batteries. 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 401 

"Seeing this contest so unequal I despatched my adjutant-general to 
the division commander to ask that support be sent to my men, but no 
support came. Three several times did this last of the enemy's lines at- 
tempt to drive my men back and were as often repulsed. This struggle 
at the foot of the hill on which were the enemy's batteries, though so un- 
equal, was continued for some 30 minutes. With a second supporting line 
the heights could have been carried. Without support on either my right 
or my left my men were withdrawn to prevent their entire destruction or 
capture. The enemy did not pursue, but my men retired under a heavy 
artillery fire, and returned to their original position in the line, and biv- 
ouacked for the night, pickets being left on the pike. ... In the engage- 
ment of this day I regret to report a loss of 577 men killed, wounded, and 
missing." 

Soon after this battle a newspaper correspondent, " P. W. A./' 
described Wilcox's charge and his sending in vain to Anderson for 
reenforcements, and stated that Anderson had Posey's and 
Mahone's brigades idle, and that the battle was lost for lack of 
their support. Anderson replied, admitting the facts, but stating 
that he was under orders from Hill to hold two brigades in reserve, 
and that when Wilcox's call for help was received he was unable 
to find Hill and refer the matter to him. 

Next on Wilcox's left was our lone Fla. brigade, Perry's, now 
under Lang. It had but three small regiments, and mustered 
about 700 bayonets. Lang reports as follows : — 

"At 6 P.M., Wilcox having begun to advance I moved forward, being 
met at the crest of the first hill with a murderous fire of grape, canister, 
and musketry. Moving ■ forward at the double quick, the enemy fell 
back beyond their artillery, where they were attempting to rally, when we 
reached the crest of the second hill. Seeing this the men opened a galling 
fire upon them, thickly strewing the ground with their killed and wounded. 
This threw them into confusion when we charged them with a yell, and 
they broke and fled into the woods and breastworks beyond, leaving four 
or five pieces of cannon in my front, carrying off, however, most of the 
horses and limbers. 

" Following them rapidly I arrived behind a small eminence at the foot 
of the heights, where, the brigade having become much scattered, I halted 
for the purpose of re-forming, and allowing the men to catch their breath 
before the final assault upon the heights. 

" While re-forming, an aid from the right informed me that a heavy force 
had advanced upon Wilcox's brigade and was forcing it back. At the 
same time a heavy fire of musketry was poured upon my brigade from the 
woods 50 yards in front, which was gallantly met and handsomely replied 



402 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

to by my men. A few moments later another messenger from the right 
mformed me that Wilcox had fallen back and the enemy was then some 
distance in rear of my right flank. Going to the right I discovered that the 
enemy had passed me more than 100 yards and were attempting to sur- 
round me. I immediately ordered my men back to the road some 300 
yards to the rear. Arriving there I found there was no cover under which 
to rally and continued to fall back, rallying and re-forming upon the line 
from which we started. ... In this charge the brigade lost about 300 
killed, wounded, and missuig." 

Next came Wright's Ga. brigade about 1800 strong. Wright, 
in his report, describes the ground over which his advance was 
to be made, the distance to be traversed under fire increasing 
toward the left. 

"I was compelled to pass for more than a mile across an open plain, 
intersected by numerous post and rail fences, and swept by the enemy's 
artillery, posted along the Emmitsburg road, and upon the crest of the 
heights a little south of Cemetery Hill." 

He noted that Posey's brigade upon his left was not advancing, 
and fearing that with his left flank in the air he would be involved 
in serious difficulty, he sent an aid to Anderson with a message 
on the subject. Anderson ordered Posey to send forward two 
regiments as skirmishers. Later Posey speaks of supporting 
his skirmishers with his remaining regiments ; but as his casual- 
ties in the whole campaign were but 12 killed and 71 wounded, 
evidently his brigade was not seriously engaged, and the whole 
attack was allowed to terminate with that of Wright. Neither 
Hill nor Anderson give any explanation. Hill had still unen- 
gaged and close at hand Mahone's brigade and Heth's division in 
reserve. 

Wright's report is of special interest as his advance was over 
the same ground covered the next day by the charge of Pickett's 
division. His report thus describes it after he had carried the 
enemy's advanced fine, capturing several guns, crossed the 
pike, and approached the stone wall marking Pickett's farthest 
advance in his charge on the 3d. 

"We were now within less than 100 yards of the crest of the heights, 
which were lined with artillery, supported by a strong body of infantry 
under protection of a stone fence. My men, by a well-directed fire, soon 
drove the cannoneers from their guns, and leaping over the fence charged 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 403 

up to the top of the crest, and drove the enemy's infantry into a rocky 
gorge on the eastern slope of the heights, and some 80 or 100 yards in rear 
of the enemy's batteries. 

"We were now complete masters of the field, having gained the key, 
as it were, of the enemy's whole line. Unfortunately, just as we had 
carried the enemy's last and strongest position, it was discovered that the 
brigade upon our right had not only not advanced across the turnpike, 
but had actually given way and was rapidly falling back to the rear, 
while on our left we were entirely unprotected, the brigade ordered to our 
support having failed to advance. ... 

"We were now in a critical condition. The enemy's converging lines 
were rapidlM closing upon our rear ; a few moments more and we would 
be completely surrounded ; still no support could be seen coming to our 
assistance, and with painful hearts we abandoned our captured guns, faced 
about, and prepared to cut our way through the closing lines in our rear. 
This was effected in tolerable order, but with immense loss. The enemy 
rushed to his abandoned guns as soon as we began to retire and poured 
a severe fire of grape and canister into our thinned ranks as we retired 
slowly down the slope into the valley below. I continued to fall back until 
I reached a slight depression a few hundred yards in advance of our skir- 
mish line of the morning, when I halted, re-formed my brigade, and 
awaited the further pursuit of the enemy. . . . 

"In this charge my loss was very severe, amounting to 688 in killed, 
wounded, and missing, including many valuable officers. I have not the 
slightest doubt that I should have been able to have maintained my posi- 
tion on the heights and secured the captured artillery if there had been 
a protecting force on my left, or if the brigade on my right had not been 
forced to retire. We captured over 20 pieces of artillery, all of which we 
were compelled to abandon." 

Is there anywhere a sadder story of the war than this ? In all 
the reports of all the battles of the war there is no one more elo- 
quent of fine conduct, but of poor handling of splendid troops. 
And presently we shall see in sharp contrast, in the Federal 
army, during this same afternoon, perhaps the best example 
which the war produced of active supervision and efficient 
handling of a large force on the defensive. 

This action of Wright's ended Longstreet's battle of the 
afternoon. Three of Anderson's five brigades had attacked in 
progressive order and in single lines. They had been defeated 
and driven back, one at a time, in the order of their advance. No 
better demonstration could be asked of the evils of progressive 
attacks. The three brigades could just as easily have attacked 



404 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

simultaneously with McLaws, and several other brigades of 
Hill's corps could have supported and advanced with them. The 
temporary success of each brigade in a single and isolated Une 
puts it beyond doubt that such an attack would have had better 
result. 

It has been told that Meade, being on the left with Sickles at 
the time of Longstreet's attack, had at once begun to bring 
up reenforcements. It is interesting to note the number thus 
brought forward before the fighting ceased at dark. 

The first help sent Sickles, when his six brigades were attacked 
by Longstreet's eight, was Barnes's division of the 5th corps, 
three brigades, — Tilton's, Sweitzer's, and Vincent's. Vincent 
fought Oates on Little Round Top and repulsed him, Vincent, 
however, being killed. Tilton and Sweitzer attacked Law and 
Anderson, but were themselves soon driven back. 

The losses of this division were : Vincent's, 352 ; Tilton's, 125 ; 
Sweitzer's, 427; total, 904. As Barnes retreated, Caldwell's 
division of the 2d corps came up, with four brigades under Cross, 
Kelley, Zook, and Brook. The battle seesawed, but Caldwell 
was driven back with the loss of half his division. Cross and 
Zook were killed and Brook wounded. The brigade losses were : 
Cross, 330; Kelley, 198; Brook, 389; Zook, 358; total, 1275. 

While Caldwell was in the stress of action, Sykes advanced 
Ayres's division of three brigades, sending Weed to the left to the 
aid of Vincent ; and the two brigades of regulars, under Day and 
Burbank, to the left of Caldwell's division. Here their right 
was exposed by the retreat of Caldwell, and they were com- 
pelled to cut their way back to the main Federal line upon the 
crest of the ridge, closely pursued and severely punished by the 
Confederates. Weed, supporting Vincent at a critical juncture, 
had been himself killed. Between Weed and Vincent, however, 
Oates's force had been driven to the base of the mountain, where 
it remained unpursued. Day and Burbank, when driven back, 
formed upon Weed's left upon the crest. Weed's losses were 200 ; 
Day's, 382; Burbank's, 447; total, 1029. 

Most of this fighting was taking place about midway between 
Little Round Top, which was the left flank of the Federal Une, 
and the Peach Orchard on the Emmitsburg road. In the dis- 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 405 

puted arena was a wheat field nearly surrounded by woods on the 
west of Plum Run, here running south through marshy ground. 
The tide of battle rolled back and forth across this field several 
times, and when Ayres's regulars were driven back and pur- 
sued, Sykes ordered forward his last division, Crawford's, called 
the Pa. Reserves, two brigades under McCandless and Fisher. 
Crawford formed in two lines, the second massed on the first, and 
his report thus describes the scene as he approached it : — 

"Our troops in front, after a determined resistance, unable to withstand 
the force of the enemy, fell back, and some finally gave way. The plain 
to my front was covered with fugitives from all divisions, who rushed 
through my lines and along the road to the rear. Fragments of regiments 
came in disorder, and without their arms, and for a moment all seemed 
lost. The enemy's skirmishers had reached the foot of the rocky ridge 
(Little Round Top) and his columns were following rapidly." 

One is tempted to pause for a moment to contemplate the 
really hopeless situation of the Confederate battle. Already 
Sickles's six brigades had been reenforced by 10 brigades which 
had been defeated one, two, or three at a time, with losses to the 
reenf or cements alone of 3108 men and five generals. The 
eight Confederate brigades had themselves suffered terribly and 
lost four generals. All had marched fully 20 miles within 24 
hours, and the attack, much of it through woods and over 
rugged ground, had mingled commands and broken ranks. In- 
fantry can never deliver their normal amount of fire except in 
regular ranks, shoulder to shoulder. When ranks are broken 
the men interfere with and mask each other. To say nothing of 
probable need of ammunition at this stage of the action, one 
must recognize that now, as the 11th and 12th brigades of the 
Federal reenforcements approach, the Confederate need of at 
least a fresh division is great. There are not only no reenforce- 
ments on the way, but none within two miles. 

Both Hill and Ewell have orders to cooperate with Long- 
street's battle, but they are limiting their cooperation to in- 
effective cannonading of the enemy's intrenchments in their 
front, while the enemy is stripping these of infantry and march- 
ing fresh divisions to concentrate upon Hood and McLaws, and 
the three brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright, which had sup- 



406 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ported them. But when these had carried the lines in their 
front (Carr's, Brewster's, and Biirhng's brigades of the 3d corps), 
Hancock had brought up Harrow's and Hall's brigades of Gib- 
bon's division; and Willard's of Hays's division. One at a 
time, the three Confederate brigades were driven back with 
losses, aheady stated, amounting to 1565 men. The six Federal 
brigades had lost as follows : Harrow's, 768 ; Hall's, 377 ; Wil- 
lard's, 714, Willard being Idlled; Carr's, 790; Brewster's, 778; 
BurUng's, 513; total, 3940.' 

It would be tedious to attempt to follow the artillery reen- 
forcements which came to the aid of Sickles 's corps, but Hunt, 
Chief of Artillery, in his report, mentions 11 batteries with 60 
guns being engaged from his general reserve. In addition to 
these the 2d, 3d, and 5th corps had 80 guns engaged. Against 
these 140 guns, Longstreet had but 62 gims on the field, and 
Anderson's division but seven. The artillery on both sides suf- 
fered severely in men and horses. A number of Federal bat- 
teries were captured, and held temporarily, but only two 
or three guns could be brought off the field. Hunt's report 
says : — 

"The batteries were exposed to heavy front and enfilading fires and 
suffered terribly, but as rapidly as any were disabled they were retired 
and replaced by others." 

Besides the reenforcements of 12 brigades already mentioned 
(including Crawford's Pa. reserves), Meade had followed them 
with Robinson's and Doubleday's divisions of the 1st corps, 
five brigades (taken from the fines in front of HiU's corps), and 
with WiUiams's division, three brigades of the 12th corps. Two 
more brigades. Candy's and Cobham's, of Geary's division of the 
12th corps, were also withdrawn from the intrenchments upon 
Gulp's Hill, and ordered to the left, but they missed their road 
and did not reach the scene of action in time. These with- 
drawals left of the 12th corps but a single brigade, Greene's, 
holding the intrenchments upon Gulp's Hill in front of John- 
son's division of Ewell's corps, who had been all day under 

* The Federal losses stated are from the official returns which include the 
losses of all three days, but most of the brigades mentioned suffered the 
greater part of their losses during the afternoon of the 2d. 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 407 

orders to attack at the sound of Longstreet's guns. What they 
did will be told presently. 

All of these reenforeements did not become engaged. A part 
of Stannard's brigade recaptured six of the Federal guns, which 
the Confederates had overrun but could not remove. Part of 
Lockwood's brigade of the 12th corps, who were raw troops, were 
led into action by Meade in person, and also retook a captured 
battery. Most of these reenforeements came into view upon the 
crest, from the lower slopes of which Crawford's division now 
advanced in a counter-stroke to the Confederate charge which had 
routed and pursued Ayres's division. The mere sight of the long 
lines and soHd blue masses which appeared to the Confederates 
as they cleared the woods and scanned the opposite slopes, was 
calculated to paralyze the advance. Ten fresh brigades were 
in position before them, besides the remnants of the 13 brigades 
which had been driven back. About 75 guns were in action sup- 
porting this huge force. To this day there survive stories show- 
ing how the Confederates were impressed by this tremendous 
display. One, still told by guides at Gettysburg, is that a cry 
was heard in the Confederate ranks, "Have we got all creation 
to whip?" And another of the time was that the Federal 
commander was heard to give his orders : "Attention, Universe ! 
Nations into Une ! By Kingdom! — Right wheel." 

Fortunately for the Confederates, the Federal counter-stroke 
was confined to a very moderate advance by Crawford's division. 
Our disorganized Unes made a show of resistance, but it only 
led to the loss of perhaps 200 prisoners from Anderson's brigade, 
which unwisely prolonged its fire. The enemy, however, only 
advanced to the eastern edge of the Wheat Field, and the Con- 
federates retreated no farther than the western edge. From 
those positions the firing was kept up until darkness brought 
a welcome end. For in our worn-out condition and isolated 
position we were in a very dangerous situation. Had Meade 
now ordered an advance he would have found Longstreet's left 
flank in the air, and the whole hne of McLaws's and Hood's 
divisions much exhausted and but poorly suppUed with ammu- 
nition. The ground on the left was open and the moon was 
full. There was certainly a great opportunity offered the 



408 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Federal commander, with his large force of fresh troops in hand 
near the field, and only needing the word to go. 

It is now time to see how Lee's orders were being interpreted 
and carried out upon the left. The official reports are a painful 
record of insufficient comprehension of orders and inefficient 
attempts at execution, by officers each able to shift the blame 
of failure upon other shoulders than his own. Between the 
lines the apparent absence of supervision excites constant won- 
der. But everywhere that the troops fought their conduct was 
admirable. 

Ewell, as before told, was ordered to attack with Johnson's 
division when he heard the sound of Longstreet's guns. Ewell 
says that later his instructions were modified into "making a 
diversion," but Lee's report does not recognize such modifica- 
tion, Ewell interpreted his orders as calling only for a cannon- 
ade. It must be admitted that any serious attack by Johnson 
would have been suicidal. The enemy's lines were of exceptional 
strength, which is noted in the Federal reports. Ruger, for 
instance, thus describes the position of his division. 

"Breastworks were immediately constructed of logs, rocks, and earth 
along the whole line, and at the gap in the line caused by the swale, so 
as to give cross fire in front of gap. In rear of breastworks of 1st brigade, 
about 75 yards and nearly parallel therewith, was a stone wall, behind which 
the second line of the brigade was placed. In front of the line of the 3d 
brigade Rock Creek was from four to six feet deep, with muddy bottom, 
caused by a dam near the turnpike. The whole position was covered 
with rocks. . . ." 

Added to these difficulties was the fact that there was but a 
single position where the Confederates could plant guns to fire 
upon this line, and that an inferior one, giving little shelter and 
exposed to an enffiade foe. It was so contracted that with 
difficulty 14 guns were crowded upon it, within about 1000 
yards of the enemy. It might have been foreseen that this 
battery, exposed to the fire of double its number of guns, would 
soon be put out of action. That was what happened : its com- 
mander, an especially gallant "Boy Major," Latimer (under 21 
years), being killed. Besides these guns Ewell's diversion em- 
braced six rifles, in rear of Latimer at a range of 2000 yards; 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 409 

and 12 more, on Seminary Ridge to the left of Hill's artillery at 
a range much over a mile. Hill's artillery comprised 55 guns on 
Seminary Ridge. So the whole assistance given to Longstreet's 
attack between 4 p.m. and darkness by the other two corps was 
confined to an artillery duel by 32 guns of Ewell and 55 of Hill, 
mostly at extreme ranges. But the value of this duel as as- 
sistance to Longstreet was absolutely nothing, for it did hot 
prevent the enemy from withdrawing troops from every corps 
in his line to repel our assault. 

This cannonading was maintained for about two hours, after 
which it gradually diminished until dark. Meanwhile, about 
six o'clock, Ewell had sent orders to each of his division 
commanders to attack the enemy's lines in his front. This 
involved for Johnson an attack upon Gulp's Hill. The divi- 
sion had not been pushed close to the hill in preparation for an 
assault, although one had been contemplated all day. It now 
had a full mile to advance and Rock Creek had to be crossed. 
This could only be done at few places and involved much delay. 
Only three of Johnson's four brigades moved to the attack. His 
official report says : — 

"I then advanced my infantry to the assault of the enemy's strong 
position — a rugged and rocky mountain, heavily timbered and difficult 
of ascent; a natural fortification rendered more formidable by deep in- 
trenchments and thick abattis — Jones's brigade in advance, followed by 
Nichols's and Steuart's. Gen. Walker was directed to follow, but report- 
ing to me that the enemy were advancing upon him, from their right, he 
was ordered to repulse them as soon as possible. . . . Gen. Walker did 
not arrive in time to participate in the assault that night. 

" By the time my other brigades had crossed Rock Creek and reached 
the base of the mountain, it was dark. His skirmishers were driven in, 
and the attack made with great vigor and spirit. It was as successful 
as could have been expected under the circumstances. Steuart's bri- 
gade, on the left, carried a line of breastworks which ran perpendicular 
to the enemy's main line, captured a number of prisoners and a stand of 
colors, and the whole line advanced to within short range and kept up a 
heavy fire \mtil late in the night." 

As has been told, the whole of the 12th corps had been with- 
drawn from the lines except Greene's brigade. This brigade 
was being extended when its advance was met by Steuart, who 



410 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

got possession only of empty trenches. Johnson's other brigades 
found the trenches in front of their approach held by Greene's 
thin line, but in the darkness of the woods, the steep and rocky 
ground, and the abattis and obstructions in front, Johnson's line 
was halted at irregular distances, and the attack resolved it- 
self into a random and ineffective musketry fire. Nothing 
more was possible. And even had they found more trenches 
vacant and occupied them, Meade could at will concentrate am- 
ple force to drive them out. The more one studies the situation, 
the more strange it seems that Lee abandoned his first purpose 
to withdraw Johnson from his false position. 

Early's attack is next to be described. It, too, was isolated, 
inadequate, and unsupported. It necessarily failed. Both 
attacks were in progress at the same time, but Longstreet's, 
which they were intended to support, had already ceased. Like 
Johnson's division. Early was also short of one brigade, Smith's 
having been sent to guard the rear from the direction of York. 
Gordon also was not engaged, as Early soon realized that the 
attack was an isolated one and would be quickly repulsed. 

Early's report gives the following details: — 

" . . .As soon as Johnson became warmly engaged, which was a little 
before dusk, I ordered Hays and Avery to advance and carry the works 
on the height in front. These troops advanced in gallant style to the 
attack, passing over the ridge in front of them under a heavy artillery fire, 
and then crossing a hollow between that and Cemetery Hill and moving 
up this hill in the face of at least two lines of infantry posted behind stone 
and plank fences; but these they drove back, and passing over all ob- 
stacles they reached the crest of the hill and entered the enemy's breast- 
works crowning it, getting possession of one or two batteries. 

"But no attack was made on the immediate right, as was expected, 
and not meeting with support from that quarter, these brigades could 
not hold the position they had attained, because a very heavy force of 
the enemy was turned against them from that part of the line which the 
divisions on the right were to have attacked, and these brigades had, 
therefore, to fall back, which they did with comparatively slight loss, 
considering the nature of the ground over which they had to pass, and 
the immense odds opposed to them, and Hays's brigade brought off four 
stands of captured colors. Gen. Rodes did not advance for reasons given 
in his report." 

The maps show that Hays's brigade on the right had only 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 411 

about 500 yards to advance over ground exposed to the enemy's, 
fire. Avery's brigade on the left had a somewhat greater distance. 

Hays reports his casualties in this affair as 181. Avery was 
killed. The casualties of his brigade for the three days were 
345, of which at least two- thirds were suffered in this charge. 

Howard's report gives the story from the Federal side : — 

"The attack was so sudden and violent that the infantry in front of 
Ames was giving way. In fact, at one moment the enemy had gotten 
within the batteries. A request for assistance had already gone to head- 
quarters, so that promptly a brigade of the 2d corps under Col. Carroll 
moved to Ames's right, deployed, and went into position just in time to 
check the enemy's advance. At Wiedrich's battery, Gen. Ames, by ex- 
traordinary exertions, arrested a panic, and the men with sponge staffs 
and bayonets forced the enemy back. At this time he received support 
from Gen. Schurz. Effective assistance was also rendered at this time 
by a portion of Gen. Steinwehr's command at points where the enemy was 
breaking through. This furious onset was met and withstood at every 
point, and lasted less than an hour." 

It only remains to show why Rodes failed to cooperate with 
Early and Johnson as Ewell had ordered. The fault was with 
Ewell himself. We have already seen that he had allowed 
Johnson's division to remain all day so far from the position 
which he was to attack that, when ordered to advance, darkness 
fell upon him before he could reach it. Similarly Ewell had 
allowed both of his other divisions to locate themselves far out 
of reach of the places where they were likely to be needed. Of 
his own motion, however. Early had advanced half of his divi- 
sion at dawn to the Federal skirmish line, and these two brigades 
were ready to advance when ordered. 

Rodes had remained about the northwestern edge of the 
town, near where the fighting of the first day had ended, and 
was still there when the orders came to attack. He was already 
preparing to advance, having seen both infantry and artillery 
withdrawn by the enemy from his front to resist Longstreet's 
pressure upon their left. But his location was so unfortunate 
that, in spite of this warning, both Johnson's and Early's at- 
tacks were begun and finished before Rodes had reached the 
enemy's skirmish line. 

Finding then his opportunity gone he wisely desisted. But 



412 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

as Lee and his staff during the morning had visited Ewell's lines, 
it is strange that such faulty locations escaped notice and cor- 
rection. Rodes's report not only shows the badness of his 
original position, but tells of an excellent one for the attack, 
which so far had entirely escaped the recognition of any Confed- 
erate reconnoitring officer. His report says : — 

"Having to draw my troops out of town by the flank, change the direc- 
tion of the line of battle, and then to traverse a distance of 1200 to 1400 
yards, while Gen. Early had to move only half that distance without 
change of front, the result was that before I drove the enemy's skirmishers 
in. Gen. Early had attacked and been compelled to withdraw. . . . But 
instead of falling back to the original line, I caused the front line to assume 
a strong position in the plain to the right of the town along the hollow of 
an old road-bed. This position was much nearer the enemy, was clear 
of the town, and was one from which I could readily attack without con- 
fusion." 

Rodes's description of his new position is of special interest. 
Taken in connection with his statement of the distance to be 
traversed by Early's charge, it shows the existence of far more 
favorable ground for an attack upon Cemetery Hill than is to 
be found elsewhere upon the Federal Hne of battle from Culp's 
Hill to Little Round Top. It was open to our occupation from 
the afternoon of the first day, when Ewell stopped the pursuit, 
and it must ever remain a grave reflection upon the Confederate 
conduct of the battle that the weakest part of the Federal posi- 
tion was the only portion which was not attacked. It will be 
more fully described in the account of the action on the 3d. 

Thus ended the second day, and one is tempted to say that 
thus ended the battle of Gettysburg. For of the third day it 
must be said, as was said of the charge of the Six Hundred at 
Balaklava, "Magnificent, but not War!" 

The first day had been won by 17 Confederate brigades of 
infantry attackuig 13 Federal. The victory was fruitless be- 
cause Ewell stopped the pursuit in full tide. 

On the second day, Longstreet, with 11 brigades, in seven 
piecemeal attacks, drives back six Federal brigades, which, 
being gradually reenforced by 18 fresh brigades, check the 
Confederate advance, and recover part of the lost ground, before 



GETTYSBURG: SECOND DAY 413 

night ends the conflict. Cooperative attacks by Ewell and Hill, 
ordered by Lee, fail to be effective because both Ewell and Hill 
had failed to have their divisions in proper positions for the 
charge long before the moment arrived, although each had had 
ample time. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

Gettysburg: Third Day 

The Plan of the Day. Johnson Reenforced. Johnson's Battle. Lee 
joins Longstreet. A Discussion. The Decision. The Neglected Op- 
portunity. Posting the Guns. Artillery of Other Corps. Infantry 
Formation. Hill's Cannonade. The Nine Howitzers. Note from Long- 
street. Talk with Wright. Cannonade Opens. Pickett called for. 
Pickett and Longstreet. Pickett Appears. The Repulse. Lee on the 
Field. The Afternoon. Nelson's Enfilade. Advances from Peach 
Orchard. 

In his official report Lee writes : — 

"The result of the (second) day's operations induced the belief that 
with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the 
positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the 
columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined 
to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, 
reenforced by Pickett's three brigades, was to attack the next morning, 
and Ewell was ordered to assault the enemy's right at the same time. The 
latter during the night reenforced Johnson with two brigades from Rodes's 
and one from Early's division." 

This statement shows that the strongest features of the enemy's 
position were not yet apprehended. These were the abihty of 
the enemy to concentrate their whole force upon any point 
attacked; and the impregnable character of the two Federal 
flanks. The two brigades sent from Rodes to reenforce Johnson 
were taken from the new position discovered by him early in the 
evening and already referred to, not only as the most favorable, 
but as practically the only position from which the Federal line 
could have been attacked with any hope of success. The bri- 
gade sent from Early was sent from a force which could have 
effectively cooperated with an attack by Rodes. The effect of 
sending the three brigades was to emasculate the centre of our 
line and to concentrate seven brigades where they were utterly 

414 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 415 

useless. Before proceeding, however, we may best here give 
briefly the outcome of Johnson's battle. 

He had been ordered by Ewell to attack at daylight, under 
the impression that Longstreet would attack at the same hour. 
In fact, however, Longstreet received no orders during the 
night, and the troops required for his attack could not be gotten 
into their positions before noon. Johnson, however, was himself 
attacked by the enemy at daylight at a point where he was still 
holding the trenches he had found abandoned the night before. 
He repulsed the Federal assault and attempted to follow the 
fugitives, but was repulsed. Heavy firing was kept up from 
behind rocks, trees, and parapets until near noon. Rumors of 
movements of the enemy upon his left, which afterward proved 
to be false, then led him to withdraw to the base of the hill 
where he remained unmolested until night, when he was at last 
recalled to the west of the town. His losses were about 1873, 
showing that the fighting was severe. 

Lee's headquarters were beyond the Chambersburg pike, about 
four miles by road from the scene of battle on our right. During 
the night the Washington artillery was brought up and disposed 
with the rest of Longstreet's guns about the Peach Orchard, with 
the intention of resuming the battle in the morning. During 
the night Longstreet had sent scouts in search of a way by 
which he might turn the enemy's left and believed he had 
found one with some promise of success. Soon after sunrise, 
while Longstreet awaited the arrival of Pickett's division with 
Dearing's battalion of artillery, intending then to extend his 
right, Lee joined him and proposed an assault upon the enemy's 
left centre by Longstreet's three divisions. 

Longstreet demurred, and, as had occurred on the day before, 
some time was spent in discussion and examination. Although 
the opposing lines were in full view and easy range of each other, 
neither seemed anxious to begin an action. The enemy's guns 
were generally behind breastworks on the high hills and ridges 
with ample covering in rear for their horses and caissons. Ours, 
posted before daylight, stood exposed on gently rolling ground 
about the Peach Orchard and vicinity. The enemy fired occa- 
sional shots, but not enough to force us to reply, and we were 



416 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

but too glad to be able to reserve our ammunition for more 
important work. 

Longstreet pointed out to Lee the enemy's position on the 
Round Tops and the danger of withdrawing Hood and McLaws 
from our right flank, which would be necessary if they were to 
take part in the attack upon the enemy's left centre. Lee recog- 
nized the necessity and substituted six brigades from Hill's 
corps. His report says : — 

"Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hills 
on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked 
in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the 
day pre\aous from the same cause and he now deemed it necessary to de- 
fend his flank and rear by the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, 
therefore, reenforced by Heth's division and two of Pender's brigades to 
the command of which Trimble was assigned."^ 

Longstreet further objected that the enemy's artillery on the 
''high rocky hills" would enfilade the lines assaulting the left 
centre. Col. Long, of Lee's staff, in his Memoirs of Lee, writes : — 

"This objection was answered by Col. Long who said that the guns 
on Round Top could be suppressed by our batteries. This point being 
settled, the attack was ordered and Longstreet was directed to carry it 
out." 

Longstreet, in his Manassas to Appomattox, describing the 
same conversation, gives further detail as follows : — 

"I asked the strength of the column. He (Lee) stated, 15,000. Opin- 
ion was then expressed that the 15,000 men who could make successful 
assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle ; but he was 
impatient of listening and tired of talking, and nothing was left but to 
proceed." 

It seems remarkable that the assumption of Col. Long so easily 
passed unchallenged that Confederate guns in open and inferior 
positions could "suppress" Federal artillery fortified upon com- 
manding ridges. Our artillery equipment was usually admitted 
to be inferior to the enemy's in numbers, calibres and quality of 
ammunition. Moreover, here, the point selected and the 
method of the attack would certainly have been chosen for us 
by the enemy had they had the choice. Comparatively the 

1 Pender had been mortally wounded in the artillery duel of Hill's corps 
during the afternoon of the 2d. 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 417 

weakest portion of their line was Cemetery Hill, and the point 
of greatest interest in connection with this battle is the story of 
our entire failure to recognize this fact. The narrative may 
therefore pause while this neglected opportunity is pointed out. 

There was one single advantage conferred by our exterior 
lines, and but one, in exchange for many disadvantages. They 
gave us the opportunity to select positions for our guns which 
could enfilade the opposing lines of the enemy. Enfilading fire 
is so effective that no troops can submit to it long. Illustrations 
of this fact were not wanting in the events of this day. What 
has been called the shank of the Federal fish-hook, extending 
south from the bend at Cemetery Hill toward Little Round Top, 
was subject to enfilade fire from the town and its flanks and 
suburbs. That liability should have caused special examination 
by our staff and artillery officers, to discover other conditions 
which might favor an assault. There were and are others still 
easily recognizable on the ground. The salient angle is acute 
and weak, and within about 500 yards of its west face is the 
sheltered position occupied by Rodes the night of July 2d, 
which has already been mentioned. 

From nowhere else was there so short and unobstructed an 
approach to the Federal line, and one so free from flank fire. 
On the northeast, at but little greater distance, was the position 
whence Early's two brigades the evening before had success- 
fully carried the east face of the same salient. Within the edge 
of the town between these two positions was abundant oppor- 
tunity to accumulate troops and to estabUsh guns at close 
ranges. 

As long as Gettysburg stands and the contour of its hills re- 
mains unchanged, students of the battle-field must decide that 
Lee's most promising attack from first to last was upon Cemetery 
Hill, by concentrated artillery fire from the north and assaults 
from the nearest sheltered ground between the west and north- 
east. 

That this was not realized at the time is doubtless partly due 
to the scarcity of trained staff and reconnoitring officers, and 
partly to the fact that Ewell had discontinued and withdrawn 
the pursuit on the afternoon of the 1st, when it was about to 



418 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

undertake this position. Hence the enemy's pickets were not 
driven closely into their lines, and the vicinity was not carefully 
examined. Not a single gun was established within a thousand 
yards, nor was a position selected which enfiladed the lines in 
question. 

Quite by accident, during the cannonade preceding Pickett's 
charge. Nelson's battalion of Swell's corps fired a few rounds 
from a position which did enfilade with great effect part of the 
11th corps upon Cemetery Hill, but the fire ceased on being sharply 
replied to. Briefly the one weak spot of the enemy's line and 
the one advantage possessed by ours were never apprehended. 

In addition to the six brigades of Hill's corps assigned to 
Longstreet for his column of assault, one more, Wilcox of 
Anderson's division, was later added, making ten brigades in all, 
of which only three were Longstreet's and seven were Hill's. I 
was directed by Longstreet to post all of his artillery for a pre- 
liminary cannonade, and then to take a position whence I could 
best observe the effect of our fire, and determine the proper 
moment to give the signal to Pickett to advance. The signal for 
the opening of the cannonade would be given by Longstreet him- 
self after the infantry brigades were all in position. 

A clump of trees in the enemy's line was pointed out to me 
as the proposed point of our attack, which I was incorrectly 
told was the cemetery of the town, and about 9 a.m. I began to 
revise our line and post it for the cannonade. The enemy very 
strangely interfered with only an occasional cannon-shot, to 
none of which did we now reply, for it was easily in their power 
to drive us to cover or to exhaust our ammunition before our 
infantry column could be formed. I can only account for their 
allowing our visible preparations to be completed by supposing 
that they appreciated in what a trap we would find ourselves. 
Of Longstreet's 83 guns, 8 were left on our extreme right to 
cover our flank, and the remaining 75 were posted in an irregular 
line about 1300 yards long, beginning in the Peach Orchard and 
ending near the northeast corner of the Spangler wood. 

While so engaged. Gen. Pendleton offered me the use of nine 
12-Pr. howitzers of Hill's corps, saying that that corps could 
not use guns of such short range. I gladly accepted and went to 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 419 

receive the guns under command of Maj, Richardson. I placed 
them under cover close in rear of the forming column with 
orders to remain until sent for, intending to take them with the 
column when it advanced. 

A few hundred yards to left and rear of my line began the 
artillery of the 3d corps under Col. Walker. It comprised 60 
guns, extending on Seminary Ridge as far as the Hagerstown 
road, and two Whitworth rifles located nearly a mile farther 
north on the same ridge. In this interval were located 20 rifle 
guns of the 2d corps under Col. Carter. Four more rifles of the 
same corps under Capt. Graham were located about one and a 
half miles northeast of Cemetery Hill. These 24 guns of the 2d 
corps were ordered to fire only solid shot as their fuses were un- 
reliable. 

There remained unemployed of the 2d corps 25 rifles and 16 
Napoleons, and of the 3d corps, fifteen 12-Pr. howitzers. It is 
notable that of the 84 guns of the 2d and 3d corps to be engaged, 
80 were in the same line ^parallel to the position of the enemy and 
56 guns stood idle. It was a phenomenal oversight not to place 
these guns, and many beside, in and near the town to enfilade 
the ''shank of the fish-hook" and cross fire with the guns from 
the west. 

The Federal guns in position on their lines at the commence- 
ment of the cannonade were 166, and during it 10 batteries 
were brought up from their reserves, raising the number engaged 
to 220 against 172 used upon our side during the same time. 

The formation of our infantry lines consumed a long time, and 
the formation used was not one suited for such a heavy task. 
Six brigades, say 10,000 men, were in the first line. Three bri- 
gades only were in the second line — very much shorter on the left. 
It followed about 200 yards in rear of the first. The remaining 
brigade, Wilcox's, posted in rear of the right of the column, 
was not put in motion with the column, and being ordered for- 
ward 20 minutes or more later, was much too late to be of any 
assistance whatever. Both flanks of the assaulting column were 
in the air and the left without any support in the rear. It was 
sure to crumble away rapidly under fire. The arrangement may 
be represented thus : — 



420 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Brockenhrough, Davis, McGowan, Archer, Garnett, Kemper, 
Lane, Scales, Armistead, 

Wilcox. 

No formation, however, could have been successful and the light 
one doubtless suffered fewer casualties than one more compact 
and deeper would have had. 

A little before noon there sprung up upon our left a violent 
cannonade which was prolonged for fully a half-hour, and has 
often been supposed to be a part of that ordered to precede 
Pickett's charge. It began between skirmishers in front of 
Hill's corps over the occupation of a house. Hill's artillery first 
took part in it, it was said, by his order. It was most unwise, 
as it consumed uselessly a large amount of his ammunition, the 
lack of which was much felt in the subsequent fighting. Not a 
single gun of our corps fired a shot, nor did the enemy in our front. 

When the firing died out, entire quiet settled upon the 
field, extending even to the skirmishers in front, and also 
to the enemy's rear; whence behind their lines opposing 
us we had heard all the morning the noise of Johnson's 
combats. 

My 75 guns had all been carefully located and made ready for 
an hour, while the infantry brigades were still not yet in their 
proper positions, and I was waiting for the signal to come from 
Longstreet, when it occurred to me to send for the nine howitzers 
under Richardson, that they might lead in the advance for a 
few hundred yards before coming into action. Only after the 
cannonade had opened did I learn that the guns had been re- 
moved and could not be found. It afterward appeared that 
Pendleton had withdrawn four of the guns, and that Richardson 
with the other five, finding himself in the Une of the Federal fire 
during Hill's cannonade, had moved off to find cover. I made 
no complaint, believing that had these guns gone forward with 
the infantry they must have been left upon the field and per- 
haps have attracted a counter-stroke after the repulse of Pickett's 
charge. 

Meanwhile, some half -hour or more before the cannonade be- 
gan, I was startled by the receipt of a note from Longstreet as 
follows : -^ 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 421 

"Colonel: If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off 
the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our effort pretty 
certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Pickett to make the 
charge. I shall rely a great deal upon your judgment to determine the 
matter and shall expect you to let Gen. Pickett know when the moment 
offers." 

Until that moment, though I fully recognized the strength of 
the enemy's position, I had not doubted that we would carry it, 
in my confidence that Lee was ordering it. But here was a 
proposition that / should decide the question. Overwhelming 
reasons against the assault at once seemed to stare me in the 
face. Gen. Wright of Anderson's division was standing with 
me. I showed him the letter and expressed my views. He 
advised me to write them to Longstreet, which I did as follows : — 

"General: I will only be able to judge of the effect of our fire on the 
enemy by his return fire, as his infantry is little exposed to view and the 
smoke will obscure the field. If, as I infer from your note, there is any 
alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening 
our fire, for it will take all the artillery ammunition we have left to test 
this one, and if result is unfavorable we will have none left for another 
effort. And even if this is entirely successful, it can only be so at a very 
bloody cost." 

To this note, Longstreet soon replied as follows : — 

"Colonel: The intention is to advance the infantry if the artillery has 
the desired effect of driving the enemy's off, or having other effect such 
as to warrant us in making the attack. When that moment arrives ad- 
vise Gen. Pickett and of course advance such artillery as you can use in 
aiding the attack." 

Evidently the cannonade was to be allowed to begin. Then 
the responsibility would be upon me to decide whether or not 
Pickett should charge. If not, we must return to Va. to re- 
plenish ammunition, and the campaign would be a failure. I 
knew that our guns could not drive off the enemy, but I had a 
vague hope that with Ewell's and Hill's cooperation something 
might happen, though I knew little either of their positions, 
their opportunities, or their orders. 

I asked Wright : "What do you think of it? Is it as hard to 
get there as it looks?" He answered: "The trouble is not in 



422 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

going there. I went there with my brigade yesterday. There 
is a place where you can get breath and re-form. The trouble 
is to stay there after you get there, for the whole Yankee 
army is there in a bunch." 

I failed to fully appreciate all that this might mean. The ques- 
tion seemed merely one of support, which was peculiarly the prov- 
ince of Gen. Lee. I had seen several of Hill's brigades forming 
to support Pickett, and had heard a rumor that Lee had spoken 
of a united attack by the whole army. I determined to see 
Pickett and get an idea of his feelings. I did so, and finding 
him both cheerful and sanguine, I felt that if the artillery fire 
opened, Pickett must make the charge; but that Longstreet 
should know my views, so I wrote him as follows : — 

" General : When our fire is at its best, I will advise Gen. Pickett to 
advance." 

It must have been with bitter disappointment that Long- 
street saw the failure of his hope to avert a useless slaughter, for 
he was fully convinced of its hopelessness. Yet even he could 
have scarcely realized, until the event showed, how entirely un- 
prepared were Hill and Ewell to render aid to his assault and to 
take prompt advantage of even temporary success. None of 
their guns had been posted with a view to cooperative fire, nor 
to follow the charge, and much of their ammunition had been 
prematurely wasted. And although Pickett's assault, when 
made, actually carried the enemy's guns, nowhere was there the 
slightest preparation to come to his assistance. The burden of 
the whole task fell upon the 10 brigades employed. The other 
27 brigades and 56 fresh guns were but widely scattered spec- 
tators. 

It was just 1 P.M. by my watch when the signal guns were 
fired and the cannonade opened. The enemy replied rather 
slowly at first, though soon with increasing rapidity. Having 
determined that Pickett should charge, I felt impatient to launch 
him as soon as I could see that our fire was accomplishing any- 
thing. I guessed that a half-hour would elapse between my 
sending him the order and his column reaching close quarters. 
I dared not presume on using more ammunition than one hour's 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 423 

firing would consume, for we were far from supplies and had- 
already fought for two days. So I determined to send Pickett 
the order at the very first favorable sign and not later than 
after 30 minutes' firing. 

At the end of 20 minutes no favorable development had 
occurred. More guns had been added to the Federal line than 
at the beginning, and its whole length, about two miles, was 
blazing like a volcano. It seemed madness to order a column 
in the middle of a hot July day to undertake an advance of three- 
fourths of a mile over open ground against the centre of that line. 

But something had to be done. I wrote the following note 
and despatched it to Pickett at 1.25: — 

" General : If you are to advance at all, you must come at once or we 
will not be able to support you as we ought. But the enemy's fire has not 
slackened materially and there are still 18 gims firing from the cemetery." 

I had hardly sent this note when there was a decided falling 
off in the enemy's fire, and as I watched I saw other guns hmbered 
up and withdrawn. We frequently withdrew from fighting 
Federal guns in order to save our ammunition for their infantry. 
The enemy had never heretofore practised such economy. After 
waiting a few minutes and seeing that no fresh guns replaced 
those withdrawn, I felt sure that the enemy was feeling the 
punishment, and at 1.40 I sent a note to Pickett as follows: — 

"For God's sake come quick. The 18 guns have gone. Come quick 
or my ammunition will not let me support you properly." 

This was followed by two verbal messages to the same effect 
by an officer and sergeant from the nearest guns. The 18 guns 
had occupied the point at which our charge was to be directed. 
I had been incorrectly told it was the cemetery. Soon only a 
few scattered Federal guns were in action, and still Pickett's line 
had not come forward, though scarcely 300 yards behind my 
guns. 

I afterward learned what had followed the sending of my first 
note. It reached Pickett in Longstreet's presence. He read it 
and handed it to Longstreet. Longstreet read and stood silent. 
Pickett said, "General, shall I advance?" Longstreet knew 
that it must be done, but was unwilling to speak the words. He 



424 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

turned in his saddle and looked away. Pickett saluted and said, 
"I am going to move forward, sir," and galloped off. 

Longstreet, leaving his staff/ rode out alone and joined me on 
the left flank of the guns. It was doubtless 1.50 or later, but I 
did not look at my watch again. I had grown very impatient 
to see Pickett, fearing ammunition would run short, when 
Longstreet joined me. I explained the situation. He spoke 
sharply, — "Go and stop Pickett where he is and replenish 
your ammunition." I answered : " We can't do that, sir. The 
train has but little. It would take an hour to distribute it, and 
meanwhile the enemy would improve the time." 

Longstreet seemed to stand irresolute (we were both dis- 
mounted) and then spoke slowly and with great emotion : " I do 
not want to make this charge. I do not see how it can succeed. 
I would not make it now but that Gen. Lee has ordered it and 
is expecting it." 

I felt that he was inviting a word of acquiescence on my part 
and that if given he would again order, "Stop Pickett where 
he is." But I was too conscious of my own youth and inex- 
perience to express any opinion not directly asked. So I re- 
mained silent while Longstreet fought his battle out alone and 
obeyed his orders. 

The suspense was brief and was ended by the emergence from 
the wood behind us of Garnett riding in front of his brigade. I 
had served on the Plains with him and Armistead in 1858, and 
I now met him for the first time since Longstreet's Suffolk cam- 
paign. He saluted and I mounted and rode with him while his 
brigade swept through our guns. Then I rode down the line 
of guns, asking what each gun had left. Many had canister 
only. These and all having but few shell were ordered to stand 
fast. Those with a moderate amount of suitable ammunition 
were ordered to limber up and advance. 

During the cannonade the reserve ordnance train had been 
moved from the position first occupied, and caissons sent to it 
had not returned. Only about one gun in four could be ordered 
forward from the centre, but from the right Maj. Haskell took 
five from Garden's and Planner's batteries, and Maj. Eshleman, 
of the Washington artillery, sent four somewhat to Haskell's left. 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 425 

Returning to the centre I joined the few guns advancing from 
the batteries there, and moved forward to a swell of ground just 
west of the Emmitsburg road, whence we opened upon troops 
advancing to attack the right flank of Pickett's division. 
Eshleman and Haskell to the left front of the Peach Orchard 
soon also opened fire. The charging brigades were now close in 
front of the Federal Unes and the musketry was heavy. 

As we watched, we saw them close in upon the enemy in smoke 
and dust, and we ceased firing and waited the result. It was 
soon manifest in a gradual diminution of the fire and in a 
stream of fugitives coming to the rear pursued by some fire but 
not as much, it seemed to me, as might have been expected. 

After perhaps 20 minutes, during which the firing had about 
ceased, to my surprise there came forward from the rear Wilcox's 
fine Ala. brigade, which had been with us at Chancellorsville, and, 
just 60 days before, had won the affair at Salem Church. It had 
been sent to reenforce Pickett, but was not in the column. Now, 
when all was over, the single brigade was moving forward alone, 
and there was no one there with authority to halt it. Tliey were 
about 1200 strong and on their left were about 250, the renmant 
of Perry's Fla. brigade. It was at once both absurd and tragic. 

They advanced several hundred yards beyond our guns, under 
a sharp fire. Then they halted and opened fire from some 
undergrowth and brushwood along a small ravine. Federal 
infantry soon moved out to attack their left, when Perry fell 
back past our guns ; Wilcox moved by his right flank and making 
a circuit regained our lines at the Peach Orchard. His loss in 
this charge was 204 killed and wounded. Perry's loss was about 
proportional, with some prisoners in addition. 

While Wilcox's brigade was making its charge. Gen. Lee rode 
up and joined me. He was entirely alone, which could scarcely 
have happened except by design on his part. We were not 
firing, but holding position to prevent pursuit by the enemy. I 
have no doubt that Lee was apprehensive of this, and had come 
to the front to help rally the fugitives if that happened. He 
remained with us perhaps an hour and spoke to nearly every 
man who passed, using expressions such as : " Don't be dis- 
couraged." "It was my fault this time." " Form your ranks 



426 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

again when you get under cover." " All good men must hold 
together now." 

I had with me as an aid, Lt. Colston, ordnance officer of my 
battalion. At one time loud cheering was heard in the Federal 
lines and Lee asked Colston to ride to the front and find out 
the cause. Colston's horse was unused to the spur and, balking, 
Colston had a stick handed him and used it. Lee said : " Oh, 
don't do that. I once had a foolish horse and I found gentle 
measures so much the best." Colston presently reported 
that the Federals were cheering an officer riding along their 
line. Lee remarked that he had thought it possible that John- 
son's division in the Federal rear might have gained some 
success. Evidently he was not yet informed that Johnson, 
about noon, had withdrawn to a defensive position. Kemper 
was brought by on a Utter. Lee rode up and said, "General, I 
hope you are not badly hurt." Kemper repHed, "Yes, General, 
I'm afraid they have got me this time." Lee pressed his hand, 
saying: "I trust not! I trust not." Col. Fremantle, of her 
Majesty's Coldstream Guards, had also joined the party. We sat 
on horseback on the slope behind the guns where we could see 
over the crest, but the group of horses was not visible to the 
enemy. 

When all the fugitives had passed and there was still no sign 
of counter-stroke, Lee rode off. I continued to hold my hne of 
guns with few changes until after dark. There were some 
advances by Federal skirmish lines, which we kept in check 
with our guns, sometimes having to use canister sharply. But 
the Federal guns did not interfere, for which we were duly 
grateful. 

During the afternoon I quietly withdrew guns, one at a time, 
sending them to be refitted, and by 10 o'clock our whole line 
had been retired about to the position from which the attack 
began on the 2d. 

Now that we have reached the turning-point of our campaign, 
we may revert to some incidents of note in the progress of the 
battle. 

In speaking of our neglect to enfilade the Federal lines, it 
was stated that quite by accident a few rounds were fired during 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 427 

the cannonade which happened to enfilade a part of Cemetery 
Hill. In the Philadelphia Weekly Times of May 31, 1877, Col. 
Osborne, Chief of Artillery, 11th corps, describes the cannonade, 
in which he commanded "a little over 60 guns," and mentions 
this incident as follows : — 

"The fire from our west front had progressed 15 to 20 minutes when 
several guns opened on us from the ridge beyond East Cemetery Hill. 
The line of fire from these last batteries, and the line of fire from the bat- 
teries on our west front, were such as to leave the town between the two 
lines of fire. These last guns opened directly on the right flank of my line 
of batteries. The gunners got our range at almost the first shot. 

"Passing low over Wainwright's guns they caught us square in flank 
and with the elevation perfect. It was admirable shooting. They raked 
the whole line of batteries, killed and wounded the men and horses, and 
blew up the caissons rapidly. I saw one shell go through six horses stand- 
ing broadside. 

"To meet this new fire I drew from the batteries facing west the 20-lb. 
Parrott battery of Capt. Taft, and wheeling it half round to the right 
brought it to bear on them. I also drew from the reserve one battery 
and placed it in position on Taft's right. . . . 

"Fortunately for us these batteries, placed in the new line, at once se- 
cured the exact range of their immediate adversaries. In a few minutes 
the enemy's fire almost ceased, and when it again opened, and while the 
fire was progressing, it was irregular and wild. They did not again get 
our range as they had it before we replied." 

Gen. Howard in the Atlantic Monthly, July, 1876, writing of this 
occasion, says, "One regiment of Steinwehr's was fearfully cut 
to pieces with a shell." It doubtless received an enfilading shot 
from the firing here described. 

The official reports enable us to identify this firing as done at 
a range of 2500 yards by three rifled guns of Milledge's battery 
of Nelson's battalion of Ewell's reserve artillery. Nelson had 
three batteries carrying 13 guns, and the 48 rounds fired by 
Milledge were the only shots fired by the battalion during the 
campaign. It was not, however, Nelson's fault, but his superior's. 
His report says : — 

"About 12 M. I was ordered to draw the attention of the enemy's bat- 
teries from our infantry, in connection with Capt. Graham, commanding 
Rockbridge artillery, and fired about 20 or 25 rounds from a point to the 
left and somewhat in advance of Capt. Graham's position. On Friday 
night I encamped about one-half mile ui rear of my position on that day." 



428 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

The Ordnance report of the 2d corps identifies the guns and 
gives the rounds fired as 48. 

Mention has been made of the five guns advanced by Maj. 
Haskell from the Peach Orchard, and the four from the Wash- 
ington artillery a little to their left. These guns moved so far 
outside of Pickett's charge that they were able to fire obliquely 
upon the Federals opposing it. Haskell on the extreme right 
was even able to enfilade portions of the Federal reenforcements 
The fighting here was almost hand to hand. The following 
account is given by Col. Rice of the 19th Mass, :^ — 

"The men in gray were doing all that was possible to keep off the mixed 
bodies of men, who were moving upon them swiftly and without hesita- 
tion, keeping up so close and continuous a fire that at last its effects be- 
came terrible. . . . The grove was fairly jammed with Pickett's men, 
in all positions, lying and kneeling. Back from the edge were many stand- 
ing and firing over those in front. By the side of several who were firing, 
lying down or kneeling, were others with their hands up in token of 
surrender. In particular I noticed two men, not a musket length away, 
one aiming so that I could look into his musket barrel ; the other, lying 
on his back, coolly ramming home a cartridge. A little farther on was one 
on his knees waving something white in both hands. Every foot of 
ground was occupied by men engaged in mortal combat who were in every 
possible position which can be taken while under arms or lying wounded 
or dead. 

"A Confederate battery near the Peach Orchard commenced firing. 
A cannon-shot tore a horrible passage through the dense crowd of men 
in blue, who were gathering outside the trees. Instantly another shot 
followed and fairly cut a road through the mass. ..." 

The official report of Col. Abbott of the 20th Mass. thus 
describes the same scene: — 

"The enemy poured in a severe musketry fire, and at the clump of 
trees they burst also several shells, so that our loss was very heavy, more 
than half the enlisted men of the regiment being killed or disabled, while 
there remained but three out of 13 officers. . . ." 

The enfilading shots described by Col. Rice doubtless came 
from the batteries under command of Maj. Haskell, No official 
report was made, but I quote from a personal letter of Maj. 
Haskell some years later : — 

» B. & L. 387. 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 429 

"Just before Pickett's division charged, you rode up and after inquir- 
ing what ammunition I had, you ordered me to move forward with five 
guns, part of which were taken from each battery. We advanced about 
300 to 500 yards when I saw a large mass of infantry to our left front be- 
ginning to deploy, apparently to strike the right flank of Pickett's division. 
I at once opened fire on this infantry, which almost immediately scattered 
or withdrew, unmasking a large number of guns. Gen. Hunt told me 
after the war there were over 20. In a very few minutes these guns had 
disabled several of mine, killing and wounding quite a number of men and 
horses. Our ammunition being exhausted, I ordered such guns as could be 
moved to withdraw, ordering Garden and Planner to return as quickly 
as possible with litters for the wounded, and teams and limbers for the 
disabled guns. This they did, getting everything out." 

The four guns under Capt. Miller and Lt. Battle fared nearly 
as badly. Maj. Eshleman, seeing that they were being rapidly 
cut up, withdrew them ; but two of the guns, three of the teams, 
a Lt., and several men were put hors de comhat in the movement. 

But one official report from Pickett's division has been pub- 
lished, that of Garnett's brigade, by Maj. C. S. Peyton, 19th Va., 
who was the only field officer of the division not killed or wounded. 
Pickett wrote a report which reflected unjustly upon the bri- 
gades of Hill's corps, among which the break first occurred. 
Lee returned the report, asking Pickett to modify it, which 
Pickett delayed and finally neglected to do. I quote from 
Peyton's report, dated July 9, as follows : — 

" Notwithstanding the long and severe marches made by the troops of 
this brigade, they reached the field about 9 a.m. in high spirits and in good 
condition. At about 12 m. we were ordered to take position behind the 
crest of the hill, on which the artillery under Col. Alexander was planted, 
where we lay during the most terrific cannonading, which opened at 1.30 
P.M., and was kept up without intermission for one hour. 

"During the shelling we lost about 20 killed and wounded. Among 
the killed was Lt.-Col. Ellis of the 19th Va. . . . At 2.30 p.m. the artil- 
lery fire having to some extent abated, the order to advance was given, 
first by Gen. Pickett in person, and repeated by Gen. Garnett with prompt- 
ness, apparent cheerfulness, and alacrity. The brigade moved forward 
at quick time. The ground was open, but little broken, and from 800 to 
1000 yards from the crest whence we started to the enemy's line. The bri- 
gade moved in good order, keeping up its line almost perfectly, notwith- 
standing it had to climb three high post and rail fences, behind the last 
of which the enemy's skirmishers were first met, and immediately driven 



430 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

in. Moving on, we soon met the advanced line of the enemy, lying 
concealed in the grass on the slope about 100 yards in front of his second 
line, which consisted of a stone wall, about breast high, running nearly 
parallel to and about 30 paces from the crest of the hill which was lined 
with their artillery. 

"The first line referred to above, after offering some resistance, was 
completely routed, and driven in confusion back to the stone wall. Here 
we captured some prisoners, which were ordered to the rear without a 
guard. Having routed the enemy here, Gen. Garnett ordered the brigade 
forward, which it promptly obeyed, loading and firing as it advanced. 

" Up to this time we had suffered but little from the enemy's batteries, 
which apparently had been much crippled previous to our advance, with 
the exception of one posted on the mountain, about one mile to our right, 
which enfiladed nearly our entire line with fearful effect, sometimes as 
many as 10 men being killed and wounded by the bursting of a single 
shell. From the point it had first routed the enemy, the brigade moved 
rapidly toward the stone wall, under a galling fire both from artillery and 
infantry, the artillery using grape and canister. We were now within 
about 75 paces of the wall, unsupported on the right and left. Gen. 
Kemper being some 50 or 60 yards behind and to the right, and Gen. Armi- 
stead coming up in our rear. 

" Gen. Kemper's line was discovered to be lapping on ours, when, deem- 
ing it advisable to have the line extended on the right, to prevent being 
flanked, a staff officer rode back to the general to request him to inchne 
to the right. Gen. Kemper not being present (perhaps wounded at 
the time), Capt. Fry of his staff immediately began his exertions to carry 
out the request, but in consequence of the eagerness of the men in pressing 
forward, it was impossible to have the order carried out. 

"Our liae, much shattered, still kept up the advance until within 
about 20 paces of the wall, when, for a moment, it recoiled under the 
terrific fire that poured into our ranks both from their batteries and 
from their sheltered infantry. At this moment Gen. Kemper came up on 
the right and Gen. Armistead in rear, when the three lines, joining in con- 
cert, rushed forward with unyielding determination and an apparent spirit 
of laudable rivalry to plant the Southern banner on the walls of the enemy. 
His strongest and last lines were instantly gained ; the Confederate battle 
flag waved over his defences, and the fighting over the wall became 
hand to hand and of the most desperate character; but, more than half 
having already fallen, our line was found too weak to rout the enemy. 

"We hoped for a support on the left (which had started simultaneously 
with ourselves), but hoped in vain. Yet a small remnant remained in 
desperate struggle, receiving a fire in front, on the right and on the left, 
many even climbing over the wall, and fighting the enemy in his own 
trenches until entirely surrounded; and those who were not killed or 
wounded were captured, with the exception of about 300 who came off 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 431 

slowly, but greatly scattered, the identity of every regiment being en- 
tirely lost, and every regimental commander killed or wounded. 

"The brigade went into action with 1287 men and about 140 officers, 
as shown by the report of the previous evening, and sustained a loss, as the 
list of casualties will show, of 941 killed, wounded, and missing, and it is 
feared, from all the information received, that the majority (those reported 
missing) are either killed or wounded. . . . 

" There was scarcely an officer or man in the command whose attention 
was not attracted by the cool and handsome bearing of Gen. Garnett, 
who, totally devoid of excitement or rashness, rode immediately in rear 
of his advancing line, endeavoring by his personal efforts, and by the aid 
of his staff, to keep his line well closed and dressed. He was shot from 
his horse while near the centre of the brigade, within about 25 paces of the 
stone wall. . . . 

"The conduct of Capt. M. P. Spessard of the 28th Va. was particu- 
larly conspicuous. His son fell mortally wounded at his side ; he stopped 
but for a moment to look on his dying son, gave him his canteen of water, 
and pressed on, with his company, to the wall, which he climbed, and 
fought the enemy with his sword in their own trenches until his sword was 
wrested from his hands by two Yankees; he finally made his escape in 
safety." 

All accounts of the charge agree that its failure began when 
the advance had covered about half the distance to the Federal 
line. At that point the left flank of Pettigrew began to crumble 
away and the crumbling extended along the line to the right as 
they continued to advance until two-thirds of the line was gone, 
before the remainder, beginning at Fry's brigade, was finally 
absorbed in the collision with the enemy. That result was in- 
evitable. Under the conditions it should have been foreseen. 

The Federal line on our left overlapped our line by nearly a 
half-mile. It was crowded with guns, and their oblique fire upon 
the unsupported left could be endured but for a short period, 
particularly, as several fences crossed their line of advance, 
causing constant disturbance of their ranks. The artillery of 
the 3d corps, firing from Seminary Ridge, which had been vainly 
expected to silence this portion of the enemy's line, was now 
itself practically silent, on account of its imprudent expenditure 
in the duel about 11 a.m. Lee's report says : — 

"Our artillery, having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the 
protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were 
unable to reply or render the necessary support to the attacking party. 



432 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, 
the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our 
left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge 
in front and from Cemetery Hill on the left. It finally gave way, and the 
right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advanced works 
and capturing some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front 
and on both flanks, and driven back with heavy loss." 

Evidently the reliance for the support of our left flank had 
been the fire of the 82 guns from Seminary Ridge. It was as 
oversanguine as that expressed by Col. Long in the morning 
conference on the right, and it failed to note that the enemy 
might hold guns in reserve. This was done on the present occa- 
sion. Hunt, the Federal chief of artillery, had withdrawn many 
guns to await the charge which he knew was coming. 

The crumbling away of Pettigrew's left precipitated the 
advance of Wilcox. Pickett, who was riding with his staff in 
rear of his division, saw that the brigades on the left were break- 
ing and sent two aides to endeavor to rally them, which they 
were unable to do. A third was sent at the same mom.ent to 
Longstreet to say that the position in front would be taken, but 
that reinforcements would be required to hold it. Longstreet, 
in reply, directed Pickett to order up Wilcox, and Pickett sent 
three messengers in succession to be sure that the order was 
promptly acted upon. As the fugitives from Pettigrew's divi- 
sion came back, Wright's brigade of Anderson's division was 
moved forward a few hundred yards to cover their retreat. 
Later, after Wilcox had fallen back, by Lee's order, Wright was 
moved across to the rear in support of Wilcox, in case the enemy 
should make an advance, which at times seemed probable during 
the entire afternoon. 

It must be ever held a colossal mistake that Meade did not 
organize a counter-stroke as soon as he discovered that the Con- 
federate attack had been repulsed. He lost here an opportunity 
as great as McClellan lost at Sharpsburg. Our ammunition was 
so low, and our diminished forces were, at the moment, so widely 
dispersed along our unwisely extended line, that an advance 
by a single fresh corps, the 6th, for instance, could have cut us 
in two. Meade might at least have felt that he had nothing to 
lose and everything to gain by making the effort. 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 433 

Longstreet felt that the Hnes held by Hood and McLaws were 
unwisely advanced for the changed conditions, and, during the 
afternoon, he quietly withdrew these divisions to the rear of the 
Emmitsburg road. During the process of the withdrawal, 
the enemy advanced McCandless's brigade of the 5th corps 
into the neutral ground between the lines, where it accidentally 
encountered the 15th Ga. of Benning's brigade. This by mis- 
take had been marched to the front, when it was intended to be 
moved to the rear. The regiment, though only numbering about 
250, took a position and opened fire, expecting reenforcements. 
It was quickly outflanked and only with difficulty and by severe 
fighting did it extricate itself, losing 101 men. 

During the morning there were cavalry affairs upon each of 
our flanks. Upon our left, Stuart advanced, and a severe combat 
ensued with Gregg's division and Custer's brigade. The result 
was a draw, each side claiming what it held at the close as a 
victory. Upon our right, Kilpatrick reports that at 8 a.m. he 
received orders, — 

"to move to the left of the Federal line and attack the enemy's right 
and rear with his whole command [Custer's and Farnsworth's brigadesl, 
and the regular brigade [Merritt's]." 

By some mistake, surely a fortunate one for the Confederates, 
Custer's brigade had already been sent to Gregg's division, on 
the other flank. Our right was at first merely picketed by 100 
cavalry on the extreme flank, while, nearer the position of our 
infantry, was a strong line of skirmishers with Bachman's and 
Reilly's batteries in support. 

Had Kilpatrick come with three brigades upon our right flank, 
he could not have failed to discover an immense opportunity 
open to him. Behind the mask of our videttes were wide fields 
stretching along the valleys of Willoughby Run and Marsh 
Creek for miles to the north and west, containing all our trains 
practically unguarded. The bulk of our cavalry was engaging 
Gregg's division about two miles east of Gettysburg. Once 
through our skirmish line, Kilpatrick would have had great scope 
before any adequate force could be brought against him. As it 
was, we had a narrow escape. Merritt's dismounted men had 



434 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

found the flank of our videttes, and were driving them rapidly 
to the rear, when Anderson's brigade was brought to the rescue, 
and Merritt was driven back. 

Meanwhile, Kilpatrick had ordered Farnsworth to charge 
through our long line of infantry pickets extending from the 
Emmitsburg road to the right flank of our infantry line on the 
lower slope of Big Round Top . Farnsworth at first remonstrated, 
but then made the charge gallantly, with about 300 men of the 
1st W. Va. and the 1st Vt. They rode through the Texan skir- 
mish line, but found themselves surrounded with no escape but 
to make a circuit and return, broken into squads by the fire of 
infantry and artillery, and by the natural obstacles of the 
ground. Farnsworth fell with five mortal wounds. The total 
killed and wounded in the charge were 65.^ 

The report of the Federal chief of artillery gives interesting 
details. The supply of ammunition carried with that army was 
270 rounds per gun. The Confederate army carried for the 
campaign about 150 rounds per gun. 

Hunt reports an expenditure in action of 32,781 rounds, an 
average of 106 per gun for 310 guns, excluding the cavalry. 
Ewell's corps reports 5851 rounds expended, and HilFs corps 
7112 rounds. No report was made of Longstreet's ammunition, 
but his 83 guns were all engaged, while Ewell and Hill each 
engaged only 65. Ewell averaged about 90 rounds per gun 
engaged, and Hill about 110. Longstreet's 83 guns doubtless 
averaged as much as Hill's, which would make about 9000 for 
the battle. This gives an aggregate for the army of about 
22,000, or 103 rounds per gun for 213 guns engaged, excluding 
cavalry. The killed and wounded (not including th§ missing) 
in the Federal reserve artillery, 108 guns all engaged, num- 
bered 230, an average per gun of 2.1. In Longstreet's corps 
the total was 271, for 83 guns, an average per gun of 2.6, In 

* Confederate eye-witnesses declared that Farnsworth, having fallen 
mortally wounded, was summoned to surrender, but refused and shot himself. 
His shoulder-straps and papers were brought into our lines and the story told 
by reliable witnesses during the afternoon. Federal accounts, however, 
claim that the wounded officer who shot himself was not Farnsworth but 
a Capt. Cushman who was left for dead on the field, but recovered and was 
killed in a later battle. 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 435 

EwelFs the total was 132, and average per gun engaged 2. In Hill's 
the total was 128 and average per gun engaged 2. The destruc- 
tion of artillery horses was very great, but figures are given only 
for Hill's corps. This reported 190 killed in action, 80 captured, 
187 abandoned on the road, and 200 condemned as broken down ; 
a total of 627 lost in the campaign, with 77 guns. Serving the 
26 guns of Alexander's battalion, 138 men and 116 horses, or 
over 5 men and 4 horses per gun, were killed or wounded. The 
greater part of this loss was from artillery fire, and its severity 
shows that the ground occupied was unfavorable and afforded 
little shelter. 

An anxious inventory of the ammunition left on hand was made 
during that afternoon, and much relief was felt that "enough 
for one day's fight" was found. 

During the afternoon of the 3d, Lee determined upon immedi- 
ate retreat to Va. Such an end to our invasion had, indeed, been 
inevitable from its beginning, but the difficulties were now greatly 
increased. Fortunately, Meade was not in aggressive mood, and 
Lee decided to give his trains one day's start of his troops. 
Many Federal writers have sought to excuse Meade's failures to 
improve the opportunities offered him, one after the other, on 
the 3d, 4th, and 5th, and 11th, 12th, and 13th of July. It is 
needless to balance pros and cons. An axiom of the game of 
war is to attack whenever a large stake may be won by success, 
and but small loss incurred by repulse. Then the game is 
worth the candle, and the game must be played. It is the hard- 
est of all games to a general new to the responsibility of chief 
command. 

Under cover of the night, Lee took a defensive line upon Semi- 
nary Ridge with its right flank retired to Willoughby Run. Here 
he stood all day of the 4th, apparently inviting attack, but for- 
tunate in remaining unmolested. 

Imboden's cavalry had joined him on the 3d, 2100 strong, with 
a six-gun battery. During the night of the 3d, Imboden had 
been directed to organize most of our vehicles into a single 
train, and to conduct it without a halt to Williamsport. Here 
it would stop only to feed, and would then ford the Potomac and 
move without a halt to Winchester. Imboden's force, with a 



436 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

few more guns, would guard the front and flanks of the column, 
which would be about 17 miles long. A brigade of Stuart's 
cavalry, with a battery, would guard the rear. Lee's medical 
director was charged to see that all the wounded who could bear 
the journey were carried in the empty wagons and ambulances. 

Wliat this journey was to mean to the wounded, none seem to 
have imagined before starting, or they would have greatly pre- 
ferred to become prisoners. Every vehicle appeared to be 
loaded to its capacity. 

It was about 4 p.m. on the 4th before the head of the train was 
put in motion from Cashtown. Meanwhile, what would have 
seemed a visitation of the wrath of God had come upon us, had 
we not preferred the theory which has been previously referred 
to, that storms may be generated by heavy firings. Now there 
came suddenly, out of the clear sky of the day before, one of 
the heaviest rainfalls I have ever seen. Probably four inches 
of water fell within 12 hours, and it was sure to make the Poto- 
mac unfordable for a week. Imboden, in Battles and Leaders, 
gives the following description : — 

" Shortly after noon on the 4th, the very windows of heaven seemed 
to have opened. The rain fell in blinding sheets, the meadows were soon 
overflowed, and fences gave way before the raging streams. During the 
storm, wagons, ambulances, and artillery carriages by hundreds — nay, by 
thousands — were assembling in the fields along the road from Gettys- 
burg to Cashtown in one confused and apparently inextricable mass. 
As the afternoon wore on, there was no abatement of the storm. Can- 
vas was no protection against its fury, and the wounded men, lying upon 
the naked boards of the wagon-bodies were drenched, horses and mules 
were blinded and maddened by the wind and water, and became almost 
xmmanageable. " 

My personal recollections of the occasion are vivid. About 
5 P.M., my somewhat battered battalion drew into a meadow 
adjoining the Fairfield Pike with orders to watch the passing 
column of troops and take its place in the column immediately 
behind the 3d corps, when it passed. This might be, we were 
told, in an hour or two. There was good grass in the meadow 
and the horses needed food, but the need to move promptly 
when the time came prevented unhitching. By good fortune, 
four of us got possession of an old door, upon which we could sit, 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 437 

laying it flat on a knoll some 50 yards from the road. On that 
door we sat or lay in the rain all night, every half-hour taking 
turns in walking out to the road to see what command was 
passing. At daylight the rain ceased to fall, but the sky re- 
mained threatening. About 6 a.m., we took our place in the 
column, and marched 19 hours until 1 a.m. that night. Then we 
bivouacked until four near Monterey Springs on the Blue Ridge. 
We then marched again for 14 hours, and bivouacked about 6 p.m. 
two or three miles beyond Hagerstown. Ewell's corps, moving 
behind ours, did not leave the vicinity of Gettysburg until about 
noon on the 5th. 

The wagon-train under Imboden moved on roads to our right, 
via Greenwood to Williamsport. It made better speed than our 
column of infantry and artillery, but at a cost of human suffering 
which it is terrible to contemplate. Some of the wounded were 
taken from the wagons dead at Williamsport, and many who were 
expected to recover died from the effects of the journey. Among 
these, it was said, were Gens. Pender and Semmes, neither of 
whom had been thought mortally wounded. 

Imboden gives a harrowing account of the movement of the 
train, as follows : — 

"After dark I set out from Cashtown to gain the head of the column 
during the night. My orders had been peremptory that there should 
be no halt for any cause whatever. If an accident should happen to any 
vehicle, it was immediately to be put out of the road and abandoned. 
The column moved rapidly, considering the rough roads and the darkness, 
and from almost every wagon issued heart-rending wails of agony. For 
four hours I hurried forward on my way to the front, and in all that time 
I was never out of hearing of the groans and cries of the wounded and 
dying. Scarcely one in a hundred had received adequate surgical aid, 
owing to the demands on the hard-working surgeons from still worse cases 
which had to be left behind. Many of the wounded in the wagons had 
been without food for 36 hours. Their torn and bloody clothing, matted 
and hardened, was rasping the tender, inflamed, and still oozing wounds. 
Very few of the wagons had even a layer of straw in them and all were 
without springs. The road was rough and rocky from the heavy washings 
of the preceding day. The jolting was enough to have killed strong men 
if long exposed to it." 

"From nearly every wagon as the teams trotted on, urged by whip 
and shout, came such cries and shrieks as these : — 

"'Oh God! Why can't I die!' 



438 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

" ' My God ! Will no one have mercy and kill me ! ' 

'"Stop! Oh! for God's sake stop just for one minute; take me out 
and leave me to die by the roadside.' 

" ' I am dying ! I am dying ! My poor wife, my dear children ! What 
will become of you ? ' . . . 

"No help could be rendered to any of the sufferers. No heed could be 
given to any of their appeals. Mercy and duty to the many forbade 
the loss of a moment in the vain effort then and there to comply with the 
prayers of the few. On ! On ! We must move on. The storm con- 
tinued, and the darkness was appalling. There was no time to fill even a 
canteen of water for a dying man, for, except the drivers and the guards, 
all were wounded and utterly helpless in that vast procession of misery." 

When daylight came, the head of the column had reached Green- 
castle, having traversed about 30 miles, and it still had 15 to go 
to reach Williamsport. Here began a succession of small at- 
tacks of the long train by citizens, and small detachments of 
Federal cavalry, scouting in the country. At one point some 
citizens cut the spokes of a dozen wagons, but a guard sent back, 
arrested and took them off as prisoners of war. At another 
point about a hundred wagons were captured. The head of the 
column reached Williamsport in the afternoon and during the 
night the balance came up. Here it met two regiments of John- 
son's division, returning from Staunton, where they had escorted 
the prisoners taken at Winchester on the advance. 

Imboden required every family in the town to cook provisions 
for the wounded, under pain of having its kitchen occupied. The 
river was in flood and impassable except by two small ferry-boats. 
Next morning he learned of the approach of five Federal brigades 
of cavalry — about 7000 men, with 18 guns. The flanks of the 
city fortunately rested upon creeks, leaving only the north front 
to be defended. He armed about 800 teamsters and convales- 
cents, and with the two regiments of infantry and his dismounted 
cavalry he marched about so as to create the impression of a 
large force. He put in the line all of his guns and brought over 
some ammunition in the ferry-boats. A sharp fight ensued, 
the teamsters acquitting themselves handsomely. The enemy 
was driven back and held off until the approach of Stuart's 
cavalry in the afternoon caused the Federal cavahy to with- 
draw. 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 439 

As a precaution against such freshets, Lee had maintained a 
pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. But it was weakly guarded, 
and on June 5, a small raiding party, sent by French from 
Frederick, had broken it, and destroyed some of its boats, 
fortunately not all. The retreat of the army was, therefore, 
brought to a standstill just when 48 hours more would have 
placed it beyond pursuit. We were already nearly out of 
provisions, and now the army was about to be penned upon 
the river bank, and subjected to an attack at his leisure by 
Meade. 

All diligence was used to relieve the situation. The ferry- 
boats were in use by day and by night carrying over, first, our 
wounded, and next 5000 Federal prisoners brought from 
Gettysburg. These were safely escorted on to Staunton 
by Imboden with a single regiment of infantry. Warehouses 
upon the canal were torn down, and from the timber new 
pontoon boats were being built to repair the bridge at Falling 
Waters. 

Meanwhile, the engineers selected and fortified a line of bat- 
tle upon which we would make a last stand. A fairly good 
line was found with its right flank on the Potomac near 
Downsville, passing by St. James College and resting its left 
on the Conococheague. Longstreet's corps held its right flank. 
Hill the centre, and Ewell the left. On the 10th, Meade 
was approaching rapidly, driving in our advanced guards. 
An unfortunate affair occurred at Funkstown, where Ander- 
son's Ga. brigade, called upon to assist our cavalry, was 
so badly directed by them that a Federal battery enfiladed 
the line, and a battery of our ' own horse artillery by 
mistake also fired into it. The brigade suffered 126 cas- 
ualties. 

On the 11th, the army was ordered into position upon the 
selected line, Lee in person overlooking the placing of Long- 
street's corps. I never before, and never afterward, saw him 
as I thought visibly anxious over an approaching action; 
but I did upon this occasion. No one can say what might 
have been the result of a Federal attack, for, although our 
supply of ammunition was low, we were on the defensive^ and 



440 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

the temper of the troops was excellent for a desperate resist- 
ance. 

Meade's report indicates easy acquiescence in our retreat from 
Gettysburg. While the 6th corps followed us to the vicinity of 
Fairfield on the 5th, picking up stragglers, the rest of the army 
remained on the battle-field for two days, "employed in succor- 
ing the wounded and burying the dead." 

A third day was lost "halting a day at Middletown to procure 
necessary suppUes and to bring up the trains." Under ordi- 
nary circumstances Lee might now have been across the Poto- 
mac, but there were further rains on the 7th and 8th, and Lee's 
escape was exceedingly narrow. 

On the 13th, both his bridge and the ford near Wilhamsport 
were passable, and orders were issued to make the crossing during 
that night. The river had fallen to a stage barely permitting 
infantry to ford, but about dark it again began to rise. Ewell's 
corps was ordered to cross by the ford. Longstreet, followed 
by Hill, was to cross by the pontoon bridge. Caissons were or- 
dered to start from the Unes at 5 p.m., the infantry and artillery 
at dark. 

Meade might have attacked on the 12th but contented himself 
with reconnoissance. As a result of the reconnoissance of the 
12th, he assembled his corps commanders and proposed a dem- 
onstration in force on the 13th by the whole army, to be con- 
verted into an attack if any opening was found. 

The opinion of a majority of his leading officers was so adverse 
to the proposition that Meade allowed himself to be persuaded, 
thus giving Lee the last day needed. Later in the day he re- 
pented and issued orders for a general advance on the 14th. It 
was made just a day too late. Lee had left only two guns stalled 
in the mud, and a few hundred stragglers broken down by the 
night march, short in distance, but rarely equalled for its 
discomfort and fatigue. 

Another rain-storm had set in before dusk, and it kept up nearly 
all night. It was the dark period of the moon and the blackness 
of the night was phenomenal. The route to the bridge was 
over small farm roads, rough, narrow, and hilly. Already 
from the incessant rains they were in bad condition, and now. 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 441 

under the long procession of heavy wheels, churning in the mud, 
they became canals of slush in which many vehicles were hope- 
lessly stalled. 

My command, between sunset and sunrise, was only able to 
cover about three miles — seldom moving more than a few yards 
at a time. Large bonfires on the banks were kept up to hght 
the entrance upon the bridge, but in spite of them a wagon 
loaded with wounded ran off into the river. After daylight 
the weather cleared and better progress was made, the last of 
Hill's corps crossing about 1 p.m. During the morning it was 
followed by the enemy who skirmished with our rear-guard and 
picked up stragglers. 

In one of these skirmishes, a small body of Federal cavalry was 
allowed to approach within 200 yards of Heth's division under 
Pettigrew, who supposed them to be our own cavalry bringing 
up the rear. These, however, had passed without giving 
notice that they were the last. A Maj. Weber, of the 6th Mich. 
Cav., seeing but a small portion of the Confederate line, 
charged it with about 40 men. Weber was killed and nine- 
tenths of his command shot down, but one of a few pistol-shots 
which they fired gave a mortal wound to Gen. Pettigrew. He 
had been wounded in the hand on the 3d, and was unable to 
manage his horse, which reared and fell with him. In the act 
of rising, the fatal shot struck him, 

Swell's corps reached Williamsport by the Hagerstown turn- 
pike and commenced fording the river by midnight. The ar- 
tillery with an escort of one brigade was sent to cross the 
pontoon bridge. Rodes's report describes the fording of the 
Potomac, as follows : — 

"My division waded the river just above the aqueduct over the 
mouth of the Conococheague ; the operation was a perilous one. It was 
very dark, raining, and excessively muddy. The men had to wade through 
the aqueduct, down the steep bank of soft and slippery mud, in which num- 
bers lost their shoes and down in which many fell. The water was cold, 
deep, and rising, the lights on either side of the river were dim, just afford- 
ing enough light to mark the places of entrance and exit. The cartridge 
boxes of the men had to be placed around their necks ; some small men 
had to be carried over by their comrades; the water was up to the 
armpits of a full-sized man. 



442 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

"All the circumstances attending this crossing combined to make it an 
affair, not only involving great hardship, but one of great danger to the 
men and company officers; but be it said to the honor of these brave 
fellows, they encountered it not only promptly but actually with cheers 
and laughter. 

"We crossed without loss except of some 25,000 or 30,000 rounds of 
ammunition unavoidably wetted and spoiled. After crossing, I marched 
a short distance beyond Falling Waters and then bivouacked ; and there 
ended the Pa. campaign." 

It is not necessary to follow the march of the army from the 
Potomac via Front Royal and Culpeper to the hne of the Rapi- 
dan, which it finally occupied. It is notable that Lee had not 
proposed to entirely withdraw from an aggressive attitude when 
he crossed the Potomac. His report states that he intended 
to cross the Blue Ridge into Loudon Co., where he might op- 
pose Meade's crossing into Va., but that the Shenandoah was 
found to be impassable. While waiting for it to subside, the 
enemy crossed below and seized the passes he had designed to use. 

Not only this, but Meade also moved along the eastern slope, 
threatening to cut Lee off from Gordonsville and the railroad. 
Longstreet was pushed ahead and barely succeeded in crossing 
the Shenandoah in time to prevent the enemy from occupying 
Manassas and Chester gaps, through which Longstreet moved 
to Culpeper by July 24. Hill's corps soon followed, and Ewell, 
moving farther up the valley, crossed at Thornton's Gap. All 
were finally united behind the Rapidan on Aug. 4, while the 
cavalry, under Stuart, held Culpeper, and the enemy held the 
fine of the Rappahannock. 

The following tables of casualties furnish the best compara- 
tive indications of the amount of fighting which fell to the lot 
of different organizations. It is notable that six Confederate 
brigades were not severely engaged, and the 6th Federal corps 
was scarcely engaged at all. The totals given are from the 
official returns of both armies, but the Confederate returns are 
known to be very incomplete. The best estimate of actual 
Confederate losses has been made by Livermore in Numbers and 
Losses in the Civil War. It is about 50 per cent greater for the 
killed and wounded, and is attached hereto. 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 443 

CONFEDERATE CASUALTIES. GETTYSBURG. APPROXIMATE 
' By Brigades 



COMMAJJDS 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Kershaw 
Semmes 
Barksdale 
Wofford 
CabeU's Arty. 


115 
55 

105 
30 

8 


483 
284 
550 
192 
29 


32 

91 

92 

112 


630 
430 
747 
334 
37 


McLaws's Div. 


313 


1538 


327 


2,178 


Garnett 
Armistead 
Kemper 
Dearing's Arty. 


78 

88 

58 

8 


324 

460 

356 

17 


539 
643 
317 


941 

1,191 

731 

25 


Pickett's Div. 


232 


1,157 


1,499 


2,888 


Law 

Anderson, G. T. 
Robertson 
Benning 
Henry's Arty. 


74 

105 

84 

76 

4 


276 
512 
393 
299 
23 


146 

54 

120 

122 


496 
671 
597 
497 

27 


Hood's Div. 


343 


1,504 


442 


2,289 


Alexander's Arty. 
Washington Arty. 


19 
3 


114 
26 


6 
16 


139 
45 


Reserve Arty. 


22 


140 


22 


184 


Aggregate 1st Corps 


910 


4,339 


2,290 


7,539 


Hays 
Hoke 
Smith 
Gordon 
Jones's Arty. 


36 
35 
12 
71 

2 


201 
216 
113 
270 
6 


76 
94 
17 
39 


313 
345 

142 
380 

8 


Early's Div. 


156 


806 


226 


1,188 


Steuart 
Nichols 
StonewaU 
Jones 
Latimer's Arty. 


83 
43 
35 
58 
10 


409 
309 
208 
302 
40 


190 
36 

87 
61 


682 
388 
330 
421 
50 


Johnson's Div. 


229 


1,269 


375 


1,873 



444 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



CONFEDERATE CASUALTIES. GETTYSBURG. APPROXIMATE 

By Brigades 



Commands 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Daniel 

Iverson 

Doles 

Ramseur 

O'Neal 

Carter's Arty. 


165 

130 

24 

23 

73 

6 


635 
328 
124 
122 
430 
35 


116 

308 

31 

32 

193 

24 


916 
820 
179 
177 
696 
65 


Rodes's Div. 


421 


1,728 


704 


2,853 


Brown's Arty. 
Nelson's Arty. 


3 


19 




22 


Reserve Arty. 


3 


19 




22 


2d Corps 


809 


3,823 


1,305 


5,937 


Wilcox 

Mahone 

Wright 

Perry 

Posey 

Lane's Arty. 


51 
8 
40 
33 
12 
3 


469 

55 

295 

217 

71 

21 


257 

39 

333 

205 

6 


777 
102 
668 
455 
83 
30 


Anderson's Div. 


147 


1,128 


840 


2,115 


Pettigrew 
Brockenbrough 
Archer 
Davis 
Garnett's Arty. 


190 
25 
16 

180 


915 
123 
144 
717 
5 


517 
17 


1,105 
148 
677 

897 
22 


Heth's Div. 


411 


1,905 


534 


2,850 


Perrin 
Lane 

Thomas 
Scales 
Poague's Arty. 


100 
41 
16 

102 

2 


477 
348 
136 
323 
24 


110 
6 


577 
389 
152 
535 
32 


Pender's Div. 


262 


1,312 


116 


1,690 


Mcintosh's Arty. 
Pegram's Arty. 


7 
10 


25 
37 


1 


32 

48 


Reserve Arty. 


17 


62 


1 


6,735 


3d Corps 


837 


4,407 


1,491 


6,735 



GETTYSBURG: THIRD DAY 445 

CONFEDERATE CASUALTIES. GETTYSBURG. APPROXIMATE 

By Brigades 



Commands 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Hampton 
Lee, F. 
Lee, W. H. F. 
Jones 
Jenkins's Arty. 


17 
5 

2 
12 


58 
16 
26 
40 


16 

29 

13 

6 


91 
50 
41 
58 


Total Cavalry 


36 


140 


64 


240 


Aggregate 


2,592 


12,709 


5,150 


20,451 


Li verm ore's Estimate 


3,903 


18,735 


5,425 


28,063 



FEDERAL CASUALTIES. GETTYSBURG 
By Divisions 



Commands 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Wadsworth 
Robinson 
Rowley 
Wainwright's Arty. 


299 

91 

265 

9 


1,229 

616 

1,296 

86 


627 

983 

541 

11 


2,155 

1,690 

2,103 

106 


1st Corps 


666 


3,131 


2,162 


6,059 


Caldwell 
Gibbon 
Hays 
Hazard's Arty. 


187 
344 
238 

27 


880 

1,212 

987 

119 


208 

101 

66 

3 


1,275 

1,647 

1,291 

149 


2d Corps 


797 


3,194 


378 


4,369 


Birney 
Humphreys 
Randolph's Arty. 


271 

314 

8 


1,384 

1,562 

81 


356 

216 

17 


2,011 

2,092 

106 


3d Corps 


593 


3,029 


589 


4,211 


Barnes 
Ayres 
Crawford 
Martin 


167 

164 

26 

8 


594 

802 

181 

33 


142 

63 

3 

2 


904 

1,029 

210 

43 


5th Corps 


365 


1,611 


211 


2,187 



446 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

FEDERAL CASUALTIES. GETTYSBURG 
By Divisions 



Commands 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Wright 
Howe 
Newton 
Tompkins's Arty. 


1 

2 
20 

4 


17 
12 

148 

8 


2 

28 


18 

16 

196 

12 


6th Corps 


27 


185 


30 


242 


Barlow 
Steinwehr 
Schurz 
Osborn's Arty. 


122 
107 
133 

7 


677 

507 

684 

53 


507 

332 

659 

9 


1,306 

946 

1,476 

69 


11th Corps 


369 


1,922 


1,510 


3,801 


Williams 

Geary 

Muhlenberg's Arty. 


96 
108 


406 

397 

9 


31 
35 


533 

540 

9 


12th Corps 


214 


812 


66 


1,082 


Arty. Reserve 
Gen. Hd. Qrs. 
Cavalry 


43 
91 


187 

4 

354 


12 
407 


242 
4 

852 


Aggregate 


3,155 


14,529 


5,365 


23,049 



CHAPTER XIX 

Battle of Chickamauga 

Position of the Confederacy after Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Reenforce- 
ments of Bragg. The Armies before the Battle of Chickamauga. The 
Order of Battle. Engagement of the 19th. Battle of the 20th. Rose- 
crans's Order to Wood. Longstreet's Advance. The Casualties. 
Thomas at Chattanooga. The Battle of Wauhatchie. Bragg's Posi- 
tition. Battle of Chattanooga or Missionary Ridge. Positions of the 
Armies. The Attack on the Ridge. Bragg's Retreat. The KnoxvUle 
Campaign. Longstreet's Expedition. Fort Sanders and its Garrison. 
Storming the Fort. The Retreat. Casualties of the Campaign. 

Having rested at Culpeper from July 24 to 31, and then 
crossed the Rapidan to Orange C. H., where we could receive 
supplies by rail, Lee's army now recuperated rapidly from its 
exhaustion by the campaign of Gettysburg. There remained 
nearly five months of open weather before winter. The pros- 
pects of the Confederacy had been sadly altered by our failures 
at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Grant would now be able to 
bring against us in Ga. Rosecrans reenforced by the army which 
had taken Vicksburg. To remain idle was to give the enemy 
time to do this. Once more the necessity was upon us to devise 
some offensive which might bring on a battle with approximately 
equal chances. Lee, accordingly, urged forward the building up 
of his own army with the design of an early aggressive movement 
against Meade. It must be admitted that the opportunity for 
such was slight. The enemy's fortified lines about Alexandria 
were too near; as was proven later, when in Nov. an advance 
was actually attempted. 

But the Confederacy still held unimpaired the advantage of the 
"Interior Lines," already spoken of as open to them in May, 
and then urged by Longstreet both upon Secretary Seddon and 
Lee. These still offered the sole opportunity ever presented the 
South for a great strategic victory. Already, however, move- 

447 



448 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ments of the enemy were on foot which, in a few weeks, would 
enable them to close the shorter route from Richmond to Chat- 
tanooga via Knoxville, and leave us only the much longer and 
less favorable line via Weldon, Wilmington, and Augusta. Un- 
fortunately, no one but Longstreet seems to have appreciated 
this, and he was very slow in again taking up the matter and 
urging it. 

It resulted that the movement, when attempted, was too late 
to utilize the short Knoxville Une and that only five small 
brigades of infantry were transferred to the west in time to take 
any part in the hard-fought battle of Chickamauga. This was 
consequently but another bloody and fruitless victory to be 
followed by a terrible defeat in a few weeks when the enemy's 
reenforcements had joined. It is jfirst to tell of the dilatory 
consideration and slow acceptance of the proposed strategy, 
which should have been decided upon even before Lee's army 
was again south of the Potomac, and every subsequent move- 
ment planned to facilitate it. 

It was not until about Aug. 15, two weeks after the army 
was safe behind the Rapidan, that Longstreet again called the 
attention of Sec'y Seddon to the tremendous threatenings of the 
situation, and pointed out the one hope of escape which he could 
suggest. There seems to have been no reply. A few days later, 
in conversation with Lee, Longstreet again expressed his views. 
Lee was unwilling to consider going west in person, but approved 
the sending of Longstreet, and even spoke of his being given in- 
dependent command there, if the War Department could be 
brought to approve. 

About Aug. 23, Lee was called to Richmond, and was 
detained there by President Davis for nearly two weeks. During 
this time, consent was given that Longstreet should go to reen- 
force Bragg against Rosecrans, but with only Hood's and Mc- 
Laws's divisions, nine brigades, and my battaUon of 26 guns. 
It was proposed to send this force from Louisa C. H. by 
rail to Chattanooga, via Bristol and Knoxville, a distance of 
but 540 miles, and it was hoped that the movement could be 
made within four days. 

There was too little appreciation of the importance of time in 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 449 

the enterprise proposed, and it was not until Sept. 9 that the 
first train came to Louisa C. H. to begin the transportation. 

On that day 2000 Confederates under Gen. Frazier, who had 
been unwisely held at Cumberland Gap and allowed to be sur- 
rounded by a superior force, surrendered without a fight. Al- 
ready Burnside had occupied Knoxville, leaving us only the 
long fine via Petersburg, Wilmington, Augusta, and Atlanta, 
about 925 miles, with imperfect connections through some cities 
and some changes of gauge. The infantry was given precedence, 
and my battahon was marched to Petersburg, where it took 
trains about 4 p.m., Thursday, Sept. 17. At 2 a.m., Sunday, the 
20th, we reached Wilmington, 225 miles in 58 hours. Here we 
changed cars and ferried the river, leaving at 2 p.m. The battle 
of Chickamauga was being fought upon the 19th and 20th, only 
five of our nine brigades having arrived in time to participate. 
We reached Kingsville, S.C, 192 miles in 28 hours, changed trains 
in six hours, and got to Augusta, 140 miles, at 2 p.m. on Tues- 
day, the 22d. Leaving Augusta at 7 p.m., we reached Atlanta, 171 
miles, at 2 p.m., Wednesday. Leaving at 4 a.m., Thursday, we 
were carried 115 miles and landed at Ringgold Station, 12 miles 
from the battle-field, at 2 a.m. on Friday, Sept. 25. Our jour- 
ney by rail had been 843 miles and had consumed seven days and 
10 hours, or 178 hours. It could scarcely be considered rapid 
transit, yet under the circumstances it was really a very creditable 
feat for our railroad service under the attendant circumstances. 
We found ourselves restricted to the use of one long roundabout 
line of single-track road of fight construction, much of it of the 
"stringer track" of those days, a 16-pound rail on stringers, 
with very moderate equipment and of different gauges, for the 
entire service at the time of a great battle of the principal armies 
of the Confederacy. The task would have taxed a double-tracked 
road with modern equipment. 

Its efficient performance was simply impossible, and the in- 
complete success we were able to obtain by getting five brigades 
of Longstreet's infantry upon the field, without any of his ar- 
tillery, shows the soundness of our strategy, and is an earnest of 
what might have been accomplished, had a campaign upon our 
short interior fines been inaugurated in May, under Lee in 



450 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



person, instead of the unfortunate invasion of Pa. Indeed, it 
must be said of the battle itself, that the force upon the field was 
ample to have reaped the full fruits of victory, had its manage- 
ment been judicious. The story of the details, presently to be 
told, is but another story of excellent fighting made vain by in- 
efficient handling of an army hastily brought together, poorly 
organized, and badly commanded. 

It will be seen that the battle was opened by two divisions 
attacking the whole army of the enemy in a fortified position, the 
attack being made in a single line without supports at hand. 
They are defeated and put out of action for the day. Two more 
divisions try and fare little better. A fifth, in reserve, sends 
in one brigade without result; four are not engaged. The 
morning is gone and the battle of the Right Wing is over. That 
of the Left Wing has scarcely begun. It advances, finds by acci- 
dent a gap in the enemy's line, and drives off three divisions of the 
enemy. The left wing fights the rest of the enemy's army 
(three-fourths of it) until near dark, when both wings unite and 
drive the enemy off the field ; darkness covering his retreat. It 
is the old famihar story of piecemeal attacks. 

On the arrival of Longstreet, Bragg's army would comprise five 
corps and a reserve division, organized as shown below. No 
exact returns of the total "present for duty" exist, but instead 
are given Livermore's estimates of the ''Effective Strength." ^ 

ARMY OF TENN., GEN. BRAGG, SEPT. 19-20, 1863 



Corps 


Divisions 


Brigades 


Batteries 


Polk 


Cheatham 
Hindman 


Jackson, Smith, Maney, Wright, 

Strahl 
Anderson, Deas, Manigault 


5 
3 


Hill, D. H. 


Cleburne 
Breckenridge 


Wood, Polk, Deshler 
Helm, Adams, Stovall 


3 

4 


Walker 


Gist 
Liddell 


Colquitt, Ector, Wilson 
Govan, Walthall 


2 
2 


Buckner 


Stewart 
Preston 


Bate, Brown, Clayton 
Gracie, Trigg, KeUy 


4 
3 



1 Livermore's Numbers and Losses in Civil War, p. 105. 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 451 

ARMY OF TENN., GEN. BRAGG, SEPT. 19-20, 1863 



Corps 


Divisions 


Brigades 


Batteries 


Res. Div. 


Johnson 


Gregg, McNair, Fulton 


2 


Longstreet 


McLaws 
Hood 


Kershaw, Humphreys, Wofford,^ 
Bryan ' 

Law, Robertson, Benning, Jen- 
kins,^ Anderson ^ 




Res. Arty. 


Batteries 


Williams, 4; Robertson, 5; Alex- 
ander, 6 ^ 


9 



Total Inf. and Arty., 33 Brigades, 174 Guns. Effective total 52,066 



Wheeler 
Cavalry 


Wharton 
Martin 


O'Rews, Harrison 
Morgan, Russell 


1 
1 


Forrest 
Cavalry 


Armstrong 
Pegram 


Wheeler, Dibbfell 
Davidson, Scott 


2 

2 



Total Cavalry, 8 Brigades, 24 Guns. Effective total, 14,260 



Unlike the armies in Va., which had never considered them- 
selves defeated, our Western army had never gained a decided 
victory. Naturally, therefore, Lee enjoyed both the affection 
and confidence of his men, while there was an absence of much 
sentiment toward Bragg. It did not, however, at all affect the 
quaUty of the fighting, as shown by the casualties suffered at 
Chickamauga, which were 25 per cent by the Confederates in 
killed and wounded, exclusive of the missing. 

Neither in armament, equipment, or organization was the 
Western army in even nearly as good shape as the Army of 
Northern Virginia. About one- third of the infantry was still 
ermed only with the smooth-bore musket, caHbre .69. Only 
a few batteries of the artillery were formed into battalions, and 
their ammunition was all of inferior quality. 

Much has been said in the accounts of prior battles of the in- 
sufficient and unskilled staff service in the Army of Northern 
Virginia, even after many active campaigns. The Western 
armies generally had had far less opportunities to learn from 
^ Names in Italics arrived too late for the battle. 



452 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



experience, and fewer resigned ex-army officers from the old U. S. 
Army among them, to organize and train their raw material. 
Several of Bragg's divisions had been recently brought together 
and were strangers to each other. Nearly all were unfamihar 
with the country in which they found themselves, which was 
unusually wooded and hilly. Bragg, himself, was lacking in 
(juick appreciation of features of topography. 

The organization of the Federal army, with its strength present 
for duty before the battle, is given below, and also Livermore's 
estimate of the "Ineffective Strength." 

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, GEN. ROSECRANS, SEPT. 19-20, '63 



Corps 


Divisions 


Brigades 


Batteries 


14th 
Thomas 
Prcs. 22,758 


Baird 
Neglcy 
lirannon 
Reynolds 


Scribner, Starkweather, King 
Beatty, Stanley, Sirwcll 
(\)nncll, Croxton, Van Derveer 
Wilder, King, Turchin 


3 
3 
3 
3 


20th 
McCook 
Pres. 13,372 


Davis 

Johnson 

Sheridan 


Post, Carlin, Heg 
Willich, Dodge, Baldwin 
Lytic, Laiboldt, Bradley 


3 
3 
3 


21st 
Crittenden 
Pres. 14,190 


Wood 
Palmer 
Van Cleve 


Buell, Wagner, Harkcr 
Cruft, Hazen, Grose 
Beatty, Dick, Barnes 


3 
4 
3 


Reserve 
Granger 
Pres. 5,489 


Steedman 


Whitaker, Mitchell, McCook 


3 



Total Inf. and Art., 33 Brigades, 204 Guns, Pres. 53,919. Efifective 50,144 



Cavalry 

Mitchell 



McCook 
Crook 



Campbell, Ray, Watkins 
Minty, Long 



Total Cavalry, 5 Brigades, 30 Guns, Pres. 9,504. Effective 8,078. 



Comparing the two armies, we see that while Bragg's "Effec- 
tive total" (66,326) is largely greater than Rosecrans (58,222), it 
is due to Bragg's excess in cavalry (6182), which arm had little 
opportunity in the battle upon either side. Of infantry and ar- 
tillery, Rosecrans had an excess of 1853 men and 30 guns, besides 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 453 

the superiority of his small-arms and rifled artillery over the in- 
ferior equipment of the Confederates. It is well recognized that 
the defensive role is the least hazardous, and, on this campaign, 
Rosecrans, although on the strategic offensive, gladly seized the 
tactical defensive when Bragg incautiously gave him the privi- 
lege. 

Bragg's daily experience in the handling of his army should 
have warned him that it was not a miUtary machine which 
could be rehed upon to execute orders strictly, or to be alert 
to seize passing opportunities, and it is safe to say that its power 
for offence was scarcely 50 per cent of what the same force would 
have developed upon the defensive. 

The position at Chattanooga held by Bragg at the beginning of 
the campaign was entirely untenable, as Rosecrans's line of 
approach, along the Nashville and Chattanooga R.R., reaching 
the Tennessee River at Stevenson, threatened Bragg's commu- 
nications for 40 miles south, and he was forced to fall back without 
a battle and take position where he might guard his communica- 
tions. He withdrew from Chattanooga on Sept. 8, and, moving 
south about 22 miles, disposed his forces in the vicinity of Lafay- 
ette and held the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, a spur of the great 
plateau of Lookout Mountain, running northeast, with Mc- 
Lemore's Cove between the two. Rosecrans was misled by 
Bragg's easy abandonment of Chattanooga into the belief that 
his retreat would be continued at least as far as Dalton, and 
perhaps to Rome. So, with little delay or caution, the Federal 
troops were pushed forward in rapid pursuit. 

As the country was semi-mountainous, well wooded, and but 
sparsely settled, neither commander proved able to keep him- 
self fully informed of his adversary's movements. Each lost, 
therefore, possible opportunities of attacking isolated portions 
of his adversary with a superior force. 

The most important of these was lost by Bragg, who, on Sept. 
10 and 11, might have crushed, in McLemore's Cove, parts of 
Thomas's and McCook's corps. Orders were issued for at- 
tacks, but there was no supervision of the necessary preparatory 
movements, and various obstacles intervened, until the enemy 
discovered his danger and made his escape. Bragg, in his offi- 



454 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

cial report, placed the principal blame for this failure upon 
Gen. Hindman, and preferred charges against him, which, upon 
further investigation, he subsequently withdrew. There can 
be no doubt that upon this occasion an opportunity was lost to 
the Confederates which might have won the campaign. But 
the loss was due entirely to the misfortune of inadequate or- 
ganization, and lack of the trained staff, which alone can make an 
efficient army of any assemblage of troops. Of course, rumors 
of the sending of Longstreet with two divisions to reenforce 
Bragg, were sure to, and did, reach the enemy by many channels 
and from many sources. Even from the lines along the Rapidan, 
there were deserters and negro servants who were well informed 
about all considerable movements. At Richmond and Peters- 
burg, at Wilmington, Charleston, and Atlanta, the enemy, doubt- 
less, maintained spies, and the coming of the reenforcements from 
Lee was no secret among Bragg's brigades, even long before 
their arrival. One would suppose, too, that the wisdom of such 
strategy would be so apparent that it would be easily guessed, on 
hearing that any movement was on foot. It is, therefore, worthy 
of note that the Federal War Department, where reports and 
rumors from all sources were brought together and studied, even 
as late as Sept. 11, was incHned to believe that Bragg was re- 
enforcing Lee. It was not convinced to the contrary until Sept. 
15. Before that, Rosecrans had discovered the proximity of 
Bragg's army and had hastened to concentrate his scattered di- 
visions, some of which, mistaking the roads, made marches of 
50 miles. Tlie concentration took place in the valley of Chicka- 
mauga Creek, about 12 miles south of Chattanooga on the western 
slope of Missionary Ridge. 

Bragg, meanwhile, reahzing something of his opportunities, 
made more than one effort to strike in detail some of the nearest 
Federal divisions, but was unable to succeed. It was only on the 
night of the 17th that he finally issued an order for an advance 
in force upon the next day. Having waited so long, he had best 
have waited longer. Already he had given Rosecrans just the 
time needed to concentrate his entire army. Even a day 
sooner might have caught portions of it out of position and 
much exposed, but when the action opened on the 19th, not only 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 455 

was the whole Federal army in hand, but most of it had fairly 
well intrenched itself. 

There was now no reason to hasten an attack, and there were 
two reasons for delay. First, by taking a threatening position, 
and using his superior force of cavalry upon Rosecrans's rear, he 
might have forced the Federals to attack ; and Bragg's army, as 
has been said, was twice as powerful for defence as for offence. 
Second, he was now receiving reenforcements, averaging nearly 
a brigade a day. On the 19th, only Hood with three of Long- 
street's veteran brigades had reached the field. Longstreet, in 
person with two more, arrived in time to take part on the 20th. 
McLaws with four more brigades of infantry and 26 guns of the 
reserve artillery were close behind, and were enough to have 
turned the evenly balanced scale in the battle. 

On Sept. 15, Rosecrans's army was west of the Chickamauga, 
and had its right extended south beyond the left of Bragg's army. 
Bragg's right, at the same time, east of the Chickamauga ex- 
tended north beyond Rosecrans's left. Either army, changing 
front to its left, might thus have turned the other's flank with 
great advantage, but neither was quite prepared to act promptly. 
Rosecrans, however, on the 17th, appreciated his own danger 
and began to extend his left and to draw down his right, prac- 
tically moving his whole army to the left. This movement was 
continued during the night of the 18th and on the morning of the 
19th. Before Bragg was prepared to open his attack, Rosecrans's 
left had occupied the strong ground chosen for it to rest upon, on 
Kelley's farm, about nine miles south of Chattanooga. From this 
point, the line extended to the Chickamauga at Lee and Gordon's 
Mill, about four miles, with the divisions in the following order 
from left to right : — 

Brannon, Baird, Reynolds, Palmer, Van Cleve, Wood, with 
Negley's division in reserve, and the three divisions of McCook's 
corps — Davis, Johnson, and Sheridan — massed near Crawfish 
Spring, near by on the right. At Rossville, six miles from Chatta- 
nooga and about three north of Kelley's farm, was Granger's 
reserve corps, of three brigades, holding the very important gap 
at that point in Missionary Ridge. 

Bragg's order of battle was of the progressive or echelon type, 



456 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

and prescribed that the attack should be begun by his right 
column under Hood, which should cross at Reed's Bridge, and, 
turning to the left oblique, should sweep up the Chickamauga 
and be reenforced as it proceeded by Walker's and Buckner's 
corps, crossing by Alexander's Bridge and Tedford's Ford. 
Meanwhile Polk, at Lee and Gordon's Mill, should press the enemy, 
bearing to the right where resistance was met, until a crossing 
was made at or between the mill and Dalton's or Tedford's Ford. 
Hill's corps would watch the left flank and cross and attack the 
enemy's right if he attempted to reenforce his centre. The 
cavalry would protect the flanks, Wheeler on the left and For- 
rest on the right. Cooking was ordered to be done at the trains, 
and cooked rations forwarded to the troops. 

This order seems simple, well conceived, and apparently as 
well adapted to surrounding conditions as it could have been 
made, but its execution, as will be seen, departed widely from 
the course prescribed. 

The right column under Hood, charged with the opening of the 
battle, was composed of three brigades of Hood's and three of 
Bushrod Johnson's. In reaching their assigned positions, there 
was much delay to all of the columns, due to the bad and narrow 
roads through the forest, and, in addition, Hood's column was 
opposed by the enemy's cavahy, and had a preliminary skirmish 
at Pea Vine Church. At Reed's Bridge, and also at Alexander's, 
it was necessary to force the crossing, and both bridges were so 
injured by the enemy that fords somewhere in the vicinity had 
to be used to cross the stream. These delays consumed the whole 
of the 18th, and, at nightfall, Hood's six brigades and Walker's 
five bivouacked on the west side of the Chickamauga about a mile 
and a half in front of the Rossville and Lafayette road, upon 
which Rosecrans began to arrive and take position before day- 
hght on the 19th. Buckner's corps, at Tedford's Ford, having 
been directed to delay until Hood and Walker were across, had, 
after a slight skirmish, gotten possession of both banks of the 
river at Tedford's, and also at Dalton's, a half-mile to the left. 
Polk's corps and Hill's occupied the day in moving from the vicin- 
ity of Lafayette to their prescribed positions opposite the enemy's 
right. At dawn on the 19th, the division of Buckner began cross- 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 457 

ing at Tedford's and Dalton's, but, before they were ready to 
attack, the initiative was seized by the Federals, under the im- 
pression that only a single Confederate brigade was in front of 
them. Croxton's brigade, supported by the other two brigades 
of Brannan's division, was ordered to advance. This brought 
on the battle, which was waged all day with severe losses on each 
side, but with material success on neither. The entire Federal 
army was engaged, except two brigades. Of the Confederates, 
the brigades of Anderson, Deas, Manigault, Helm, Adams, Sto- 
vall, Gracie, Trigg, Kelley, Kershaw, and Humphreys were not 
engaged. The fighting was desultory and without concert of 
action. From 7 a.m. until noon, there was a gap of about two 
miles between the 14th and 21st Federal corps, which, had the 
Confederates discovered it, might have given them the victory. 

The fighting was kept up until dark. Longstreet arrived on the 
field at 11 p.m., having arrived at Catoosa Station about four, and 
ridden without a guide, narrowly missing riding into the enemy. 
The battle was ordered to be renewed at daylight, but under a 
different organization. The army was now divided into two 
wings, the right under Polk, and the left under Longstreet. To 
Polk's wing was assigned Cheatham's division of his corps, and 
the corps of Hill and Walker, with the cavalry under Forrest on 
the right. To Longstreet, Bragg gave the division of Hindman 
of Polk's corps, Johnson's division, Buckner's corps, and the five 
brigades of Hood's and McLaws's divisions, with the cavalry 
under Wheeler on the left. This organization was adopted, 
because the troops were already approximately in the positions 
assigned, but it involved further subdivision of the command 
without any increase of staff, and led to an unfortimate delay 
of some hours in opening the battle. 

This was to be begun by Hill's corps at daylight. Sunrise 
was at 5.45. The orders were given by Bragg to Polk about 
midnight, but never reached Hill until 7.30 in the morning. The 
locations of the different commanders were not known to each 
other. When the orders to attack arrived, there were essential 
preparations still to be made, as the troops were not in position, 
and two hours were consumed in getting them even approxi- 
mately so. These hours were very precious to the enemy. All 



458 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

during the night, the noise of his axes had been heard felling trees 
and building breastworks of logs, and this work was kept up 
until the Federal right, under Thomas, occupied a veritable 
citadel, from which assaults by infantry alone could scarcely 
dislodge him. 

His divisions were in the following order from left to right: 
Baird of the 14th corps, Johnson of the 20th, Palmer of the 21st, 
Reynolds of the 14th. These divisions occupied the breastworks 
above described, which ran north and south and were terminated 
at each end by wings extending weU to the rear. Next on the 
right was Brannan's division of the 14th, and then Negley's, of 
the same. Then came Sheridan and Davis of the 20th, and then 
Wood and Van Cleve of the 21st in reserve. 

At 9.30 A.M., Breckenridge moved to the attack and was soon 
followed by Cleburne. These two divisions were unfortunately 
placed in a single Une and without any supports in the rear. They 
advanced in the following order from right to left: Adams, 
Stovall, Helm, Polk, Wood, Deshler. The two right brigades of 
Adams and Stovall were found to entirely overlap the enemy's 
line, and they pushed on slowly, and gradually swung to the left 
and came into collision with the retired portion of the enemy's 
line. Meanwhile, the centre of Helm's brigade had struck the 
enemy's fortified line, and, after a severe fight in which Helm was 
killed, it was repulsed. The brigades of Adams and Stovall 
were now entirely isolated, but maintained their aggressive until 
Adams was himself wounded and captured, when they were with- 
drawn, and the three brigades cut no further figure in the battle 
until late in the afternoon. Had Cleburne's division been behind 
this division in support, or even had their advance been simul- 
taneous, there might have been a different story to tell. 

Its three brigades — Polk, Wood, and Deshler — were also in 
single fine and advanced a little after the repulse of Helm. 
Polk and the right flank of Wood's met the same fire which had 
repulsed Helm. Wood and Deshler advanced farther before 
they received it, but they were all driven back with heavy losses, 
which included Deshler himself. The contest was kept up for 
a long time, and was reenforced by the five brigades of Walker's 
division, who were brought up from the rear and put in at 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 459 

various points without making any serious impression. These 
brigades constituted the whole command of Polk in charge of the 
left wing, except the division of Cheatham which contained five 
brigades. Why neither Bragg or Polk put them in until after 
6 P.M. is not explained. One would imagine that they would 
have been called upon before giving up the whole plan of the 
battle, which was now done. Originally, it had been designed to 
break the left flank of the enemy and then sweep him to the 
right. Now the effort will be to break the right flank and sweep 
to the left. And in this the right wing of the army will take no 
more part than the left wing has taken in the battle of the 
morning, and Cheatham's division will practically take none at 
all. 

About 11 A.M., Bragg, finding the attack on the enemy's left 
making no progress, sent a staff-officer down the Unes with 
orders to every division commander to move upon the enemy 
immediately. The order was first delivered to Stewart's division 
of Buckner's corps. This formed two lines deep and two bri- 
gades front, with the aid of Wood's brigade of Cleburne's divi- 
sion on its right. The four brigades, Brown and Wood fol- 
lowed by Clayton and Bate, advanced together. The enemy were 
driven by this charge some 200 yards and lost a battery of guns, 
but here the impulse was gone and the advance stopped. Mean- 
while, Longstreet had appealed to Bragg for permission to attack 
with his entire wing, and, consent being given, had formed 
Johnson's division with Fulton and McNair in front, with Gregg 
in the second line, and with Hood's division in a third line. 
Hindman's division formed on the left, and about 11.30 a general 
advance was essayed. Preston's division was in reserve on the 
extreme left. 

It is now time to look in the Federal ranks and see what was 
taking place there. Although the attack was only made at 9.30, 
and by only 12 brigades, and was resisted by Thomas with 12 
brigades in fortified lines, yet, at 10.10 a.m., we find Garfield, 
Rosecrans's adjutant, writing to McCook to be prepared to sup- 
port the left flank, "at all hazards even if the right is drawn 
wholly to the present left." At 10.30 he called for help, and 
Sheridan's division was ordered to him. At 10.45, upon a fur- 



460 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ther call, Van Cleve's division was also ordered to support him 
"with all despatch." Negley's division had withdrawn from its 
positionin Une to support Baird, and had been replaced by Wood's 
division, making the order of the divisions: Baird, Johnson, 
Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, Wood, Davis, Sheridan. About this 
time another message from Thomas reached Rosecrans that he 
was heavily pressed, and the aide who brought it informed Rose- 
crans that "Brannan was out of line and Reynolds's right 
was exposed." On this Rosecrans dictated a message to 
Wood: — 

"The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as 
fast as possible and support him." 

This order changed the issue of the battle, Reynolds's divi- 
sion was slightly echeloned with Brannan's, but no one other 
than Reynolds considered it worthy of note. When Wood 
obeyed his order and reached the ground, Brannan was found to 
already occupy it, and Thomas sent Wood on to the support 
of Baird. Reynolds had blimdered in his complaint, and 
Rosecrans had blundered in acting on it without reference to 
Thomas. 

On receipt of the order. Wood, leaving his skirmishers in front, 
started his division at a double-quick to the left, passing in rear 
of Brannan's division to reach the right of Reynolds. He had 
advanced but little more than a brigade length when Johnson's 
Confederate division, supported by Hood and Hindman, burst 
through the forest in front and fell upon the movement. Had 
this movement of Wood's division been foreseen by the Con- 
federates and prepared for, it could not have happened more 
opportunely for them. Longstreet has been given great credit 
for it, which, however, he never claimed. It was entirely acci- 
dental and unforeseen, but in a very brief period it threw the 
entire left flank of the enemy in a panic. 

Longstreet's advance cut off the rear of Buell's brigade of 
Wood's division, and two brigades of Sheridan's advancing to 
fill the gap being opened behind Wood. These brigades did 
not make enough resistance to check the Confederates, whose 
triple lines could be seen advancing and who now followed the 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 461 

fugitives. Hindman's brigades, diverging to the left, routed the 
division of Davis and captured 27 guns and over 1000 prisoners. 
Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden were all caught and in- 
volved in the confusion of a retreat which soon became a panic. 
It was not, however, pursued and might have halted and been 
re-formed within a mile of the field without seeing the enemy. 
The retreat, however, was continued to Chattanooga. A 
severe check was sustained by Manigault, who attacked Wilder's 
brigade. This brigade had two regiments armed with Spencer 
repeating rifles, and the 29th 111. serving with it on this occasion, 
carried the same arm. They occupied a very favorable position 
on a steep ridge and their fire at close quarters was very severe 
and drove back the first advance. Then, finding themselves 
isolated, they presently withdrew from the field. 

About this time, Longstreet was sent for by Bragg, who was 
some distance in rear of Longstreet's present position. The 
change in the order of battle was explained to Bragg and the 
route of two divisions of the enemy, and he was requested to 
draw the forces from the right wing to unite with the left, and 
move behind Thomas, where a gap of great extent had been 
opened, and drive him out of his fortified position. Bragg, 
however, was discouraged, and said "there was no fight left 
in the right wing." Cheatham's division had not been engaged. 

Longstreet's account of the interview states: — 

" He [Bragg] did not wait, nor did he express approval or disapproval 
of the operations of the left wing, but rode for his headquarters at Reed's 
bridge. There was nothing for the left wing to do but to work along as 
best it could." 

A pause in the fighting now ensued, which the Federals em- 
ployed in forming a new line for their centre and right with the 
troops remaining on the field, — Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and 
Reynolds, — whose positions had not been changed, and Bran- 
nan, with fragments of Wood, Negley, and Van Cleve. With 
these troops a short and very strong line was formed scarcely 
a mile in extent from right to left, and occupying favorable 
ground in the forest which gave it protection from artillery 
fire. In plan the right wing of this line covered two reentrant 



462 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

angles located on commanding ridges, from which they were 
able to dehver a plmiging fire by volley, the ranks alternating 
with httle exposure. During the afternoon they were reenforced 
by two brigades of Granger's division coming up from Rossville. 
Practically about two- thirds of the army, say 30,000 men under 
Thomas, here held together in a strong position and stood prac- 
tically back to back, while he repelled a series of desperate 
charges by the brigades of Anderson, Deas and Manigault, 
Gracie, Trigg and Kelley, Gregg, McNair and Fulton ; and the 
five brigades of Longstreet, Kershaw, Humphreys, Law, Robert- 
son and Benning, about 25,000. Not more than half of these 
brigades were engaged at any one time. The bayonet was some- 
times used, and men were killed with clubbed muskets. This 
was kept up from 2 to 6 p.m., during which time the infantry fire 
was incessant and tremendous. About 5 p.m. Longstreet suc- 
ceeded in getting 11 guns under WilUams into position, 
whence their fire could take in flank and rear the positions of 
Thomas's four left divisions; but the distance was about 900 
yards, and the effect was not immediate. 

About 6 P.M. the Confederates on the right flank, who had 
lain quiet since noon, recovering from their severe punishment 
in the morning, prepared to make a general advance. About 
the same time, Thomas had taken warning from the artillery fire 
now coming in on his flank and rear and made preparations to 
withdraw his command. He had also received orders from 
Rosecrans to withdraw to Rossville, but had delayed to execute 
them until the last moment. It had now come, and had he 
delayed longer his losses would have been great. As it was, 
they were comparatively fight. At some points there were 
severe struggles and at others there was little resistance, but 
everywhere his lines were occupied and the triumphant Con- 
federates celebrated their victory with such cheering as is said 
never to have been heard before. 

The table of casualties shows the heaviest percentages of the 
war. Deducting the missing, many of whom were prisoners, and 
also the losses of the cavalry, which were light, the killed and 
wounded among the infantry and artillery were 14,871 out of 
47,520, or over 31 per cent among the Confederates. 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 463 

CASUALTIES ARMY OF TENN., CHICKAMAUGA, SEPT. 19-20, 1863 



Corps and 
Division 


Brigade 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Strength 


Polk 
Cheatham 


Jackson 

Smith 

Maney 

Wright 

Strahl 


55 
40 
54 
44 
19 


430 
260 
315 
400 
203 


5 

7 

15 

43 

28 


490 
307 
384 
483 
250 


1,405 
1,200 
1,177 
1,252 
1,149 




Total 


212 


1,608 


99 


1,919 


6,183 


Polk 
Hindman 


Anderson 

Deas 

Manigault 


80 

123 

66 


454 
578 
426 


24 

28 
47 


558 
729 
539 


1,865 
1,942 
1,914 




Total 


269 


1,458 


99 


1,826 


5,621 


Hill 
Cleburne 


Wood 

Polk 

Deshler 


96 
52 
56 


680 
493 
366 


2 
2 
2 


778 
547 
424 


Not giv. 
1,783 




Total 


204 


1,539 


6 


1,749 


5,115 


Hill 
Breckenridge 


Helm 

Adams 

Stovall 


63 
66 
37 


408 
269 
232 


35 

84 
46 


506 
429 
305 


1,485 

1,314 

970 




Total 


166 


909 


■ 165 


1,240 


3,769 


Walker 
Gist 


Colquitt 

Ector 

Wilson 


49 
59 
99 


251 
239 
426 


36 

138 

80 


336 
436 
605 


Not giv. 
It 




Total 


207 


916 


254 


1,377 


5,000 


Walker 
Liddell 


Govan 
Walthall 


73 
61 


502 
531 


283 
196 


858 
788 


Not giv. 




Total 


134 


1,033 


479 


1,646 


3,175 


Buckner 
Stewart 


Bate 

Brown 

Clayton 


63 
50 
86 


530 

427 
518 


11 

4 

15 


604 
481 
619 


1,316 
1,412 
1,446 




Total 


199 


1,475 


30 


1,704 


4,174 


Buckner 
Preston 


Grade 

Trigg 

Kelly 


90 
46 
66 


576 
231 
241 


2 
4 
3 


668 
281 
310 


2,128 
1,536 
1,136 




Total 


202 


1,048 


9 


1,259 


4,800 



464 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



CASUALTIES ARMY OF TENN., CHICKAMAUGA, SEPT. 19-20, 1863 



Corps and 
Division 


Brigade 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Strength 


Johnson's 
Reserve 


Gregg 

McNair 

Fulton 


113 
67 

28 


447 
320 
271 


17 
54 
74 


577 
441 
373 


1,436 

1,291 

956 




Total 


208 


1,038 


145 


1,391 


3,683 


Longstreet 
Hood 


Law 

Robertson 

Benning 

Kershaw 

Humphreys 


61 

78 
46 
68 
20 


329 
457 
436 
419 
132 


35 
6 

1 


390 
570 

488 
488 
152 


Not giv. 

(( 




Total 


273 


1,773 


4 


2,088 


6,000 


Total Polk's Corps 
Total Hill's Corps 
Total Walker's Corps 
Total Buckner's Corps 
Total Johnson's Div. 
Total Longstreet's Corps 


481 
370 
341 
401 
208 
273 


• 3,066 
2,448 
1,949 
2,523 
1,038 
1,773 


198 
171 
733 

39 
145 

42 


3,745 

2,989 
3,023 
2,963 
1,391 

2,088 


11,804 

8,884 
8,175 
8,974 
3,683 
6,000 


Total Inf. and Arty. 


2,074 


12,797 


1,328 


16,199 


47,520 


Total Cavalry 








250 


14,260 



CASUALTIES ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, CHICKAMAUGA, 
SEPT. 19-20, 1863 



Corps 


Division 


Killed 


Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


Strength 


14th 
Corps 
Thomas 


1st 
2d 
3d 
4th 


181 
66 

325 
93 


794 

430 

1,652 

685 


1,202 
295 
214 
176 


2,177 
791 

2,191 
954 




Total 


14th Corps 


665 


3,561 


1,888 


6,114 


22,758 


20th 
Corps 
McCook 


1st 
2d 
3d 


124 
148 
151 


720 
940 
939 


405 
554 
276 


1,349 
1,642 
1,366 




Total 


20th Corps 


423 


2,699 


1,235 


4,357 


13,372 


21st 
Corps 
Crittenden 


1st 
2d 
3d 


132 

134 

56 


744 

1,031 

604 


194 
203 
302 


1,070 

1,368 

962 




Total 


21st Corps 


322 


2,382 


699 


3,403 


14,190 


Reserve 


Granger 


215 


976 


631 


1,822 


5,479 


Total Inf. and Arty. 


1,625 


9,618 


4,453 


15,696 


55,799 


Total Cavalry 


32 


136 


300 


• 468 


9,842 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 465 

Among the Federal infantry and artillery the killed and 
wounded were 11,243 out of 55,799, or an average of about 21 
per cent. No returns are given of the Confederate losses in the 
cavalry, but they were very Ught in the Federal cavalry, only 
32 killed and 136 wounded, and there is no reason to suppose 
them any heavier among the Confederates. Apparently the 
forest paralyzed the cavalry of both armies. 

Very many of the reports of the Confederate brigadiers state 
the number of men engaged, and these statements, excluding 
cooking details, ambulance men, and stragglers, are more exact 
than the official returns, and are used in estimating the per- 
centages of killed and wounded. In Gist's and Hood's divisions 
only no figures are given, and here estimates have been made in 
round numbers. 

There is much discrepancy in the reports of the two com- 
manders as to the guns, small arms, and prisoners taken. Bragg 
reports 51 guns and 15,000 stand of small-arms. Rosecrans 
admits but 36 guns and 8450 small-arms, which is more probably 
correct. The Confederates were in the habit of exchanging their 
inferior guns and small-arms on the field for the better ones of 
the enemy, leaving the old in their places. Some of these found 
on the field were by mistake assumed to be captured. A fist of 
the 51 reported captured is given in the reports with the manu- 
facturers' marks, and of these 15 appear as of Confederate make. 
Of prisoners, Bragg reports 8000, while Rosecrans admits but 
4750. No accurate returns were made of the prisoners captured. 
The numbers were largely guesswork, the same prisoners being 
often claimed by more than one command. There is no reason 
to doubt the accuracy of Rosecrans's report. It gives, also, some 
interesting statistics of the ammunition expended which was 
but 7325 rounds of artillery and 2,650,000 of infantry. The 
wooded character of the field is shown in the comparatively small 
amount of artillery ammunition which is said to have been 
*' 12,625 less than was expended at Stone River," and is less 
than one-fourth of the Federal expenditure at Gettysburg. 

On the morning of the 21st the army under Thomas was in 
position on Missionary Ridge, about Rossville, five miles in rear 
of the field of the day before. Here it took position and awaited 



466 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

attack all day, but none was made. Longstreet reports that he 
advised crossing the Tennessee River and moving upon Rose- 
crans's communications, and that Bragg approved and ordered 
Polk's wing to take the lead, while his wing cared for the woimded 
and poHced the field. The army, however, was in such confu- 
sion and need of ammunition that it was dark before the rear 
of Polk's corps was stretched out upon the road, and Longstreet's 
march was postponed until the 22d. During the night Thomas 
withdrew into the city, which was already partially fortified, and 
was now easily made impregnable. 

Bragg followed on the 22d and took position in front of him, 
Longstreet's scheme of moving across the Tennessee River on 
Rosecrans's communications he deemed impracticable and 
dropped it. The town was not invested closely, but position was 
taken on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, about three 
miles out, with the intention of compelhng the evacuation of Chat- 
tanooga by cutting it off from its base of supplies at Stevenson, Ala. 

The shortest and best road came via Jasper, crossed the river 
at Kelley's Ferry, and, recrossing at Brown's Ferry, found itself 
directly opposite Chattanooga on the north side of the river, about 
40 miles from Stevenson. But this road could not be used. 
Below Kelley's Ferry it skirted the river and was commanded by 
small-arms from the south side. This compelled the enemy to 
cross Walden's Ridge to get by, adding many miles to their 
journey over exceedingly rough country. 

The importance of holding strongly the country between the 
two ferries, Kelley's and Browns's, seems never to have been 
appreciated by either Bragg or Longstreet, who had charge of 
the left wing of the army. The duty was confided to a single 
small brigade, Law's, of Hood's division, which was sent around 
the toe of Lookout Mountain for the purpose. A full division 
at least should have guarded so important a point, and one so 
exposed.^ 

^ It was about this time that Gen. W. F. Smith, known in the U. S. 
Army as " Baldy " Smith, was assigned to the Federal army, as chief engineer. 
He devised and superintended the execution, not only of the skilful strategic 
moves by which the blockade of Chattanooga was broken, but those by 
which Grant on Nov. 25 so easily, and with such little loss, routed Bragg at 
Chattanooga. 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 467 

The opportunity to blockade the wagon traffic was not at 
once understood by the Confederates, and it was Oct. 11 
before it was fully enforced. After that date wagons were often 
eight days in bringing a load from Stevenson, and reduced rations 
were issued to the Federals. Wheeler's cavalry in a raid had 
destroyed most of the transportation of the 14th corps, but was 
itself nearly destroyed by the opportunity of plundering the 
wagons. Couriers reported that "from Bridgeport to the foot 
of the mountains the mud is up to the horses' belhes." On the 
6th Rosecrans reported "the possession of the river is a sine 
qua non to the holding of Chattanooga." Reconnoissances and 
preparations were made, and on the night of the 27th a flotilla 
of pontoons, carrying about 1500 men under Hazen, was 
floated down and landed at Brown's Ferry. On the north 
side a force was marched by land to meet them, and a pontoon 
bridge was built. By morning a brigade with artillery was es- 
tablished and fortifying itself in a strong position on the southern 
bank. Before Bragg could concentrate enough to attack them. 
Hooker appeared, coming from Bridgeport, with the 11th and 
12th corps of the Army of the Potomac. These had been hurried 
out to reenforce Rosecrans, when the Federals reahzed that 
Longstreet had reenforced Bragg. 

This, of course, put an end to the contemplated attack, but, 
with very questionable judgment, Bragg ordered a night attack 
upon a portion of Geary's division of the 12th corps (about 1500 
strong with four guns), which had encamped at a point called 
Wauhatchie. This was about three miles from Brown's Ferry, 
where Hooker, with the remainder of his force, had united with 
the force under Hazen. 

THE BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE 

Night attacks are specially valuable against troops who have 
been defeated and are retreating. They are of Uttle value un- 
der any other circumstances. The war, too, had now reached a 
stage where men had become impossible to replace in the Con- 
federate ranks. Nothing could be more injudicious than to 
sacrifice them, even for a success, which would have no effect 
upon the campaign. 



468 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 




BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 469 

That was the case in this instance. Near at hand, the Federals 
had double or treble the force of the Confederates, and the camp 
to be attacked was two miles within the Federal hnes. The 
attack must be made, the fruit of it be gathered, and withdrawal 
accomphshed before the light of dawn; for with the dawn, or 
even before it, an overwhelming force of the enemy would cut 
off the withdrawal. 

The only troops available for the attack were four brigades of 
Hood's division, under Jenkins, which had been brought around 
the high toe of Lookout Mountain. This road was exposed to 
batteries on the north side of the river and could only be used at 
night. Three of the brigades. Law, Benning, and Robertson, had 
suffered severely, both at Gettysburg and Chickamauga, and 
scarcely averaged 700 men each. These brigades were ordered 
to cross Lookout Creek, and seize the road between Hooker's 
camp near Brown's Ferry and the camp of Geary to be at- 
tacked. The remaining brigade was Jenkins's own, now under 
Bratton, and was about 1800 strong. 

Law, with two regiments, had opposed Hazen's landing on the 
27th, and skirmished on the 28th with the advance of the 11th 
and 12th corps under Hooker, but had now withdrawn across 
Lookout Creek. From the mountains above, a fine view was 
afforded of the valley with Hooker's camp at the north end, and 
Geary's three miles behind it. Jenkins had been summoned be- 
fore sundown to view it and get some idea of the topography. 
He returned after dark and joining Law discussed the enterprise, 
which Law strongly advised against. The orders, however, 
were peremptory and there was no superior at hand to appeal to. 
The moon was about full, and soon after dark Law moved with 
his brigade across the bridge and, after some time spent in 
exploration, took position on a ridge nearly parallel to the road 
between Brown's Ferry and Wauhatchie, and some 50 to 150 
yards distant. It was about two miles below the camp of 
Geary's division, and less than a mile above the encampments of 
the 11th and 12th corps. The Texas brigade reporting to Law, 
he placed two of its regiments on his left and one on his right, 
and sent the 4th regiment to hold the bridge in his rear. Ben- 
ning's brigade was sent to ambush the road farther ahead. 



470 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

This effort to hold the road against efforts to reenforce Geary 
might have been much more effective had Law thrown his bri- 
gades boldly across the road, with perhaps two brigades in his 
front line supported by the third in a second hne. He prob- 
ably failed to adopt this policy only because he was too con- 
scious of his weakness. His retreat was more assured and easier 
from the position which he took. And, in view of the risks at- 
tendant on the venture, and the small chances of success, it 
may have been the more prudent course. 

In the placing of Law's command there had been a few picket 
shots about 10 o'clock, which had caused Geary's command to 
be put under arms and to be unusually alert. Soon after mid- 
night their own picket challenged and was shot down, upon which 
the camp was alarmed, all hghts extinguished, and the troops 
formed in line. The weather was somewhat cloudy, making the 
moonUght fitful. Jenkins endeavored to restrain his men from 
firing as they deployed before the camp, but it was in vain, and 
gradually the regiments extending on each side overlapped the 
Federal line and awaited an attack on the Federal rear by Lt.- 
Col. T. M. Logan, with a force of sharp-shooters, who had passed 
around to the rear. Their attack was to be a signal for a general 
charge. About an hour had now elapsed. 

It was just at this juncture that Jenkins gave orders to with- 
draw. Law had notified him that the enemy had passed his 
position, which was a mistake. The road had been open all the 
while, but no troops had passed. On the opening of the attack 
upon Geary there had been a general alarm in all the camps 
below, and several brigades had been ordered to go to his relief. 
The first brigade passing Law's ambush received volleys which, in 
the darkness, did httle harm but threw their fines into confusion. 
Forming then parallel to the road, the Federals charged Law's 
position, but were at first repulsed. Re-forming, and extending 
their fines, Steinwehr's division made a second attempt, but 
Smith's brigade, which struck Law's front, was again repulsed 
with heavy loss. The men, however, did not on this occasion 
faU back to the foot of the hiU, but ralfied in the darkness of the 
woods, near at hand, until a part of the 136th N.Y., which had 
overlapped Law's front, had appeared in his rear. The attack 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 471 

being then renewed was successful all along the Une, and Law fell 
back toward the bridge, not being pursued. Robertson, who 
had had eight casualties, and Benning, who had had none, also 
withdrew, as the retreat of Law compelled. 

Meantime, in the confusion of the night a column of two 
Federal brigades, ordered to go direct to Geary's help, had halted 
without orders, and was overlooked for nearly two hours. Owing 
to this oversight, and the non-pursuit of Law, both he and Jenkins 
were able to cross the bridge before daylight. 

No artillery was used by the Confederates, but Knaps's bat- 
tery of four guns, with Geary, was severely engaged at close 
quarters, expending 224 rounds and losing 3 killed and 19 
wounded. 

Geary's total casualties were : — 

34 killed, 174 wounded, 8 missing : total 216. 

These all occurred in Greene's and Cobham's brigades about 
1600 strong. The Federal casualties in the brigades opposing 
Law were : — 

45 killed, 150 wounded, 7 missing : total 204. 

These occurred principally in Tyndale's and Orland Smith's 
brigades. The aggregate was 420. The Confederate casualties 
reported are as follows : — 

Law : 3 killed, 19 wounded, 30 missing : total 52. 
Jenkins: 31 killed, 286 wounded, 39 missing: total 356. Aggregate 
408. 

The character of the attack by Jenkins's brigade, and of the 
defence by Greene's and Cobham's, aided by the battery, had 
been excellent. The casualties were heavy, and included many 
officers distinguished among their comrades for conduct. Noth- 
ing less could have been expected, and nothing materially more 
could be hoped for, and such considerations should have for- 
bidden this adventure. The guarding of the rear by Law 
proved a success, though due to a Federal mistake, not to his 
disposition. Only about half his force was engaged. It re- 
pulsed two attacks, but was swept away by the third. The 
enemy, however, made no advance and a free road, left open until 
after daylight, provided an escape for all four brigades from one 



472 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

of the most foolhardy adventures of the war. A Court of In- 
quiry in the 11th 'corps was held, which found that Krzyzan- 
owski's brigade had halted without authority and against the 
orders of the division commander, when under orders to go to 
Geary's assistance. 

These operations left Rosecrans with free communications by 
the shortest and best roads, and at liberty to receive all the 
reenforcements coming to him. Besides the 11th and 12th corps, 
under Hooker, already near at hand, it was known that Grant 
was bringing up a large force under Sherman from Memphis, 
and it was clear that within 30 days a force would be concentrated 
against us sufficient to overwhelm us. Rosecrans had now con- 
verted Chattanooga into a citadel, impregnable to assault by 
storm, within which he could confidently await the accumula- 
tion of whatever force was needed. 

The burden of the attack was upon us. We must promptly 
take the aggressive, and meet and defeat, either Grant and Sher- 
man approaching from the west, or Burnside, near at hand and 
threatening on the east, and be able then to reconcentrate our 
army against the other adversaries. President Davis had 
recently paid a visit to the army, which, it was known, was dis- 
satisfied with Bragg as a commander, but after some investi- 
gation had decided to sustain him. Bragg, accordingly, had 
the decision of the question what should be done. 

On Nov. 3 he issued orders for Longstreet's corps, with Wheel- 
er's cavalry, to attack Burnside's corps at Knoxville, which 
was to be assailed at the same time by a force of perhaps 4000 
men under Ransom, coming from southwest Virginia. With 
the remainder of his army, Bragg proposed to hold his present 
lines, in front of Chattanooga, during the absence of Long- 
street's division. As these fines occupied a concave front of 
fufiy eight miles against an enemy concentrated within four, 
they were necessarily weak and unable to quickly reenforce 
threatened points. Longstreet pointed out their disadvantages 
and urged a withdrawal of the remainder of the army to a strong 
defensive position behind the Chickamauga River, and that 
his own force for the attack of Burnside at Knoxville should be 
increased to 20,000 men, to insure quick and easy work, and 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 473 

save any dependence upon the hypothetical force from south- 
west Virginia. Bragg, however, overruled all suggestions, and 
Longstreet was put in motion on Nov. 4 for Knoxville, with 
Wheeler's two divisions (four brigades) of cavalry. 

The result was what might have been expected, and we may 
anticipate and record it, briefly, before following Longstreet in 
his adventure against Knoxville. 

THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA OR MISSIONARY RIDGE 

On Oct. 22 Grant had reached Chattanooga and superseded 
Rosecrans. By Nov. 20 he had concentrated at Chattanooga 
about 65,000 infantry and artillery present for duty, and pro- 
vided siege artillery for the forts about Chattanooga. Bragg, 
meanwhile, had further reduced his force by sending Bushrod 
Johnson with two brigades, 2500 men, to Knoxville, who joined 
Longstreet just too late to be of any service. This had reduced 
his force to about 40,000 infantry present for duty, greatly 
handicapped by their position in the long concave exterior Une. 
On Nov. 22 Grant took the aggressive and set on foot attacks 
upon Bragg's extreme right and left flanks. On the morning of 
the 24th Hooker turned the extreme left flank at Wauhatchie, 
in the valley of Lookout Creek, by climbing the slope of Lookout 
Mountain to the foot of the palisade. This pahsade is a precipice 
dividing the top of the mountain from the slopes forming its 
toe. These were held by one brigade of Bragg's infantry who 
were advanced some distance down the slope. Advancing along 
the foot of the precipice he took the Confederate positions on the 
toe of the mountain in reverse. They were also exposed to 
artillery fire from the front across the river and were thus surely 
driven out, about as fast as Hooker's men could pick their way 
along the steep slopes at the foot of the precipice, which bounded 
the mountain on the west. 

Ten miles away on the right flank, Chickamauga Creek emptied 
into the Tennessee by two mouths, and, in the eastern mouth of 
the creek. Grant had concealed a number of pontoons, and behind 
the hills north of the river was Sherman with over three divi- 
sions. On the morning of Nov. 24 a bridge was built across the 



474 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Tennessee and 12,000 men were brought across and made a lodg- 
ment on the east end of Missionary Ridge, before Bragg was aware 
of it. 

At sunrise, on the 25th, both Hooker and Sherman were ordered 
to attack. When Hooker advanced it was discovered that 
during the night of the 24th, the Confederate forces had aban- 
doned Lookout Mountain and withdrawn all of their men across 
Chattanooga Creek, burning the bridge. Hooker followed in 
pursuit with three divisions, Osterhaus's, Cruft's, and Geary's, 
about 10,000 m-en. About four hours were lost in rebuilding 
the bridge. Beyond it, only a feeble resistance was developed 
near Rossville on the western extremity of Missionary Ridge by 
two regiments of Stewart's division. Stevenson's division, which 
had held Lookout Mountain, had been transferred during the 
night to the extreme right to oppose Sherman. Hooker placed 
Osterhaus on the right of the ridge, Cruft on the ridge (which 
being narrow he occupied with three lines), and Geary on the left 
or front of the ridge. In this formation he advanced almost 
unopposed and with slight loss until he connected about sundown 
with Johnson's division of the 14th corps, which had formed a 
part of Thomas's attack upon the centre in the afternoon, as 
will presently be described. 

Sherman had had the entire day of the 24th practically un- 
molested to establish himself on the northern extremity of 
Missionary Ridge, and reenforcements from Chattanooga had 
reached him in the afternoon. Soon after sunrise on the 25th 
he moved to the attack. A wide depression in the ridge sepa- 
rated the portion of it which he occupied from that held by 
Bragg. Here, during the afternoon and night, Hardee had in- 
trenched Cleburne's division and prepared to make a desperate 
stand. Sherman's men, fresh from Vicksburg, attacked with 
great vigor, and being repulsed, renewed the attack several 
times with no better success. Sherman, in his report, denies 
that they were repulsed, but says : — 

"Not so. The real attacking columns bf Gen. Corse, Col. Loomis, and 
Gen. Smith were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggle all day, 
persistently, stubbornly, and well." 

This is one way of stating it. Their charges were all driven 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 475 

back, with losses more or less severe, to the nearest places afford- 
ing cover. From these they kept up musketry fire, with little 
loss or execution, all the rest of the day. Some reenforcements 
sent on the flanks did similarly, and before three o'clock in the 
afternoon Sherman's whole force had been fought to a standstill, 
and Cleburne held his position intact and with very little fight- 
ing the rest of the day. 

But Grant's third attack, the one upon the centre, was yet to 
be made. It was to be upon Missionary Ridge and the topog- 
raphy requires some description. The ridge is here an average 
of some 200 feet high, with steep slopes, averaging on each side 
fully 500 yards wide. Many ravines and swales intersect the 
surface, which had been wooded but was now recently cleared, 
leaving many stumps. When the position was first occupied, a 
line of breastworks had been built at the foot of the slopes, 
between one and a half and two miles from the Federal lines. 
Later some unfinished breastworks were erected halfway up the 
hill. 

The Confederate engineers now seemed at a loss to decide 
exactly where to make their final stand, and only at the last did 
they decide to make it at the proper place, at the top of the hill. 
But with it they made the fatal mistake of dividing their forces, 
already too small, and putting one-half in their skirmish line, at 
the bottom of the hill, and the other half at the top. Very few 
of the Confederate reports of this battle have been preserved, 
but many interesting details are given in papers, left by Gen. 
Manigault of S.C., who commanded a brigade in Hindman's 
division. The construction of the works was only begun on the 
23d, with a very insufficient supply of tools. The ground was 
hard and rocky, and when the assault was made on the 25th, 
the trenches were but half completed, and only afforded pro- 
tection to the lower part of the body. The Confederate engineer 
who laid it out had orders to locate the line upon the highest 
ground, and blindly obeyed. At many places this left numerous 
approaches, up ravines and swales, entirely covered from the 
fire of the breastworks. Manigault persuaded the engineer, who 
complained of having too much to do, to allow him to lay out 
his own line, and at such places he located the line below the 



476 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

crest so as to sweep the whole approach. Brigades to the right 
and left did not do this, and there were many places where an 
assaulting column could approach within a short distance with- 
out receiving any fire. 

The fatal mistake of dividing the force seems to have been 
decided on during the night of the 24th, for it was not done until 
the morning of the 25th. One-half of each brigade was then sent 
to the line at the foot of the hill, and the remainder to the line 
at the top. This disposition of forces was made in all the troops 
on the ridge, and the number available gave, in each position, 
only a single rank, with the men about one pace apart. Private 
instructions were given the superior officers, if attacked by more 
than a single line of battle, to await the enemy's approach within 
200 yards, then to deliver their fire, and retire to the works 
above. This was an injudicious order, as will be seen — im- 
practicable of successful execution after the enemy had gotten 
that near in such large force. 

About noon the enemy began to form in masses in front of our 
centre, about two miles away. About two o'clock these masses 
deployed and formed two lines of battle, with a front of at least 
two and a half miles. After completing their arrangements these 
moved within a mile of our lower works and halted. Behind 
these two lines a reserve force, apparently equal in number to 
one of them, was disposed at intervals in close columns of regi- 
ments, and followed them some 300 yards in rear. The whole 
array was preceded by a powerful line of skirmishers deployed 
at half distances. One could not but be struck with the order 
and regularity of the movements and the ease with which the 
Federals preserved their lines. The sight was a grand and im- 
pressive one, the like of which had never been seen before by 
any one who witnessed it. 

Manigault writes : — 

" I felt no fear for the result, even though the arrangements to repel the 
attack were not such as I liked, neither did I know at the time that a col- 
imin of the enemy was at that moment on our left flank and rear, or that 
our army numbered so few men. I think, however, that I noticed some 
nervousness among my men as they beheld this grand military spectacle, 
and I heard remarks which showed that some uneasiness existed, and that 
they magnified the host in their view to at least double their number." 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 477 

The reference made to the ''column of the enemy at that 
moment on our left flank and rear" is to the three divisions under 
Hooker, advancing from Rossville on both sides of Missionary- 
Ridge. They were due to reach the field about sundown. 

For some time after the last halt of the enemy there was an 
ominous silence over the whole field, except for an occasional 
distant cannon-shot. Sherman's battle, from one to two miles 
to the right, had been fought out. Hooker was marching cau- 
tiously unopposed, and, by a sort of tacit understanding, even 
the skirmishers in front paused in contemplation of the coming 
storm. 

The attack on the Confederate centre was assigned to Thomas, 
who had been in readiness all the morning, but was still delayed 
by Grant, who hesitated to order it until either Sherman had 
turned our right flank or Hooker had turned our left. Hooker 
was delayed and does not seem to have been heard from. Sher- 
man had been fought to a standstill ; but thinking that he saw 
reenforcements moving from the Confederate centre against 
Sherman, Grant directed Thomas to give the signal. It was a 
dozen guns, fired by the enemy, and was followed by the open- 
ing of their whole line, and soon after by our own guns from 
Missionary Ridge directed at the dark masses of their troops. 
The effect of a plunging fire, however, from our high elevation, was 
distinctly less than it would have been upon a plain, and when 
the enemy's lines were set in motion, which soon followed, it 
was apparent, at a glance, that our artillery was utterly inade- 
quate to the task of stopping the great force before us. 

Meanwhile one-half of the whole Confederate force was under 
secret orders to retreat when the enemy arrived within 200 yards, 
and the enemy's generals were themselves under orders from 
Grant not to advance beyond our skirmish line. Manigault thus 
describes what took place : — 

"When the enemy had arrived within about 200 yards our men gave 
their volley, and a well-directed and fatal one it proved, but then followed 
a scene of confusion rarely witnessed, and only equalled at a later hour on 
that day. The order had been issued to retire, but many did not hear it, 
owing to the reports of their own pieces and the deafening roar of artillery. 
Others supposed their comrades flying and refused to do likewise. Some 



478 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

feared to retire up the hill, exposed to a heavy fire in their rear, feeling 
certain, as their movements must be slow, that they would be killed or 
wounded before reaching their friends above. All order was lost, and each 
striving to save himself took the shortest direction for the summit. The 
enemy seeing the confusion and retreat moved up their first line at a 
double quick and came over the breastworks, but I could see some of 
our brave fellows firing into the enemy's faces and at last falling over- 
powered. . . . 

"The troops from below at last reached the works exhausted and 
breathless, the greater portion so demoralized that they rushed to the rear 
to place the ridge itself between them and the enemy. It required the ut- 
most efforts of myself and other officers to prevent this, which we finally 
succeeded in doing. Many fell, broken down from over-exertion, and 
became deathly sick or fainted. I noticed some instances of slight hem- 
orrhage, and it was fifteen minutes before the nervous systems of those 
men were so restored as to be able to draw a trigger with steadiness." 

In the meantime, Grant had observed the battle from his 
commanding position in the rear. As above said, he thought he 
had seen Bragg detaching troops from his centre, opposite 
Thomas, and sending them to reenforce the right opposite 
Sherman, and many Federal reports, ever since, have fallen into 
the same error. But all are wrong. Sherman had been fought 
to a standstill, and Cleburne had no need for reenf or cements. 
Also, Thomas's preparations could be seen too plainly. So the 
elaborate strategy, which had sent Sherman to turn Bragg's 
right, came to naught at the fighting point. Grant had seen, 
with much satisfaction, the Confederate lower line of intrench- 
ments in the possession of his forces. But, as he looked, he was 
surprised to see, at a number of points, that his men had not 
halted as he had ordered, but were beginning to chmb the slope 
and advance against the fortified line at the crest. He asked 
angrily: "Who ordered those men up the hill?" and, when all 
present disclaimed it, said: "Some one will suffer for it, if it 
turns out badly." But the men themselves, having reached the 
designated position, were able to take a more practical view of 
it than the general himself at a distance. 

It would be impossible for the troops to remain in the new 
position under the fire of the Confederate line at the top of the 
hill. There was nothing to do but to follow the fugitives and 
endeavor to mingle with them. As the pursuers advanced, they 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 479 

soon appreciated the fact that the ravines and swales afforded 
more or less protection from fire, and the whole line soon divided 
and concentrated itself on about six separate lines of advance. 
Not one of these was on the front held by Manigault's brigade. 
Every attempted advance here had been met with fire, before 
which it either fell back to cover, or disappeared to the right or 
left. Next on the left was Patton Anderson's brigade of Missis- 
sippians, and next on the right was Deas's brigade of Alabamians. 
A large number of Federals soon found shelter behind some over- 
hanging rocks in Deas's front within 20 yards of his line of battle. 
Manigault turned a gun upon them and they were driven from 
view, but beyond a turn of the rock, they got a lodgment in 
large numbers, so that the division commander called for and 
took Manigault's largest regiment to reenforce Deas. 

Meanwhile an officer from the left reported that the enemy 
had broken the Miss, brigade, and, going to the left to get a 
view, Manigault saw the Federals in possession of the Miss, 
battery and the brigade retreating in disorder. The Federals 
soon turned the captured guns upon his line, enfilading a portion 
of it, and about the same time the Alabamians on the right also 
gave way. His own men on the flanks were still fighting well, 
but the centre, the part being enfiladed, even now wavering, 
would soon melt away. 

A ridge some 500 yards to the rear offered favorable ground 
for a rally, and, seeing that all was lost and to check the fugitives 
impossible, he commanded a retreat, directing the officers to 
rally the men upon that ridge. A rapid run-for-it was success- 
fully made, with some loss under a heavy fire, but about two- 
thirds of what was left of the brigade were rallied on the ridge, 
and were soon joined by the remnants of the Ala. and Miss, 
brigades. Manigault saved two of his guns, but two were cap- 
tured. The enemy seemed contented with his success and did 
not pursue, and the firing ceased all along the line except at 
the extreme right, where Cleburne and the troops opposing 
Sherman still held their ground until withdrawn after dark. 

Considering how utterly the centre of his line was routed, 
Bragg made a surprisingly good retreat, the enemy not pursuing 
vigorously. Bragg crossed the Chickamauga that night, de- 



480 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

stroying the bridges behind him. On the 26th, he retreated to 
Ringgold, where on the 27th he repulsed a pursuing force which 
then retired. The army then withdrew to Dalton, where, five 
days later, Bragg, at his own request, was relieved of the com- 
mand. He lost his campaign primarily when he allowed Rose- 
crans to reopen the short line of his communications. Sending 
Longstreet to Knoxville while holding such advanced lines can-- 
not be excused or palliated. It was a monumental failure to 
appreciate the glaring weakness of his position. His men never 
really fought except against Sherman on his extreme right, and 
there they were victorious and retreated unmolested after night. 
He was simply marched out from his position on Lookout, and 
he would have been also marched off of Missionary Ridge by 
Hooker, had not Grant grown impatient. The unwise division 
of his forces had put it in Grant's power to defeat him by march- 
ing with at least 50 per cent less than the usual fighting. 

Bragg's casualties were but 361 killed and 2160 wounded, 
about the average of a single corps or one-sixth of those at 
Chickamauga. But he lost 40 guns. Grant's losses were also 
but small, on Lookout Mountain and on Missionary Ridge. 
They were heaviest where Sherman attacked Cleburne's and 
Breckenridge's divisions, but even there where the fighting was 
prolonged most of the day, there were no such casualties as there 
had been at Chickamauga. 

Grant's total was 753 killed, 4722 wounded, 349 missing. 
Total 5824. 

Livermore estimates the forces engaged on each side as fol- 
lows : — 

Efifective Federal infantry and artillery, 56,359. 

Effective Confederate infantry and artiUery, .... 40,929. 

THE KNOXVILLE CAMPAIGN 

On Nov. 3, as has been told, Longstreet was ordered to 
march against Burnside in E. Tenn., with McLaws's and Hood's 
divisions of infantry, Alexander's and Leyden's battalions of 
artillery (of 23 and 12 guns) and five brigades of cavalry under 
Wheeler with 12 guns. This force numbered about 15,000, of 
which about 5000 were cavalry and 10,000 infantry and artillery. 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 481 

Cooperation was promised from southwest Va. by a force 
of about 4000 under Ransom, but it was too late in starting, 
and its infantry and artillery only reached Longstreet on his 
retreat northward after the siege of Knoxville. 

It was designed to move Longstreet by rail from Chattanooga 
to Sweetwater, Tenn., within 40 miles of Knoxville. This, it was 
hoped, could be easily done by the 7th or 8th, The artillery and 
McLaws's division were marched to Tyner's Station on Nov. 4, and 
Hood's division to the tunnel through Missionary Ridge on the 
night of the 5th. Trains, however, could only be furnished to 
carry them to Sweetwater by the 12th, and it was the night of the 
14th before a pontoon bridge could be thrown across the river 
at Huff's Ferry near London, and the advance upon Knoxville, 
29 miles off, actively undertaken. The men and guns of my 
own battalion were carried on a train of flat cars on the 10th, 
the train taking over 12 hours to make the 60 miles. The 
cannoneers were required to pump water for the engine and to 
cut up fence rails for fuel along the route, and the horses were 
driven by the roads. 

The forces of Burnside at Knoxville consisted of four small 
divisions, two of the 9th corps, and two of the 23d, about 12,000 
infantry and artillery and 8500 cavalry. The cavalry, during 
the coming siege, for the most part held the south side of the 
river, where they erected strong works on the commanding hills 
and were little molested, as our own cavalry was generally kept 
on the north bank on our left flank. Burnside was ordered not 
to oppose Longstreet's advance, but to retreat before him and 
draw him on, as far as possible from Chattanooga. On Sunday, 
Nov. 15, Longstreet crossed and advanced as far as Lenoirs; 
Burnside falling back, skirmishing. On the 16th, an effort was 
made to bring him to battle at Campbell's Station, but only a 
skirmish resulted, in which the Federal loss was 31 killed, 211 
wounded, and 76 missing, and the Confederates 22 killed, 152 
wounded. Burnside withdrew into Knoxville that night and 
Longstreet followed and drew up before it on Nov. 17. On 
the 18th, the outposts were driven in and close reconnoissances 
made, in which the Federal Gen. Sanders was killed. He had 
been recently promoted, was an officer of much promise, and a 



482 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 




BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 483 

relative of President Davis. The reconnoissanees developed the 
enemy holding a very strong defensive line with but a single 
weak point. This was the northwest sahent angle where their 
north and south line, running perpendicular to the river below 
the town, made a right angle and turning to the east ran parallel 
with the river to the northeast of the town. There it rested, 
behind an extensive inundation of First Creek, upon a strong 
enclosed work on Temperance Hill, mounting 12 guns, with 
outlying works upon Mabry's and FUnt Hills. 

These had been built, with several other works, during the 
prior Confederate occupation, and one, enclosing three sides of a 
rectangle about 125 by 95 feet with bastion fronts, the rear being 
open, had been nearly completed at the northwest salient angle 
above referred to. This was now called Fort Sanders, after the 
general killed on the 18th, and every exertion was used to com- 
plete and strengthen it, all able-bodied inhabitants of the town 
being impressed, both white and black, to aid in labor upon the 
fortifications. The Confederate engineer who laid out this work 
had injudiciously turned the salient angle of its northwest bastion 
directly toward the valley of Third Creek, just at the point where 
this valley allowed an approach, within 120 yards, completely 
covered from the fire of the fort. A convex crest of the valley 
curved from this point to the east and south, and sheltered a 
large territory, affording space for many brigades to be held 
completely under cover, within distances of from 150 to 400 
yards of the enemy's intrenchments. These conditions made it 
the most favorable point for attack, and, indeed, the only one 
at all favorable north of the river. 

A third of the enemy's northern front was protected by in- 
imdations of First and Second creeks, across which his guns had 
open sweep for a mile. To make a large circuit, and turn it, 
would be to abandon our communications with our base of sup- 
pUes. An attack upon either of his short flanks running back 
to the river would be enfiladed from the south bank. Two 
strong enclosed works. Fort Comstock and Battery Wiltsie, 
covered the only approach between the inundations. 

The theory of Longstreet's expedition was that he should take 
a much superior force and make short work of it. In fact, we 



484 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

had an inferior force of infantry and artillery, until after the 
arrival of Johnson's and Grade's brigades, which will be referred 
to presently. The cavahy on neither side took any part in the 
siege operations. We had now to take the offensive which made 
the task harder, but yet we seem to have stood a fair chance to 
carry Fort Sanders had we made an attack with all our force 
soon after our arrival. But every day of delay added to the 
strength of the enemy's breastworks, and in a very few days he 
had an interior line which might have successfully resisted, even 
had Fort Sanders been captured. It is now to tell how the 10 
days were consumed which were allowed to intervene before the 
attack. By that time a second Une had been constructed which 
might or might not have survived the loss of the first. 

The 20th saw our own line finished with batteries erected to 
repel an}'- offensive movements of the enemy, and, incidentally, 
enfilade some of the lines of Fort Sanders, which was already 
recognized as the most feasible point of attack. Had the 
advantage of an early attack been fully realized, it might have 
been organized and delivered on the 21st, or at latest by the 22d. 
But on that day one of our staff-ofRcers, who had crossed the 
Holston River on our right flank and reconnoitred the country, 
had found it possible to locate a battery upon a high hill close 
to the river, giving an advantageous line of fire upon Fort 
Sanders at a distance of 2400 yards. 

Longstreet directed this to be done, and the attack postponed 
for it. A fiat boat and some wire were procured, a ferry fixed 
up. Law's and Robertson's brigades of infantry and Parker's 
rifle battery was crossed, and, by working all night of the 24th, 
it was possible by noon of the 25th to report as ready to open 
an enfilade fire on Fort Sanders. But the loss of this time and 
the transfer of this infantry and artillery to the south side of 
the river were both ill-advised. Our rifle ammunition was 
defective in quality, our supply of it was quite hmited, and the 
range was too great for effective work under such conditions. 

Longstreet felt too the need of the two brigades sent across 
the river, and, hearing of the coming of Bushrod Johnson's and 
Grade's brigades, he decided to await their arrival expected 
the night of the 26th. They brought an effective force of about 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 485 

2600 men, but they did not actually arrive until the night of 
the 28th, and were not able to render any service. 

That night Longstreet was joined by Gen. Leadbetter, Bragg's 
Chief Engineer, who had been at Knoxville during the Con- 
federate occupation, and being the oldest mihtary engineer in the 
Confederate service, was supposed to be the most efficient. He 
was a graduate of West Point of 1836, the class ahead of Bragg 's. 
Coming to Longstreet, as he did, with the prestige of being on 
the staff of the commanding-general, and especially charged with 
the decision of all questions of military engineering, it is perhaps 
not strange that Longstreet was quick to adopt his suggestions, 
and these, it will be seen, robbed him of most of his few remain- 
ing chances of victory. 

On Thursday, the 26th, the attack having already been post- 
poned to await the arrival of Johnson's brigades, Leadbetter and 
Longstreet rode on a reconnoissance around the enemy's entire 
position. Leadbetter pronoimced Fort Sanders to be assailable, 
but expressed a preference for an attack upon Mabry's Hill. 
This was the enemy's extreme right flank, and was undoubtedly 
the strongest portion of his whole line, besides being the farthest 
removed and the most inaccessible. In fact our own pickets 
had been advanced but Uttle beyond Second Creek, and Lead- 
better's opinion was based upon very imperfect and distant 
views. 

It was therefore determined to drive in the enemy's pickets, 
and make a better reconnoissance on Friday, the 27th. Mean- 
while, so certain was Leadbetter of the advantage of a change 
in the point of attack, that Parker's battery was ordered to be 
withdrawn from the south side of the Holston on Thursday night. 
On Friday the cavalry was called on to drive in the enemy's 
pickets, and Longstreet and Leadbetter, accompanied by the 
leading generals, made a thorough reconnoissance of our left 
flank. The attack upon Mabry's Hill was unanimously pro- 
nounced impossible, Leadbetter himself concurring. On the way 
back the party stopped opposite Fort Sanders, and while watch- 
ing it with glasses, saw a man cross the ditch in front of the 
northwest saHent, showing the depth of it at that point as less 
than five feet. This encouraged a hope that the ditch of the 



486 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

fort would not be found a formidable obstacle, and as there was 
now no alternative, and Leadbetter was urgent against further 
delay, the attack was ordered at noon on the 28th, this time 
being necessary to return Parker's battery to its enfilading posi- 
tion on the south side, whence Leadbetter had had it withdrawn 
the night before. 

At noon the next day all was ready, but the day was rainy, and 
very unfavorable for artillery practice, so Longstreet again decided 
to postpone the attack until the next morning, the 29th. 

Some howitzers had been raised upon skids, so as to permit 
fire with small charges at high elevations, as mortars, in order 
to probe behind the parapets of the fort. It had been ordered 
that the opening of these mortars should be the signal for the 
advance of a large number of skirmishers, who should occupy 
the enemy's rifle pits within 120 to 250 yards of the fort, envelop- 
ing completely its north and west fronts and keeping down the 
fire, either from its embrasures or parapets. After some practice 
by the mortars and the sharpshooters, the mortars would sus- 
pend, and allow the rifled guns and others to fire to get their 
ranges. When all had gotten ranges, a rapid fire by both guns 
and mortars, 34 in all, would begin, concentrated upon the fort 
as long as seemed necessary. Its cessation would be the signal 
for the advance of the storming force of two brigades, in columns 
of regiments, supported by adjacent brigades upon the flanks. 
If the passage of the ditch was found difficult, the pioneers with 
spade and picks were expected to rapidly cut small steps in the 
slopes which would enable the men to swarm over. The sharp- 
shooters and the storming column itself could be rehed upon to 
keep down the fire of the fort on the men in the ditches while 
this was being done. 

The garrison of the fort, as afterward shown, did not exceed 
220, including the artillery, and could be overpowered as quickly 
as they could be reached. It is now to show how all prepara- 
tions were thrown away and all advantages sacrificed for the 
illusive merits of a night attack, decided upon by Longstreet 
after dark on the 28th. Leadbetter was spending the night 
with him, but whether he suggested or acquiesced was never dis- 
closed. 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 487 

About 9 P.M. that night I received notice that the plan of 
attack would be changed and that neither the rifles across the 
river, the howitzers rigged as mortars, nor any other of the 34 
guns arranged to fire on the fort would be used, except to fire a 
signal. Several days had been spent in preparation for a 
cannonade, with all our guns concentrated on the small area 
enclosed by the fort, and now it was all to be given up as well 
as all to be hoped for from the fire by dayhght of a half mile of 
sharpshooters within from 120 to 250 yards. The fort had no 
embrasure on its west front and its fire would have to be over 
the parapets and much exposed. 

The advance was intended to be a surprise, and the signal 
guns were ordered to be fired just before dawn, that the approach 
of the column might not be visible. There was Httle time for 
consultation for it was ordered that at moon rise, about 10 p.m., 
the enemy's picket line should be taken and occupied by our 
sharpshooters, and the troops should be under arms. 

Soon after 10 p.m., there was a general advance by our picket 
lines on both sides of Fort Sanders, and after some two hours of 
sharp fighting, 50 or 60 prisoners had been taken, the enemy's 
pit occupied, and they did not have out a picket 20 yards from 
the fort. Lt. Benjamin, commanding, feeling sure that the 
attack would be at daylight, required every man to sleep at his 
post, and one in every four to keep awake as a sentry. During 
the night an occasional gun was fired with canister or shell at 
random from the fort. Federal accounts state that our own 
artillery was also fired during the night, but this is a mistake. 
Our own troops were being moved and would have been en- 
dangered by such a fire. 

At the earliest sign of fight in eastern sky, three successive 
guns fired from different batteries gave the signal to the sharp- 
shooters to open fire and for the storming columns to advance. 
Their shells were visible like meteors in the air and they ex- 
ploded high above the fort. For a few minutes about a dozen 
guns poured a hot fire on the fort and into the angle of the fines 
behind it. This was intended only to encourage the storming 
columns, and was discontinued in a few minutes. At once the 
sharpshooters opened their fire upon the parapet, and orders were 



488 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

given the storming columns to move. It had been intended that 
these should be formed close behind the sharpshooters, within 
150 to 200 yards of the fort, but in the darkness this had not 
been done. The columns each had several hundred yards to go 
and Johnson's and Grade's brigades, ordered up in support, 
had from 800 to 1000. 

The storming column was composed of Wofford's Ga. brigade, 
four regiments, under Col. Ruff on the left, and of two regi- 
ments of Humphreys's Miss., and three of Bryan's Ga. brigade on 
the right. Anderson's Ga. brigade was ordered to support the 
storming column on the left by an attack on the Hnes beyond 
the fort on that side. As the two columns advanced on con- 
verging lines, they presently ran into an entanglement of tele- 
graph wires stretched between stumps which threw down the 
leading files and caused a httle delay. But these were soon torn 
away and with very httle loss. Two or three shots each were 
fired from a barbette gun in the salient, and from an embrasure 
in the northeast bastion, but with the arrival of the men at the 
ditch the artillery fire was silenced. The two columns were soon 
found to have converged in the darkness too much, and being 
already deep columns, one of four lines and one of five, they 
simply coalesced in the darkness into a mass whose officers could 
no longer separate or distinguish their own men. To this mass 
was presently added Anderson's brigade, ordered to carry the 
breastworks east of the fort. Through some mistake, some 
minutes later, they came in from the left, in two lines, where 
already nine fines were crowding each other. The ditch was 
found to be from four to eight feet deep, and about twelve feet in 
width, without any berm at the top of the counterscarp, and 
with steep sides rendered slippery by freezing weather and the 
rain of the previous day. Yet many officers and men were able 
to cross the ditch and scale the parapet, but not in such num- 
bers as to overcome the 150 infantry defending the fort with 
fine tenacity. A few shefis were fighted by Lt. Benjamin and 
thrown by hand into the ditch as hand grenades, and axes and 
billets of wood were thrown over the parapets. Lt. Gumming, 
Adj. of the 16th Ga., made his way through an embrasure with 
a dozen men, but the party was captured inside. Col. Thomas 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 489 

of the same regiment was killed in the ditch as was also Col. 
McEhoy of the 13th Miss. Lt.-Col. Fizer of the 17th lost his 
arm on the parapet and Col. Ruff, commanding Wofford's bri- 
gade, was killed on the counterscarp. 

Meanwhile fully 20 minutes elapsed and dayHght began to 
make things dimly visible. Nearly 200 men had gotten into 
the ditch and not finding it easy to advance, now preferred to 
surrender. The fire from the fort had ceased except an occa- 
sional musket fired over the parapet exposing only a hand 
of the man holding it. But at a point 500 yards to the south of 
the fort, an offset 200 yards long, running nearly west from the 
Federal breastworks, gave a fair enfilade fire upon the crowd 
of men along the counterscarp of the west front of the fort, and 
from this point the increasing daylight was bringing a fire which 
rapidly multiplied the casualties. 

Longstreet, about this time, was advancing with the brigades 
of Johnson and Gracie, with those of Jenkins and Benning upon 
the left, when he received an exaggerated report of the wire en- 
tanglement which had been first encountered. Without a second 
thought Longstreet ordered the recall. Johnson begged to be 
allowed to go on, as also did Jenkins, but Longstreet, giving full 
faith to the report, forbade. 

It is certain that after a little delay the attack would have 
been renewed, being preceded by a cannonade, and with a 
storming column provided with tools to cut steps in the scarp 
and parapet. But within a half -hour a staff officer of Ransom's 
arrived with a telegram from President Davis, by way of Bristol, 
Va., telling of Bragg's defeat on Missionary Ridge on the 25th, 
and ordering Longstreet to march to join Bragg at Dalton. 
Vague rumors of this had reached Longstreet the night before, 
but had not been credited, and had rather confirmed his inten- 
tion to attack. 

Very soon after this Burnside sent out a flag and offered us a 
truce to remove our dead and wounded, which Longstreet ac- 
cepted, — all thought of renewal of the attack being abandoned. 
The truce was later extended until dark, Longstreet at first pro- 
posing to retreat southward at night to join Bragg, but during 
the day messages arrived from that direction, and we learned 



490 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

of the approach of a force under Sherman to relieve Burnside, 
and that our road to Dalton was closed. 

The roads through upper Ga. were deemed impracticable for 
an army and destitute of supplies, so it was determined to re- 
treat toward southwest Va. But, in order to reheve the 
pressure upon Bragg as far as we could, Longstreet determined 
to maintain a threatening position before Knoxville until the 
approaching Federal reenforcements were within a day's march. 
This was done and on the night of Dec. 4, in a severe rain- 
storm, the retreat began. During the night and next morning 
we made 18 miles and encamped at Blain's Cross Roads, 
where we met Ransom's artillery and infantry coming to 
help us in the attack upon Knoxville, but nearly three weeks late. 

Having retreated nearly to Rogersville, 65 miles, by the 9th, 
on the 14th we returned to Bean Station to attack a force under 
Parke which had followed us from Knoxville. Sending two 
brigades of cavalry on the flanks to cut off the enemy's retreat, 
Longstreet advanced his whole force directly on Bean Station. 
The enemy's skirmishers were met about three miles in front 
with artillery, but were driven in by Grade's brigade. Gracie 
was wounded in the skirmish. The Federal line was formed just 
in rear of the town, with a large hotel building on the edge of 
the town strongly held by sharpshooters, firing from loopholes 
in the second and third stories. Parker's battery was advanced 
within 350 yards of the hotel, which was soon charged by Grade's 
brigade and taken possession of. Meanwhile Kershaw's brigade 
had turned the left flank of the enemy's line and four more bat- 
teries had been advanced to close ranges, when it was found that 
the enemy was withdrawing in the dusk which was now rapidly 
obscuring the field. The day was a short one and cloudy, the 
infantry had marched 16 miles over bad roads, and Longstreet 
feared that in the darkness his troops might fire into each other. 
The enemy were mainly cavalry, under Shackelford, and pursuit 
at night by our infantry would be bootless. So the artillery 
held its fire and the infantry went into bivouac. The affair 
had been bloody for its duration and our side had the worst of it. 

The casualties in Gracie's brigade .... 162 
In Johnson's they were 60 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 



491 



And in other commands they were 
The Federals report in 13 regiments total 



68 



290 
115 



It is needless to give further details of the retreat. The cam- 
paign had been one of much hardship. Some facts may be 
given showing how poorly we were provided, even with prime 
necessities, though we were in our own country. We were so 
deficient in horseshoes that on the advance to Knoxville we 
stripped the shoes and saved the nails from all dead horses, 
killing for the purpose all wounded and broken-down animals, 
both our own and those left behind by the enemy. During the 
siege, the river brought down a number of dead animals thrown 
in within the town. We watched for these, took them out, and 
stripped their feet of shoes and nails. Our men were nearly as 
badly off for foot gear as our animals. I have seen bloody stains 
left on frozen ground where our infantry had passed. In the 
artillery we took the shoes from the feet of the drivers to give 
to the cannoneers who had to march. Our rations were also 
frequently not even the reduced rations now issued to the whole 
army. Corn, unground, was often the only ration. 

Longstreet's retreat was now continued without serious engage- 
ment to Morristown and later to Greenville, where he wintered, 
and rejoined Lee at Gordonsville, Va., in the spring. 

The following table gives the Confederate casualties of the 
campaign. Those of the unfortunate assault on Fort Sanders, 
badly begun, suspended by mistake, and never concluded, are 
shown separately below. 

RETURN OF CASUALTIES, LONGSTREET'S CORPS, 
NOV. 14 TO DEC. 4, 1863 



Division 


Brigade 


hi 




09 


J 

< 


Date 








$ 


as 


o 
H 




Hood's 


Jenkins 


22 


109 


5 


136 


Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 




Benning 


1 


5 




6 


Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 




Robertson 


9 


18 


6 


33 


Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 




Law 


15 


69 


8 


92 


Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 




Anderson 


3 


57 




60 


Nov. 17 and 18 




Anderson 


33 


129 


25 


187 


Nov. 29 


Total Hoc 


)d's Division 


83 


387 


44 


514 





492 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



Division 


Brigade 




t2 


Q 
O 


o 

CO 
M 


o 

H 


Date 


McLaws's 

<< 

<( 

u 


Wofford 

Bryan 

Humphreys 

Humphreys 

Kershaw 


48 
27 

21 
19 


121 
121 

18 

87 

116 


81 
64 

56 
3 


250 
212 

18 
164 
138 


Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 
Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 
Nov. 4 to Dec. 5 
Nov. 29 
Nov. 17 and 18 


Total McLaws's Division 


115 


463 


204 


782 




Aggregate 


198 


850 


248 


1296 





Loss in the assault on Fort Sanders, Nov. 29 : killed, 129 ; wounded, 458 ; 
missing, 226; total, 813, included in the above. 



RETURN OF CASUALTIES, BURNSIDE'S COMMAND, 
NOV. 14 TO DEC. 4, 1863 



Division 


Brigade 




n 

Q 
izi 

1 




g 

an 


<! 
H 
O 

H 




9th Corps 
1st Div. 


Morrison 
Christ 
Humphreys 
Artillery 


5 
15 
18 


19 

25 

102 

2 


6 
24 
46 


30 

64 

166 

2 






Total 


38 


148 


76 


262 




9th Corps 
2d Div. 


Sigfried 

Schall 

Artillery 


5 

4 


27 
7 
1 


32 
3 


64 

14 

1 






Total 


9 


35 


35 


79 




Total 9th Corps 


47 


183 


111 


341 




23d Corps 
2d Div. 

23d Corps 
3d Div. 

23d Corps 
3d Div. 


Chapin 
Hascall 
Cameron 


2 
9 


13 
15 

97 


6 
7 
2 


19 

24 

108 




Total 23d Corps 


11 


125 


15 


151 




Cavalry. Total 4 Brigs. 


34 


85 


80 


199 




Aggregate 


92 


383 


206 


681 





CHAPTER XX 

Battle of the Wilderness 

Review. Lee's Force. Situation. Longstreet's Position. Longstreet's 
March. Swell's Advance. Ewell's Fight. 

Lee honored our return to his command with a review. It 
was the only one ever held, after the one in the Shenandoah Valley, 
in Oct., 1862. He was not given to parades merely for show. 
Now, doubtless, he felt and reciprocated the stirrings of affection in 
the hearts of his men, inseparable from our return from bloody 
Chickamauga, upon the eve of what all felt must be the struggle 
to a finish, and no one who was present can ever forget the 
occasion. 

It took place in a cleared valley with broad pastures, in which 
our two divisions of infantry, with my old battahon of artillery, 
could be deployed, not far from Mechanicsburg, where we were 
encamped some six or eight miles south of Gordonsville. 

It is now over 40 years, but in imagination I can see to-day 
the large square gate-posts, without gate or fence, for troops 
had been everywhere in that vicinity, marking where a country 
road led out of a tall oak wood upon an open knoll in front of 
the centre of our long double hues. And as the well-remembered 
figure of Lee upon Traveller, at the head of his staff, rides be- 
tween the posts and comes out upon the ground, the bugle sounds 
a signal, the guns thunder out a salute, Lee reins up Traveller 
and bares his good gray head and looks at us, and we give the 
''rebel yell" and shout and cry and wave our flags and look at 
him once more. 

For a wave of sentiment — something Hke what came a year 
later at Appomattox when he rode back from his meeting with 
Grant — seemed to sweep over the field. All felt the bond 
which held them together. There was no speaking, but the 
effect was as of a mihtary sacrament. 

493 



494 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



Dr. Boggs, a S.C. chaplain riding with the staff, said to Col. 
Venable, Lee's aid, "Does not it make the General proud to see 
how these men love him ? " Venable answered, " Not proud. ^ It 
awes him." He rode along our lines close enough to look into 
our faces and then we marched in review and went back to our 
camps. 

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, MAY 4, 1864 



5th Corps. Warren 



Griffin 
Robinson 
Crawford 
Wadsworth 



Ayres 
Leonard 
McCandless 
Cutler 



Sweitzer 
Baxter 
Fisher 
Rice 



Bartlett 
Dennison 

Stone 



6th Corps. Sedgwick, Wright 



Wright 

Getty 

Ricketts 



Brown 


Russell 


Upton 


Shaler 


Tompkins 


Wheaton 


Grant 


Neill 


Eustis 


9 Batts. 


Morris 


Seymour 






54 Guns 



9th Corps. Burnside, Parke 



Reserve Artillery. Hunt 



Cavalry. Sheridan 







2d Corps. 


Hancock 






Divisions 


Brigades 


Artillery 


Barlow 
Gibbon 
Birney 
Mott 


Miles 
Webb 
Ward 
McAUester 


Smyth 
Owen 
Hayes 
Brewster 


Frank 
Carroll 


Brooke 


Tidball 
10 Batts. 
60 Guns 



Wainwright 
9 Batts. 
54 Guns 



Stevenson 


Carruth 


Leasure 






Edwards 


Potter 


Bliss 


Griffin 






14 Batts. 


Willcox 


Hartranft 


Christ 






84 Guns 


Ferrero 


Sigfried 


Thomas 









26 Batts. 
106 Guns 



Torbert 

GreggjD.M, 

Wilson 



Custer 
Davies 
Bryan 



Devin 
Gregg, J. I. 
Chapman 



Res.Brig. 

Merritt 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, MAY, 1864 



495 



1st Coeps. Longstreet, Anderson 



Divisions 


Brigades 


Artillekt 


Kershaw 
Field 


Henagan 
Jenkins 


Wofford 
Anderson 


Humphreys Bryan 
Law Gregg 
Benning 


Alexander 
54 Guns 



2d Corps. Ewell, Early 



Early 

Johnson 

Rodes 



Hays 


Pegram 


Gordon 


Walker, Jr. 


Steuart 


Jones 


Daniel 


Ramseur 


Doles 



Johnston 

Stafford 

Battle 



Long 
70 Guns 



3d Corps. Hill 



Anderson, 


Perrin 


Mahone 


Harris 


Wright 


Walker, L. 


R. H. 








Perry 




Heth 


Davis 


Kirkland 


Cooke 


Walker, H. A. 
Archer 


80 Guns 


Wilcox 


Lane 


McGowan 


Scales 


Thomas 





Cavalry. Stuart, Hampton 



Hampton 

Lee, F. 

Lee, W. H. F, 



Young 
Lomax 
Chambliss 



Rosser 

Wickham 

Gordon 



Butler 



Chew 
20 Guns 



Our narrative may pause for a bird's-eye view of the situation. 
In all previous campaigns there had been "intermission for 
refreshment" betvsreen our battles, in which the armies would 
replenish and recruit before initiating new strategy leading up 
to a new collision — usually under a new Federal leader. Now 
from May 5, when battle was joined in the Wilderness until 
April 9, 1865, when Lee surrendered at Appomattox, there 
was scarcely a day when the armies were not under each other's 
fire. 

Grant decided beforehand not to exchange prisoners. This 
added much to the suffering to be endured on both sides. It may 
be condoned as tending to shorten the war, but the way in which 
it was done savored more of the "sharp trick" than of Grant's 
usual dignity and frankness of character. We had, perhaps xm- 



496 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

wisely, "outlawed" Butler, and Grant's trick consisted in 
making him "Commissioner for exchange of prisoners" in hopes 
that we would decline to hold communication with him. When 
we swallowed our pride and offered exchanges, pretences were 
found to still refuse. 

The campaign against us was practically to be one of exter- 
mination, and it was to be conducted by four separate armies 
and as much of the navy as could be used in the James 
River, 

Firat. Grant had four corps — the 2d, 5th, 6th, and 9th — and 
a large force of cavalry. His returns show 102,869 present for 
duty with 242 guns. Besides, there was a siege-train being pre- 
pared of 106 guns and mortars, among which were six 100-Pr. 
rifles. This train came into service in May and June. The 
cavalry were all armed with Spencer carbines, the first magazine 
guns ever used by the army. They fully doubled the efficiency 
of the cavalry against ours with only muzzle-loaders. Wilder's 
mounted infantry had had them at Chickamauga, and their value 
on that occasion has been told. Brigades of them soon began 
to appear among the Federal infantry, as will appear hereafter. 
It was useless to capture these guns, as we could not supply the 
brass cartridges required. 

Second. In the Shenandoah Valley, Sigel was preparing a 
force of about 15,000 men with 40 guns, which was to move upon 
Staunton. 

Third. From W. Va., Crook also was to move upon Staunton 
with about 9000 men and 24 guns. When Crook and Sigel had 
united, they were to move upon Lynchburg and thence upon 
Richmond, 

Fourth. Butler, at Fortress Monroe, was organizing the Army 
of the James, to move upon Richmond by its south bank. It 
would be escorted by four monitors, a fleet of gunboats, and a 
large collection of ferry-boats and river craft of every descrip- 
tion. .These would facilitate all movements by water. His 
force comprised the 10th and 18th corps and Kautz's cavalry, 
30,000 men with 79 guns, of which about 5000 were cavalry. 
Besides these four armies, there were, near Washington, about 
40,000 troops which were used for reenf or cements during the 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 497 

next two months, besides a constant stream of recruits from all 
over the North, stimulated by bounties now being paid of a 
thousand dollars per man, and, early in July, Grant also brought 
aroimd from New Orleans the 19th corps, about 12,000 men. 

There were no returns of Longstreet's corps after his return 
from E. Tenn., but he gives as a "liberal estimate," 10,000 men. 
The return of the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia, on April 
20, was as follows : — 

Ewell's Corps . . ... . 17,079 

Hill's Corps 22,199 

Artillery 4,854 

Cavalry 8,497 

Miscellaneous 1,355 . 53,984 

Adding 10,000 for Longstreet, Lee's total force was about 
64,000, and he had about 274 guns. Against the armies of Sigel 
and Crook, Breckenridge was able to muster in the Valley and 
in the S. W. Va., about 9000 men and 24 guns. 

To meet Butler, Beauregard brought to Petersburg, from 
various points in the South, troops which he organized into four 
divisions, comprising about 22,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 
about 50 guns. These included Pickett's division of Longstreet's 
corps, say 5000 men, which rejoined Longstreet about June 1, 
and Johnson's brigade of Early's division, which was returned 
to the division on May 6. 

To recapitulate, the forces under Grant's command were about 
156,000 men and those under Lee's were about 95,000. 

Grant had been urged by some of his advisers to transfer his 
army to the James, and to make his advance upon Richmond 
by that line, by which he could approach within 20 miles with- 
out the loss of a man. But he wisely held that his objective was 
Lee's army, and that it could most easily be reached in a half 
day's march from his camps at Culpeper. 

A word about our position, where Longstreet's corps was to 
await Grant's opening the campaign. It was at Mechanicsburg, 
about six miles south of Gordonsville. Lee was fully aware that 
Grant's first move would be an attempt to turn his right flank, 
which would bring him through the Wilderness, and had decided 



498 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

to attack him en route. Ewell's corps, from its camps in winter 
quarters, could reach Grant's probable route by a march of 18 
miles. Hill's corps was farther to the left and would have about 
28 miles to go. Longstreet's, from Mechanicsburg, would have a 
somewhat later start and 30 miles in an air line, which proved 
to be 42 by the country roads, used to avoid interference with 
Hill's route. 

The first day would offer us the best chances, as Grant would 
have no breastworks and could use little artillery in the Wilder- 
ness. What proved a drawn battle, begun by three divisions, 
reenforced by two after six hours, and by three more after 18 
hours, might have had a different result if begun by five and 
reenforced by two after six hours, and only one left (Anderson's) 
to come in after 18 hours. This might have been the history, if 
Longstreet's corps had been located a few miles north of Louisa 
C. H., instead of at Mechanicsburg. 

Ma j .-Gen. Field had now been assigned to the command of 
Hood's division and Kershaw had been promoted to the com- 
mand of McLaws's. I had been made Chief of Artillery of the 
corps, and the two battahons, Cabell's and Henry's (now 
Haskell's), which had been left in Va. when we went to Chicka- 
mauga, rejoined us. Col. Frank Huger succeeded to the com- 
mand of my old battalion. 

It was near midday on May 4, when the news came that 
Grant was crossing the Rapidan at Ely's and Germanna fords, 
with orders from Lee to march to Todd's Tavern on the Brock 
road, the road by which Jackson on May 2, 1863, had turned 
Hooker's position. At 4 p.m., we were on the way, with orders 
to march all night, only stopping to feed and water. We kept 
it up until near sundown the next day, when the two divisions 
went into bivouac near Craig's meeting-house, on the Carthapin 
road, having travelled about 36 miles. We were ordered to 
cook, eat, and rest until 1 a.m., and then start for Todd's Tavern. 
Before starting, orders came from Lee to come across to the 
Plank road at Parker's store, about six miles. There was a good 
moon, about 11 days old. At a fork in the road, our leading 
division took the wrong road and lost about its length in dis- 
tance, while the other lost none. It resulted that at Parker's 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 499 

store, where we took the broad, straight Plank road, the heads 
of the two sets of fours came together, and the two columns, 
eight abreast, filled the road. 

The story may now pause, to tell what had already taken place. 
Grant's effort was to pass our flank and get between us and Rich- 
mond, He had started after thorough preparation at midnight 
on the 3d, and in 18 hours had put most of his force with its 
artillery and fighting trains across the river, using five pontoon 
bridges. He had made about 12 miles, and might have made a 
few miles more, but preferred to encamp on the night of the 4th 
in close order and wait for the 9th corps, which, with the great 
bulk of the ordnance and subsistence trains, was still behind. 
This had been the most critical day, and, to Grant's relief, it closed 
without Lee's having made an appearance. The swiftness of a 
concentration is only that of its most distant part, and Ewell had 
been ordered to march slowly down the Turnpike, and let Hill, 
coming down the Plank road, get abreast of him, and both were 
directed not to bring on a general engagement until Longstreet's 
arrival. 

So Ewell encamped the night of the 4th at Locust Grove, 
five miles from Wilderness Tavern, the centre of Grant's line. 
Hill's advanced division, Heth, encamped at Mine Run, about 
13 miles from his battle-field of the next day. 

On the 5th, Grant moved early, intending to take a Une from 
Locust Grove to Parker's store. But at 7 a.m., the 5th corps 
met Ewell's corps within two miles of Wilderness Tavern. Ewell 
had his whole corps with him, about 17,000 men. Grant, guess- 
ing that the rest of our army was not up, thought to whip it in 
detail and concentrated upon it the whole of the 5th corps, about 
24,000, and over half of the 6th, say 12,000. 

It did, indeed, seem that Ewell had ventured rashly and had 
put his head in the lion's mouth, for the ground around Lacy's, 
where Grant made his headquarters, a half-mile southwest from 
Wilderness Tavern, was open, affording opportunity for artillery 
and free communication for movement of troops, and Ewell had 
no intrenchments and was strung out upon the road. It is not 
surprising that as Grant's different divisions deployed, and 
attacked from different directions, in the early part of the fight- 



500 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ing, some of the Confederate brigades were thrown into temporary 
confusion. 

But by eleven o'clock, Ewell was all up and had taken a line 
in the forest which he was able to maintain all day and until 
darkness ended the fighting. He had even captured two 24-Pr. 
howitzers in a counter-charge, and, during the night, he managed 
to intrench himself. Gens. J. M. Jones and Stafford had both 
been killed and Pegram severely wounded. 

Hill, on the 5th, had met the enemy's cavalry at Parker's 
store, and, driving them before him, had pushed down the Plank 
road. Meanwhile, when Grant had discovered Ewell in his 
front and attacked with the 5th, and part of the 6th, corps, he 
had halted the 2d corps on the Brock road, on which it had 
been marching, and had ordered the remainder of the 6th to 
advance up the Plank road that they might come upon the 
flank of Ewell. As the latter aheady had enough to occupy 
him, it was well that Hill, about noon, encountered the skir- 
mishers of the 6th. Having orders not to bring on an action 
until the arrival of Longstreet, and having only Heth's division 
present. Hill halted and formed line of battle, but did not 
attack. 

Grant, however, was promptly notified of Heth's arrival, and, 
knowing that Longstreet, having to come from beyond Gordons- 
ville, could not arrive that day, he redoubled his efforts to destroy 
both Hill and Ewell before night. So Hancock with the whole 
of the 2d corps, 28,000, and the smaller half of the 6th, say 
10,000 men, was ordered to attack Hill's two divisions, Heth 
and Wilcox, of about 7000 each. 

Hancock, though- ordered to lose no time, delayed for an hour 
or two in order to complete some intrenchments aheady started 
along the Brock road, so as to have something to fall back upon 
in case of disaster. This delay was of great value to Hill, enabling 
him to partially select and prepare his ground. This day. 
May 5, was Grant's day, full of golden opportunities. May 4 
would have been Lee's day, had he prearranged his camps so as 
to enable him to concentrate his army more promptly where 
he knew that Grant would cross. The 6th, after Longstreet's 
arrival, would belong to the chapter of accidents. Grant seems 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 501 

to have himself appreciated this, and to have continually urged 
his battle faster than his army could make the speed. 

Hill's line of battle was square across the Plank road, with 
one brigade on the left and three on the right. On the left, the 
line ran through a clearing now grown up in broom-grass and 
small pines, and containing a house known as the Widow Tabb's. 
Some artillery, under Poague, was stationed here, and Lee and 
Hill made the clearing their headquarters, Wilcox's division, 
soon arriving, was posted on Hill's left flank, extending back 
obliquely in the direction of Ewell's battle, but with a gap of at 
least a mile between. At last, at 4.15 p.m., the sun setting at 
seven, Hancock, having built strong breastworks for his whole Une 
along the Brock road, joined Getty's division of the 6th corps, 
already skirmishing for an hour with Hill, and put the whole 
weight of his corps into an attack upon Heth. Hill soon found 
that Wilcox's line was not assailed, and that it was necessary to 
bring it to the support of Heth. At first Wilcox passed to the 
front and made some charges, but finally fell back, and the two 
divisions were practically merged into one line, which fought 
lying down. 

There was never more desperate fighting than now ensued, 
and continued until about 8 p.m., when darkness terminated the 
battle. Fortunately for Hill, the dense forest prevented his 
men from reafizing the enormous odds against him, or, like 
Bragg's men on Missionary Ridge, they might have become 
demoralized by the sight. Night did not terminate the fight- 
ing any sooner than Hill wished. His ammunition was low, his 
lines disarranged, often disconnected, and some even facing in 
different directions. Besides the danger impending from Han- 
cock on his front and right, a greater one threatened Hill on his 
left. 

Warren, while fighting Ewell, had seen Wilcox in his temporary 
location and had seen his withdrawal to go to Heth's aid. He 
sent Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade, about 8000 men, 
to move in that direction and attack Hill's flank. Darkness 
overtook Wadsworth at Hill's skirmish line and he halted and 
bivouacked, ready to attack in the morning. 

During the night, Grant had been joined by Burnside's 9th 



502 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

corps, 24,000 strong, comprised in four divisions, one of which 
was of negroes. This was left to guard the trains. Two of the 
white divisions, Potter and Willcox, supported by the 3d, Steven- 
son's, were sent to penetrate the gap between Hill and Ewell, 
now over a mile in extent. 

Long before day. Hill could hear the enemy forming in the 
woods near at hand. Nothing was done in the way of prepara- 
tion or of intrenchment during the night, as the men expected 
to be relieved by Longstreet's two divisions in the morning. 
Meanwhile, Grant had been misled into a serious blunder by false 
information, curiously like what had been imposed upon Hooker 
in the Chancellorsville campaign. By the stories of prisoners he 
was led to believe, just as Hooker had been, that Pickett's divi- 
sion had arrived, and he ordered Hancock to withdraw Barlow's 
division from the force about to attack Heth, and post it on his 
left, on the Brock road, in anticipation of Pickett's expected 
appearance. There happened to be near that point the grading 
of an unfinished railroad, designed to run from Fredericksburg 
to Orange C. H., and here passing through the Wilderness a 
httle south of it, and nearly parallel to the Plank road. It 
offered a great opportunity to turn the flank of either of the 
lines about to be engaged near that road. Fortunately for us, 
Barlow did not utiUze it, but left the opportunity to Longstreet. 

Punctually at 5 a.m. on the 6th, Warren and Sedgwick attacked 
Ewell and Hancock, with Wadsworth and Getty, attacked Hill. 
A short story can be made of the attack upon Ewell. He had 
strengthened his lines during the night and gotten in more of 
his artillery. The attacks upon him were fierce and bloody, but 
were all repulsed. For six hours they were renewed frequently, 
but by 11 A.M. the fight was all out of the assailants, and for the 
rest of the day they were satisfied to He behind their breast- 
works and keep up a more or less noisy, but harmless, fire upon 
the Confederates in theirs. Late in the afternoon, however, an 
attack was made upon an exposed flank of the 6th corps by 
Gordon, of Early's division, which will be described later. But, 
of all the chapter of accidents affecting the Confederate fortunes, 
scarcely one was more unfortunate for them than what was then 
disclosed. The opportunity for this attack, which might have 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 503 

been fatal to Grant's campaign, had lain open all day, unin- 
vestigated by Ewell and Early, although both were notified of it, 
and begged to verify it. 

Hancock's attack upon Hill opened with every promise of 
success. Birney's, Mott's, and Getty's divisions advanced simul- 
taneously upon Heth and Wilcox, who made a strong resistance 
until Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade struck them 
upon the left flank, and Hancock's left overlapped and turned 
their right. With both flanks broken, they were rapidly rolled 
up toward the centre, and the men, appreciating that their posi- 
tion was no longer tenable, fell back from both flanks into the 
Plank road, and came pouring down the road past the open 
field near the Tabb house, where Lee stood among the small 
and scattered pines. Seeing McGowan pass, Lee rode up and 
said: "My God! Gen. McGowan, is this splendid brigade of 
yours running like a flock of geese?" McGowan answered: 
" General, the men are not whipped. They only want a place 
to form, and they will fight as well as ever they did." 

Meanwhile, as already told, Longstreet's double column had 
turned into the Plank road, at Parker's store, about five o'clock 
with about three miles to go. Longstreet and staff rode at the 
head of the column, which filled the whole road. As we drew 
near the Tabb house, we met what seemed to be an orderly body 
of troops marching in the opposite direction, who parted, taking 
the woods on each side and giving us the road. Presently an 
excited staff-officer appeared, trying to stop them, who, being 
asked why, answered, — "They are running, d — ^n them." Soon 
bullets began to whistle down the road, and Longstreet ordered 
the leading brigades forward into line on each side. Gregg, Ben- 
ning, and Law, under Field, took the left. Kennedy, Humphreys, 
and Bryan, under Kershaw, took the right. Some of the bullets 
were coming across the road from the right, their direction show- 
ing that the enemy was about to pass around our flank. 

Poague's guns opened fire, and Lee, seeing the Texas brigade 
passing, rode to place himself at its head. The men, recognizing 
him and his intention, shouted, "Go back! Lee to the rear," 
and a Texan Major caught his horse by the bridle and stopped 
him. He was assured that the men did not need any leading, 



504 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

and would soon restore the battle. Some one, about that time, 
pointed out Longstreet, and Lee was taken to him. 

The Federals had now advanced over a mile through the 
tangled forest and were necessarily in much disorder. Both 
sides were fighting without intrenchments, and the Federals 
were everywhere being pushed slowly back with severe loss. 
Gregg and Benning, on the left, bore the brunt of the action. 
Both were small brigades and their casualties were heavy. 
Benning was severely wounded. The losses of the brigades can- 
not be given. But few reports were made after the commence- 
ment of this campaign, and there are only a small number of 
these which state the casualties. 

The news of Longstreet's presence was soon conveyed to 
Meade and Grant, and reenforcements were sent Hancock, while 
Sedgwick and Warren were ordered to press their attacks. 
Getty was wounded and his division was withdrawn. Steven- 
son's division, the reserve of the 9th corps, was ordered to the 
left, and Barlow, on the extreme left, was directed to attack Hill's 
right. Barlow, however, only sent one brigade, Frank's, having 
been misled by the approach from his left of a body of Federal 
convalescents who were at first taken for Pickett's division. He 
also attributed to Pickett some very rapid fire heard on the left, 
where Sheridan, with his Spencer carbines, had attacked Stuart, 
by Grant's orders, but had been repulsed. Willcox's and Potter's 
divisions of Burnside's corps, sent to penetrate the gap between 
Hill and Ewell, were urged forward, and a staff-officer sent to 
guide them, but they did not come into action until two o'clock, 
before which time the ground had been occupied by Heth and 
Wilcox, who were able to repel their assault when it was made. 
With the aid of these reenforcements, the Confederate advance 
was brought to a standstill and the firing gradually ceased. 
Engineer troops were brought up, and the Federals began im- 
proving and extending their lines. 

Meanwhile, about 8 a.m., Anderson's division of Hill's corps 
had arrived on the field, and also Lee's Chief Engineer, Gen. 
M. L. Smith. He had been sent to search for an opportunity to 
turn the enemy's left. Of course, he soon found the unfinished 
raihoad, and about 10 a.m., he reported it to Longstreet. Four 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 505 

brigades were promptly formed for a flank attack to be con- 
ducted by Col. Sorrel, Longstreet's Adj.-Gen. They were 
G. B, Anderson of Field's division, Wofford of Kershaw's, 
Mahone of Anderson's (R. H.), and Davis of Heth's, This attack 
was to be at once followed by a general advance of all Long- 
street's force, which included Jenkins's large brigade and four 
others of Anderson's division, which had not yet fired a shot. 

Sorrel moved the four brigades by the flank to the unfinished 
railroad, where they faced to the left, and, about 11 a.m., they 
advanced upon the Federal line, striking it in flank and rear. 
The success of the movement was complete. Brigade after 
brigade was routed and rolled up. Hancock, noted for his 
power and influence with his men on such occasions, endeavored 
in vain to stay the panic, but was unable to do so, and, con- 
sulting with Birney, he decided to abandon all in front and 
endeavor to reestabUsh his hne upon the Brock road. Here he 
had, the day before, sacrificed valuable time to intrench a line 
which might now serve him as a refuge. The panic had extended 
even across the Plank road where Wadsworth had been killed 
and Baxter wounded, when their troops were routed. 

This was Longstreet's great opportunity. Nearly the whole 
of Grant's army had been first fought to a standstill, and now 
four brigades, with Httle loss by a lucky movement, had utterly 
routed about two full corps in the Wilderness, where it was 
almost impossible to rally broken troops. Longstreet, \\dth five 
more fresh brigades, was close at hand, fuUy prepared to join 
the victorious four and to be aided by the brigades which had 
reUeved Heth and Wilcox in the morning in a supreme effort 
to foUow up the fugitives, and to drive them into the Rapidan. 
When Smith had directed Sorrel's column on its turning expedi- 
tion, he had been given a small party and directed to find a way 
across the Brock road which would turn Hancock's extreme 
left. He had now returned and reported one found. He was 
asked to conduct the flanking brigades and handle them as the 
ranking officer. He was a fine tactician, a skilful engineer, and 
had been noted for gallantry in the defence of Vicksburg, where 
he had been chief engineer. He was a native of N.Y. and a 
graduate of West Point of the class of 1838. 



506 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

T\Tien Sorrel's flanking brigades reached the Plank road, some 
crossing in the attack and pursuit of Wadsworth, and some in 
line, a Uttle ways in the woods on the right, whence they fired 
on the fugitives down the road, he rode back to where Longstreet, 
Smith, Field, Kershaw, and others stood at the head of Jenkins's 
brigade, in column in the road, ready to be launched in the pur- 
suit. He made his report, which was of an ideal success, as had 
already been made known by the progress of the musketry. It 
may be imagined how rapidly the news was spread down the 
ranks and with what alacrity was heard the order to advance. 

Meanwhile, the 12th Va., of Mahone's brigade, had crossed 
the Plank road in the pursuit of Wadsworth and gotten ahead 
of the other regiments, detained by a fire in the woods across 
their path. It was now returning to find its brigade, which 
was in line near the road, and had, only a short while before, 
been firing at Wadsworth fugitives. The 12th, on the left of 
the road, was mistaken in the woods for an advance of the 
enemy, and fire was opened on it by the other regiments, just as 
the head of the column was about to pass, and it rode into the 
fire, Jenkins had just before ridden close to Longstreet to offer 
congratulations, and had said : "I feel happy. I had felt 
despair of our cause for some months, but am relieved. I feel 
assured we will put the enemy back across the Rapidan before 
night." 

Jenkins and Longstreet were both struck, the former mortally, 
dying within two hours; the latter in the throat, passing out 
behind the right shoulder. Capt. Doby, and Bowen, an orderly 
of Kershaw's staff, were killed. Jenkins's brigade levelled to 
return the fire, but Kershaw shouted ''F-r-i-e-n-d-s," and arms 
were recovered, and the men lay down without firing a shot. 
The 12th Va. had also lain dovm. 

Longstreet at once summoned Field, the senior officer present, 
to take the command and to press the pursuit, one column the 
direct attack, the other to turn the position along the Brock 
road. Before Field, however, had taken command. Gen. R. H. 
Anderson, his senior, arrived, and Lee soon after came up. 

Longstreet \\Tites that the plans, orders, and opportunity were 
explained to Lee, but the woods concealed everything except 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 507 

the troops along the road, and Lee did not care to handle broken 
lines, and ordered a formation for parallel battle. 

This consumed so much time that it was 4.15 p.m. when the 
attack was renewed by Field's and Anderson's divisions, ex- 
cepting Law's and Perry's brigades. Gen. Humphreys, in 
his account of this campaign, says of this attack, " Could 
it have been made early in the day and followed up, it would 
have had important consequences," EarUer in the day, it might 
have been made by three divisions, and would have found the 
enemy already retreating. Now he had had four hours to re- 
form in intrenchments and strengthen them. Grant had him- 
self given orders to renew his attack upon us at 6 p.m. Our 
attack at 4.15 so reduced the Federal ammunition, and their 
ordnance wagons were so far in the rear, that the attack was given 
up. As it was, Jenkins's brigade, under Bratton, after a half- 
hour's attack, drove off Ward's brigade and a portion of Mott's 
division, and planted their colors upon the intrenchments. But 
there were no reenforcements and the enemy had a second 
fortified line full of troops, so Bratton was at last forced to with- 
draw with severe loss. His attack, and his final repulse by 
Carroll, were both highly complimented by Hancock. Under all 
the circumstances, the renewal of the attack at the late hour, 
and without Kershaw's division, was unwise. It was certain to 
cost many lives, the chances of success were not good, and, 
even had they been, the lateness of the hour would have interfered 
with gathering the fruit of victory. 

The fire in the woods, which had started during Mahone's 
attack, had continued to burn, and some of the wounded perished 
in it. It had reached Hancock's log breastworks, and a part of 
them were on fire at the time of our afternoon assault, with 
which it materially interfered. 

It only remains to complete the record of the day's 
misfortunes with a brief account of Gordon's attack upon the 
right of the 6th corps, commenced a Uttle before sundown, 
although the existence of the opportunity for it, as already men- 
tioned, had been discovered by scouts and reported to Gordon 
by 9 A.M. Gordon had verified it by personal observation and 
reported it to his division commander^ Early, and urged an 



508 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

attack. Early had adopted a theory that Grant would have 
Burnside's 9th corps in support of the right of the 6th. In vain 
Gordon answered that observation showed it was not there, and 
in vain he appealed to Ewell, the corps commander, to verify it, 
Early's personality dominated Ewell's to such an extent that 
Ewell not only sustained him in his theory, but would neither 
go and see or refer the important question to Lee. And so the 
matter remained during all the hours and all the vicissitudes of 
the day, until about 5,30 p.m., when Lee, who had been occupied 
until then on the right, and wondered at the strange silence on 
his left, rode up and asked, "Cannot something be done on this 
flank to reheve the pressure on our right? " 

Ewell, Early, and Gordon all happened to be present. Gordon's 
proposal was mentioned, and Early vigorously combated it. Lee 
listened in grim silence to his reasons for non-action, and answered 
only with direct orders to Gordon to proceed immediately to 
make the attack, taking one other brigade, Johnson's, to sup- 
port his attack. 

Strange to say, the situation had not changed. The attack 
took place just as the sun sank in the west. It was as im- 
mediately and brilliantly successful as Longstreet's flank attack 
with four brigades at eleven o'clock had been ; but now darkness 
intervened to save Grant's army as effectually as had the bullet 
which disabled Longstreet. Two brigades, Seymour's and Shaler's, 
were completely routed, the brigadiers and several hundred men 
being captured. Gordon's casualties were very small and a 
large proportion of them were from a cross-fire of our own men 
upon the flanking party, as it swept down the Federal Une in 
front of the Confederate line of battle in the twilight. Darkness, 
of course, soon put an end to the possibility of fighting, and the 
Federals, during the night, fell back and occupied an entirely 
new line in the rear. Early, during the war, never admitted 
that the 9th corps was not on the right and rear of the 6th, but 
the publication of the official records shows that it was em- 
ployed entirely in other parts of the field. 

There are no Confederate returns for 112, out of 183, regiments. 

The Federal casualties for the two days were : — 

Killed, 2246 ; wounded, 12,037 ; missing, 3383 ; total, 18,366. 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 509 

Livermore estimates that in proportion to the numbers engaged, 
the Confederate losses could not have been any less than the 
Federal, which, estimating only the killed and wounded, were 
14,283 or 127 per 1000 men engaged. The numbers engaged, 
Livermore estimates as : — 

Federals 101,895 

Confederate 61,025 

and the corresponding Confederate loss would be 7750. The 
Confederates had : killed. Gens. J. M. Jones and L. A. Stafford, 
and wounded, Longstreet, Pegram, Benning, and Perry. The 
Federals had, wounded, Gens. Carroll and Baxter. 
Gen. Humphreys writes of this battle : — 

" I have gone into more detail because it may serve to show what diffi- 
culties were encountered by the forces engaged in it, owing to the character 
of the field on which it took place. ... So far as I know, no great battle 
ever took place before on such ground. But little of the combatants 
could be seen, and its progress was known to the senses chiefly by the 
rising and falling sounds of a vast musketry fire that continually swept 
along the lines of battle many miles in length, sounds which at times 
approached the sublime." 

SPOTTSYLVANIA 

My command had not been engaged in the Wilderness. When 
the battle began, on the 6th, I was ordered to halt all the artillery 
at Parker's store, and it remained there until in the afternoon 
of the 7th, when it was started for Spottsylvania C. H. 
When Grant made no attack on the morning of the 7th, and, 
in the afternoon, his trains were seen moving toward our right, 
Lee correctly guessed that his design was to turn our right. Late 
in the afternoon, Lee ordered Anderson, who had succeeded 
Longstreet in command of the 1st corps, to march at night for 
Spottsylvania. It was to be a foot-race to see who could first 
occupy the ground, and the advantages seemed to be with 
Grant, who had ordered Meade to start his trains at 3 p.m., so as 
to clear the roads, and to establish one corps at the court-house, 
one at the cross-roads known as the Blockhouse, and one at 
Todd's Tavern. The troops were to march at 8.30 p.m., and 
they had about 12 miles to go. It was in the dark of the moon. 



510 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

We had about 15 miles to go, and, on arrival, only two divi- 
sions to oppose to the three corps. Fitz-Lee's cavalry, however, 
was on the road in front of Spottsylvania, and Hampton's de- 
fended Corbin's Bridge on the Catharpin road, by which the 
enemy might have interfered with our march. Our cavalry had 
cut down trees to blockade the roads, and they defended their 
blockades so well that the enemy's cavahy could not force them 
in the night, but had to wait for daylight. 

The enemy enjoyed a great advantage in having the initiative. 
Lee could not know until after daylight in the morning whether 
Grant's entire army had left his front or not. In any event, our 
two divisions could have no reenforcements during the greater 
part of the day. Thanks to the good work of Hampton's divi- 
sion at Corbin's Bridge, we passed that danger point safely. 
Our artillery, from Parker's store, came by the Shady Grove road, 
and about daylight we joined the two divisions of infantry near 
the Po River, where the column halted for an hour to rest and 
eat breakfast, expecting this to be a busy day. For already we 
could hear the beginning of some fighting two miles to our left, 
indicating that the Federal columns were finding our cavalry in 
their way. 

The Federals, however, were sure that they had won the race. 
Mr. Dana, Asst. Sec. of War, who was with Grant at the time, 
wrote of it afterward, as follows : — 

" I remember distinctly the sensation in the ranks when the rumor first 
went around that our position was south of Lee's. It was the morning of 
May 8. The night before, the army had made a forced march on Spott- 
sylvania C. H. There was no indication the next morning that Lee 
had moved in any direction. As the army began to realize that we were 
moving south, and, at that moment were probably much nearer Rich- 
mond than was our enemy, the spirits of both officers and men rose to the 
highest pitch of animation. On every hand I heard the cry 'On to Rich- 
mond.'" 

Our little halt for breakfast, greatly needed by both men and 
animals after the night march, about exhausted all the margin 
by which we had won the race. About 7 a.m., we reached a 
cross-road, where stood the peculiar looking house, called the 
Blockhouse, built of squared logs. Here we met pressing 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 511 

appeals for help from two directions. From Spottsylvania 
C, H., one and a half miles in front, Rosser's brigade reported 
itself as being driven by Wilson's division of cavalry, coming 
from the direction of Fredericksburg. From the road to the 
left, which crossed the Brock road on the Spindler farm one 
mile away, Fitz-Lee reported himself as heavily pressed by 
Warren's corps of infantry, and the increasing musketry fire 
told that the situation was fast growing critical. The two lead- 
ing brigades, Kennedy and Humphreys of Kershaw's division, 
were at once filed to the left and hurried to the relief of Fitz- 
Lee's cavalry. The other brigades of the same division, Wofford 
and Bryan, went on ahead to the aid of Rosser. Haskell's 
battahon of artillery went with Kershaw and Humphreys. Fitz- 
Lee was defending some slight rail breastworks on the edge of a 
dense pine thicket, overlooking a large open area, and the in- 
fantry quickly relieved the men with carbines behind the rails. 
The latter, unobserved, were withdrawn to the rear through the 
thicket, mounted and taken by Lee to the aid of Rosser. 

Kennedy and Humphreys had hardly gotten into position 
when they were charged by the three brigades of Robinson's 
division of the 5th corps. Each brigade was formed in column 
of regiments, four lines deep. Two brigades formed the first 
line, and the third brigade the second line. Warren had told 
them, the prisoners afterward stated, that there was only 
cavalry behind the rail breastworks, who had no bayonets, and 
could not stand close quarters. They actually did charge home 
to the rails, and a bayonet fight took place across them; but 
though superior in numbers, the Federals were repulsed, leaving 
the ground strewn with dead and wounded, Robinson being 
among the latter. Haskell's guns took part in the repulse and 
did fine service, losing a captain. Potts, killed. 

Field's division now came up to Kershaw's support and 
extended his line to the left. Huger's battahon took position 
in the edge of the pine thicket where the cavalry had stood, 
and Cabell's battalion was held in reserve. Wilson's cavalry, 
having held Spottsylvania C. H. for two hours, was withdrawn 
by Sheridan, as Rosser, reenforced by Fitz-Lee, was moving upon 
him. Wofford and Bryan now rejoined Field. 



512 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Meanwhile, after the repulse of Robinson's division, Griffin's 
division made two assaults. The first met about the same fate 
as Robinson. The second did not come so far, but secured posi- 
tions to our right, where they could find cover from 300 to 400 
yards away, and began to intrench. Crawford's division next 
came up to Griffin's left and extended his intrenchment, only 
exchanging rather distant fire with ours. Wadsworth's, the last 
division, now under Cutler, next made an attack upon our left, 
driving in our pickets and establishing a line prolonging Grifiin's 
to his right. It was now about midday, and Warren's corps had 
been fought to a standstill. 

About this time, Meade ordered Sedgwick to reenforce Warren 
with his whole corps and join him in an attack upon our two 
divisions, which was to be "immediate and vigorous." It was 
scarcely done as ordered, for it was not made until five o'clock ; 
it was but a partial attack, and it was nowhere successful. The 
time required to form troops for an attack can seldom be exactly 
fixed, and here it was said that the ground was new to every 
one and the troops were tired with an all-night march. 

The attack was made, however, by so large a force, that it 
overlapped our fine on its right, which might have proved a very 
serious matter. As luck would have it, however, Crawford's 
division, the overlapping part which entered the woods beyond 
our extreme right about dusk, ran into Rodes's division of 
Ewell's corps, just arriving on the field, after an all-day march 
from the Wilderness, nearly exhausted by the heat, dust, and 
the smoke of the fires still burning there. Rodes promptly 
drove Crawford back to his place in the Federal line, and then 
forming his division on the right of Kershaw, he proceeded to 
intrench. Johnson's division formed on his right and Early's 
division, now under Gordon, in reserve. The fighting along the 
fines lasted until dark. During it, nearly every gun in our corps 
had been engaged, and was now assigned to some position, 
either on the line or behind, where it could fire over. Now at 
night, all were intrenching themselves, and we made our bivouac 
near the Blockhouse. 

Hill's corps, now under Early, Hill being sick, had remained 
all day of the 8th guarding the movement of our trains from 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 513 

the Wilderness. On the 9th, it followed the other corps to 
Spottsylvania and took position on Ewell's right, except Mahone's 
division (formerly Anderson's), which was formed on the left of 
Field, overlooking the Po. The day was taken as a much-needed 
day of rest by the Federals, in which we cheerfully acquiesced. 
The sharpshooting, however, was active upon both sides. One 
of our sharpshooters killed Gen. Sedgwick at a range of about 
700 yards from the pine thicket on the Brock road. He was suc- 
ceeded by Wright in the command of the 6th corps. 

The day was largely devoted to improving our breastworks, 
an art in which we were much behind our adversaries. Our 
equipment with intrenching tools was always far below our re- 
quirements, and in emergencies the men habitually loosened the 
ground with bayonets, and scooped it up with tin cups. The hne 
was laid out generally by those who built it. The Federals had 
a large force, perhaps 2500 men, of engineer troops and heavy 
artillery regiments, habitually employed in building and im- 
proving their intrenchments under the direction of engineer 
officers. They were more valuable than an equal number of 
regular troops, and should be a part of the equipment of every 
army. 

Sheridan, on the 8th, had been ordered to concentrate his 
cavalry, move against Stuart, and then upon our communica- 
tions, and when his supplies were exhausted, to proceed to the 
James River, renew his supplies, and return to the army. 

Burnside's corps arrived on the 9th by the Fredericksburg 
road and began intrenching opposite Hill, whose lines covered 
the court-house on our right. He had encountered some dis- 
mounted cavalry whom he mistook for a brigade of Longstreet's 
infantry, and so reported it to Grant. This misled Grant into 
the belief that Lee was moving in the direction of Fredericks- 
burg, and he ordered Hancock immediately to cross the Po, 
move down it and recross by the Shady Grove road, thus turn- 
ing our left flank. Hancock at once put three divisions to cross 
simultaneously at three different points. The farthest up-stream 
met a stubborn resistance from dismounted cavalry, but it was 
presently driven off by those who had crossed below, where the 
second effort had met little resistance, and the third none. 



514 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Pontoon bridges were immediately thrown at all three places, 
and the troops were pushed down-stream, hoping to secure the 
Shady Grove road bridge. Darkness, however, soon forced a 
halt, but some of the men reached the river and found it not 
fordable. At early dawn, Hancock reconnoitred, but found 
Mahone's brigade on the opposite bank too strongly posted to 
be attacked. Further reconnoissances were being made, when, 
about 10 A.M., Hancock was ordered to send two divisions of his 
three back across the Po to take part in an assault ordered in 
the afternoon at five. Gibbon and Birney were accordingly with- 
drawn, leaving Barlow's division alone on the south side. 

Meanwhile, when Hancock crossed the Po on the afternoon of 
the 9th, Lee had ordered Heth's division from his extreme right 
to the extreme left, with orders to cross below our lines, and, 
coming up, to strike Hancock's three divisions on the flank. 
Heth had crossed the Po, some distance below our left flank, on 
the morning of the 10th, and tiu-ned to the right, hunting for 
Hancock's flank. It was fortunate for him that he had made 
so wide a circuit that he did not find it until after Hancock, 
with his two divisions, had been withdrawn to the north side, 
for Barlow's four brigades alone largely outnumbered him with 
only three, and Barlow could have been quickly reenforced. 
Heth would otherwise have lost much of his division, as its 
retreat across the Po would have been difficult. 

As it was, Heth made two spirited charges upon two of Barlow's 
brigades drawn up behind the crest of a ridge, with the others 
supporting in the rear. Both charges were repulsed with severe 
loss, but meanwhile, a fire breaking out in the woods in rear, 
Meade ordered Barlow withdrawn. This was done with the 
loss of one gun, wedged between trees by the horses, who were 
stampeded by the fire. In withdrawing. Barlow suffered severely 
from the artillery across the Po, which swept the plain over 
which he reached the bridge. Some of the wounded perished in 
the fire. Gen. H. H. Walker of Heth's division was severely 
wounded. It had been a mistake to send Hancock across the 
Po at such a late hour in the afternoon. Night intervened be- 
fore he could accomplish anything, and it disclosed his plan. 
Next day he abandoned it before discovering that Heth was 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 515 

in his power. At night Heth was returned to the right 
flank. 

Heavy shelling of the 1st corps lines had been kept up all 
the morning, and in the afternoon three assaults were made at 
different points. One against Field's division had been ordered 
at 5 P.M., but at 3.30 Warren thought the opportunity for attack 
so favorable that he made it without further delay. In full uni- 
form, he attacked the lines held by Field's division with Cutler's 
and Crawford's divisions and Webb's and Carroll's brigades, 
approaching through dense thickets which hid him from view 
until at quite close quarters. But our guns had been placed to 
flank these thickets and riddled them with canister as the enemy 
passed through. They emerged in bad order and unable to form 
imder close musketry, and were repulsed with severe losses, 
among them Gen. Rice, mortally wounded. A few only suc- 
ceeded in gaining our works, where their covered approach had 
been closest, but they were killed or captured. 

Not satisfied with this effort, Hancock tried a second assault 
at 7 P.M., with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, supported by 
part of the 5th corps, but it was also repulsed with severe loss 
to the enemy and with very trifling loss to us. Glancing back 
over the sequence of events, it appears that Burnside's mistaking 
dismounted cavalry for Longstreet's infantry on the 9th, was a 
most fortunate one for Lee. For it led to Grant's prematurely 
sending Hancock across the Po and then withdrawing him. Had 
he continued on that flank and perhaps been reenforced by 
Warren, it is hard to see how he could have failed to defeat 
Heth and completely turn Lee's flank, and get upon his com- 
munications which now ran to Louisa C. H. 

While these affairs were going on upon our left, a carefully 
planned and partially successful effort was being made near 
our centre. In the hasty extension of our Hne to the eastward 
in the afternoon of the 8th, Ewell, to keep on high ground, had 
changed direction and gone a mile north ; then, making a right- 
angled saUent, had returned within three-fourths of a mile of the 
point of departure before resuming his eastward course. There 
resulted a great sailent a mile long, reaching out toward the enemy 
and ending in the point afterward known as the "Bloody 



516 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Angle." It was a piece of bad engineering and certain to invite 
an attack as soon as the enemy understood it. 

This it required a few days for them to do, for our sharp- 
shooters prevented any close reconnoissance. Meanwhile, how- 
ever, our men found that the sides of the sailent angle were en- 
filaded by the musketry fire of the enemy's sharpshooters coming 
over the parapets, and, for protection, traverses were erected 
every few yards along them. On the 10th, all the features 
of this salient had not been understood, but on its western 
face the enemy had found a place where a large force could 
approach within 200 yards of our intrenchments, entirely un- 
observed, and would have but that distance under fire to enter 
them. It was here that the carefully planned effort was made 
at 5 P.M. 

The assault was made under Col. Upton commanding a bri- 
gade in Russell's division of the 6th corps. He was a graduate 
of West Point of the class of '61, and had already shown him- 
self distinguished as a tactician and a leader of troops. His 
command included three brigades, comprising 12 regiments which 
were formed in four lines. No commands were given while 
moving into position. All had bayonets fixed and guns loaded, 
but only the front line had them capped. On reaching our 
works, the 1st line would divide, half going to the right and half 
to the left, to sweep in each direction. The 2d hne would halt 
at the works and open fire to the front. The 3d would lie 
down behind the 2d, and the 4th would he down at the edge of 
the wood, whence they charged, and awaited the result. In the 
charge, all officers would constantly repeat the shout "forward," 
and the men would rush forward with eyes on the ground they 
were traversing. 

The attack fell upon Doles's Ga. brigade of Rodes's division, 
and Upton thus describes how the charge was met : — 

" Here occurred a deadly hand-to-hand conflict. The enemy sitting in 
their pits with pieces upright, loaded, and with bayonets fixed ready to im- 
pale the first who should leap over, absolutely refused to yield the ground. 
The first of our men who tried to surmount the works fell pierced through 
the head by musket balls. Others, seeing the fate of their comrades, held 
their pieces at arm's-length and fired downward, while others, poising their 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 517 

pieces vertically, hurled them down upon their enemy, pinning them to the 
ground. . . . Numbers prevailed and like a resistless wave the column 
poured over the works, quickly putting hors de combat those who resisted, 
and sending to the rear those who surrendered." 

Mott's division was to have supported Upton on the left, but 
it did not appear. It seems that this division was formed for 
the attack where our batteries had a view of it, and that when 
it attempted to advance, at the signal for the charge, it found 
itself the target of a severe artillery fire, under which the bri- 
gades broke and fell back to the foot of the hill. Meanwhile, the 
Confederate brigades on the right and left had promptly attacked 
Upton upon both flanks, and Battle's brigade, brought up from 
the rear, attacked him in front. He brought up his fourth line 
in vain in a hard fight, and was finally driven back with loss, 
which he states as "about 1000 in killed, wounded, and pris- 
oners," probably about 20 per cent of his command. Ewell's 
official report of the affair, dated Richmond, March 20, 1865, 
says : — 

"The enemy was driven'from our works, leaving 100 dead within them 
and a large number in front. Our loss, as near as I can tell, was 650, of 
whom 350 were prisoners." 

The total losses of the Federals for the day were estimated at 
4100, and included Gen. Stevenson of Burnside's corps killed by 
a sharpshooter. 

Grant believed that the failure of Mott's division to advance 
had caused Upton's defeat upon the 10th, and on the 11th he 
planned a much more powerful attack to be made by the whole 
of the 2d and the 9th corps. In preparation for this, the corps 
commanders were ordered to ascertain the least force which could 
hold their fines, and leave the remainder available for service 
elsewhere. They were also directed to press their skirmishers 
forward so as to allow close reconnoissance of our works. Later, 
he determined upon the safient already described, and afterward 
known as the "Bloody Angle," as the point of attack. On our 
lines the day was one of bitter sharpshooting and angry artillery 
practice. Meanwhile, all movements of the enemy were carefully 
watched for indications of his plans, and one was reported from 



518 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

which Lee derived the impression that he was preparing to make 
a flank march to our left. 

Hancock had sent Miles to reconnoitre across the Po in the 
direction of Todd's Tavern. Only two regiments were sent, and 
they returned in the evening, but our report had exaggerated the 
numbers and undue importance was attached to the incident. 
Early had also reported indications of movements to the left. 
Lee believed that Grant was preparing for another flank march 
to be attempted during the night, and orders were sent to each 
chief of artillery to withdraw at sundown all of his guns which 
were in lines close to the enemy, so that if it became neces- 
sary to move during the night, the withdrawal of the guns 
would not be heard. Mahone's division was still upon Field's 
left, and Lee also ordered it, with two brigades of Wilcox, 
to make a night march and occupy Shady Grove before day- 
light. 

During the night, it was discovered that the movement to 
the left had been unimportant (it was supposed to have been 
a feint, but it was not) so that Mahone was recalled, and 
now he, with Wilcox's two brigades, were returned to Hill's 
corps. The order to the chiefs of artillery, however, was 
not recalled, and consequently 22 guns of Page's and Cut- 
shaw's battalions were, about sundown, withdrawn from the 
position about to be attacked. It was a fatal mistake, as 
will presently appear. 

On the line of Longstreet's corps, I had ventured to accom- 
plish the intent of the order without literal compliance with its 
terms. I had visited every battery and had its ammunition 
chests mounted (they were usually dismounted, and the 
chests placed under cover in the pits) and the carriages so placed 
and the roads so prepared that we could withdraw easily 
and without noise. Our guns all remained in position on the 
lines. 

It was in the dark of the moon, and heavy rain was falling as 
the Federals began to move soon after nightfall. It was after 
midnight when they reached the ground where they were to 
form. Hancock's formation is interesting, but it failed from an 
over-concentration of force. 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 519 

HANCOCK'S FORMATION FOR CHARGE, MAY 12, 1864 



Barlow's Div. 
Brooks's brig. miles's brig. 

t t 



Birney's Div. 

t 



Smyth's brig. 



BROWN s brig. 



Mott's Div. 



t 



Gibbon's Div. 
t 



Did not follow until advance struck the works. 



At Gettysburg, our formation for Pickett's charge (which was 
too light) was in two Unes supported at a little distance by a 
part of a third. Upton's charge, on the 10th, was in four lines, 
and was at first successful, but was finally repulsed. Hancock 
seemed anxious to make sure, and formed Barlow's division 
in two lines of two brigades each, "closed in mass." This gave 
a column at least 10 ranks (or 20 men) deep. Barlow had open 
ground to advance over. On his right, Birney had a marsh and 
then a thick wood of low pines, until quite near the enemy. He 
was in two lines followed by Mott in one. In rear of all stood 
Gibbon's division deployed. All officers were dismounted, and 
the division and brigade commanders and their staffs marched 
in the centre between the lines. The intervals between the 
ranks in Barlow's division were all so small that, soon after the 
advance began, the intervals were lost and the division became 
a solid mass. 

Grant had ordered the charge at 4 a.m., but, owing to fog, 
Hancock delayed until 4.35. As it began to grow light, the order 
was given to charge. The men moved at first quietly and slowly, 
but about the time when the Confederate pickets fired, they 
broke into a run and there was some cheering. The distance to 



520 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

our works was about 1200 yards. The Confederates had heard 
the noise of the column being formed, and urgent calls had been 
sent for the return of the 22 guns which had garnished our para- 
pets the day before, but had been withdrawn about sundown, as 
already told. They were now coming back through the woods 
in two long lines under Page and Cutshaw. The two leading 
guns were in time to unUmber, and, between them, fired three 
rounds into the Federal masses before they were surrounded. 
All the column, except the two rear guns, was captured. Had 
they been in their places, it is quite certain that the charge would 
not have been successful. Nowhere else, in the whole history 
of the war, was such a target, so large, so dense, so vulnerable, 
ever presented to so large a force of artillery. Ranks had 
already been lost in the crowd and officers could neither show 
example or exercise authority. A few discharges would have 
made of it a mob which could not have been rallied. There was 
a thick abattis of felled trees in front and "chevaux de frieze" 
which, Barlow says, " would have been very difficult to get through 
under a cool fire." For the mob, which his division would have 
soon formed, there would have been no escape but ffight, with 
phenomenal loss for the time exposed to fire. As it was, our 
infantry had time to fire only two or three hurried rounds, when 
the enemy were upon them. Perhaps one- third escaped, but 
about two-thirds were captured, among them being Maj.-Gen. 
Johnston and Brig.-Gen. Steuart. Of the 22 guns, 18 were cap- 
tured at once. Two more were abandoned between the lines, 
where our men were able to use them against the enemy during 
the day, but the enemy got them during the night. 

Thus, the first Federal operation of the day was a great success, 
so far as guns and prisoners were concerned; but the tactics 
used were so faulty that they practically so embarrassed all the 
future operations, as to prevent any further fruit from the vic- 
tory, although the whole force of the army was brought to bear. 
The enemy, in possession of the salient and the captured guns, 
pursued the fugitives and turned some of the captured guns upon 
them. But the fugitives, falling back, soon met reinforcements 
coming from the brigades of Johnston and Gordon on the right, 
and from Daniel and Ramseur on the left, who attacked them 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 521 

with great spirit. The pursuers were utterly disorganized, as, in- 
deed, was almost the whole of Hancock's corps, and there was 
scarcely room within the salient to organize and re-form the lines. 
Efforts were being made by Barlow when the well-organized 
Confederate brigades began to push back the disorganized pur- 
suers and recover some of the ground which had been lost. It 
was reported to Grant that Hancock was being checked and 
eight brigades of the 6th corps were ordered to reenforce him. 
They charged in with cheers and were added to the troops al- 
ready much too crowded in the confined space. This was about 

8 A.M. 

Meanwhile, Burnside had been ordered at 5 a.m. to assault 
A. P. Hill's lines on our right. He had sent Potter's division 
against Lane's, our extreme brigade on that flank. Potter car- 
ried the line and captured two guns. Lane re-formed his brigade 
in some old breastworks, which enfiladed those Potter had taken, 
drove him out, and recaptured the guns. Wilcox sent two bri- 
gades to Lane's help, but they were not needed and were sent 
back. 

About 8 A.M., Burnside was ordered to move to his left and 
connect with Hancock's line, which he did by 9.15. Willcox's 
division of the 9th was now ordered to attack Heth's line, at a 
favorable point where a pine thicket allowed a close approach 
under cover. While his attack was in progress, he was struck 
on his left flank by Lane's and Weisiger's brigades of Hill's corps, 
who had been sent out by Early to endeavor to reheve the press- 
ure at the salient. Lane claimed to have captured a battery, 
but was unable to take it off. Willcox was helped by Crittenden's 
division, and skirmishing and heavy artillery firing was kept up 
all day without material result. 

To return now to the Angle where eight brigades of the 6th 
corps had arrived about 8 a.m. The determined counter attacks 
of Ewell's brigades had cleared the space within the breastworks 
and compelled the enemy to confine themselves to the outside 
slopes of the parapet or the interior of a few enclosures along its 
inside slopes made by joining the ends of the traverses, which 
were only 10 or 12 feet apart, and built up of logs. Every avail- 
able foot of cover was occupied, and outside of the parapets the 



522 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

men stood from 20 to 40 deep. Those in rear would pass guns 
to some in front, who would fire almost as rapidly as if they had 
breech-loaders. Fortunately, much of the fire was without aim 
or nothing could have lived before it. The entire forest in its 
front was killed, logs were whipped into basket stuff. An oak 
tree, 22 inches in diameter, whose trunk is still preserved in 
Washington, was cut down entirely by musketry fire, disabling 
several men in the 1st S.C. regiment, by its fall. Ammunition 
was supplied liberally from the rear and many men fired over 
300 rounds. The bodies of the wounded and slain of both sides 
who had fallen in the earlier attacks were shot to pieces and 
mangled beyond any recognition. 

In the meantime, Lee had brought up three brigades of Hill's 
corps (Perrin's, and Harris's of Mahone's division and McGowan 
of Wilcox's), and Grant added two brigades of Ricketts's division 
and three of Cutler's to the 19 brigades already engaged. He 
also brought up artillery on the two flanks outside the salient 
to rake the prolongations of the parapet held by the Federals. 
In their reserve artillery were eight 24-Pr. Cochorn mortars, and 
these, too, were brought and effectively used to drop shells 
behind the Confederate parapets. Across the throat of the 
Angle, our line was covered from view by the wood. Lee's only 
opportunity for attack was along the west parapet, where the 
traverses were close together, as already told. Here the Confed- 
erates never relaxed their efforts and succeeded in getting pos- 
session of nearly all of them up to the salient. Many were shot 
and stabbed through the crevices of the logs. Perrin was killed 
and McGowan severely wounded. In his report, the latter writes 
as follows : — 

" In getting into this trench, we had to pass through a terrific fire. . . . 
We found in the trenches Gen. Harris, and what remained of his gallant 
brigade, and they (Mississippians and CaroHnians), mingled together, made 
one of the most gallant and stubborn defences recorded in history. These 
two brigades remained there, holding our line without reenforcements, 
without food, water, or rest, under a storm of balls, which did not intermit 
one instant of time, for 18 hours. The trenches on the right of the Bloody 
Angle ran with blood and had to be cleared of the dead bodies more than 
once. . . . The loss in my brigade was very heavy, being in the aggre- 
gate 451. . . . Our men lay on one side of the breastwork and the 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 523 

enemy on the other, and in many cases men were pulled over. It is be- 
lieved we captured as many prisoners as we lost." 

We pass now to the left, to Longstreet's front opposite War- 
ren. At dawn, Warren had opened all his guns and pressed for- 
ward his skirmishers, hoping soon to see us sending forces to 
our right, to meet" Hancock's victorious advance. But Han- 
cock had overdone his effort, as has been seen, and his advance 
had been brief. Our guns were all behind their parapets and 
firing slowly in reply to the enemy. Warren saw no encourage- 
ment to attempt an attack, so he waited. At 9.15, Grant ordered 
him " to attack at once, at all hazards and with his whole force 
if necessary." At 10 a.m., we saw Warren's men advance over 
the open ground where they had first assaulted us on the 8th. 
By common consent, infantry and artillery reserved their fire 
until his line was within 100 yards. Then both opened, and the 
line was quickly driven back with heavy loss to them, and but 
little to ourselves. They fell back to their right out of our sight 
in a hollow. We followed their disappearance with a random 
fire of artillery down the hollow, which Bratton's skirmishers 
reported enfiladed them and caused much loss. But, being ran- 
dom fire, it was presently discontinued to save ammunition. 
Soon there broke out in the hollow a furious fusillade for which we 
could find no explanation, unless they were firing on each other 
by mistake. This seemed unlikely when it was kept up for over 
two hours, a great roar of musketry. Bratton, in his report, 
says : — 

" It seemed a heavy battle and we had nothing to do with it. Skir- 
mishers from the 1st and 5th (S.C.) regiments were ordered up to the crest 
to discover what it meant. 

"They found them lying behind the crest, firing at what did not clearly 
appear, but they (the skirmishers) , with great gallantry, charged them with 
a yell, routed, and put the whole mass to flight most precipitate and head- 
long, capturing some 40 prisoners. In their haste and panic a multitude 
of them ran across an open space and gave our battery and my line of 
battle on the right a shot at them, the skirmishers, too. We kept up a 
most effective fire on them, and that field also was thickly dotted with 
their dead and wounded." 

I can find no mention of this episode in any Federal report 



524 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

beyond statements in the itineraries of Griffin's and Cutler's 
divisions tliat they were engaged, Griffin three and Cutler four 
hours, on the morning of the 12th. Can it be that two Federal 
divisions fought each other for nearly that time and that every 
reference to it in the official reports has been carefully sup- 
pressed? It seems so. Warren's account of the attack gives 
suspiciously few details, not even noting the divisions engaged. 
Here is the whole of it: — 

"I also again assailed the enemy's intrenchments, suffering heavy loss 
but failing to get in. The enemy's direct and flank fire was too destructive. 
Lost very heavily." 

It hardly seems likely that so much loss could have been in- 
curred from their very brief exposure to our fire. Longstreet's 
official diary describes the action only as two violent assaults 
between nine and ten, on a part of Field's line. Gen. B. G. 
Humphreys's book throws no light on the subject beyond the 
following footnote : — 

"I was overlooking the right of the army and gave the order for the 
assaults there to cease as soon as I was satisfied they could not succeed ; 
and directed the transfer of the troops to the centre for the attack there." 

What, then, prolonged the engagements of Griffin and Cutler 
between three and four hours, of which no one gives any details ? 

Immediately after this failure of Warren to break our fine, his 
whole force was transferred to the Angle, except Crawford's 
division of two brigades, and Kitching's and Denison's brigades. 
This added 8 brigades to the 24 already massed there, and 
artillery was also brought to bear from every spot, near and far, 
which offered a location. It had been intended to use Warren's 
corps in a fresh attack upon the Angle, but after some prepa- 
ration it was wisely abandoned. Lee had brought up Humphreys's 
brigade from Kershaw's, and Bratton's from Field's division. We 
had also contributed Cabell's Art'y Batt'n to strengthen the force 
holding the line across the gorge, and it was practically impreg- 
nable. As night approached, several Federal brigades were des- 
ignated to keep up the fire upon our lines all night. It was 
faithfully done, at least until 1 a.m., about which time, under 
cover of the darkness, we withdrew to the gorge line, leaving to 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 525 

the enemy the intrenchments which had been so well defended 
all day. It had been necessary in the morning to retake them 
from Hancock's first assault, and to hold them until Lee could 
close the gorge. Afterward, he could not withdraw the force 
with which he had done it until nightfall, though there was 
no longer any value in the lines they held. 

The mihtary lesson to be learned from the failure of Hancock's 
assault (for it was a failure to get only 20 guns and perhaps 
4000 prisoners for such a gigantic effort) is, that there is a maxi- 
mum limit to the force which can be advantageously used in any 
locality, and a superfluity may paralyze all efforts. Here there 
was a great superfluity. 

The Federal losses for the 12th are given by Humphreys as : — 

Killed and wounded 6,020 

Missing 800 6,820 

The Federal Gens. Wright, Webb, and Carroll were wounded. 
The Confederate losses, Humphreys estimates as between 4000 
and 5000 killed and wounded and 4000 prisoners. We had : Gens. 
Daniel and Perrin killed; James A. Walker, R. D. Johnston, Mc- 
Gowan, and Ramseur severely wounded ; Edward Johnson and 
George A. Steuart captured. One feature of the occasion which 
added to the hardship and suffering on both sides was the rain 
which fell almost incessantly for two nights and a day. Mr. Dana 
gives the following account of a visit to the Angle on the 13th : — 

"All around us the underbrush and trees had been riddled and burnt. 
The ground was thick with dead and wounded men, among whom the 
relief corps was at work. The earth, which was soft from the heavy rains 
we had been having both before and during the battle, had been trampled 
by the fighting thousands of men until it was soft like hasty pudding. 
As we stood there looking silently down at it, of a sudden the leg of a man 
was lifted up from the pool and the mud dripped off his boot. It was so 
unexpected, so horrible, that for a moment we were stunned. Then we 
pulled ourselves together and called to some soldiers near by to rescue 
the owner of the leg. They pulled him out with but little trouble and dis- 
covered that he was not dead, only wounded. He was taken to the hos- 
pital where he will get well, I believe." 

As might have been expected. May 13 was comparatively a 
day of rest. The only record in my note-book is of the Federal 



526 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

wounded in front of our lines, who had been left on the ground 
since the 8th. Some were still alive, and we had noticed one who 
had occasionally raised himself to nearly a sitting posture. To- 
day he was trying to knock himself in the head with the butt of 
his musket, making several feeble efforts. Grant only con- 
sented to ask a flag of truce for the wounded some days after 
Cold Harbor on June 3. On more than one occasion, the wounded 
Federals had been burnt by fires in the woods. 

On the 14th, we found the enemy gone from our front, but none 
of the wounded were now found alive. The man who had tried 
the day before to kill himself was found to belong to the Maryland 
brigade. He had been partially stripped and was most elaborately 
tattooed. At night. Field's division was transferred from our 
left flank to the extreme right, where we found Warren's corps 
already in front of us, having been transferred the night before. 

We did not know it at the time, but it afterward appeared that 
Grant had designed another great battle for us this morning. 
Only the fearful roads, due to the recent rains, and the exliaus- 
tion of his men had forced him to abandon the effort. On the 
11th, he had sent his famous despatch that he would "fight it 
out on this line if it takes all the summer." 

On the night of the 13th, the moon was young, the night foggy, 
rainy, and intensely dark. The 5th and 6th corps were ordered 
to march by farm roads, passing in rear of the 2d and 9th, cross 
the Ny, move through fields to the Fredericksburg road, on it 
recross the Ny, form on Burnside's left, and attack our right 
flank at 4 a.m. on the 14th. The 2d corps and the 9th were to 
be ready, and, when ordered, to join in the attack upon our 
whole line. Though every precaution had been taken to mark 
the way with bonfires and men posted along the route, Warren 
only arrived on time with about 4000 men. Tlie rain had put 
out the fires and the men had lost their way and floundered in 
the mud, until they were so broken and scattered that they could 
not be gotten into condition for operations that day, and the 
proposed attack was abandoned. We had doubtless had a 
narrow escape from serious trouble. With ordinary weather the 
distance was not great, and both the 5th and 6th corps could 
have surprised our flank at dawn in the morning. Om- in- 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 527 

trenchments on that flank did not then extend much beyond the 
court-house. 

At 10 o'clock at night of the 14th came orders for our head- 
quarters and Kershaw's division to follow Field to the right flank. 
There we extended our line to the right, covering Snell's Bridge 
over the Po. The enemy occupied himself with building defensive 
Unes which did not follow ours toward the Po, but turned east- 
ward and bent back toward the northeast, designed to be held by 
a reduced force, while he concentrated for another effort to break 
our line in the gorge of the salient, where he had been checked on 
the 12th. It had been suggested to Grant by Wright and Hum- 
phreys that, after the lapse of a few days, his movement to the 
left and concentration there would have caused Lee to weaken 
his left, and afford a favorable opportunity to surprise our 
Bloody Angle position again. 

By the 17th, his works were strong enough to be held by War- 
ren with the 5th corps, and the 2d and 6th were ordered to pass 
around the 9th during the night, and the three corps to attack 
in conjunction at dawn, while Warren's corps cooperated with 
the artillery from the Federal left. The attack seemed to promise 
well. Three corps of infantry were to make it, and the artillery 
of four were to support it. It would fall wholly on Ewell's corps, 
reduced by capture of Johnson's division on the 12th ; its artil- 
lery only supplemented by a few guns of Hill's corps. It proved, 
however, an utter failure. The infantry was so slow in finding its 
way through the woods, behind which the line lay, that it was 
nearly 8 a.m. when it found itself in sight of our line through an 
opening in the woods. Twenty-nine guns opened upon it. Gib- 
bon's and Barlow's division, which had been in the assaulting 
column on the 12th, again led the assault in lines of brigades, a 
much more effective formation than the column closed in mass, 
which presented itself on the 12th. They advanced over the same 
ground they had then traversed, and it is reported that the stench, 
which arose from the unburied dead, "was so sickening and 
terrible that many of the officers and men were made deathly sick 
from it." But our guns, which had been absent before, were 
now in position. Already, before they emerged from the wood, 
they were much shaken, and some of the brigades were driven 



528 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

back entirely by the artillery fire, our guns giving little attention 
to their artillery but confining their fire to the infantry. Only 
a few of these approached our abattis. None penetrated it, and 
the first attack was never renewed. About 10 a.m., Meade or- 
dered the attack discontinued, and the troops withdrawn. Few 
of our infantry were engaged and none of them heavily for any 
length of time, the whole affair being decided by the artillery 
of the 2d and 3d corps. McParlin, Medical Director, reports of 
this affair : — 

"Five hundred and fifty-two wounded were the result, and the char- 
acter of the wounds were unusually severe, a large proportion being caused 
by shell and canister." " 

Our own loss was very trifling. 

Grant, on the 19th, was preparing to move Hancock at night 
on the road to Richmond and had issued the order about noon. 
In the afternoon, he was interrupted in his preparations by the 
appearance of Ewell with his corps, about 6000 men, in his rear. 
Lee had suspected that Grant was beginning a flanking move- 
ment, and had directed Ewell to demonstrate against him to 
find out. Ewell obtained leave, instead, to move around his 
right, hoping to accomplish the result with less loss, as Grant's 
position in our front was strongly intrenched. By a circuitous 
route and roads impassable for artillery, he took his infantry 
far around the enemy and crossed the Ny in their rear, near the 
camp of Tyler's large division and Kitching's larger brigade. 
Here Ewell occupied a very critical position. He was so slow in 
realizing this and beginning his retreat that Ramseur, fearing 
that further delay would cause disaster, charged the enemy. 
Having driven them a short distance, he retreated, and, taking a 
position in rear with Peguam, the two were able to delay the 
enemy until darkness covered a withdrawal. Hancock and 
Warren both hurried reenforcements to Tyler, and Ewell made 
a lucky escape. His loss in this venture was severe for the time 
engaged, being about 900 killed, wounded, and missing, or 15 
per cent of his whole force. It would have cost less and have 
risked much less to have made a demonstration in front. The 
Federal loss was estimated at 1100. 

The two battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania may be 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 629 

considered as parts of the one great battle of "Grant and Lee," 
begun in the Wilderness on May 5, 1864, and terminated only at 
Appomattox on April 9, 1865. During all this time the two armies 
were locked as if in a mortal embrace. Only by night could they 
shift positions. Firing by day was almost incessant. The con- 
sumption of men was far in excess of anything ever known before. 
The killed and wounded of the Federals in the Wilderness and 
Spottsylvania had been 28,202, and with 4,225 missing, the total 
loss had been 33,110. 

The Confederate losses can never be accurately known for any 
of the battles, from now until the close of the war, as few reports 
could be made in such active campaigns. Livermore's estimates 
give 17,250 for the same battles, the missing not included. 

THE NORTH ANNA AND COLD HARBOR 

After the signal failure on the 18th of his second venture at 
the Bloody Angle, Grant seems to have exhausted the pos- 
sibihties on the Spottsylvania lines, and for his next effort he 
decided to lay a snare for Lee. It was thought that if Hancock's 
corps was sent off about 20 miles on the line of the Fredericks- 
burg R.R., that Lee would be tempted to attack it and endeavor 
to crush it while isolated. Grant, having every preparation 
made for a rapid march, might follow and attack Lee before he 
could intrench himself. Hancock, accordingly, marched at night- 
fall on the 20th, and, by midday of the 21st, Barlow had crossed 
the Mattapony and began to intrench at Milford Station, the 
rest of the 2d corps following. Next morning, the 5th corps 
marched about 10 a.m., and the 6th and 9th followed later in the 
day. 

Lee never knew of the trap set for him. When he was in- 
formed of Hancock's appearance at Milford by signal stations 
and cavalry detachments, he supposed it to be an effort to pass 
him on the flank. Little time was wasted. Wilcox drove in the 
6th corps skirmishers in an effort to find out what was going on, 
and Ewell was moved at once across the Po, on the right, and 
about noon was started to Hanover Junction. Longs treet 
followed him at night, and Hill moved at the same time by a 



530 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

parallel road. Longstreet marched all night and until about 
noon on the 22d, when we bivouacked on the south side of the 
North Anna about 30 miles from the camps we had left, and 
within a mile of the Junction. Hill, who had now returned to 
duty, crossed the North Anna about 10 miles above us on the 22d, 
and moved down next morning. 

The lure set for Lee had failed of its object. To make the 
effort, Hancock had been sent by a route about nine miles longer 
than the most direct from Grant's left to Hanover Junction, 
which was only 25 miles, and three miles shorter than Lee's 
shortest. Having the additional advantage of the initiative, it 
was doubtless an error on Grant's part to undertake it. On the 
22d, it was learned that all three of Lee's corps had passed the 
night before, and the Federal corps were now all directed to follow. 

At Hanover Junction, Lee received his first reenforcements, 
about 9000 men. On May 15, Breckenridge had severely de- 
feated Sigel at New Market, in the Valley, and driven him south 
of Cedar Creek, allowing Lee to bring down Breckenridge with 
two brigades of infantry, about 2500 men. Beauregard, on May 
16, had also defeated Butler at Drury's Bluff, allowing Lee to 
send for Pickett's division, about 5000 men. Hoke's brigade, 
about 1200 strong, was also brought from Petersburg and as- 
signed to Early's division. Gordon was promoted and assigned 
to the remnant of Johnson's division, to which also his own 
brigade under Evans was now transferred from Early, 

We had taken position behind the North Anna, but had not 
yet selected a line of battle or started any intrenchments, when 
early in the afternoon, the enemy appeared north of the river, 
and opened fire with artillery upon two slight bridge-head works 
at the north ends of the railroad bridge and the Telegraph road 
bridge, which had been constructed to repel raiders a year before. 
We brought up guns and replied, but ravines on the north side 
allowed covered approaches to both bridge-heads, and both 
were captured with some prisoners. We held, however, the 
south end of the railroad bridge, until after dark, and burned it. 

Hancock's corps had approached along the railroad and the 
Telegraph road. Burnside's corps, next on his right, was di- 
rected on the Ox Ford, a crossing about two miles above the 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 531 

railroad. The 5th corps came to the river at Jericho Mills, four 
miles above the railroad, and, finding no enemy opposing, a 
pontoon bridge was laid and the whole corps was crossed by 
4.30 P.M. Meanwhile, at Ox Ford, Burnside had found the 
south bank held in such force that it was not deemed prudent 
to attack. The 6th corps was held in reserve on the north bank. 

Finding himself at Jericho Mills in the vicinity of Hill's corps. 
Warren had formed line of battle in very favorable position, 
He was able to cover his front with the edge of a wood concealing 
his actual line. His left rested on the river, which made a large 
concave bend in his rear and again drew near his right, with open 
ground upon that flank commanded by the artillery. But the 
rare opportunity of an isolated corps unintrenched was here 
offered, and Hill hastened to attack it. 

About 6 P.M., he fell upon Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the 
right, who had not fully formed their lines. Cutler was broken 
and pursued, but the artillery on that flank was able to save the 
situation and Hill was finally repulsed. The casualties were 
about equal, perhaps 1500 on each side. 

During the night, Lee had selected and intrenched an excellent 
line, in fact, it was too good, for it defeated its object, as the 
enemy never dared to attack. It rested on the river from a half- 
mile above the bridge to the Ox Ford, and thence, leaving the 
North Anna, it ran across the narrow peninsula one and a half 
miles to Little River, where its left rested. Returning to the 
centre, on the North Anna above the bridge, the fine ran south- 
east across a large bend of the river and rested on its right three 
miles below, near the site of Morris's Bridge. In front of us, the 
enemy formed with the 5th and 6th corps before our left flank, 
and with the 2d and part of the 9th before our right flank. Their 
two wings, both south of the river, were unable to communicate 
without crossing the river twice. This peculiar situation could 
not fail to suggest unusual opportunities to each commander. 

Burnside was first ordered to attack and carry Ox Ford, which 
would at once unite their wings and divide ours. But Burnside 
pronounced the task impossible, and did not attempt it. Han- 
cock on his left, and Warren on his right, each advanced skir- 
mishers and felt our lines, but both reported against any attack. 



532 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Lee, at this time, happened to be very much indisposed and con- 
fined to his tent. But he was exceedingly anxious, with the re- 
enforcements which he had received, to improve the slightest 
opportunity to give Grant a severe blow. This seemed a rare 
occasion where he might fall upon Hancock's and Potter's 
division of the 9th before they could be assisted by the other 
corps. He said to his staff: "We must strike them. We must 
never let them pass us again." 

But it happened that the country occupied by the Federal 
lines upon both flanks, and especially on their left, was fiat and 
open, allowing full use of their artillery, and their intrenchments 
were very strong. Probably it was wisely held by our subor- 
dinates that no successful attack could be made, and at night 
on May 26, Grant removed the temptation, ere Lee had recov- 
ered from his illness, by moving for the Pamunkey. 

On May 24, Sheridan had rejoined from his expedition to the 
James, on which he had done some damage to the two railroads, 
entering Richmond from the north, and burned some rolling 
stock and stores, but had made no impression on the campaign. 
I think it quite probable, however, that had Sheridan's cavalry 
been with the army. Grant would not have tried his vain strata- 
gem of placing Hancock as a lure at Milford, but, with his aid, 
have endeavored to anticipate us at Hanover Junction. So I 
think this raid should be classed as a blunder, like Pleasonton's 
at Chancellorsville and Stuart's at Gettysburg. Our most serious 
loss in connection with it had been the death of our brilliant 
cavalry leader, Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, who was killed at 
Yellow Tavern, near Richmond, on May 11. As before said, I 
have always believed that Lee should have made him the suc- 
cessor of Stonewall Jackson when the latter was killed at Chan- 
cellorsville. 

Grant's total casualties in the North Anna lines. May 23 to 
27, are given as : — 

Killed 22, wounded 1460, missing 290, total 1973. 

The Confederate losses were probably about the same. 
On the 26th, Grant, at noon, started Sheridan and the pontoon 
trains to cross the Pamunkey River at Hanover Town. After 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 



533 



dark the infantry moved, and by next morning his whole army 
had vanished, except cavalry pickets at the sites where the 
bridges had stood. The movement of the enemy was not dis- 
covered until the morning of the 27th. The rough sketch map 
represents the essentials " of the position. 

The army was put in motion without delay, crossing the 
South Anna on the railroad bridges and, after a march of 15 miles, 
we encamped that night near Half Sink. The next morning, we 



- - ~ 5^-% 




A'tchmo>\c(. 



moved about 13 miles and found ourselves near the Totopotomoy, 
with Grant just arriving on the opposite side. Sheridan's cav- 
alry was in his front, and under orders to make a demonstration 
toward Richmond. Hampton, with his own and Fitz-Lee's 
cUvisions, and Butler's brigade of cavalry, recently arrived 
from S.C., were attacked by Gregg's and Torbert's divisions, 
with Merritt's reserve brigade at Haw's Shop. The battle 
was fiercely contested all day, but the enemy had the great ad- 



534 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

vantage of the Spencer magazine carbine, and, late in the after- 
noon, they drove Hampton back. 

Ewell's health at this time required him to surrender the com- 
mand of his corps permanently to Early, who was succeeded by 
Ramseiu", promoted. 

On Sunday, the 29th, Grant ordered the 6th, 2d, and 5th 
corps, in that order from his right to left, to reconnoitre in their 
fronts and locate our hues, the 9th corps being held in reserve. 
The 6th corps found only the cavalry on om* left flank. Hie 
other two found our pickets on the Totopotomoy, and, at an 
average distance of a thousand j'ards behind, om- line was 
rapidly intrenching. Some sharp skirmishing occiured diu-ing 
the next tlu-ee days, the enemy crossing the Totopotomoy and 
intrenching opposite to us. 

In many of the Federal accoimts, it is assumed that Lee's 
attitude at this period was strictly the defensive. Perhaps 
it should have been, but all who were near him recognized 
that never in the war was he so ready to attack upon the 
slightest opportunity. An instance occurred on May 30, of 
which I was a spectator. A half-mile in front of om- hne we could 
see Bethesda Chiu-ch, an important junction point, well within 
the enemy's territory, and sm-e to be included within his lines, 
rapidly being extended to his left. Down a long, straight road, 
we had seen their cavalry all the morning, and, about noon, a 
brigade of infantry appeared. Immediately, Lee ordered Early 
to send a brigade to attack it. Early selected Pegram's brigade, 
commanded by Gen. Edward Willis, a brilhant yoimg officer, 
just promoted from the 12th Ga., who had been a cadet at West 
Point at the beginning of the war. He had been a personal 
friend and I saw his brigade start on its errand with apprehen- 
sion of disaster, for it was e\ddent that a hornets' nest would be 
stirred up. The Federal brigade was quickly routed and piu-- 
sued, but the pm-suers soon encountered a di^'ision with its 
artillery and were repulsed with severe loss. It had "made a 
resolute attack," as stated by Humphreys, and lost Willis and 
two of his colonels, killed. 

Meanwhile. Butler ha\dng been defeated, and. as said by 
Grant, ''bottled" at Bermuda Hundreds, Grant decided to draw 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 535 

from him two divisions of the 10th and one of the 18th corps, 
under command of W. H. Smith, with which to give Lee a surprise. 
The orders had been given on May 22, the troops to be brought 
by water down the James and up the York. On May 30, the 
transports bearing them began to arrive at the White House, and 
to disembark about 16,000 infantry, whose coming was not 
known to Lee. But he, having the reenforcements which joined 
him at Hanover Junction, about 9000, and receiving now Hoke's 
division, which had come over from Drury's Bluff, about 6000, 
and being disappointed at Grant's failure to attack his lines 
on the Totopotomoy, had himself planned a grand stroke for 
June 1. 

The cavahy of the two armies had been heavily engaged for 
two days near Cold Harbor, and Hoke's division was in that 
neighborhood. Lee proposed to extend Longstreet's corps to 
join it, and, attacking early, to sweep to his left behind Grant's 
lines, taking them in flank, while Hill and Ewell pressed them 
in front. He did not even yet suspect the presence of Smith's 
troops, and it was with high hopes of a great victory on the 1st 
that Longstreet's corps, under Anderson, with all its artillerj', 
marched to the vicinity of Cold Harbor, during the night of 
May 31. 

Grant had, meanwhile, determined to send two corps to seize 
Cold Harbor on the 1st. Torbert, the evening before, with his 
dismounted troopers and magazine carbines, had repulsed a 
severe attack by Fitz-Lee, but, anticipating attack by Hoke's 
infantry in the morning, he had begun to -withdraw during the 
night. He received orders, however, to hold the position at all 
hazards, on which he returned, and devoted the night to in- 
trenching his position. The 6th corps, from the extreme Fed- 
eral right, was put in motion that night for Cold Harbor, having 
about 15 miles to go. Smith, with 10,000 men and 16 guns, 
already on the march from "V\Tiite House to join Grant, had 
also been ordered during the night to Cold Harbor. A mistake 
in the order took him first to New Castle Ferry on the Pamunkey, 
and it was only at 4 p.m. of the 1st that he joined at Cold Harbor 
the 6th corps, the head of which had reached the ground about 
10 A.M. after a fatiguing all-night march. It is plain, then, 



536 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

that here a rare opportunity had been offered the Confed- 
erates. 

With Hoke's large division on its right flank, Longstreet's 
corps should have been able to quickly clear the way of three 
brigades of cavalry. It would have had then the opportunity 
to meet the 6th corps scattered along the road for many miles 
and in an exhausted condition. Unfortunately, Hoke's brigade 
had not been put under Anderson's command, so neither felt 
full responsibility. It only formed in line, but did not attack 
the cavalry breastworks, reporting them as too strong. Kershaw 
made an attack about 6 a.m., but only put into it two brigades. 
The enemy, with their magazine carbines behind intrenchments, 
repulsed two assaults with severe loss, and then the turning en- 
terprise was abandoned. Lee was not upon the ground in the 
early hours of the day, and Longstreet was absent, wounded. 
No effort worthy the name was used to carry out Lee's plan of 
attack, nor were the favorable conditions appreciated, although 
they might have been, as only cavalry was found in our front. 
Hoke's division should have been used to turn their flank and 
get among their dismounts. 

While Kershaw made his attack, the remainder of the long 
column halted in the road, expecting the march to be presently 
resumed. But when the delay was prolonged, and a few ran- 
dom bullets from the front began to reach the line, without any 
general instructions, the men here and there began to dig dirt 
with their bayonets and pile it with their tin cups to get a little 
cover. Others followed suit, and gradually the whole column 
was at work intrenching the line along which they had halted. 
Gradually it became known that the enemy were accumulating 
in our front, and then, as the country was generally flat, orders 
were given to close up the column and adopt its line as the line 
of battle, distributing our guns upon it at suitable points. Our 
intrenchments were scarcely more than a good beginning, a line 
of knee-deep trench with the earth thrown in front. It was en- 
tirely without abattis or obstruction in front, except at a point 
on our picket hue where a small entanglement had been left by 
our cavalry. Meanwhile, Grant, under the mistaken idea that 
Lee was afraid to fight in the open, was urging an early attack 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 537 

before Lee had time to fortify. But it was 1 p.m. before the 
whole of the 6th corps was up, and it was 6 p.m. before Smith's 
command was in position. 

In the 6th corps, each brigade was formed in column of regi- 
ments, with the brigade on the extreme left refused. The 18th 
corps was formed in columns of brigades, with the extreme right 
refused. So the columns of the 18th were three ranks deep, and 
those of the 6th averaged four. The Confederate formation was 
but a single rank behind their breastwork, which, as has been 
described, was the work of but a few hours, almost without in- 
trenching tools. There was also in it a gap of something over 
50 yards, where a wooded and tangled ravine and small stream 
separated Hoke's and Kershaw's divisions. 

A rough sketch will illustrate : — 

18th Corps 6th Corps 

martindale brooks devens ricketts russell getty 



field's div. Pickett's div. kershaw's div. < hoke's div. 

The distance between the lines was about 1400 yards, and our 
pickets were about 300 yards in our front. About 6 p.m., we had 
ceased to expect an attack that evening, when a sudden increase 
of fire on the picket line and the opening of artillery stopped 
our digging and called all to arms. Soon a perfect tornado of 
fire broke out in front of Hoke and Kershaw, and extended, but 
not heavily, to Pickett's front. It soon appeared that at all 
points but one the enemy's advance had been checked by our 
fire, without its reaching our line of battle. This was at the 
50-yard gap which had been carelessly left between Hoke and 



538 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Kershaw. Here a body of wood, fronting on our line for about 
200 yards, extended quite a distance toward the enemy, allowing 
their approach free from observation, until they had actually 
passed through the gap and were in our rear. This they did in 
such numbers that they were able to turn to the right and left 
and possess themselves of a small portion on each flank, captming 
a few hundred prisoners. 

As there were no reserves, Hunton's brigade from Pickett's 
division, and Gregg's from Field's, were hurried to the spot and 
checked the enemy, recovered the portion taken from Hoke, 
and connected the broken ends by a horseshoe some 200 yards 
in length. At all other points the enemy stopped at what was 
practically our picket hne and intrenched themselves. Dark- 
ness put an end to the fighting. The Federal loss was about 
2650. The Confederate was evidently less, as the enemy only 
came to close quarters near the gap in the line. 

Grant felt encouraged by his partial success, and, believing 
that he had inserted the small end of a wedge, prepared to 
drive it home. Lee was practically fighting with a river at his 
back. It was only the Chickahominy, but could his army be 
routed, Grant could surely inflict severe losses upon it before 
Lee could retreat over the few available roads. The 2d corps, on 
Grant's right, was ordered during the night to march around 
9th and 5th and reenforce the 6th, which was ordered to 
the attack at dawn. But it was the dark of the moon, and the 
night march proved slow and exhausting; the 18th corps was 
also short of ammunition, so the attack was postponed, at first 
until 5 P.M. The 5th corps, on June 2, was ordered to draw in 
its right flank, and extend its left past the front of Field's and 
Pickett's, to unite with Smith ; and the 9th corps was ordered to 
be massed in rear of the 5th and to support it in the general 
attack. This was now again postponed until 4.30 a.m., on the 
3d, to allow a full night's rest and ample preparation. 

Lee, meanwhile, was no less busy. When he found in the 
morning that the 2d corps had gone from his front, he had no 
doubt of its destination, and marching Breckenridge's, Wilcox's, 
and Mahone's divisions past our rear, he extended Hoke's line 
to the Chickahominy. He also sent Fitz-Lee's division of 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 539 

cavalry across the river to observe and picket the south side. 
Early, he directed to cross the lines which had been deserted by 
the 2d corps and to sweep down to the right on the flank of the 
5th. This movement captured the skirmish line of the 9th corps 
which had marched off not long before, and some of that of the 
5th which was being shifted to its left, but by that time Warren 
had changed front to oppose it and received assistance from the 
9th corps, and Early's advance was checked. The fighting lasted 
until night, and Gen. Doles of Rodes's division, a very valuable 
officer, was killed. Had Early had enough men to give his move- 
ment force, it might have had important results. 

On our front the sharpshooting and artillery practice were in- 
cessant. In fact, as a diversion in favor of Early, I was ordered 
to be aggressive with the artillery, and on Field's fine Huger's 
battalion was put out in front of the works to get enfilading fires. 
In front of Pickett and Kershaw, the enemy's intrenchments 
were within good range, and their accuracy of fire was such as 
to disable gun carriages through the embrasures by cutting their 
spokes. A Napoleon gun of Cabell's was placed in a pit at the 
end of Kershaw's line (where it was broken the night before), 
ammunition for it being passed up by hand along the fine for 
several hundred yards. The country was so flat that at few 
points could the fine be safely approached from the rear. 

A better horseshoe connection around the gap between Ker- 
shaw and Hoke was built to replace the temporary one of the 
night before; and our intrenchments everjnvhere got all the 
work we were able to put upon them, but were still quite im- 
perfect. 

Grant received to-day a reenforcement of 3000 infantry and 
2000 cavalry under Gen. Cesnola, from Port Royal. They were 
sent to join Wilson's cavalry upon our left, and were ordered to 
join in the attack upon Early next morning in flank and rear, 
while Warren and Burnside attacked in front. 

No long description of this carefully planned battle is neces- 
sary. Of course, it came off punctually to the minute. For 
among Grant's great and rare qualities was his ability to make 
his battles keep their schedule times. One may almost say also, 
"Of course, we repulsed him everywhere." For it was still 



540 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

true, as Stonewall Jackson had said of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, "We sometimes fail to drive the enemy from positions. 
They always fail to drive us." In that respect our army sin- 
gularly resembled the famous "One-Horse Shay." We held 
together wonderfully until all our parts, worn out together, 
failed together at Appomattox. Naturally, as the attack had 
been on the largest possible scale, the repulse was unusually 
severe and bloody ; and the roar of the battle, while it lasted, 
probably exceeded even that of the combats in the Wilderness, 
which Humphreys described as often approaching the sub- 
lime. It broke forth, mingled with vast cheering, in the still- 
ness of early dawn, but it was no surprise. For over an hour the 
men in the trenches had been alert at hearing in front muffled 
commands and smothered movements. The Napoleon of Ca- 
bell's in the pit at the end of Kershaw's broken line, which had 
been supplied with ammunition the day before by passing it 
from hand to hand along the Une, was to be withdrawn to the 
angle where the new horseshoe joined our old line, and the 
trench in front of its new position was abandoned. The nec- 
essary work was only finished at the approach of dawn, and, in 
whispers, the gunners and infantry supports rolled it back by 
hand, leaving the trench empty behind them. It was safely 
located at the embrasure prepared for it, enfilading the deserted 
trench, and double-shotted with canister, but a few minutes before 
the cheering enemy, who here had not 100 yards to advance 
through thin woods, swarmed over the parapet to find the 
trench deserted, into which they leaped, and to receive the double 
canister and the musketry and artillery of the new line as they 
paused wondering at our disappearance. 

The sound of the battle reached Richmond, and men came out 
on the streets to listen to it. Some houses were prepared for 
an unusual influx of wounded, but few came. Richmond 
listened calmly, for it had confidence in the One-Horse Shay. 

The brunt of the action lasted about an hour, though at isolated 
places attacks were renewed, or more or less distant fire was 
kept up until after noon. As a general thing, the assaults were 
checked at about 50 yards from our lines, but at two or three 
points leading officers were killed on or very near our parapets. 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 541 

At one point only was our parapet carried. There a hurried lo- 
cation in front of Barlow's division permitted him to approach, 
under complete shelter from fire of our line of battle, within 75 
yards. Here a rush captured three guns and some few hundred 
prisoners, but Finnegan's brigade soon recaptured the guns 
and drove out the enemy. 

Grant had authorized Meade, about 7 a.m., to discontinue all 
assaults which seemed unpromising, but Meade continued to 
urge renewed efforts until 1.30 p.m. Each of the principal corps 
complained repeatedly of cross-fires of artillery which swept 
through the ranks "from the right of Smith to the left of Han- 
cock," as reported by Humphreys. Again he states, — 

"The assault of the 2d corps could not be renewed unless the enemy's 
enfilading artillery fire could be silenced." 

Of the 6th corps he writes : — 

"During all this time, besides the direct fire, there was an enfilade 
artillery fire that swept through the ranks from the right to the left." 

And of the 18th corps : — 

"The fire from the right came from a part of the enemy's works against 
which no part of our attack was directed, and Gen. Smith was unable to 
keep it down with his artillery." 

The artillery so complained of was mostly Huger's battalion 
of 24 guns, which held the line between Pickett's and Field's 
divisions and was, some of it, used in front of the breastworks. 

Swinton narrates that some hours after the failure of the first 
assault, Meade sent instructions to each corps commander to 
renew the attack without reference to the troops on his right or 
left ; that the order descended through the wonted channels, but 
was not obeyed — "the immobile lines pronounced a verdict 
against further slaughter." 

As so told, an entirely erroneous impression is here created. No 
such silent defiance of orders occurred, or anything like it. But 
there were, doubtless, in the situation described above, occasions 
when there was delay in obedience until artillery could be sent 
to suppress the hostile guns. This might be distorted in the 
telling and so originate such stories. 

At dusk, heavy firing of musketry and artillery broke out at 



542 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

two or three points, and presently died away. Each side beheved 
it had been attacked and had repulsed an assault. The actual 
fact was that each was putting out pickets for the night and had 
drawn the other's fire in false alarm. I have not mentioned 
them before, but, throughout the campaign, whenever the lines 
were close together, there was likely to be heavy firing of mus- 
ketry and artillery breaking out in the night, which was after- 
ward reported to be a night attack repulsed. Every one of 
them upon both sides was but a false alarm. The only actual 
night attack of the war of which I know was the battle of Wau- 
hatchie near Chattanooga, Oct. 28, '63. 

The Federal casualties are given for June 1-3 as 9948. As the 
losses on the 1st were approximately estimated at 2650, those 
on the 3d were approximately 7300. The loss of officers killed and 
wounded was particularly heavy. The total casualties of the 
campaign since crossing the Pamunkey were 14,129. 

The Confederate losses on the 3d were never reported, but are 
known to have been small. The Confederate Medical and Sur- 
gical History of the War gives 1200 wounded and 500 missing 
from June 1 to 12. This, Humphreys estimates, represents about 
1500 killed and wounded, which may be taken as a maximum. 
Besides the general officers already mentioned as having been 
killed and wounded during the campaign, there were also wounded 
Gen. Kirkland of Heth's division and Lane of Wilcox's. Also, on 
the 3d of June, were wounded Law of Field's division and Finne- 
gan of Mahone's. 

There now ensued on Grant's part several days of indecision, 
while he debated what to do next. Meanwhile, to keep up 
appearances, regular approaches were suggested in the orders, 
and, at one point in our front, they broke ground at night a 
short distance in front of their line of battle and attempted the 
construction of a battery. Having no Coehorn mortars, we im- 
provised mortar fire with howitzers, and the battery was never 
completed. But, during this whole interval, a terrible fire of 
sharpshooters was maintained upon both sides, which made life 
in our cramped and insufficient trenches almost unsuppor table. 
Scarcely anywhere in them could one stand erect without being 
exposed to a sharpshooter. Head logs and loopholes built up 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 543 

of sandbags on the parapets, gave accuracy to the fire. By 
watching, all the low points on the enemy's line, where men 
would be exposed in moving about, soon became known. The 
sharp shooters would then lie with guns already aimed, ready to 
draw the trigger at the slightest glimpse. 

To shield themselves from the midsummer sun, our men were 
accustomed to invert their muskets, sticking the bayonets in the 
ground, and letting the hammers of four guns pinch the four 
corners of a blanket, under which the four men might crowd and 
get some shelter from the direct midday blaze. To visit the 
guns scattered all along the lines, one must crouch under the 
blankets and step over the men, who, in the summer of 1864, 
were far from being free of insect pests. Points where one 
could get out to the rear were fully a half-mile apart, and be- 
tween brigades and regiments there would often be a gap of a 
few feet or a few yards which the enemy's sharpshooters were 
usually watching with their fingers on the triggers. 

In the Federal lines their intrenchments were deeper and 
broader, and with abundant zigzag approaches from the rear. 
Their force was ample to permit frequent reliefs, while we had 
none. Yet they suffered proportionately. Gibbon's single 
division reported 280 officers and men killed and wounded by 
sharpshooters between the 3d of June and the 12th. 

Humphreys thus describes the conditions in the Federal 
army, which had both men and supplies in profusion : — 

"The labor in making the approaches and strengthening the intrench- 
ments was hard. The men in the advance part of the lines, which were 
some miles in length, had to lie close in narrow trenches ; with no water, 
except a httle to drink, and that of the worst kind, being from surface 
drainage ; they were exposed to great heat during the day ; they had but 
little sleep ; their cooking was of the rudest character. For over a month 
the army had had no vegetables. . . . Dead mules and horses and offal 
were scattered all over the country, and between the lines were dead bodies 
of both parties lying unburied in a burning sun. The country was low 
and marshy in character. The exhausting effect of all this began to show 
itself, and sickness of malarial character increased largely. Every effort 
was made to correct this. Large quantities of vegetables were brought 
up to the army, and a more stringent police enforced." 

Meanwhile, Lee made two efforts to take the offensive against 



544 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Grant's right flank and rear. On the 6th, he sent Early on the 
north of Matadequin Creek, and on the 7th he made an attempt 
south of the same. In each case swamps were fomid interven- 
ing, which prevented anything being accomphshed. 

A few days after the battle, while Grant was still in his state 
of indecision and 'the make believe of siege operations was going 
on, Halleck suggested to him the investment of Richmond on 
the north bank of the James. It was seriously considered, as 
offering greater security to Washington, but finally rejected. 

On June 5, Hunter, in the Valley, who had succeeded Milroy, 
defeated Jones, who had succeeded Breckenridge. As soon as 
Lee learned of this, he ordered Breckenridge to return and take 
with him the troops he had brought to Lee at Hanover Junction. 
On June 12, he took the bold move of detaching Early's whole 
corps and sending it to the Valley, by way of Charlottesville. It 
was ordered to attack Hunter in rear, and, having disposed of 
him and united with Breckenridge, to move down the Valley, 
cross the Potomac, and threaten Washington. It is probable that 
in deciding upon this hne of strategy, Lee was influenced by hopes 
that strong demonstrations against Washington might recall 
Grant's army for its protection, as had so often happened before. 
If so, however, the hope now proved vain. Grant's force proved 
ample to detach enough to protect Washington and still prosecute 
his campaign before Petersburg. If Early could be spared, it 
might have been wiser to have sent him to Johnston's army in Ga. 



CHAPTER XXI 

The Movement against Petersburg 

The Crisis of the War. High Price of Gold. Difficulty of recruiting in 
the North. Grant crosses the James and moves on Petersburg. Han- 
cock's Corps Delayed. Movements of Lee. Beauregard's Defence. 
Fighting of June 16 and 18. Success of Grant's Strategy. 

It is now time to describe Grant's movement against Peters- 
burg which, I think, more than any battle or other incident, con- 
stituted what may be called the Crisis of the War. Possibly the 
South never had any real chance of success from the first, and 
the actual crisis was past when she fired the first gun. But, 
though the North was immensely her superior in all the resources 
of war, the South was able to win many hard-fought bat- 
tles, and her armies to cherish the hope, as year after year 
elapsed, that the desperation of her resistance might exact such 
a price in blood and treasure as would exhaust the enthusiasm 
of her adversary. Certainly, at no other period was there such 
depression among the people at home, in the army, in the field, 
or among the officials of the government in Washington. The 
expenses of the war were nearly $4,000,000 a day. Gold was 
at a high premium and advancing rapidly. It went from 168 
in May to 285 in July. 

The following table shows the fluctuations for each month of 
1864: — 



Month 


Day 


Highest 


Day 


Lowest 


Jan. 


19 


1591 


6 


15U 


Feb. 


16 


161 


27 


157i 


March 


26 


169f 


1 


159 


April 


26 


186i 


4 


166i 


May 


27 


190 


10 


168 


June 


30 


250 


8 


193 


July 


11 


285 


1 


222 


Aug. 


5 


261f 


30 


23U 


Sept. 


2 


254J 


30 


191 


Oct. 


31 


227f 


3 


189 


Nov. 


8 


260 


18 


210 


Dec. 


7 


243 


18 


212| 





545 



546 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Enlisting had almost ceased, although stimulated by enor- 
mous bounties. A thousand dollars per man was the ordinary 
price, and single regiments would sometimes take from their 
counties 1000 men, and draw a milHon dollars in bounties the 
day of their muster. There was growing bitterness in pohtical 
circles in view of the approaching presidential election. The 
terrible lists of casualties in battle were daily bringing mourn- 
ing and distress to every hamlet in the country. 

S win ton (p. 494) writes of this period as follows : — 

"War is sustained quite as much by the moral energy of a people as 
by its material resources ; and the former must be active to bring out and 
make available the latter. . . . For armies are things visible and formal, 
circimiscribed by time and space, but the soul of war is a power unseen, 
bound up with the interests, convictions, passions of men. Now so gloomy 
was the outlook after the action on the Chickahominy, and to such a de- 
gree, by consequence, had the public mind become relaxed, that there was 
at this time great danger of a collapse of the war.^ 

"Had not success come elsewhere to brighten the horizon, it would have 
been difficult to have raised new forces to recruit the Army of the Potomac, 
which, shaken in its structure, its valor quenched in blood, and thousands 
of its ablest officers kUled and wounded, was the Army of the Potomac no 
more." 

It was under these circumstances that Grant made his first 
move after the week of indecision which followed the battle of 
Cold Harbor. The most natural movement, and the one which 
Lee expected, was that he would merely cross the Chickahominy 
and take position on the north bank of the James at Malvern 
Hill, adjoining Butler on the south bank at Bermuda Hundreds. 
This would unite the two armies at the nearest point to Rich- 
mond, and they would have the aid of the monitors on the river 
in a direct advance. But Grant determined to, cross the James 
at Wilcox's Landing, 10 miles below City Point, and entirely 
out of Lee's observation, and to move thence directly upon 
Petersburg with his whole army. He would thus pass in rear 
of Butler and attack the extreme right flank of the Confederate 
line, which, it was certain, would now be held by only a small 

* The archives of the State Department, when one day made public, 
will show how deeply the government was affected by the want of military 
success and to what resolutions the Executive had in consequence come. 



THE MOVEMENT AGAINST PETERSBURG 547 

force. It involved the performance of a feat in transportation 
which had never been equalled, and might well be considered 
impossible, without days of delay. 

It was all accompUshed, as will be seen, without mishap, and 
in such an incredibly short time that Lee refused for three days 
to beheve it. During these three days, June 15, 16, and 17, 
Grant's whole army was arriving at and attacking Petersburg, 
which was defended at first only by Beauregard with about 
2500 men. Lee, with Longstreet's and Hill's corps, for the same 
three days, lay idle in the woods on the north side, only replacing 
some of Beauregard's troops taken to Petersburg from in front 
of Butler. 

But for this, Longstreet's corps might have manned the in- 
trenchments of Petersburg, when Grant's troops first appeared 
before them, and it is not too much to claim that his defeat 
would have been not less bloody and disastrous than was the 
one at Cold Harbor. For, while the intrenchments at Cold 
Harbor were the poorest and slightest in which we ever fought, 
the Petersburg lines had been built a year before, and were of 
the best character, with some guns of position mounted and all 
the forest in front cleared away to give range to the artillery. 

This, then, was really the nearest approach to "a crisis" which 
occurred during the war, as will more fully appear as we follow 
the details. Instead of "success elsewhere," Grant here escaped 
a second defeat more bloody and more overwhelming than any 
preceding. Thus the last, and perhaps the best, chances of Con- 
federate success were not lost in the repulse at Gettysburg, nor 
in any combat of arms. They were lost during three days of 
lying in camp, believing that Grant was hemmed in by the broad 
part of the James below City Point, and had nowhere to go 
but to come and attack us. The entire credit for the strategy 
belongs, I believe, to Grant, though possibly it may be shared 
by Meade's chief of staff, Humphreys, whose modest narrative 
makes no reference to the subject. 

On Saturday, June 11, the 5th corps was moved down the 
Chickahominy, about 10 miles to the vicinity of Bottom's Bridge. 
The next night it crossed on two pontoon bridges, and, inclining 
to the right, it took position east of Riddle's Shop, where it 



548 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

intrenched to cover the passage of the other corps. All of the 
other corps moved at the same time. The 2d corps crossed at 
the same bridge and marched to Wilcox Landing on the James. 
The 6th and 9th corps crossed the Chickahominy at Jones's 
Bridge and marched to the same place; the 18th corps, under 
Smith, was sent back to the White House, where it took trans- 
ports for City Point, and was landed there the night of the 14th. 
Here it was joined by Kautz's cavalry, about 2400 strong, and 
by Hink's colored division, 3700, making in all about 16,000 men, 
who were ordered to march at dawn on the 15th for Petersburg, 
about eight miles, which they were to attack. Here we may 
leave them for a while. 

Hancock's 2d corps reached Wilcox's Landing at 6 p.m. on 
Monday, the 13th, after an all-night march of about 30 miles. 
The 5th corps, under Warren, held its position covering the 
passage of other corps until night of the 13th, when it followed 
Hancock and reached Wilcox's Landing the next noon. The 
cavalry and infantry had had some sharp skirmishing, and re- 
ported their casualties as 300 killed and wounded. The 6th and 
9th corps, whose marches had been from 5 to 10 miles longer 
than Hancock's, arrived in the afternoon of the 14th. 

During the 14th, the transports, which had brought the 18th 
corps around from the White House to City Point, were em- 
ployed in ferrying Hancock across the James. By the morning 
of the 15th, his whole corps was across, with most of its artillery, 
and at 10.30 a.m., it set out for Petersburg, following Smith who 
had gone from City Point for the same destination about sunrise. 
Hancock had about 20,000 men, and about 16 miles to go. All 
the compHcated movements involved in this manoeuvre, and in 
the capture of Petersburg at which it was aimed, had been as 
usual well thought out, and covered in the orders and instruc- 
tions to the different commanders, with a single exception. 

This exception was very serious in its results, as it postponed 
the capture of Petersburg for over nine months. It had its rise 
in the division of command and responsibility between the co- 
operating armies. This, in its turn, had arisen from the political 
necessity of placing Butler in command of the Army of the 
James. Smith's corps was a part of that army, and Grant, 



THE MOVEMENT AGAINST PETERSBURG 549 

feeling that secrecy was essential to success, visited Butler on 
the 14th, and at his quarters prepared the orders for Smith's 
advance and attack on Petersburg the next day. VvTien he 
returned to the Army of the Potomac, he failed to notify Meade 
of the hour of Smith's march, and other details, and Meade, of 
course, did not inform Hancock. It resulted that Hancock was 
not ordered to march until 10.30 a.m., when he might just as 
easily have marched at sunrise, and he was directed by a route 
an hour or two longer than one he might have used. Finally, 
he came upon the field at Petersburg after dark, when he might 
have arrived in time to unite in Smith's assault. 

Meanwhile, the 5th, 6th, and 9th corps on the banks of the 
James, awaited the construction of the greatest bridge which 
the world has seen since the days of Xerxes. At the point 
selected, the river was 2100 feet wide, 90 feet deep, and had a 
rise and fall of tide of 4 feet, giving very strong currents. A 
draw was necessary for the passage of vessels. The approaches 
having been prepared on each side, construction was begun at 
4 P.M., on the 14th, by Maj. Duane, simultaneously at both ends. 
In eight hours the bridge was finished, and the artillery and 
trains of the 9th, 5th, and 6th corps began to cross in the order 
named, that being the order in which the corps would follow. 
For 48 hours, without cessation, the column poured across, and 
at midnight on the 16th Grant's entire army was south of the 
James. 

Let us now turn to Lee. On the morning of the 13th, finding 
the enemy gone, he at once put his army in motion, crossed the 
Chickahominy, and that afternoon took position between White 
Oak Swamp and Malvern Hill. Hoke's division went on to 
Drury's Bluff. His cavalry came in contact with Wilson's 
cavalry, and also with Warren's infantry, which had intrenched 
itself on the Long Bridge road not far in front of his position. 
Some sharp skirmishing took place, as shown by Warren's report 
of 300 casualties. The presence of Warren was taken as assurance 
that Grant's army was about to advance on the north side of the 
James, and Warren's withdrawal at dark, discovered the next 
day, was supposed to mean only a drawing nearer to Butler's 
position, where the narrowness of the river would permit the easy 



550 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

establishment of pontoon bridges. On the 14th, a staff-officer 
of Beauregard's came over from Petersburg to lay before Lee 
the defenceless position of that city, and to beg for reenforce- 
ments. Lee consented that Beauregard should take Hoke's 
division, which had already gone to Drury's Bluff, but would 
not consent to weaken Longstreet or Hill, who were near Riddle's 
Shop. Hoke was accordingly started for Petersburg early on 
the 15th, with 18 miles to go. His leading brigade, Hagood's, 
was picked up by railroad trains and reached Petersburg about 
sunset, the rest of the division arriving about 9 p.m. Until Hoke 
came, the whole force at Petersburg consisted of Wise's brigade 
of infantry "not more than 1200 strong," two small regiments 
"of cavalry under Bearing." "Some Hght artillery with 22 
pieces . . . besides a few men manning three or four heavy 
guns in position." ^ 

Besides these, there were some old men and boys, called Local 
Reserves, who on June 9 under Col. F. H. Archer, a veteran of 
Mexico, and Gen. R. E, Colston, disabled at Chancellorsville, had 
acted with great gallantry in repelling a raid by Kautz's cavalry. 
The total gross of all arms is given as 2738. 

After Beauregard's staff-officer had left him, Lee gave orders 
to our corps to march the next morning, the 15th, to Drury's 
Bluff. About sunrise, we broke camps and took the road, but 
there was a demonstration of the enemy's cavalry about Malvern 
Hill and we were halted to learn what it meant. About mid- 
day, the report came that the enemy had fallen back, but our 
march was not resumed, and we later returned to our bivouacs. 

On the 16th, the 1st corps headquarters, with Pickett's and 
Field's divisions, were hurried across the pontoon bridge at 
Drury's Bluff and down to the Bermuda Hundreds lines, which 
had been held by Bushrod Johnson's division, but had been 
abandoned the night of the 15th when Beauregard had with- 
drawn it for the defence of Petersburg. Kershaw's division 
followed us only as far as Drury's Bluff, and was halted there. 
We reached the ground in time to drive off one of Butler's bri- 
gades which had come out to the railroad and begun to tear it 
up. We drove this brigade back very nearly into their original 

^ Roman's Beauregard, II., 229. 



THE MOVEMENT AGAINST PETERSBURG 551 

lines, and, on the next afternoon, the 17th, a charge of Pickett's 
division entirely regained our lines which had been abandoned 
by Bushrod Johnson. 

During these three days, the 15th, 16th, and 17th, Beauregard, 
while defending Petersburg, with great skill and tenacity, had 
repeatedly reported to Lee the arrival of Grant's army at Peters- 
burg, and begged for reenforcements. Lee's replies were as 
follows : — 

"June 16, 10.30 a.m. I do not know the position of Grant's army and 
cannot strip the north bank of troops." 

"June 17, 12 m. Until I can get more definite information of Grant's 
movements, I do not think it prudent to draw more troops to this side of 
the river." 

On this day, Grant's entire force being now on the field, his 
attacks were urged with increasing vigor, and at 6.40 p.m. 
Beauregard telegraphed Lee as follows : — 

"The increasing number of the enemy in my front, and inadequacy 
of my force to defend the already too much extended lines, will compel 
me to fall back within a shorter one, which I will attempt to-night. This 

1 shall hold as long as practicable, but, without reenforcements, I may have 
to evacuate the city very shortly. In that event I shall retire in the 
direction of Drury's Bluff, defending the crossing of Appomattox River 
and Swift Creek." 

After the receipt of this despatch, Kershaw's division was 
ordered to proceed during the night to Bermuda Hundreds, and 
a little later the order was extended to continue the march to 
Petersburg. The fighting on Beauregard's lines lasted until 
nearly midnight. But when it was over, and the transfer of his 
troops to their new line was fairly under way, he began to take 
more radical measures to convince Lee of the situation. He 
sent three of his staff, one after the other, within two hours, with 
details about the prisoners captured from different corps of the 
Federal army, with the stories told by each of their marches 
since leaving Cold Harbor on the 12th, The first messenger 
was Beauregard's aide, Col. Chisolm, who interviewed Lee, lying 
on the ground in his tent near Drury's Bluff, between 1 and 

2 A.M. on the 18th. Lee seemed very placid and heard many 
messages, but still said he thought Beauregard was mistaken in 



552 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

supposing that any large part of Grant's army had crossed the 
river. He said also that Kershaw's division was already under 
orders to Petersburg, and he promised to come over in the 
morning. 

Chisolm was soon followed by Col. Alfred Roman, but he had 
to leave his messages, as Lee's staff would not disturb him 
again. About 3 a.m., Maj. Giles B, Cooke arrived and insisted 
upon an interview. He brought further statements by prisoners 
which, laid before Lee, thoroughly satisfied him that Grant's 
army had now been across the James for over 48 hours. The 
following telegrams, which were immediately sent, will indicate 
his change of view. 

"June 18, 3.30 a.m. Superintendent R. & P. R.R. Can trains run to 
Petersburg? If so, send all cars available to Rice's Turnout. If they 
cannot run through, can any be sent from Petersburg to the point where 
the road is broken ? It is important to get troops to Petersburg without 
delay." 

"To Gen. Early, Lynchburg. 

" Grant is in front of Petersburg. Will be opposed there. Strike as 
quick as you can. If circumstances authorize, carry out the original plan 
or move upon Petersburg without delay." 

At the same time, orders were sent Anderson for Field's divi- 
sion and the corps headquarters and artillery to follow Kershaw's 
division into Petersburg. Kershaw arrived there about 7.30 
A.M. ; the rest of us about nine. 

We must now return to Smith's column, which we saw start 
to Petersburg, about 16,000 strong, at dayhght on the 15th, 
with about eight miles to go, 2500 of the command being 
cavalry, 3700 of them colored troops. Beauregard awaits them 
in the lines of Petersburg which encircle the city, about two miles 
out, from the river above to the river below, a development of 
about 10 miles. The intrenchments had no abattis or obstruc- 
tions in front and consisted only of a small outside ditch and a 
parapet, with platforms and embrasures for guns at suitable 
intervals. As Beauregard expected Hoke's division about dark, 
every moment of delay was valuable. To prolong it, he used 
the old deface of sending forward a regiment of cavalry and a 
battery. These delayed the approach for about three hours. 



THE MOVEMENT AGAINST PETERSBURG 553 

at the expense of a gun captured. The march was then resumed, 
and about 9 a.m. the head of the column came to the zone of 
felled forest in front of the intrenchments. Beauregard, for- 
tunately, had a good supply of guns and ammunition which he 
used freely in preventing the enemy from establishing his batteries 
or moving his troops within sight, and it was 1.30 p.m. when the 
column was deployed. Smith had still to make his reconnoissanee, 
and this occupied him until 5 p.m. But it had been efficiently 
made, for he learned that our infantry was stretched out in a 
very thin line, and it led him to decide that his charge should 
be made, not with a column, but with clouds of skirmishers. 
Another hour was taken to form the troops, and at 6 p.m. all 
would have been ready, but it was now found that the chief 
of artillery had sent all the horses to water, and it required an 
hour to get them back. Tall oaks from little acorns grow! 
By such small and accidental happenings does fate decide 
battles ! Petersburg was lost and won by that hour. 

At 7 P.M., the guns returned and opened a severe fire, to which 
the Confederate guns did not reply, reserving their fire for the 
columns which they expected to see. These never appeared, 
but instead, the cloud of skirmishers overran the works and 
captured the guns still loaded with double canister and defended 
by only a sldrmish line of infantry. Hink's colored division, 
which made the charge, lost 507 killed and wounded from the 
fire of the skirmishers. It captured four guns and 250 prisoners. 
Lines of battle followed, and by 9 p.m. occupied about one and a 
half miles of intrenchment, from Redan No. 7 to No. 11, inclusive 
(counting from the river below), getting possession of 16 guns. 
Hancock's corps had arrived on the ground during the action, 
and, when it was over, at Smith's request it relieved his troops. 
Smith had been informed of the approach of reenforcements to 
both sides, and he thought it wiser to hold what he had, than 
to venture more and risk disaster. Kautz's cavalry had been 
kept beyond the intrenchments all day by Bearing's cavahy 
and a few guns, which fired from the redans in the vicinity of 
No. 28. About 6 p.m., hearing no sounds of battle from Smith, 
Kautz withdrew, with a loss of 43 men, and went into bivouac. 

After the fighting began, Beauregard had recognized that he 



554 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

would need every available man to defend the city, and he 
ordered Johnson to leave only Gracie's brigade in his hnes, and 
to come to Petersburg with the rest of his division. Johnson 
brought about 3500 men, which, with Hoke, gave Beauregard 
in the morning an effective force of about 14,000 infantry. 
During the night he built a temporary line, throwing out the 
captured portion, while his efficient chief engineer, Col. D. B. 
Harris, laid out and commenced a better located permanent line 
at an average distance of a half-mile in the rear. 

On the 16th, Hancock was in command, and the 9th corps 
arrived on the field, giving him about 48,000 effectives. He 
devoted the day to attacks upon each flank of the broken line 
and succeeded in capturing one redan. No. 4, on Beauregard's 
left, and three, Nos. 12, 13, and 14, on his right. 

On the 17th, the fighting began at 3 a.m. and was continued 
until 11 P.M. The attack at three was conducted by Potter's divi- 
sion of the 9th corps, and was a complete surprise. Extraordinary 
precautions had been adopted to make it so. No shot was fii-ed. 
Canteens had been packed in knapsacks, and all orders were 
transmitted in whispers. The Confederates were so exhausted, 
by their incessant fighting by day and working by night, that 
they were sound asleep, with arms in their hands, and double 
canister in their guns. Only a single gunner was waked in time 
to pull a single lanyard before the enemy swept over and got 
possession of Redan No. 16, with 4 guns and 600 prisoners. 
Nowhere else during the long day were they able to make any 
headway. 

The 5th corps had now arrived and one division of the 6th. 
About dark in the afternoon, Redan No. 3, on the left, had been 
taken and held temporarily by Ledhe's division of the 9th corps. 
Gracie's brigade, which had just come in from Bermuda Hun- 
dreds, was put to charge them, and drove them out, capturing 
over 1000 prisoners. After the fighting ceased. Col. Harris 
superintended the withdrawal of the troops from the temporary 
line to the new location which had been prepared in the last 48 
hours. 

At 4 A.M. on the 18th, a general advance was made by the 2d, 
5th, and 9th corps, the 6th and 18th supporting in reserve. The 



THE MOVEMENT AGAINST PETERSBURG 555 

ground in front of the points which had been assaulted was 
thickly strewn with the Federal dead, and the shght trenches, 
from which they had fought so long and desperately, were filled 
with the slain there had been no opportunity to bury or remove. 
A few deserters or prisoners were picked up, and from them 
Meade learned that Beauregard's whole force had been but two 
divisions and Wise's brigade, now reduced by heavy losses, but 
trying to occupy a hastily constructed line a half-mile, more or 
less, in the rear. This information was conveyed to all the 
corps commanders, who were ordered to press forward vigorously 
and overwhelm our lines in their unfinished condition. 

No army could ask a more favorable chance to destroy its 
antagonist than was here presented. Their whole army was at 
hand, and the reenforcement of Longstreet's corps, even now 
coming to Beauregard, was not over 12,000 men and was still 
about three to five hours away. The little which was accom- 
plished during the whole day is striking evidence of the condi- 
tion to which the Federal army had now been reduced. 

At first, much time was lost in driving in our pickets, and in 
efforts to arrange for simultaneous assaults by the different corps. 
Meade himself at last fixed upon twelve o'clock, and ordered each 
corps at that hour to assault with a strong column. By that 
time Kershaw's division had relieved Johnson's, taking its place 
in the trenches. Hoke, Wise, and none of the artillery could be 
relieved until after dark, without unwise exposure of the troops. 
Field's division took position in the trenches on Kershaw's left, 
but it did not become engaged. 

Humphreys states that about midday the 2d corps made two 
assaults, "both repulsed with severe loss." Later Meade again 
ordered — 

"assaults by all the corps with their whole force, and at all hazards, 
and as soon as possible. All the corps assaulted late in the afternoon, 
and at hours not widely apart: Birney with all his disposable force; 
Nott from the Hare house . . . supported by one of Gibbon's brigades; 
Barlow on Mott's left, — but were repulsed with considerable loss. Burn- 
side found the task of driving the enemy [it was but a picket force] out 
of the railroad cut a formidable one, and, assaulting, established his corps 
within a hundred yards of the enemy's main line. . . . Warren's assault 
was well made, some of Griffin's men being killed within 20 feet of the 



556 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

enemy's works, but it was no more successful than the others. His 
losses were very severe. . . . On the right, Martindale advanced and gained 
some rifle-pits, but did not assault the main line." 

On the Confederate side, the day was not considered a day of 
battle, but only of demonstrations and reconnoissance. None 
of our reenforcements were engaged, the only fighting done 
having been by Hoke's division and Wise's brigade, who, under 
Beauregard, had already borne the whole brunt of the four days 
and three nights. The official diary of Longstreet's corps says 
of the day : — 

"We arrive in Petersburg and Kershaw relieves Bushrod Johnson's 
division, Field taking position on Kershaw's right. A feeble attack is 
made in the afternoon on Elliott's brigade." 

No official report is given of any brigade except Hagood's, 
which describes only skirmishing, and one attempted charge on 
our extreme left, "which never got closer than 250 yards." 

It was necessary to wait until night before Beauregard's 
artillery could receive its plaudit of "Well done! good and 
faithful servants," and be relieved by the fresh battahons of 
Longstreet's corps. Of all the moonlight nights I can remember, 
I recall that Saturday night as, perhaps, the most briUiant and 
beautiful. The weather was exceedingly dry, the air perfectly 
calm, with an exhilarating electrical quality in it. The dust 
rose with every movement and hung in the air. The whole 
landscape was bathed and saturated in silver, and sounds were 
unusually distinct and seemed to be ahve and to travel every- 
where. It was not a night for sleep in the trenches. There was 
a great deal to be done at aU points, to strengthen and improve 
them, and every man was personally interested in working at 
his immediate location. 

In spite of all pains, the drawing out of old guns and approach 
of new was attended with sounds which wandered far and with 
luminous clouds of dust gradually rising in the air. Then the 
enemy would know we were moving and there would come 
crashes of musketry at random and volleys of artillery from their 
lines. Then our infantry would imagine themselves attacked, 
and would respond in Hke fashion, and the fire would rim along 
the parapet to right and left, and gradually subside for a while, 



THE MOVEMENT AGAINST PETERSBURG 557 

to break out presently somewhere else. I was accompanied by 
Lt.-Col. Branch, a Col. of artillery of Beauregard's army, a very 
competent and gallant officer, unfortunately killed in 1869 by 
the falling of a bridge near Richmond. 

Grant did not renew his assaults on the 19th, but expressed 
himself satisfied that all had been done which was possible, and 
he now directed that the troops should be put under cover and 
have some rest. 

Humphreys writes : — 

" The positions gained by the several corps close against the enemy were 
intrenched, and the two opposing lines in this part of the ground remained 
substantially the same in position to the close of the war." 

In brief review, it must be said that Grant successfully de- 
ceived Lee as to his whereabouts for at least three days, and 
thus, at the most critical period of the war, saved himself from 
a second defeat, more bloody, more signal, and more undeniable 
than Cold Harbor. For, if Beauregard alone, with only 14,000 
men, was able to stop Grant's whole army even after being 
driven by surprise into temporary works, what would Lee and 
Beauregard together have done from the strong original fines of 
Petersburg ? Grant, personally, was at that period not abstemi- 
ous, and that his troops knew of it [perhaps sometimes exag- 
gerating facts in speaking of it] was known, even to the Con- 
federates, from the stories of prisoners captured at Cold Harbor. 
Such a defeat in case of any disaster, with such rumors afloat, 
would have cast a baleful back-light over the campaign, even to 
Spottsylvania and the Wilderness. He was now able to base a 
quasi claim to victory in estabfishing himself within the fines of 
Petersburg. But all the odium of repeated defeats would have 
been heaped upon his campaign, had it terminated with a final 
and bloody repulse. 

All this had been changed by his well-planned and successfully 
conducted strategy. The position which he had secured was full 
of great possibifities, as yet not fully comprehended. But, al- 
ready, the character of the operations contemplated, removed all 
risk of serious future catastrophe. However bold we might be, 
however desperately we might fight, we were sure in the end to 



558 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

be worn out. It was only a question of a few months, more or 
less. We were unable to see it at once. But there soon began 
to spring up a chain of permanent works, the first of which were 
built upon our original lines captured by the skirmishers the 
first afternoon, and these works, impregnable to assault, finally 
decided our fate, when, on the next March 25, we put them to the 
test. 

Of this period following the battles of Cold Harbor and Peters- 
burg, the future historian may find something to say. By all 
the rules of statecraft, the time had now arrived to open nego- 
tiations for peace. There would no longer be any hope of final 
success, but there would still be much of blood, of treasure, and 
of pohtical rights, which might be saved or lost. The time never 
came again when as favorable terms could have been made as 
now. For it was the hour of the lowest tide in Federal hopes. 
It remains a fact, however, that for many months, even until 
the very capture of Richmond, both the Confederate army and 
the people would have been very loth to recognize that our cause 
was hopeless. Lee's influence, had he advised it, could have 
secured acquiescence in surrender, but nothing else would. His 
confidence in his army, doubtless, for some months delayed his 
realization of the approaching end. Even when he foresaw it, 
his duty to his government as a soldier was paramount, and 
controlled his course to the very last. 

And there is this to be said. In every war there are two 
issues contended for. First, is the political principle involved; 
which with us was the right of secession. The second is 
prestige or character as a people. Conceding our cause, did we 
defend it worthily, history and posterity being the judges ? 

We lost the first issue ; and the more utterly it was lost, the 
better it has proved to be — for ourselves, even more than for 
our adversaries. Without detracting from their merit, but dis- 
playing and even enhancing it, we have gained the second by a 
courage and constancy which could only be fully developed and 
exhibited under the extreme tests endured, and by the high 
types of men who became our leaders. Is not that end worthy 
of the extreme price paid for it, even to the last drop of blood 
shed at Appomattox? I am sure that to the army, any end 



THE MOVEMENT AGAINST PETERSBURG 559 

but the last ditch would have seemed a breach of faith with the 
dead we had left upon every battle-field. 

The Federal casualties for Petersburg and for the campaign 
are given as follows : — 

June 13 to 18 : killed 1,298, wounded 7,474, missing 1,814, total 10,586. 
May 5 to June 18 : killed 8,412, wounded 44,629, missing 9,609, total 62,750. 

No returns exist for Beauregard's losses, but they have been 
estimated at: killed, 500, wounded 2200, missing 2000, total 
4700. The losses among the general officers were severe on 
both sides, being of Confederates : killed 8, wounded 15, captured 
2, total 25, and of Federals : killed 6, wounded 8, captured 2, 
total 16. 



CHAPTER XXII 

The Mine 

The Petersburg Trenches. Wilson and Kautz's Cavalry Raid. Their 
Rout on the 29th. Early's Demonstration toward Washington. The 
Mine at the Elliott Salient. Extent of the Tunnel and Galleries. Its 
Ventilation. Countermines. Plans for a Federal Charge to follow 
the Explosion. Movements of Hancock. The Explosion on the 30th. 
The Crater. Failure of the Federal Assault. 

Our first days 'in the Petersburg trenches were exceedingly- 
busy ones. From June 19 to 24, a daily entry in my note-book 
was "severe sharpshooting and artillery practice without inter- 
mission day or night." Our whole time was spent in improving 
our lines and getting our batteries protected and with good 
communications. Never until in this campaign had the enemy 
used mortar fire in the field, but now Abbot's reserve artillery 
regiment of 1700 men brought into use 60 mortars ranging from 
24-Pr. Coehorns to 10-inch Sea-coast, which caused us great 
annoyance, as we had to keep our trenches fully manned and 
had no protection against the dropping shells. Fortunately, I 
had ordered some mortars constructed in Richmond about two 
weeks before, and they began to arrive on June 24, and were at 
once brought into use. They were only 12-pounders, but were 
light and convenient, and at close ranges enabled us to hold our 
own, with less loss than might have been expected. The can- 
noneers in the batteries, and the infantry in the lines who were 
exposed to this mortar fire, managed to build little bomb-proofs, 
and a labyrinth of deep and narrow trenches in rear of the lines. 
Abbott's siege-train also included six 100-pounder, and forty 
30-Pr. rifles, besides their regular field-artillery. Many of the 
heavy cahbres were mounted on the permanent forts, erected in 
the outer line already referred to. 

These constituted a sort of intrenched citadel, consisting of 

560 



THE MINE 561 

isolated forts connected by infantry parapets with ditches and 
abattis, and impregnable to any assault. Here a small fraction 
of the army could securely hold its line for days, and continue 
to threaten Petersburg, leaving the rest free to extend lines on 
the south or to threaten Richmond on the north. Meanwhile, 
in front, their offensive system of trenches and redans was pushed 
as close as possible to ours, and we were constantly menaced 
with assault, should we weaken our garrison. 

One point in our front, called Elhott's Salient, was recognized 
as particularly weak. The edge of the deep valley of Poor 
Creek, approximately parallel to our general line of works, here 
approached within 133 yards of the salient, which was held by 
Pegram's battery, Elliott's brigade occupying the adjacent lines. 
Along the near edge of the valley, the enemy built strong rifle- 
pits, with elaborate head-logs and loopholes, from which a con- 
stant fire was kept up upon our works. In the valley behind 
was ample room for an unlimited force, which could be collected 
and massed without our knowledge, and would have but 133 
yards to advance under fire to reach our works. We soon 
managed to place obstructions in front of the parapet at this 
point and watched closely, confidently expecting that the enemy 
would here begin soon to make zigzag approaches as in a siege. 

On June 22, Grant sent Wilson's and Kautz's divisions 
of cavalry upon a raid against the Lynchburg and Danville 
railroads. On the same day, the 2d and 6th corps were stretched 
out to the left with the intent of reaching the Weldon R.R., 
and perhaps even to the road to Lynchburg. 

Lee, advised of this movement, sent A. P. Hill with Wilcox's 
and Mahone's division, supported by Johnson's, to meet it. With 
Wilcox's division, he obstructed the advance of the 6th corps 
so effectively that it failed to reach even the Weldon road, by 
at least a mile. With Mahone's and Johnson's divisions, he 
passed through a gap carelessly left between the 2d corps, which 
was swinging around to its left, and the 6th, which was advanc- 
ing, and struck Barlow's division of the 2d in the rear. Barlow's 
and Gibbon's divisions were both badly defeated, losing four 
guns (which were turned upon the fugitives), several colors and 
about 1700 prisoners. Mott's division was also routed but re- 



562 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

treated so precipitately as to lose few prisoners. Hill returned 
at night to his intrenchments, and the next morning the 2d corps 
reoccupied the lines from which it had been driven and the 6th 
corps formed on its left obliquely toward the Weldon road. 

Wilson and Kautz were followed in their raid by W. H. F. Lee's 
division of cavalry which, however, was unable to prevent the 
tearing up of the Lynchburg R.R. from near Petersburg to 
Burkeville, and of the Danville road from Burkeville south to 
the Staunton River. Here the bridge was defended by local 
militia who were intrenched with artillery. The river was un- 
fordable, and Lee, attacking in the rear, the Federals decided to 
rejoin Grant at Petersburg by a circuit to the east. 

Unfortunately for them, Hampton's and Fitz-Lee's divisions 
had just returned from the pursuit of Sheridan's cavalry to 
Trevillian's Station, where they had had a drawn battle on 
June 11 and 12. These divisions, aided by W. H. F. Lee's, 
which had continued in the pursuit, and by two brigades of 
infantry under Mahone, fell upon Wilson and Kautz on the 29th 
at Ream's Station and routed them with the loss of 1500 killed, 
wounded, and captured, and all of their artillery (12 guns) and 
their wagon-train. They finally made their escape across the 
Blackwater, burning the bridge behind them, and thus cutting 
off pursuit by Hampton and Lee. They reached the James at 
Light House Point on July 2. 

They had been absent 10 days, had marched over 300 miles, 
and torn up 60 miles of railroad. The tracks, however, were soon 
repaired and traffic restored by all the lines. By the Weldon 
road, however, it soon became necessary to halt the trains short 
of Petersburg, and to wagon by a roundabout road into the town. 

Between July 6 and 9, Grant had found it necessary to send 
the three divisions of the 6th corps to Washington to oppose 
Early and Breckenridge. These, whom we saw sent by Lee, 
from Cold Harbor, to check Hunter's advance upon Lynchburg, 
had reached Lynchburg before him. Hunter feared either to 
attack, or to retreat by the way he had come. After a pause 
of two days he started, on June 19, through W.Va. via the 
Great Kanawha, the Ohio River, and the Baltimore and Ohio 
R.R. to Harper's Ferry. This left the valley open. Early at 



THE MINE 563 

once moved down it to demonstrate against Washington. The 
only force available to oppose him was Wallace's command from 
Baltimore, with Ricketts's division of the 6th corps, which was 
the first to arrive. Early had crossed the Potomac at Shepherds- 
town and moved through the passes of South Mountain. On 
July 9, he attacked and defeated Wallace on the Monocacy. 
The next day he moved upon Washington, Wallace being 
driven toward Baltimore. 

Never before, probably, had Washington been as bare of troops 
as when Early arrived before it on the afternoon of July 11. 
But there were regular garrisons of infantry and artillery at 
many of the permanent forts, — District of Columbia volunteers, 
regiments of Veteran Reserves, many miscellaneous detach- 
ments at the camp of instruction, and about 2000 organized em- 
ployees of the quartermaster's department, — in all over 20,000 
men. These troops alone, without aid, could have defended the 
city indefinitely and forced Early to imdertake a siege. That 
night, there arrived the two remaining divisions of the 6th corps, 
and 6000 men of the 19th corps, under Emory, from New Orleans. 

In the afternoon. Early had reconnoitred, and, in consultation 
with his officers, had ordered an assault in the morning. It is 
scarcely credible that he would have made more than a demon- 
stration, for any real attack would have been but a bloody 
farce. In the night he heard of the arrival of the troops and 
in the morning could see them. He did not attack and that 
night he withdrew, marching to Leesburg, where he recrossed 
the Potomac. Grant had intended, on Early's repulse, not 
only to bring back the 6th corps to Petersburg, but also to bring 
down the 19th. Had he now carried out those intentions, it is 
likely that Lee would have brought down Early. It was Lee's 
policy, however, to fight for time and delay matters by division, 
rather than to hasten them by concentration. So he left Early 
in the Valley, where his presence would be a constant menace 
and would neutralize more troops than his equivalent elsewhere. 

On June 30, 1 became convinced that the enemy were prepar- 
ing to mine our position at the Elliott Salient. At that point, 
incessant fire was kept up by their sharpshooters, while a few 
hundred yards to the right and left the fire had been gradually 



564 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

allowed to diminish and men might show themselves without 
being fired at. That indicated that some operation was going 
on, and for several days I had expected to see zigzag approaches 
started on the surface of the ground. When several days had 
passed and nothing appeared, I became satisfied that their 
activity was underground. On my way home, I was that day 
wounded by a sharpshooter and received a furlough of six weeks 
to visit my home in Ga. On my way to the cars next day, I 
was driven by Lee's headquarters, where I reported my behef 
about the mine. Tliere happened to be present Mr. Lawley, the 
Enghsh correspondent of the London Times, who was much 
interested and asked how far it would be necessary to tunnel 
to get under our works, I answered about 500 feet. He stated 
that the longest military tunnel or gallery which had ever been 
run was at the siege of Delhi, and that it did not exceed 400 feet. 
That it was found impossible to ventilate for any greater dis- 
tance. I replied that in the Federal army were many Pa. 
coal miners who could be rehed on to ventilate mines any dis- 
tance that might be necessary, and it would not do to rely 
upon mihtary precedents. It proved that my suspicion was 
correct. 

It was June 30 when I guessed it. The gallery had been 
commenced on June 27. It was undertaken, in opposition to 
the advice of all the mihtary engineers at Federal headquarters, 
by Lt.-Col. Pleasants of the 48th Pa. regiment, a coal miner, 
who saw the opportunity which the situation offered. A gallery 
was successfully extended 511 feet, with two branch galleries at 
the end, to the right and left, each 37 feet long. Tliese branch 
galleries were charged with gunpowder in eight parcels of 1000 
pounds each, connected by open troughs of powder to be fired 
by safety fuses coming through the tamping and along the 
gallery. 

His method of ventilation was very simple. When the tunnel 
had penetrated the hill far enough to need it, a close partition 
was built across it near the entrance with a close fitting door. 
Through the partition on the side of this door was passed the 
open end of a long square box, or closed trough, which was 
bmlt along on the floor of the tunnel, conveying the fresh out- 



THE MINE 565 

side air to the far end of the tunnel, where the men extending it 
were at work. 

To create a draft through this air-box, a fireplace was excavated 
in the side of the tunnel, within the partition, and a chimney 
was pierced through the hill above it. A small fire in this 
chimney place, and the outside air would pass through the air- 
box to the far end of the tunnel, whence it would return and 
escape up the chimney, taking with it the foul air of the tunnel. 
This tunnel was finished July 17, the galleries on the 23d, and 
the mine was charged and tamped on the 28th. 

Lee, on receipt of my message on July 1, ordered our engineers 
to start countermines at the Elliott Salient. Two shafts were 
sunk about 10 feet and Ustening galleries were run out from 
each. Unfortunately, the shafts were located on the right and 
left flanks of the battery, and the enemy's gallery passed at a 
depth of 20 feet under the apex, and was so silently built that 
our miners never knew of their proximity. Had they detected it, 
they would have hastened to explode what is called a camonfiet, 
an undercharged or "smothered mine," which does not disturb 
the surface, but caves in adjacent galleries. 

By July 10, our miners had done enough work, had it been 
done at the apex of the salient, to have heard the enemy, who 
would have been directly beneath them. Work was not only 
kept up, however, on the flanks, but at two other positions 
farther to the left, known as Colquitt's and Grade's salients, 
countermines were also begun; at Colquitt's on the 10th and 
at Grade's on the 19th. All four of our mines were constantly 
pushed until the 30th, when the explosion occurred, the total 
length of our galleries being then about 375 feet. Of the two 
galleries on each side of the mine, one, which was unoccupied, 
was destroyed by the explosion. In the other, the miners were 
at work, but, though much shaken up, the galleries were not 
crushed and the miners climbed out and escaped. 

Meanwhile, in spite of predictions of failure, the mine had 
been constructed, and though we were known to suspect it, and 
our countermining operations could be heard, it was now deter- 
mined to delay the explosion until preparations could be made 
to have it foUowed by a grand charge, supported by the con- 



566 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

centration of a great force, both of infantry and artillery. That 
it might be the more effective, Grant determined to combine 
strategy with main force, and first endeavor to dravv^ a large part 
of our infantry to the north side of the James. At suitable 
points, he had already built signal-towers overlooking our lines, 
and some of our most important roads; and now the artillery 
officers were directed to prepare specially to concentrate fire 
upon every gun in our lines which could be used for the defence 
of Elliott's Salient. In obedience to these instructions, Hum- 
phreys reports, "heavy guns and mortars, 81 in all, and about 
the same number of field-guns," were prepared with abundant 
ammunition. 

At Deep Bottom, Butler maintained two pontoon bridges 
across the James, with part of the 10th corps on the north side, 
under cover of his gunboats and ironclads. Of course, we had 
to maintain a moderate force in observation, which, under Gen. 
Connor, was located near Bailey's Creek. Grant could cross 
both the Appomattox and the James and go from his lines around 
Petersburg to Deep Bottom by a march of 12 miles, all of it 
entirely concealed from our view. Lee could only send troops 
to meet him by a march of 20 miles. 

On the afternoon of July 26, Hancock with about 20,000 
infantry and Sheridan with two divisions, about 6000 cavalry, 
were started to Deep Bottom. It was expected that this force, 
aided by the 10th corps, would surprise the Confederate bri- 
gade (Conner's), and would then make a dash toward Richmond. 
Sheridan was directed also to endeavor to cut the railroads north 
of Richmond. During the night, this force crossed the river, 
and, at dawn on the 27th, moved upon our lines and captured 
four 20-Pr. Parrotts in an advanced position. 

It happened that Lee had noted activity of the enemy in that 
quarter. Wilcox's division was already at Drury's Bluff, and, 
on the 24th, it and Kershaw's division were sent to reenforce 
Conner. Tliis force made such a show that Hancock, finding it 
there before him, did not deem it wise to assault their line. On 
their left, Kershaw even advanced against Sheridan's cavalry 
and forced it to retreat. It took a position behind a ridge, 
where it dismounted a considerable force armed with the Spencer 



THE MINE 567 

magazine carbines. Kershaw unwisely attempted a charge and 
was quickly repulsed, losing 250 prisoners and two colors. 

On hearing of Hancock's crossing on the morning of the 27th, 
and that prisoners had been captured from the 2d, 10th, and 18th 
corps, Lee immediately sent over W. H. F. Lee's division of 
cavalry and Heth's infantry of Hill's corps. Later in the day, 
he arranged to have Field's division of infantry withdrawn from 
his trenches at dark, to follow during the night, and Fitz-Lee's 
cavalry the next morning. President Davis was also advised, 
and on the 29th the Local Defence troops in Richmond were 
called out to the defence of the Richmond lines. These troops 
were never called out except in the gravest emergencies, which 
indicates the importance Lee attached to the demonstration. 

But it was only a demonstration designed to be abandoned, if 
it failed to make a surprise of our lines at Deep Bottom on the 
27th. As this became fully apparent on the 28th, orders were 
issued from Deep Bottom to prepare the mine for explosion on 
the morning of the 30th. Orders were also given for the 2d corps 
with a division of the 18th corps and one of the 10 th to return 
and take part in the assault. Sheridan's cavalry was also to 
return, and passing in rear of the army to take position on its 
left to threaten our extreme right and prevent our reenforcing 
the vicinity of the mine. The explosion might have been 
arranged for the afternoon of the 29th, but the morning of the 
30th was chosen, as it permitted the placing of more heavy guns 
and mortars for the bombardment, which would follow the 
explosion, as well as preliminary arrangements, such as massing 
the troops, removing parapets and abattis to make passages for 
the assaulting columns, and the posting of pioneers to remove 
our abattis and open passages for artillery through our lines. 
Depots of intrenching tools, with sandbags, gabions, fascines, 
etc., were established, that lodgments might be more quickly 
made, though the pioneers of all regiments were already well 
supplied with tools. Engineer officers were designated to accom- 
pany all columns, and even pontoon trains were at hand to 
bridge the Appomattox in pursuit of fugitives. Finally, Meade 
personally impressed on every corps commander the importance 
of celerity of movement. Briefly, no possible precaution was 



568 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

omitted to be carefully ordered, and the success of the Deep 
Bottom expedition, in drawing Lee's forces to that locaUty, had 
exceeded all expectations. 

On the morning of the 30 th, Lee had left to hold the 10 miles 
of lines about Petersburg but three divisions (Hoke's, Johnson's, 
and Mahone's), about 18,000 men, most of the rest of his army 
being 20 miles away. Hoke and Johnson held from the Appo- 
mattox on the left to a little beyond the mine. Mahone held all 
beyond, one brigade being four miles to the right. The 2d, 5th, 
9ith, and parts of the 10th and 18th, with two divisions of Sheridan's 
cavalry, 16 divisions in all, near 60,000 men, were concentrated 
to follow up the surprise to be given by the explosion under 
Johnson's division. That it should be the more complete, for 
two days no heavy guns or mortars had been fired, that the 
Confederates might believe that the Federals were preparing to 
retreat. 

Everything now seemed to be working exactly as Grant would 
have it, and it is difficult to entirely explain how the attack came 
to fail so utterly. Several causes cooperated which will be 
presently referred to, but among them was the same cause 
which, on May 12, nullified the Federal surprise at the Bloody 
Angle at Spottsylvania. Too many troops had been brought 
together, and they were in each other's way. On a smaller 
scale, in the assault of Fort Sanders at Knoxville, three Confeder- 
ate brigades got mingled in the assault, which at once lost its 
vigor, though it did not retreat until after receiving severe punish- 
ment. The brigadier in command, on this occasion, ascribed his 
failure to the presence of the two other brigades who should have 
been upon his flanks. 

The assault was to be led by Ledlie's division of the 9th corps, 
a selection made by lot, and a very unfortunate one, as Ledlie 
and Ferrero, who commanded the colored division, which was to 
follow Ledlie, both took shelter in a bomb-proof, where they re- 
mained during the entire action. The mine was ordered to be 
fired at 3.30 a.m., but the fuses had been spliced and when first 
fired, failed at the sphce. After an hour, an officer and sergeant 
entered the tunnel and relighted the fuse . The explosion occurred 
at 4.40. As the sun rose about 4.50, the delay had been advan- 



THE MINE 569 

tageous, as it gave daylight for the movements of the troops and 
for the artillery fire. 

The explosion made a crater 150 feet long, 97 feet wide, and 
30 feet deep, the contents being hurled so high in the air that 
the foremost ranks of the assaulting columns, 150 yards away, 
shrank back in disorder in fear of the falling earth. The bulk 
of the earth, however, fell immediately around the crater, mingled 
with the debris of 2 guns, 22 cannoneers, and perhaps 250 in- 
fantry (nine companies of the 19th and 22d S.C., which had 
been carried up in the air). Quite a number of these who fell 
safely were dug out and rescued alive by the assaulting column. 
Some, not yet aroused, were lost, covered up in the bomb- 
proofs of the adjacent trenches by the falhng earth. This 
formed a high embankment, as it were, all around the crater, 
with one enormous clod, the size of a small cabin, perched about 
the middle of the inside rim, which remained a landmark for 
weeks. A high interior line, called a trench cavalier, had been 
built across the gorge of the salient enclosing a triangular space, 
and the left centre of this space about coincided with the centre 
of the explosion. The parapets were partially destroyed and 
largely buried by the falling earth. 

Into this crater the leading division literally swarmed, until 
it was packed about as full as it could hold, and what could not 
get in there, crowded into the adjacent trenches, which the 
falling earth had caused to be vacated for a short distance on 
each flank. But, considering the surprise, the novelty of the 
occasion and the terrific cannonade by 150 guns and mortars 
which was opened immediately, the coolness and self-possession 
of the entire brigade was remarkable, and to it is to be attributed 
the success of the defence. This was conducted principally by 
Col. McMaster of the 17th S.C, Gen. Elliott having been soon 
severely wounded. The effect of the artillery cannonade was 
more a moral effect than a physical one, for the smoke so obscured 
the view that the fire was largely at random, at least for one or 
two hours, during which it was in fullest force. The effort was at 
once made to collect a small force in the trenches upon each 
flank, and one in an intrenchment occupying a slight depression 
which ran parallel to our line of battle some 250 yards in rear 



570 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

of it, the effort being to confine the enemy to the crater and the 
Unes immediately adjoining. The multiplicity of the deep and 
narrow trenches, and the bomb-proofs in the rear of our lines, 
doubtless contributed to our success in doing this on the flanks, 
but there was also decided lack of vigor and enterprise on the 
part of the enemy, which permitted us to form barricades, which 
were successfully defended to the last. 

Meanwhile the reenforcements to the storming column, in- 
stead of spreading to the flanks, massed outside of our lines in 
rear of the storming column, which had made no further advance, 
but had filled the crater and all the captured lines. Several 
efforts were made to advance from time to time, but the first 
were feeble, and could be checked by the remnants of the bri- 
gade under McMaster, until two regiments of Wise's brigade 
and two of Ransom's were brought up from the left. With their 
aid, the situation was made safe and held until about 10 a.m., 
when Mahone arrived at the head of three brigades of his corps, 
drawn from the lines on our right. A regiment of Hoke's from 
the left also came up later. 

In the meantime, a few of our guns had found themselves able 
to fire with great effect upon the enemy massed in front of our 
lines. The left gun in the next salient to the right, occupied by 
Davidson's battery, was in an embrasure which flanked the 
Pegram Sahent, but was not open to any gun on the enemy's 
fine. This gun did fearful execution, being scarcely 400 yards 
distant. It was fired by Maj. Gibbes commanding the battalion, 
for perhaps 40 rounds, until he was badly wounded, after 
which it was served by Col. Huger and Haskell, Winthrop, and 
Mason of my staff, and later by some of Wise's infantry. A hot 
fire was turned upon it, but it was well protected and could 
never be kept silent when the enemy showed himself. 

Five hundred yards to the left was a four-gun battery under 
Capt. Wright of Colt's battaUon, in a depression behind our line, 
and masked from the enemy by some trees. But it had a 
flanking fire on the left of Pegram's Salient and across all the 
approaches and a number of infantry of Wise's brigade could 
also add their fire. Wright's fire was rapid, incessant, and 
accurate, causing great loss. The Federal artillery made vain 



THE MINE 571 

efforts to locate him with their mortar shells which tore up the 
ground all around, but could never hit him or silence him. 

Besides these, a half-dozen or more of Coehorn mortars, under 
Col. Haskell, from two or three different ravines in the rear, threw 
shell aimed at the crater. And, finally, 600 yards directly in rear 
of the mine was the sunken Jerusalem Plank road, in which I 
had placed Haskell's battalion of 16 guns about the 20th of 
June, and he had been kept there ever since, without showing a 
gun or throwing up any earth which would disclose his position. 
He had suffered some loss from random bullets coming over 
the parapets at the salient 500 yards in front, but it was borne 
rather than disclose the location. 

This morning, on one occasion, a charge was attempted by 
the colored division, part of which was brought out of the crater 
and started toward the Plank road. Then Haskell's guns showed 
themselves and opened fire. The charge was quickly driven back 
with severe loss among its white officers. A single private, with 
his musket at a support arms, made the charge, running all the 
way to the guns and jumping into the sunken road between 
them, where he was felled with a rammer staff. Meanwhile, our 
guns across the Appomattox on the Federal right, and from 
our left near the river, had kept up a reply to the Federal can- 
nonade to prevent their concentration opposite the mine. Lee 
and Beauregard had early come to the field, which they surveyed 
from the windows of the Gee house, where Johnson made head- 
quarters, on the Jerusalem Plank road, near Haskell's guns. 
Hill had gone to bring up his troops. 

On the arrival of Mahone, he at once prepared to attack, and 
had formed Weiseger's brigade, when a renewed attempt to 
advance was made from the enemy's lines on our left of the 
crater. He at once met this by a counter-charge of Weiseger's 
with a portion of Elliott's which drove the enemy back and which 
caused the retreat from the rear of their lines of many who had 
been sheltered within them. These suffered severely by our fire 
from the flanks as they crossed the open spaces behind, under 
fire from the guns upon both flanks and infantry as well. 

This retreat under such severe fire was seen in the Federal 
lines, just in time to put a stop to an attack upon our right 



572 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 



flank, about to be made by Ayres's division of Warren's corps, 
which had been ordered to capture the " one-gun battery " on 
our right, as they called the one at which Gibbes had been 
wounded.^ 

There was very Uttle infantry supporting this gun, or able to 
reach it, without exposure. Ayres's attack would probably have 
been successful. He was about to go forward, when Meade 
directed all offensive operations to cease. Wright's brigade 
arriving about half -past eleven, Mahone made a second attack, 
which was repulsed with the aid of the Federal artillery bearing 
upon the ground. 

Between 1 and 2 p.m., Sanders's brigade having arrived, and 
also the 61st N.C. from Hoke, a combined movement upon both 
flanks of the crater was organized. Mahone attacked on the 
left, with Sanders's brigade, the 61st N.C. and the 17th S.C. ; 
Johnson attacked on the right with the 23d S.C. and the re- 
maining five companies of the 22d, all that could be promptly 
collected on that flank. 

This attack was easily successful. Mahone has stated that 
the number of prisoners taken in the crater was 1101, including 
two brigade commanders, Bartlett and Marshall. 

The tabular statement of the Medical Department gives the 
Federal casualties of the day as: killed, 419; wounded, 1679; 
missing, 1910 ; total, 4008. EUiott's brigade reported the loss 
by the explosion as : — 



In 18th S.C. 4 companies 
In 22d S.C. 5 companies 
In Pegram's battery out of 30 
present 



Total 



86 
170 

22 



Agg. 



278 



About 300 were 

blown up, but a 

small percentage 

escaped alive. 



Including these, Johnson reports the casualties in his division 
(ElHott, Wise, Ransom, Gracie), as follows : — 

Killed, 165; wounded, 415; missing, 359; total, 938. 

' Humphreys calls this a two-gun battery. There were two embrasures 
and two guns, but only one used. The other did not bear where desired. 



THE MINE 573 

There are no returns for Mahone's and Hoke's divisions. 
Hoke's division was composed of Corse's, Clingman's, Fulton's, 
Hagood's, and Colquitt's brigades, and Mahone's had only three 
brigades on the field, — Weiseger's, Wright's, and Sanders's. Of 
these eight brigades, only Weiseger's had serious losses, but there 
are no reports except for Colquitt's, who, Hke the rest of Hoke's 
division, held a portion of the Une not attacked. His casualties 
were 4 killed and 27 wounded. The total Confederate loss is 
given in the Tabular Statement of the Medical Department as : 
400 killed, 600 wounded, and 200 missing, which is perhaps 
between 200 and 300 too small. 

The MiUtary Court censured Gens. Burnside, Ledlie, Ferrero, 
Willcox, and Col. BHss, commanding a brigade. They also ex- 
pressed their opinion : — 

" That explicit orders should have been given assigning one officer to 
the command of all the troops intended to engage in the assault when 
the Commanding General was not present in person to witness the 
operations." 

There is nothing in the Reports to explain this. Grant sent a 
despatch to Halleck at 10 a.m., saying that he "was just from the 
■front," and about that time Humphreys reports that Meade, 
with Grant's concurrence, ordered the cessation of all offensive 
movements. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

The Fall of 1864 

The Situation in August. Hood appointed to succeed Johnston. Evacua- 
tion of Atlanta. Capture of Mobile. Reelection of Lincoln. Battle 
of Franklin. Sherman's March. Fort Fisher. Conference at For- 
tress Monroe. Fort Stedman. Movements of Grant. Five Forks. 
Fort Whitworth and Fort Gregg. Evacuation of Petersburg. Appo- 
mattox. Correspondence between Lee and Grant. Conversations 
with Lee. The Meeting at Appomattox. The Surrender. Visit to 
Washington. Conversations with Mr. Washburne. Return Home. 
Record of the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Gen. Humphreys writes of the situation in Aug., soon after 
the fiasco of the Mine, as follows : ^ — 

"Between this time and the month of March, 1865, several movements 
of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James were made to the 
right and to the left, which resulted in the extension of our line of intrench- 
ments in both directions, and caused a corresponding extension of the 
Confederate intrenchments on our left, and their occupation in stronger 
force of their intrenchments on the north bank of the James. By this 
process their lines finally became so thinly manned, when the last move- 
ment to our left was made in March, 1865, as to be vulnerable at one or 
two points, where some of the obstructions in their front had been in a 
great measure destroyed by the exigencies of the winter." 

In other words, attacks upon our lines were now abandoned 
for a succession of feints, first upon one flank and then upon 
the other, by which our lines were extended at both ends to the 
point of breaking. This point was reached in eight months at 
one or two places, where the Confederates had been tempted by 
the severity of the winter to burn the ahattis in front of their 
breastworks. We will not attempt to follow either these efforts 
of the enemy, or Lee's aggressive counter-movements, of which 

^ Virginia Campaign, p. 267. 
574 



THE FALL OF 1864 575 

there was no lack, though all were attended with much hard 
fighting. 

Besides the heavy casualties of these incessant affairs, which 
followed each other at short intervals from Aug. 1 to Nov. 1, 
there was daily sharpshooting and much mortar and artillery 
practice, which helped swell the totals. Confederate reports are 
entirely lacking, but losses were fully as heavy in proportion to 
the numbers engaged, as were the Federal losses ; for on several 
occasions Lee was the aggressor and lost heavily. On one, 
Oct. 7, on the Darbytown road. Field's division was sent to 
charge two brigades in breastworks, which proved to be armed 
with the Spencer magazine-guns. He was quickly repulsed with 
severe loss, which included Gregg of Texas killed, and Bratton 
of S.C. wounded. The total Federal casualties for this period, 
Aug. 1 to Dec. 31, are given as: killed, 2172; wounded, 11,138; 
missing, 11,311; total, 24,621. The corresponding Confederate 
losses were probably between 12,000 and 14,000. 

It will afford -a better view of the situation as a whole to 
glance at those events referred to by Swinton, where he says : — 

"Had not success elsewhere come to brighten the horizon, it would 
have been difficult to raise new forces to recruit the Army of the Poto- 
mac." 

The first and most important of the events resulting in ''suc- 
cess elsewhere" was President Davis relieving Joseph E. Johnston 
of the command of the army opposing Sherman at Atlanta, and 
appointing Hood to succeed him. This step was taken with 
great reluctance, and under great popular and pohtical pressure 
brought by Gov. Brown and Sen. Hill of Ga., who claimed that 
Johnston intended to surrender Atlanta without giving battle. 
After many reiterations of such charges, Davis was at length led 
to give a promise to reheve Johnston if, on being asked for some 
assurance of his intention to fight, he failed to give it. Gen. 
Bragg was sent to interview him, and after spending two days 
with him, wired : — 

"He has not sought my advice, and it was not volunteered. I cannot 
learn that he has any more plan in the future than he has had in the past." 

Davis then wired to Johnston a direct inquiry, as follows : — 



576 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

"I wish to hear from you as to present situation, and your plan of 
operations, so specifically as will enable me to anticipate events." 

This was sent July 16, and Johnston replied the same day : — 

"... As the enemy has double our number, we must be on the defen- 
sive. My plan of operations must, therefore, depend upon that of the 
enemy. It is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight to advantage. 
We are trying to put Atlanta into condition to be held for a day or two by 
the Ga. militia, that army movements may be freer and wider." 

This reply was certainly not specific, and was considered 
evasive. It will be remembered that, in April, 1862, the rela- 
tions between the President and Johnston had been strained to 
the verge of breaking by the general's reticence as to his plans, 
and avoidance of interviews, even by galloping to the front on 
seeing the President approach near the field of Seven Pines. 
There a crisis was avoided by Johnston's wound and loss of the 
command of the army. 

Now, a very similar issue had arisen, and with it the old 
and bitter feelings on each side. On the 17th Adjt.-Gen. Cooper 
wired Johnson : — 

" I am directed by the Sec. of War to inform you that as you have 
failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and 
express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby 
relieved from the command of the Army and Department of the Tenn., 
which you will immediately turn over to Gen. Hood." 

To this Johnston replied that the order had been received 
and obeyed, and added : — 

"As to the alleged cause of my removal I assert that Sherman's army 
is much stronger, compared with that of Tenn., than Grant's compared 
with that of northern Va. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance 
much more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that of Richmond 
and Petersburg, and penetrated much deeper into Va. than into Ga. Con- 
fident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evi- 
dence of competence." 

It is vain to speculate on what might have happened had 
Johnston been left in command. Had Lee been commander-in- 
chief, he would not have been relieved, as was indicated by his 
restoring Johnston to command on his taking that position in 



THE FALL OF 1864 577 

February. But it is a fact that Johnston had never fought but 
one aggressive battle, the battle of Seven Pines, which was 
phenomenally mismanaged. 

On the 20th and 21st, Hood attacked Sherman, but was de- 
feated, and after a month of minor operations was finally, on 
Sept. 1, compelled to evacuate Atlanta. Meanwhile, a naval 
expedition, sent under Farragut against Mobile, had captured 
the forts commanding the harbor of that city on Aug. 23. These 
two events, the capture of Mobile and Atlanta, following each 
other within a few days, came at perhaps the period of the 
greatest political depression of the administration. On Aug. 
23, Mr. Lincoln had written on a slip of paper : — 

"This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable 
that this administration will not be reelected. Then it will be my duty 
to so cooperate with the President-elect, as to save the Union between the 
election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such 
grounds that he cannot possibly save it afterward." 

This paper he folded and had the Cabinet put their names on 
its back. 

The victories came like an interposition of Providence, and 
proved to be the final turning of the balance in the Federal 
favor. The Democratic party had nominated McClellan on 
a peace platform, mistaking the general discontent and depres- 
sion, for a desire for peace at any price. McClellan himself had 
repudiated the platform, but, as victory now seemed inclining to 
the Federal banners, all opposition to the administration died 
out. At the election in Nov., Mr. Lincoln received 212 elec- 
toral votes and McClellan but 21. 

The attacks which Hood had made upon Sherman on the 20 th 
and 22d had both been judiciously planned and had stood 
excellent chances of success. The failure in both cases was 
from want of strict compliance with orders on the part of one 
of his corps commanders, Gen. Hardee. To trace it further, 
would bring it home to himself for failure to supervise the execu- 
tion of important orders — a sort of failure from which even the 
most eminent commanders have never been exempt. 

Another and striking example of it attended Hood's next cam- 



578 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

paign, this time involving practically a death-blow to his army. 
Having manoeuvred to draw Sherman out of intrenchments at 
Atlanta by moving upon his communications, he succeeded in 
drawing him as far north as Dalton, and then crossed into 
Alabama at Gadsden, where he arrived Oct. 20. Here he had 
hoped to deliver battle, but Sherman declined to follow, and 
returned to Atlanta, making preparations for the march to 
Savannah, upon which he set out Nov, 15. 

In this event, Hood's orders from the President were to follow 
Sherman and hang upon his rear. But, with the approval of 
Beauregard, who had been placed in command of the depart- 
ment, Hood decided, instead, to advance upon Nashville, where 
Thomas commanded, with an inferior force under Schofield, hold- 
ing the country to the south. Pres. Davis had not imagined 
that any demonstration Hood could possibly make upon Nash- 
ville would be seriously regarded by Grant. The result, how- 
ever, proved that it was thought to threaten Ky., and it was 
considered of such grave importance that Grant had threatened 
to relieve Thomas for delay in attacking Hood. Grant was 
actually on his way to Nashville perhaps to do this when Thomas 
won his victory. So much in explanation of Hood's campaign. 
The issue at stake was now lost by the non-compliance with 
orders of Gen. Cheatham, commanding one of Hood's corps. 

Schofield had taken position on the north side of Duck River, 
opposing Hood's crossing. Hood left Lee's corps to demonstrate 
against Schofield, while he threw a pontoon bridge across the 
river three miles above and crossed Cheatham's and Stewart's 
corps which marched to Spring Hill on the Franklin pike, 12 miles 
in Schofield's rear, arriving about 3 p.m. This place was held 
by the 2d division of the 4th corps, about 4000 strong; Hood's 
force was about 18,000 infantry. Hood took Cheatham with 
Cleburne, a division commander, within sight of the pike, along 
which the enemy could now be seen retreating at double-quick, 
with wagons in a trot, and gave explicit orders for an immediate 
attack and occupation of the pike. Similar orders, too, were 
given to Stewart's corps, and when Hood found later that 
nothing was being done, he sent more messages by staff-officers, 
which also failed of effect. The head of Schofield's infantry 



THE FALL OF 1864 579 

arrived about nine o'clock and passed unmolested, except by- 
some random picket shots to which they made no reply. Both 
Confederate divisions had bivouacked within gunshot of the pike, 
but no effort was made to occupy it or to cross it. Undoubtedly, 
here Hood should have ridden to the front and led the troops 
into action himself. In his book, he calls the opportunity "the 
best move in my career as a soldier . " A few days after, Cheatham 
frankly admitted his delinquency. It was rumored that both 
he and Gen. Stewart had that evening absented themselves from 
their divisions. Both had been often distinguished for gallantry, 
and Hood now overlooked it, beheving it had been a lesson not 
to be forgotten. Nevertheless, it proved the death-blow to 
Hood's army. 

On the next day, Schofield took a strong position at Franklin 
for the protection of his wagon-trains, resting both flanks on the 
Harpeth River across a concave bend. His intrenched main 
line was but a mile in length. It was well protected with abattis, 
and, 280 yards in front, an entire division, Wagner's of the 4th 
corps, held an advanced Hne, with its flanks drawn back nearly 
to the main line, and also well protected by abattis. His in- 
fantry, about 23,000, was a little more than Hood's and was 
ample to man both lines, and to hold a strong reserve in a well 
sheltered position close in the rear. One of his infantry brigades. 
Casement's, was armed with magazine breech loaders. The 
ground in front was mostly level and open pasture-land, and 
batteries across the Harpeth could fire upon the approaches. 

To assault was a terrible proposition to troops who, during 
Johnston's long retreat, had been trained to avoid charging 
breastworks. But Hood saw no alternative, since he had lost 
the one opportunity of the campaign at Spring Hill the night 
before. For Schofield was now within a day's march of Nash- 
ville. He ordered the attack, and for the credit of his army it 
must be said that officers and men responded valiantly, and went 
down to defeat in a blaze of glory. Over 10 per cent of the 
force engaged were killed outright on the field, over 20 per cent 
were carried to hospitals with severe wounds, and as many more 
suffered less severe wounds or were captured. The loss of general 
officers was unparalleled on either side in any action of the war. 



580 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Cleburne, Gist, Adams, Strahl, and Granberrty were killed; 
Brown, Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott were 
wounded, and Gordon was captured. Fifty-three regimental 
commanders were killed, wounded, or captured. The result might 
have been different, but for three handicaps : 1. Hood, most un- 
wisely, did not precede his charge with a severe cannonade, be- 
cause the village of Franklin was but a half-mile in rear of his 
hne. The enemy's position was quite crowded, and all his lines 
were subject to enfilade. It would have severely shaken the 
enemy, and with little danger to non-combatants, which they 
could not avoid. 2. The action was not begun until 4 p.m. The 
sun set at 4.50 p.m. and darkness prevented Hood from getting 
in two of Lee's divisions. There was no moon. 3. The presence 
on the field of Casement's brigade with magazine breech loaders. 
It was said by a correspondent that never before had men been 
killed so fast as they were during this charge by the fire of this 
brigade. The action was hand to hand all along the enemy's 
main hne. It was carried for quite a space, at one point, but 
was restored by a charge of the reserve. At some points men 
were dragged across the parapets and captured. The battle con- 
tinued with violence until 9 p.m. and firing was kept up until 
3 a.m., when the enemy withdrew from the field, leaving his dead 
and wounded. Schofield's losses were: killed, 189; wounded, 
1033; missing, 1104; total 2326. Hood left 1750 dead on the 
field and 3800 in hospitals. The shghtly wounded and prisoners 
were about 2000. 

His losses in the battle of Franklin made it impossible for 
Hood to attack at Nashville, but he hoped to fortify and threaten 
until he was attacked, and then to gain a victory. What a vain 
hope ! Efforts were being made to bring troops from Texas across 
the Mississippi, which also, of course, proved vain. They never 
even started. His force was now reduced to about 18,000 infantry 
and 5000 cavalry, with which he took position before Nashville 
on Dec. 2. Here he intrenched himself and awaited Thomas's 
attack, which the latter delayed until Dec. 15. By this date he 
had accumulated a force of over 53,000 men. With these he 
attacked on the 15th, but with little success and with severe 
losses at points where he assailed Hood's intrenchments. 



THE FALL OF 1864 581 

On the 15th, the Federals renewed their assaults and 
during the morning were again repulsed. About 3 p.m., 
they massed a large force under cover behind a hill about 
Hood's left centre, and under cover of a heavy fire of 
artillery made a gallant charge and carried Hood's line, which, 
seeing the disaster, broke in all directions, and all efforts to 
rally it failed. 

During the night. Hood withdrew, losing 54 guns and 4500 
prisoners. There was no return made of his casualties, but he 
reported them as "very small." Thomas reported : killed, 387; 
wounded, 2562 ; missing, 112 ; total, 3061, Hood made good his 
retreat to Tupelo, Miss., where his army rested for reorganiza- 
tion on Jan. 10, 1865. In the spring, it was transferred to N.C., 
where it served under A. P. Stewart and, about 7000 strong, 
was included in Johnston's surrender. The battle of Frank- 
lin had proved its death-blow. 

Besides the loss of Atlanta and the destruction of Hood's army, 
there remains a third sequence of the change of commanders 
which deserves notice among the "successes elsewhere," prepar- 
ing the ground for Grant when he again became able to 
inaugurate a campaign. This was the unopposed march 
of Sherman from Atlanta to Savannah between Nov. 15 
and Dec. 25, with the capture of Savannah on the latter date. 
It was preceded by the deliberate burning of every house in 
Atlanta. " Not a single one was spared, not even a church." 
This was excused on the ground that "War is Hell." It 
depends somewhat upon the warrior. The conduct of Lee's 
army in Pa. presents a pleasing contrast. 

It had been hoped that the few troops which could be gathered 
in Ga., aided by the militia of the State, and by 13 brigades of 
Confederate cavalry under Wheeler, might effectively harass and 
delay such a march, but all such expectations proved utterly 
vain. Though Uttle was said in the press at the time, and our 
public speakers belittled the achievement, there is no question 
that the moral effect of this march, upon the country at large, 
both at the North and the South and also upon foreign 
nations, was greater than would have been the most decided 



582 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

victory. Already it cast the ominous shadow of Sherman's 
advance up the coast in the coming spring. 

In this connection, there now began demonstrations against 
Wilmington, which was the last port of the Confederacy holding 
out opportunities to blockade runners. These came in under 
the protection of Fort Fisher at the mouth of the river 20 miles 
below the city. The fort was a formidable one, mounting 44 
guns, and had a garrison of 1400 men under Col. Lamb. A 
mihtary and naval expedition set out against it on Dec. 13, 1864, 
under Gen. Butler and Adm. Porter in a fleet of 50 war vessels 
and 100 transports carrying 6500 infantry. The fleet was the 
largest ever assembled under the Federal flag, and it had been 
specially intended by Grant that the infantry force should be 
commanded by Gen. Weitzel. It was never contemplated that 
Butler should even accompany it. In the expressive language 
of modern slang he had not only "butted in," and had taken 
the command from Weitzel, but had devised a new mode of 
attack upon Fort Fisher. This was to be a disguised blockade 
runner loaded with 215 tons of gunpowder to be run at night 
close to Fort Fisher and exploded. It was supposed that this 
would put the whole fort hors de combat. Gen. Delafield, chief 
engineer, submitted to the War Department a report on destruc- 
tive effects of explosions of gunpowder in open air, indicating 
their very limited range. Butler was notoriously a military 
charlatan, who had been forced upon Grant as commander of 
the Army of the James by political considerations. During all 
the summer campaign, he knew and felt his importance, and 
had been able even successfully to bully Grant himself, who 
was already under sharp criticism for his terrible losses in battle, 
and for the rumors in the army of his intemperance. 

Early in July, after some preliminary correspondence, indicat- 
ing a doubt how Butler would relish any interference with him- 
self, Halleck issued an order assigning the troops under him to 
the command of W. F. Smith, and sending Butler to Fortress 
Monroe. On receipt of this order, he said to his staff, who were 
near, "Gentlemen, this order will be revoked to-morrow." The 
next day, clad in full uniform, he called at Grant's headquarters, 
where he found Mr. Dana, Asst. Sec. of War. Gen. James 



THE FALL OF 1864 583 

H. Wilson, in a memoir on the Life and Services of W. F. Smith, 
gives the following account of the interview : — 

"Dana describes Butler as entering the general's presence with a 
flushed face and a haughty air, holding out the order relieving him from 
command in the field, and asking : ' Gen. Grant, did you issue this order ? ' 
To which Grant, in a hesitating manner, replied : 'No, not in that form.' 
Dana, perceiving at this point that the subject under discussion was likely 
to be unpleasant, if not stormy, at once took his leave, but the impression 
made upon his mind by what he saw while present was that Butler 
had in some measure 'cowed' his commanding officer. What further 
took place neither he nor Mr. Dana has ever said. Butler's book, however, 
contains what purports to be a full account of the interview, but it is to 
be observed that it signally fails to recite any circumstance of an over- 
bearing nature." 

Not only was the order promptly revoked by Special Orders 
No. 62, July 19, but Butler's command on the field was extended 
to include the newly arrived 19th corps, and this disposition of 
command was still in force when Butler "butted in" to the 
Fort Fisher expedition, taking his powder boat with him, regard- 
less of Delafield's discussion of the value of powder boats. 

The boat was towed into position by Commander Rhind of the 
Navy who reported placing it "within 300 yards of the north- 
east salient of Fort Fisher," which bore "west southwest a half 
west" about midnight of Dec. 23, 1864. It was fired by several 
lines of Gomez fuse running through the mass of powder and 
ignited by several devices arranged to act an hour and a half 
after the ship was deserted. The explosion occurred at 2 a.m., 
and was supposed by the garrison of the fort to be the accidental 
explosion of a Federal gunboat. Not the slightest damage was 
done to the fort, whose garrison remained in ignorance of 
Butler's plans until published afterward. 

On the 24th and 25th, the fort was subjected to a terrific 
bombardment at the rate of 40 to 50 shells per minute for 
hours at a time, until the fleet had practically exhausted its 
ammunition. It had not silenced the fort nor materially damaged 
it, which, being reported by the land forces who had been put 
ashore, they reembarked without assaulting, on the night of 
the 26th, and the next day the expedition returned to Fortress 
Monroe. The casualties in the fort from the fire of the ships 



584 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

were 61, and a greater number were suffered in the fleet from the 
662 shots fired by the fort. 

Another and a still larger expedition was soon gotten together 
and despatched against Fort Fisher, but, though his own cam- 
paign was still in abeyance, the political situation was now so 
improved by the "successes elsewhere" that Grant was no longer 
afraid to exercise his authority, and on Jan. 4, he wrote to 
Halleck demanding Butler's official head. With a celerity indic- 
ative of the pleasure with which both Halleck and Lincoln com- 
plied with the request, it was presented to him. On Jan. 7, in 
General Orders No. 1, "By direction of the President," Maj.- 
Gen. Butler was relieved from command and ordered to repair 
to Lowell, Mass. 

On Jan. 5, a new expedition, under the command of Porter and 
Gen. Terry, set sail, carrying about 9500 infantry and a heavy 
siege-train. It arrived before Fort Fisher and opened fire on 
Jan. 13, in even greater force than on the previous occasion. 
A land force of about 7000 infantry was at hand for its defence. 
Mr. Davis sent Bragg to command it, who made no effort to pre- 
vent the enemy's landing. It might have been difficult to pre- 
vent him, but' to make no effort brought complaint and 
discouragement. The bombardment was, on this occasion, 
kept up without intermission day or night, and, instead of 
being general, was concentrated upon the land defences. On 
the afternoon of the second day, the palisades and guns of those 
defences being destroyed and a breach opened, two assaults were 
made about 3 p.m., one by Ames's division of the 23d corps, 
about 4500 strong, and one by 2000 sailors and marines from 
the fleet under Capt. Breese. The latter assaulted the breach, 
but were repulsed with severe loss. The infantry, passing 
around and through the palisades, made a lodgment between the 
traverses, and after seven hours' fighting possessed the fort. 
When Bragg took command of the land forces. Whiting, who 
had commanded the whole post before, took command of the 
fort. He was mortally, and Col. Lamb desperately, wounded in 
the defence. The loss of the infantry assaulting column was 
110 killed, 536 wounded. 

During the winter, the Confederate lines about Petersburg had 



THE FALL OF 1864 585 

been constantly extended at both ends, it has been already 
explained how. The troops were extended with them until it 
was about 37 miles by the shortest routes from our extreme left 
on White Oak Swamp below Richmond on the north side, to 
our extreme right below Petersburg. Lee's force at this time 
was about 50,000 and Grant's about 124,000. Humphreys gives 
the following brief statement of the Confederate condition : — 

" The winter of '64-65 was one of unusual severity, making the picket 
duty in front of the intrenchments very severe. It was especially so to 
the Confederate troops with their threadbare, insufficient clothing and 
meagre food. Meat they had but little of, and their Subsistence Depart- 
ment was actually importing it from abroad. Of coffee or tea or sugar, 
they had none except in the hospitals. 

'"It is stated that in a secret session of the Confederate Congress the 
condition of the Confederacy as to subsistence was declared to be : — . 
'That there was not meat enough in the Southern Confederacy for the 

armies it had in the field, 
' That there was not in Va. either meat or bread enough for the armies 

within her limits, 
'That the supply of bread for those armies to be obtained from other 
places depended absolutely upon keeping open the railroad connec- 
tions of the South, 
'That the meat must be obtained from abroad through a seaport, 
' That the transportation was not now adequate, from whatever cause, 
to meet the necessary demands of the service.' . . . 
"The condition of the deserters who constantly came into our lines 
during the winter appeared to prove that there was no exaggeration in 
this statement." 

In addition to the scarcity of provisions, there was also 
threatened a deficiency of percussion caps. The supply for the 
campaign of 1864 had been maintained only by cutting up the 
copper stills of the country, but they were now exhausted and 
there was no more copper in sight. 

Col. Taylor, in Four Years with Lee, writes that during the 
last 30 days before Petersburg : — 

" The loss to the army by desertion averaged a hundred men a day. . . . 
The condition of affairs throughout the South at that period was truly 
deplorable. Hundreds of letters addressed to soldiers were intercepted 
and sent to army headquarters, in which mothers, wives, and sisters told 
of their inability to respond to the appeals of hungry children for bread, or 



586 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

to provide proper care and remedies for the sick, and in the name of all that 
was dear appealed to the men to come home and rescue them from the 
ills which they suffered and the starvation which threatened them . Surely 
never was devotion to one's country and to one's duty more sorely tested 
than was the case with the soldiers of Lee's army during the last year of 
the war." 

Early in Feb., there occurred the last of the many affairs on 
our right flank. Grant had found that we were still hauling 
suppHes from the Weldon R.R. and had sent Gregg's cavalry to 
destroy it, and tear it up for 40 miles south, and the 2d and 5th 
corps were sent across Hatcher's Run to guard their rear. Lee, 
hearing of the Federals outside of their intrenchments, sent three 
divisions under Mahone, Evans, and Pegram to attack them. 
There was sharp fighting for two days without material success 
on either side. The Federal losses were 1474 and probably the 
Confederate were 1000. Among them, unfortunately, was Gen. 
Pegram, whose loss was universally deplored. Col. Taylor, under 
date of Dec. 4, has noted the loss of another brilhant and popular 
young officer who had been a classmate of Pegram's at West 
Point in 1854, as follows : — 

"Gen. Gracie, who showed such tact in getting Gen. Lee to descend 
from a dangerous position, was killed near the lines a day or so ago. He 
was an excellent officer, had passed through many hard-fought battles, 
escaped numberless dangers, and was finally killed while quietly viewing 
the enemy from a point where no one dreamed of danger." 

Col. Taylor, in a letter, describes the incident referred to as 
follows : — 

" Gen. Lee was making an inspection along the line occupied by Gen. 
Gracie's troops ; the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters was uncomfortably 
accurate along there and the orders were against needless exposure. To 
get a good view Gen. Lee mounted the parapet or stepped out in front of 
the works. Of course all who saw it realized his danger, but who was to 
direct his attention to it ? Gen. Gracie at once stepped to his side. The 
minnies whistled viciously. Gen. Lee, oblivious to his own danger, 
quickly realized Gen. Gracie's and immediately removed from the point 
of danger. That is all but it showed tact on the part of the latter." ^ 

1 Gen. Gracie was killed Dec. 3 by a shrapnel shot from Battery Morton 
which killed also two others with him. He had just received a furlough to 
visit his wife and child in Richmond but had missed his train. 



THE FALL OF 1864 587 

I have already said that the fall of 1864 was the period of 
the war when the Confederate authorities might have made 
peace with greatest advantage to their people. Had they then 
offered a return to the Union, they might have secured liberal 
compensation for their slaves and generally more liberal terms 
financially and politically than at any other period of the con- 
test. What these concessions might have been was suggested 
in the conference held at Fortress Monroe on Jan. 30, between 
Messrs. Lincoln and Seward, and the commissioners sent by Mr. 
Davis, Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell. After this 
conference adjourned, without coming to any agreement, there 
were rumors that Mr. Lincoln had offered to pay the South 
$400,000,000 in bonds as compensation for the slaves, if the 
South would return to the Union. This was denied by some of 
Mr. Davis's cabinet, and the discussion brought out informal 
statements which Mr. Lincoln had made in the conversation 
which had taken place. 

One was : — 

"Take a sheet of paper and let me write at the top Union, and you may 
fill in .the rest to suit yourselves." 

To this Mr. Stephens had to reply that the power to write 
that word was the single power which had been denied the 
commission. 

Next, Mr. Lincoln said that he had always felt that slavery 
having had the sanction of the government as a whole, it was 
unfair that the whole financial loss of its abolition should be 
thrown upon the South ; that he had always felt ready to vote 
bonds to compensate her for this loss, and that he had heard as 
much as $400,000,000 suggested for this purpose. 

There was no formal proposition made, for the Conference 
never reached that stage, but it is well known that until the 
day of his death, Mr. Lincoln cherished a desire to see the South 
compensated for the loss of her slaves, and that on Feb. 5, im- 
mediately after the failure of the Fortress Monroe Conference, 
he submitted to his cabinet a proposition to offer the South 
$400,000,000 in six per cent bonds in payment for peace with 
the abolition of slavery. His cabinet unanimously disapproved 



588 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

it, to his surprise and chagrin, whereon he dropped the matter, 
saying sadly, "You are all opposed to me." ^ 

"Few cabinet secrets were better kept than this," Nicolay 
says, but the diary of Sec. Welles refers to it as follows : — 

"The President had matured a scheme which he hoped would be useful 
in promoting peace. It was a proposition for paying the expense of the 
war for 200 days, or $400,000,000, to the rebel States to be for the extin- 
guishment of slavery, or for such purpose as the States were disposed. 
This in a few words was the scheme. It did not meet with favor, but was 
dropped. ..." 

Early in March, Sherman's army moved into N.C. where it 
was confronted by Gen, Joseph E. Johnston, recalled by the Con- 
federate Congress to command the army composed of the gar- 
risons of Savannah and Charleston, and the remnants of the 
army of Hood which had been brought over from. Tupelo, Miss. 
It was plain that Lee would soon be forced to abandon Rich- 
mond and Petersburg, and take advantage of his interior lines to 
unite with Johnston, and endeavor to crush Sherman before he 
could unite with Grant. Before undertaking this, which was 
felt to be an almost impossible task, however, he deterrnined 
upon one last effort to break up Grant in his immediate 
front, in spite of all of his fortifications. He selected for his 
point of attack Fort Stedman, about a mile from the Appo- 
mattox River on Grant's right, and assigned Gordon to com- 
mand the assault which was to be made Mar. 25. A surprise 
was relied on to secure Fort Stedman. Three columns of 
100 men each, with local guides, were to seize what Gordon 
took to be three redoubts commanding Stedman on each side ; a 
division was to follow them, and, through the gap thus made, 
the lines were to be swept in both directions and a force of 
cavalry was to ride and destroy the pontoon bridges across the 
Appomattox, and to raid City Point. 

Taking advantage of an order allowing deserters to come in 
with their arms, several pickets were captured, the trench guard 
rushed, the fraise and abattis cut quickly by a strong pioneer 
party, and Fort Stedman was assaulted and occupied with two 

» Told by Nicola:^ and Hay, X., 137. 



THE FALL OF 1864 589 

adjacent batteries. But the three "redoubts" were found to be 
only some old open lines at commanding points now unoccupied. 
Federal infantry presently came in force and killed or captured 
all of the three columns sent under a misapprehension very 
likely to occur where earthworks have to be guessed at from 
imperfect observation. Field's division, which had been or- 
dered over by rail from the north side, was delayed by the 
breaking down of the train. The column which had taken 
Fort Stedman was caught like rats in a trap. Humphreys 
writes : — 

"The cross-fire of artillery and infantry on the space between the lines 
prevented the enemy from escaping and reenforcements from coming to 
them. Many were killed and wounded trying to get back to their own 
lines; 1949 prisoners, including 71 officers and 9 stand of colors, fell into 
Gen. Parke's hands. His loss was 494 killed and wounded, and 523 miss- 
ing, a total of 1017." 

While this fighting was going on, the other Federal corps were 
ordered to feel the lines in their fronts; it being hoped they 
might find some weak spots from which men had been drawn 
for Gordon's attack. Much sharp fighting resulted at many 
points, the total casualties for the day reaching 2000 for the 
Federals and 4000 for the Confederates. These attacks, how- 
ever, everywhere failed entirely of their purpose except at a 
single point, on the lines of the 6th corps, about nine miles to 
our right from the point of Gordon's attack. Here, opposite a 
fort called Fort Fisher, our abattis had been weakened to get in 
fire wood from the front, and here the enemy were able to make 
a lodgment within our intrenched picket-line. When Grant's 
general assault was made at 4 a.m., April 2, this was the spot, 
and the only one, where at first it was successful. Humphreys 
states that it was — 

"through openings made by the enemy for his convenience of access 
to the front. Gen. Wright told me that this was the weakest part of all 
the line he saw, and the only point where it could have been carried. His 
loss in killed and wounded was 1100, all of which occurred in the space of 
15 minutes." 

Apprehensive now that Lee might abandon Petersburg and 
Richmond at any moment. Grant determined to delay no longer. 



590 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

taking the initiative in moving around his right flank. His 
effective force, by his latest returns, was 101,000 infantry, 9000 
artillery, 14,700 cavalry, total, 124,700, with 369 guns. Lee's 
forces by his latest return, Feb. 28, were 46,000 infantry, 5000 
artillery, and 6000 cavalry, total 57,000, from which 3000 should 
be deducted for desertions in March. In N.C, Sherman was 
about Goldsboro with about 100,000, against which Johnston in 
front of Greensboro had, perhaps, 25,000. There was really no 
need that Grant should have hurried himself, for, though by all 
the maxims of strategy, Lee should now unite with Johnston 
and both attack Sherman, his deficiencies in transportation were 
so great that no such movement was practicable. 

On March 27, Sheridan with two divisions of his excellent 
cavalry with their magazine carbines had rejoined the army, and 
Grant began to transfer his forces to his extreme left. A single 
division only, Devens of the 24th corps, was left north of the 
James. Two divisions of the 25th corps under Weitzel held the 
Bermuda Hundreds lines. All the rest of the infantry, about 
90,000 muskets and the whole of the cavalry, thoroughly or- 
ganized and abundantly equipped with transportation for rapid 
motion, on March 28 only awaited Grant's word to launch them- 
selves upon Lee's communications. 

On this occasion. Grant narrowly avoided one mistake of 
previous campaigns made, not only by himself in May, 1864, 
but by Hooker in May, 1863, and by Lee in June, 1863. He kept 
his cavalry moving and acting with his infantry instead of send- 
ing it off on a raid, having suspended on the 29th orders of the 
previous day to move against the railroads. It is noticeable, too, 
that Grant, on this occasion, concentrated practically his entire 
force in the attack upon our right, whereas, in the fall, he had 
never attacked upon one flank without some demonstration, at 
least, upon the other. 

On the 30th, Wilcox's division on the north, and Heth's on the 
south, of Hatchers Run had sharp affairs with the approaching 
Federals, whom they went out to meet in some cases, but were 
finally driven back within their lines. The Federal losses for 
the day were 1780. There are no returns for ours. 

Meanwhile, Lee was bringing up Pickett's and Johnson's divi- 



THE FALL OF 1864 591 

sions of infantry, about 6600 men, and two of Lee's divisions of 
cavalry, about 5760 men, for an expedition against Sheridan. 
They attacked him on the 31st, and drove him back in much 
confusion nearly to Dinwiddle C. H. Night ended the jfight- 
ing, with Pickett so far in advance that he would have been 
cut off by Warren's corps, during the night, had he waited un- 
til morning. But he fell back, and took position in the morning 
at Five Forks, four miles from our right at Burgess Mills. 

Here he made the fatal mistake of halting and proceeding 
to intrench, as well as the time and the scarcity of intrenching 
tools would permit. He was four miles away from where other 
troops could help him or they could be helped by him. He 
should never have stopped until he had connected with our right 
flank. 

Longstreet writes : — 

"The position was not of Pickett's choosing but of his orders, and from 
his orders he assumed that he would be reenforced." 

As it was, in the morning, April 1, Sheridan, reenforced now 
by the 5th corps, some 15,000 men, followed, and massing a force 
of cavalry on Pickett's right, with the 5th corps he turned his 
left flank and routed him, capturing, as stated by Warren, 3244 
men, 11 colors, and 4 guns, with a loss of only 634 men. The 
Federal Gen., Winthrop, was killed, and on the Confederate side 
Col. Pegram, a brother of the Gen. Pegram killed Feb. 6, and 
highly distinguished as an artillerist. 

This battle was fought between four and six in the afternoon, 
and Humphreys notices a peculiar phenomenon of acoustic 
shadows, such as has been spoken of before in telUng of other 
battles. He writes : — 

"A singular circumstance connected with this battle is the fact that 
Gen. Pickett was, all of this time and until near the close of the action, 
on the north side of Hatchers Run where he had heard no sound of the 
engagement, nor had he received any information concerning it." 

The distance was but Httle over a mile, and Fitz-Lee and Pickett 
were in company. Neither were on the field until the action was 
decided. 



592 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Although this action was a complete success, after it was over 
Warren was removed from the command of the 5th corps by 
Sheridan, under charges of which Warren was afterward fully 
acquitted by a Court of Inquiry. 

When Grant heard at 9 p.m. of Sheridan's success, he was as- 
sured that he must now have Lee's long lines stretched to near 
the breaking strain, and that the time had come when he could 
renew his assaults, suspended since the occasion of the mine. 
With his usual promptness, he ordered the 2d corps, which was 
near him, south of Hatchers Run, to feel our works in its front 
at once. The other corps, stretching back to Petersburg, were 
ordered to cannonade our Hnes daring the night, and, at his 
favorite hour of 4 a.m., to assault all the soft spots,^of which, 
for two or three days, each corps commander had been ordered 
to make a study. 

The midnight demonstration by the 2d corps waked a 
heavy fire of musketry and artillery, but produced no other 
results. The assault of the 6th corps at dawn, however, under 
Wright, was made at the point where our abattis had been 
weakened, and the enemy had made a lodgment, on Mar. 25. 
As before mentioned, here their assault was entirely successful, 
after incurring a loss of 1100 men. They then turned to the left 
and swept the Confederate line to its extremity. At the crossing 
of the Jerusalem Plank road, Parke got possession of an ad- 
vanced line, with 12 guns and 800 prisoners, but he failed to carry 
our main line in the rear, and the fighting was kept up all day. 
At all other points, the morning assaults were repulsed. 

After capturing all the works to the south and west, the enemy 
now turned toward Petersburg, where two isolated works. Forts 
Gregg and Whitworth, about 300 yards apart, stood about 
1000 yards in front of our main line of intrenchments. The 
rear of Fort Gregg was closed with a palisade, and its ditch was 
generally impassable. On the right flank, however, a line to 
connect with Whitworth had been started, and here the un- 
finished ditch and parapet gave a narrow access to the parapet 
of Gregg. It was by this route that the enemy finally reached it. 
It was defended by two guns of the Washington artillery under 
Lt. McElroy, and Lt.-Col. Duncan, with the 12th and 16th Miss., 



THE FALL OF 1864 593 

214 men in all. Fort Whitworth was open at the gorge and was 
held by three guns of the Washington artillery and the 19th and 
48th Miss, until the final charge was being made upon Fort 
Gregg, when, by Lee's order, the garrison was withdrawn. 

The defence of Fort Gregg was notable, as was also the at- 
tack. The Federal forces were evidently feehng the inspiration 
of success and the Confederates the desperation of defeat. 
Several attacks by Foster's division, of the 24th corps, were 
repulsed. The last, aided by two brigades of Turner's division 
(while the 3d brigade advanced upon Whitworth) swarmed over 
the parapet of Gregg and captured, inside, the two guns with 
two colors. Of the garrison, 55 were killed, 129 were wounded, 
and only 30 were found uninjured of the 214. Gibbon's loss 
was 122 killed, 592 wounded, total, 714. 

Lee and Longstreet, from the main line of intrenchments, wit- 
nessed the gallant defence of Fort Gregg and its final fall. A. P. 
Hill, aroused by the terrific cannonade and musketry at daylight 
and riding to join his troops, had been killed by some stragglers 
of the 6th corps, which, as has been told, had carried our lines and 
penetrated far inside of them. When Lee, on the night of April 
1, had heard of the disaster to Pickett at Five Forks, he had 
wired for Longstreet with Field's division. This left only Ker- 
shaw's division and the local troops to hold Richmond, but Weit- 
zel's force had already been so reduced that no aggressive idea 
was left him. Had he known of the withdrawal of Field's divi- 
sion, he might have been tempted to make an effort to take the 
city. On Longstreet's arrival in Petersburg, his troops were 
hurried to the intrenchments, whence they saw the gallant defence 
made by Fort Gregg, which had been done under the assurance 
that "Longstreet is coming. Hold for two hours and all will be 
well." 

When these saw the forts captured, they expected nothing else 
but that the heavy blue columns and long lines would now move 
to crush them. But the lesson of Fort Gregg had not been 
thrown away. Grant recognized that Lee must retreat during 
the night, and that from his own position he would have the 
advantage in the start, and he preferred to order things prepared 
for the march westward in the morning. Lee had already 



594 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

advised Mr. Davis of the necessity of abandoning the lines that 
night, and, having noted Grant's pause after the capture of 
Fort Gregg, now, about 3 p.m., he issued the formal orders for the 
evacuation in time to have the troops begin to move at dark. 

My headquarters had been on the Richmond side for some 
months, and my duty included the command of Drury's and 
Chaffin's bluffs, and the defence of the river. It happened that 
on April 2, I had prepared several torpedoes to be placed in the 
river that night, and early in the morning I went down into the 
swamp and was detained until late in the afternoon, when the 
orders of evacuation reached me. Part of my command was to 
cross the river at Drury's Bluff and part at Richmond, After 
giving necessary instructions, I rode into Richmond, and took my 
post at the bridge to see my batteries go by. Many accounts 
have been given of the scenes in Richmond that night, and I 
will not refer to them. 

The freight depot of the Danville Road was close by the 
bridge, and I walked into it and saw large quantities of pro- 
visions and goods which had evidently run the blockade at 
Wilmington. I treated my horse to an Enghsh bridle and a 
felt saddle-blanket, and I hung to a ring on my saddle a mag- 
nificent side of English bacon, which proved a great acquisition 
during the next few days. These provisions were intended for 
Lee's army, and had been sent to Amelia C. H. from Dan- 
ville, the train being ordered to come on to Richmond to take off 
the personnel and property of the government. Unfortunately, 
the officer in charge of it misunderstood his orders and came on 
without unloading at Amelia. Near my station in the street, a 
cellar door opened in the sidewalk, and while I waited for my 
batteries a solitary Irish woman brought many bales of blankets 
from the freight depot in a wheelbarrow and tumbled theminto the 
cellar. Many fires were burning in the city, and a canal-boat in 
flames came floating under the bridge at which I stood. I could 
not see by what agency, but it was soon dragged away. The 
explosions of our little fleet of gunboats under Admiral Semmes 
at Drury's Bluff were plainly heard and the terrific explosion 
of the arsenal in Richmond. About sunrise, my last battalion 
passed and I followed, taking a farewell look at the city from the 



THE FALL OF 1864 595 

Manchester side. The whole river front appeared to be in 
flames. Its formal surrender was made to Weitzel at 8.15 a.m. 

We marched 24 miles that day and bivouacked at night in some 
tall pine woods near Tomahawk Church. I had barely gotten 
supper when I was ordered to join two engineers being sent to 
find a wagon route for our guns and trains to an overhead rail- 
road bridge across the Appomattox River. We travelled all 
night in mud and darkness, waking up residents to ask direc- 
tions, but we finally got the whole column safely across the 
railroad bridge and went into camp near sundown about three 
miles from Amelia C. H. 

The next morning we passed through the village, where we 
should have gotten rations, but they did not meet us. They 
had gone on to Richmond and been destroyed there, as has been 
told. Here a few of the best-equipped battahons of artillery 
were selected to accompany the troops, while all the excess was 
turned over to Walker, chief of the 3d corps artillery, to take 
on a direct road to Lynchburg. About 1 p.m., with Lee and 
Longstreet at the head of the column, we took the road for 
Jetersville, where it was reported that Sheridan was across our 
path and Lee intended to attack him. We were not long in 
coming to where our skirmish line was already engaged, and a 
long conference took place between the generals and W. H. F. 
Lee in command of the cavalry. It appeared that the 2d and 
6th corps were in front of us, but might be passed in the night 
by a flank march. We countermarched a short distance, and 
then turning to the right, we marched all night, passing Amelia 
Springs, and arrived at daylight at Rice's Turnout, six miles west 
of Burkesville.^ Here I was ordered to select a line of battle 
and take position to resist attack, and here we waited for the 
remainder of the army to come up and pass us, but we waited 
in vain. 

While the 2d corps had closely pressed the rear of the column 

* During this night' s march a widespread and long-continued panic was 
started by a large black stallion carrying a fence rail swinging to his bridle 
and running away along the roads on which the troops were marching. The 
first false alarm started the troops to firing on each other, and this spread and 
was kept up a long time. Among the valuable officers killed in it by his 
own men was Maj. Smith, who commanded our Drury's Bluff batteries. 



596 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

all day, the cavalry and the 6th corps had struck its flank under 
Ewell at Sailor's Creek, Besides Kershaw's division, this force 
comprised no veteran soldiers, but the employees of the depart- 
ments under Custis Lee, the marines and sailors of our Uttle 
fleet under Admiral Tucker, and the heavy artillerists of Drury's 
and Chaffin's bluffs, under Col. Crutchfield and Maj. Stiles. 
This force, though largely composed of men who had never 
before been under fire, surprised the enemy with an unexpected 
display of courage, such as had already been shown at Fort Sted- 
man and Fort Gregg, and would still with flashes illuminate our 
last days. It formed hne of battle on the edge of a pine wood, 
in full view of two lines of battle in open ground across a little 
stream. It had no artillery to make reply, and it lay still while 
other Federal infantry was marched around them, and sub- 
mitted to an accurate and deliberate cannonade for 20 minutes, 
followed quickly by a charge of the two Hues. Not a gun was 
fired until the enemy approached within 100 yards, showing 
handkerchiefs as an invitation to the men to surrender. Then 
two volleys broke both of their lines, and the excited Confed- 
erates charged in pursuit of the fleeing enemy, but were soon 
driven back by the fire of the guns. A second charge of the 
Federals soon followed, in which the two lines mingled in one 
promiscuous and prolonged melee with clubbed muskets and 
bayonets, as if bent upon exterminating each other individually. 
Gen. Custis Lee in his official report thus describes the ending : — 

" Finding . . . that my command was entirely surrounded, to prevent 
useless sacrifice of life, the firing was stopped by some of my officers aided 
by some of the enemy's, and the officers and men were taken as prisoners 
of war."^ 

Toward noon, the enemy began to appear in our front at Rice's 
Turnout, and made demonstrations, but were easily held off by 
the artillery. Meanwhile, Lee had become very anxious over the 
non-arrival of Anderson's command (the remnants of Pickett's 
and Johnson's divisions), and at last rode to the rear to investigate. 
He did not return until near sundown and with him came fuller 

1 Col. Crutchfield, who was Jackson's chief of artillery, and lost a leg at 
Chancellors ville, was killed in this action. A graphic and detailed account 
of it is given in StUes's Four Years under Marse Robert. 



THE FALL OF 1864 597 

news of the battle at Sailor's Creek in which Anderson was also 
involved. Our loss had been about 8000 men, with six generals — 
Ewell, Kershaw, Custis Lee, Dubose, Hun ton, and Corse — all 
captured. 

One notable affair had taken place on this date, between a 
small force under Gen. Read, sent ahead by Ord to burn the 
High Bridge on the Lynchburg road, and Bearing's and Rosser's 
cavalry. The expedition consisted of two regiments of infantry 
and about 80 cavalry. They had gotten within a mile of the 
bridge, when our cavalry, in much larger force, attacked them. 
Humphreys writes : — 

"A most gallant fight ensued in which Gen. Read, Col. Washburn, and 
three other cavalry officers were killed. After heavy loss the rest of the 
force surrendered. Gen. Bearing, Col. Boston, and Maj. Thompson of 
Rosser's command were among the killed." 

About sundown, the enemy at Rice's showed a disposition to 
advance, and Lee soon gave orders to resume our retreat. In 
the morning we might have gone on toward Danville, but now 
we turned to the right and took the road to Lynchburg. I 
remember the night as one peculiarly uncomfortable. The road 
was crowded with disorganized men and deep in mud. We 
were moving all night and scarcely made six miles. About sun- 
rise, we got to Farmville and crossed the river on a bridge to the 
north side of the Appomattox, and here we received a small 
supply of rations. 

Here we found Gen. Lee. While we were getting breakfast, he 
sent for me and, taking out his map, showed me that the enemy 
had taken a highway bridge across the Appomattox near 
the High Bridge, were crossing on it, and would come in upon 
our road about three miles ahead. He directed me to send 
artillery there to cover our passage and, meanwhile, to take per- 
sonal charge of the two bridges at Farmville (the railroad and 
the highway), prepare them for burning, see that they were not 
fired too soon, so as to cut off our own men, nor so late that the 
enemy might save them. 

While he explained, my eyes ran over the map and I saw 
another road to Lynchburg than the one we were taking. This 



598 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

other kept the south side of the river and was the straighter of 
the two, our road joining it near Appomattox C. H. I pointed 
this out, and he asked if I could find some one whom he 
might question. I had seen at a house near by an intelhgent 
man whom I brought up and who confirmed the map. The 
Federals would have the shortest road to Appomattox station, 
a common point a little beyond Appomattox C. H. Saying 
there would be time enough to look after that, the general 
folded up his map and I went to look after the bridges. 

As the enemy were already in sight, I set fire to the railroad 
bridge at once, and, having well prepared the highway bridge, 
I left my aide, Lt, Mason, to fire it on a signal from me. It was 
also successfully burned. In the End of an Era by John S. Wise, 
he has described an interview occurring between his father. Gen. 
Wise, and Gen. Lee at Farmville at this time, which I quote : — 

"We found Gen. Lee on the rear portico of the house I have mentioned. 
He had washed his face in a tin basin and stood drying his beard with a 
coarse towel as we approached. 'Gen. Lee,' exclaimed my father, 'my 
poor brave men are lying on yonder hill more dead than alive. For more 
than a week they have been fighting day and night, without food, and, 
by God, Sir, they shall not move another step until somebody gives them 
something to eat.' 

"'Come in, General,' said Gen. Lee, soothingly. ' They deserve some- 
thing to eat and shall have it ; and meanwhile you shall share my break- 
fast.' He disarmed everything like defiance by his kindness. . . . Gen. 
Lee inquired what he thought of the situation. ' Situation ? ' said the bold 
old man. ' There is no situation. Nothing remains, Gen. Lee, but to put 
your poor men on your poor mules and send them home in time for the 
spring ploughing. This army is hopelessly whipped, and is fast becoming 
demoralized. These men have already endured more than I believed 
flesh and blood could stand, and I say to you. Sir, emphatically, that to 
prolong the struggle is murder, and the blood of every man who is killed 
from this time forth is on your head, Gen. Lee.' 

" This last expression seemed to cause Gen. Lee great pain. With a 
gesture of remonstrance, and even of impatience, he protested. 'Oh, 
General, do not talk so wildly. My burdens are heavy enough ! What 
would the country think of me, if I did what you suggest ? ' 

"'Country be d — d,' was the quick reply. 'There is no country. 
There has been no country. General, for a year or more. You are the country 
to these men. They have fought for you. They have shivered through 
a long winter for you. Without pay or clothes or care of any sort their 
devotion to you and faith in you have been the only things that have held 



THE FALL OF 1864 599 

this army together. If you demand the sacrifice, there are still left thou- 
sands of us who will die for you. You know the game is desperate beyond 
redemption, and that, if you so announce, no man, or government, or 
people will gainsay your decision. That is why I repeat that the blood of 
any man killed hereafter is on your head.' Gen. Lee stood for some time 
at an open window looking out at the throng now surging by upon the 
roads and in the fields, and made no response." 

Well might Lee say, "My burdens are heavy enough !" Gen. 
Wise had in no way exaggerated them. 

Poague's battahon of artillery had gone ahead to the inter- 
secting road Lee had mentioned, and Mahone's division (now 
assigned to our corps) supported by Poague's guns, took 
a good position and began to fortify. They held the position 
all day, being charged in the afternoon, repulsing the enemy 
and charging in turn. They captured the colors of the 5th 
N.H., and regained one of our guns which had been over- 
run by numbers. The enemy, Miles's division, reported a loss 
for the day of 571. The march of our column was continued 
under the protection of Mahone's division, with but one slight 
interruption. 

Crook's division of cavalry forded the river on our left and 
moved toward our train. Gregg's brigade, in the lead, was 
charged by Mumford and Rosser, and Gregg and a bunch of 
prisoners were captured, on which the rest of the division was 
withdrawn. Our march was now kept up all night and the next 
day until sundown. I rode off from the road, after midnight, 
with my staff and found a fence corner where we could rest awhile 
without having our horses stolen as we slept, for I had now 
had but one night's rest out of six. 

After sundown on the 7th, Mahone, still holding the road 
against the 2d corps under Humphreys, asked a flag of truce to 
enable him to remove the wounded, left in front of his line when 
he charged and captured the colors of the 5th N.H. When the 
reply came, granting the truce for an hour, it brought also a 
letter from Grant to Lee, as follows : — 

"Apeil 7, 1865. 

" General : The result of the last week must convince you of the hope- 
lessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Vir- 



600 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to 
shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by 
asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate army known 
as the Army of Northern Virginia. 

"U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen." 

Lee, at that moment, happened to be near Mahone's lines, and 
within an hour the following reply was delivered to Gen. Seth 
Williams, the bearer: — 

"April 7, 1865. 

"General: I have received your note of this date. Though not 
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resist- 
ance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your 
desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering 
your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its sur- 
render. 

"R. E. Lee, Gen." 

The next day, the 8th, was the first quiet day of our retreat. 
The 2d corps followed us up closely, but there was no collision. 
All the rest of the Federal army had taken the more direct road 
which I had seen on Lee's map, and was marching to get ahead 
of us at Appomattox C. H. During the day I rode for a 
while with Gen. Pendleton, our chief of artillery. He told me 
that some of the leading generals had conferred, and decided that 
it would be well to represent to Lee that, in their opinion, 
the cause was now hopeless, in order that he might surrender 
and allow the odium of making the first proposition to be 
placed upon them. 

But it was thought that Longstreet was the man to make 
the proposition to Lee. Longstreet had not been consulted, 
and Pendleton had undertaken to broach the matter to him, and 
had done so. Longstreet had indignantly rejected the propo- 
sition, saying that his duty was to help hold up Lee's hands, not 
to beat them down;" that his corps could still whip twice its 
number and as long as that was the case he would never be 
the one to suggest a surrender. 

On this, Pendleton himself had made bold to make the suggestion 
to Lee. From his report of the conversation, he had met a de- 



THE FALL OF 1864 601 

cided snub, and was plainly embarrassed in telling of it. Lee 
had answered very coldly, "There are too many men here to 
talk of laying down their arms without fighting." 

Evidently Lee preferred to himself take the whole responsi- 
bility of surrender, as he had always taken that of his battles, 
whatever their issue, entirely alone. 

Some time in the afternoon he received Grant's reply to his 
inquiry as to the terms proposed. It was as follows : — 

" Farmville, April 8, 1865. 

" General : Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, 
asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of 
Northern Virginia is received. In reply I would say that peace being 
my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, 
that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified from taking up 
arms again against the government of the United States until properly ex- 
changed. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers 
you may name for the same purpose at any point agreeable to you for the 
purpose of arranging definitely the terms- upon which the surrender of the 
Army of Northern Virginia will be received. 

"U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen." 

Lee received this late in the afternoon of the 8th. It was 
answered from the roadside and delivered to Humphreys after 
sundown for transmission to Grant. Lee had but recently been 
appointed commander-in-chief of all the Confederate armies, 
and he now delays the surrender of his own army in order 
that the negotiation may include that of all the Confed- 
erate forces under his command. In accomplishing this he 
might reasonably hope to secure the best possible terms, 
as it would bring instant peace everywhere. His letter was 
as follows : — 

"April 8, 1865. 
" General : I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of 
yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do 
not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, 
but, as the restoration of peace should be the object of all, I desire to know 
whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot therefore meet 
you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far 



602 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

as your proposal may affect the Confederate States' forces under my com- 
mand, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet 
you at 10 A.M. to-morrow on the old stage road to Richmond between the 
picket-lines of the two armies. 

"R. E. Lee, Gen." 

This letter was received by Grant at Curdsville, a roadside 
village on the road Lee had travelled, about midnight. It was 
not answered until in the morning, as Grant did not intend to 
accept Lee's invitation to meet him at 10 a.m. Grant had 
doubtless had an early interview in his mind when he sent his 
second letter, and was probably accompanying the 2d corps, that 
he might be conveniently near. But he had been recently cau- 
tioned from Washington about making or discussing any political 
terms, and, as Lee's letter seemed to involve a chance of such 
discussions, he apparently decided to make the proposed meeting 
impossible by at once leaving that road and riding across to the 
road being travelled by Ord and Sheridan. 

Before starting, however, he replied to Lee from Curdsville, 
as follows : — 

"April 9, 1865. 

" General : Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to 
treat on the subject of peace. The meeting proposed for 10 a.m. to-day 
could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally 
anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same 
feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. 
By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable 
event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of prop- 
erty not yet destroyed. 

"Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the 
loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc. 

" U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen." 

Meanwhile, during the afternoon, we had approached Appo- 
mattox C. H., two miles beyond which was the junction of 
our road with the one on which Sheridan and Ord were now 
approaching, and already the advanced guards of the two forces 
were in collision. Lee arranged during the evening with Gor- 
don and Fitz-Lee, who had the advance, that they should make 
a vigorous attack at dawn and endeavor to clear the road. 



THE FALL OF 1864 603 

This was done, and, in evidence of it, a battery of 12-Pr, Napo- 
leons was presently sent in to me, having been captured by a 
cavalry charge of Robert's brigade. Though this evidenced 
good spirit on the part of our men, our advance made no progress, 
and the increased fire told of large forces already in our front. 
Lee was up at an early hour and sent Col. Venable to Gordon to 
inquire how he progressed. Gordon's answer was : — 

"Tell Gen. Lee I have fought my corps to a frazzle, and I fear I can do 
nothing unless I am heavily supported by Longstreet's corps." 

When Lee received this message, he exclaimed : — 

" Then there is nothing left me but to go and see Gen. Grant, and I would 
rather die a thousand deaths." 

Venable writes : — 

" Convulsed with passionate grief, many were the wild words which we 
spoke as we stood around him. Said one, ' Oh, General ! What will his- 
tory say of the surrender of the army in the field?' He replied, 'Yes, 
I know they will say hard things of us. They will not understand how we 
were overwhelmed by numbers. But that is not the question, Colonel. 
The question is. Is it right to surrender this army ? If it is right, then I 
will take all the responsibility.' " 

Meanwhile, the march of the army had come to a halt in front, 
while, for a time, the rear closed slowly up. I had bivouacked 
near the road, and soon after sunrise I came upon Lee with his 
staff by the roadside, at the top of a hill. The general called me 
to him, and taking his seat upon a felled oak, peeled off its bark, 
and referring to the map we had looked at together on the 7th, 
he said : ^ — 

"Well, we have come to the Junction, and they seem to be here ahead 
of us. What have we got to do to-day?" 

I had been somewhat prepared by my talk with Pendleton, 
had formulated a plan of my own, and was glad to have a 
chance to present it. My command having been north of the 

^ I still cherish a rectangle of that Confederate photographic map linen 
mounted, labelled S. Side James River, and with Lee's autograph upon it. 
He had carried it in his breast pocket for months, and when he finally 
rode to meet Grant, Venable took it to burn. I cut off and preserved the 
outside fold with his label and signature. 



604 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

James had had no share in the fighting about Petersburg, and 
but httle in the retreat. They had now begun to hear of a sur- 
render, and would hint their sentiments in loud voices when I 
rode by. 

"We don't want to surrender any ammunition. We've been saving 
ammunition all this war. Hope we were not saving it for a surrender." 

I told the general of this and said that if he saw fit to try and cut 
our way out, my command would do as well as they had ever done. 
He answered : — 

"I have left only two divisions, Field's and Mahone's, sufficiently or- 
ganized to be relied upon. All the rest have been broken and routed and 
can do little good. Those divisions are now scarcely 4000 apiece, and that 
is far too little to meet the force now in front of us." 

This was just the opportunity wished, and I hastened to lay 
my plan before him. I said : — 

"Then we have only choice of two courses. Either to surrender, or 
to take to the woods and bushes, with orders, either to rally on Johnston, 
or perhaps better, on the Governors of the respective States. If we sur- 
render this army, it is the end of the Confederacy. I think our best 
course would be to order each man to go to the Governor of his own 
State with his arms." 

"What would you hope to accomplish by that?" said he. "In the 
first place," said I, " to stand the chances. If we surrender this army, every 
other army will have to follow suit. All will go like a row of bricks, and if 
the rumors of help from France have any foundation, the news of our sur- 
render will put an end to them. 

" But the one thing which may be possible in our present situation is 
to get some sort of terms. None of our armies are likely to be able to get 
them, and that is why we should try with the different States. Already 
it has been said that Vance can make terms for N.C., and Jo Brown for Ga. 
Let the Governor of each State make some sort of a show of force and then 
surrender on terms which may save us from trials for treason and con- 
fiscations." 

As I talked, it all looked to me so reasonable that I hoped 
he was convinced, for he listened in silence. So I went on 
more confidently: — 

" But, General, apart from all that — if all fails and there is no hope — 
the men who have fought under you for four years have got the right this 
morning to ask one favor of you. We know that you do not care for mill- 



THE FALL OF 1864 605 

tary glory. But we are proud of the record of this army. We want to 
leave it untarnished to our children. It is a clear record so far and now is 
about to be closed. A little blood more or less now makes no difference, 
and we have the right to ask of you to spare us the mortification of having 
you ask Grant for terms and have him answer that he has no terms .to 
offer. That it is 'U.S., Unconditional Surrender.' That was his reply 
to Buckner at Fort Donelson, and to Pemberton at Vicksburg, and that 
is what is threatened us. General, spare us the mortification of asking 
terms and getting that reply." 

He heard it all so quietly, and it was all so true, it seemed 
to me, and so undeniable, that I felt sure that I had him con- 
vinced. His first words were : — 

" If I should take your advice, how many men do you suppose would get 
away ? " 

"Two-thirds of us," I answered. "We would be like rabbits and par- 
tridges in the bushes, and they could not scatter to follow us." He said: 
" I have not over 15,000 muskets left. Two-thirds of them divided among 
the States, even if all could be collected, would be too small a force to 
accompUsh anything. All could not be collected. Their homes have been 
overrun, and many would go to look after their families. 

"Then, General, you and I as Christian men have no right to consider 
only how this would affect us. We must consider its effect on the country 
as a whole. Already it is demoralized by the four years of war. If I 
took your advice, the men would be without rations and under no control 
of officers. They would be compelled to rob and steal in order to live. 
They would become mere bands of marauders, and the enemy's cavalry 
would pursue them and overrun many wide sections they may never have 
occasion to visit. We would bring on a state of affairs it would take the 
country years to recover from. 

"And, as for myself, you young fellows might go to bushwhacking, 
but the only dignified course for me would be, to go to Gen. Grant and 
surrender myself and take the consequences of my acts." 

He paused for only a moment and then went on. 

"But I can tell you one thing for your comfort. Grant will not de- 
mand an unconditional surrender. He will give us as good terms as this 
army has the right to demand, and I am going to meet him in the rear at 
10 A.M. and surrender the army on the condition of not fighting again until 
exchanged." 

I had not a single word to say in reply. He had answered my 
suggestion from a plane so far above it, that I was ashamed of 
having made it. With several friends, I had planned to make 



606 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

an escape on seeing a flag of truce, but that idea was at once 
abandoned by all of them on hearing my report. 

At this time the negotiations had been definitely broken off 
by Lee's second letter. The meeting which this proposed had 
been dechned by Grant in a letter now on its way to Lee, but not 
yet received. He had told me Grant's terms as if he knew them, 
but later he felt some uneasiness lest Grant might not feel bound 
by his offer after it had once been declined. Longstreet, in 
Manassas to Appomattox, mentions his apprehensions on this 
subject, but states that he, from personal acquaintance with 
Grant, felt able to assure Lee that there would be no humiliating 
demands, and the event justified that assurance. 

About 8.30 o'clock Lee, in a full suit of new uniform, with 
sword and sash and an embroidered belt, boots, and gold spurs, 
rode to the rear, hoping soon to meet Grant and to be able to 
make the surrender. Instead, he learned of Grant's change of 
route and was handed Grant's letter, dated that morning, and 
declining the interview. He at once wrote a reply as follows, and 
asked to have it sent to overtake Grant on his long ride. 

"April 9, 1865. 
"General: I received your note of this morning on the picket line 
whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were 
embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of 
this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained 
in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. 

"R. E. Lee, General." 

While this last message was being prepared, a messenger riding 
like the wind dashed around a curve, and seeing Lee, and having 
but one arm, with difficulty stopped his horse nearly 100 yards 
beyond. All recognized the rider. Col. John Haskell of Long- 
street's artillery, and, as his horse was checked, Lee went to 
meet him, exclaiming: "What is it? What is it?" and then, 
without waiting for a reply : " Oh, why did you do it ? You have 
killed your beautiful horse !" ^ 

^ Haskeir s horse was well known in the army for its beauty and speed. 
It had been led all the way from Richmond on the retreat, with a view to 
making an escape in case of a surrender, which intent had now just been 
abandoned, as already told. The horse recovered and was sold +o a Federal 
officer for a handsome sum in gold. 



THE FALL OF 1864 607 

Haskell explained that Fitz-Lee had sent in a report that he 
had found a road by which the army could escape, and that 
Longstreet had ordered him to overtake Lee, before he could 
send a note to Grant, and to kill his horse to do it. Longstreet, 
in his book, says that Haskell's arrival was too late, that the note 
had gone. But Humphreys's narrative shows that Col. Whittier, 
who took the note, witnessed Haskell's arrival before the note 
was finished, Lee, however, had not credited the report, and a 
later messenger soon came to say that the report was a mistake. 

When Field's division had been halted by the flag of truce, 
Humphreys's corps was within a half-mile, and under his orders 
it soon appeared to be making preparation for a further advance. 
Field, meanwhile, went to intrenching. Grant had instructed 
Humphreys not to let the correspondence delay his movements. 

In Longstreet's front Gordon had all the morning been en- 
gaged with Sheridan, and firing, both of musketry and artillery, 
was still in progress. Lee had at first neglected to give author- 
ity to ask for a truce, but later sent it to Gordon who sent Maj . 
Sims of Longstreet's staff to request one. Sims met Custer who 
had himself conducted to Gordon, and demanded the imme- 
diate and unconditional surrender of the army, which Gordon 
refused. Custer said: — 

" Sheridan directs me to say to you, General, if there is any hesitation 
about your surrender, that he has you surrounded and can annihilate 
your command in an hour." 

Gordon replied : — 

"There is a flag between Lee and Grant for the purpose of surrender, 
and if Gen. Sheridan decides to continue the fighting in the face of the flag 
of truce, the responsibility for the bloodshed will be his and not mine." 

On this, Gordon says, Custer rode off with Maj. Hunter of 
Gordon's staff, "asking to be guided to Longstreet's position." 
Finding Longstreet, he made the same demand for immediate 
and unconditional surrender. I have told of this scene elsewhere ^ 
more at length, but did not know until the recent publication of 
Gordon's book, that it was Custer's second attempt that morn- 
ing to secure the surrender of the army to himself. Longstreet 

1 Century, April, 1903. 



608 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

rebuffed him, however, very roughly, far more so than appears 
in Longstreet's account of the interview. 

Meanwhile, in our rear, more serious trouble threatened. The 
2d corps, closely followed by the 6th, began to advance. Lee, 
who was still awaiting between the lines Grant's reply to his. let- 
ter (which had over 15 miles to go, and did not reach Grant until 
11.50 A.M.), sent by his staff-officers two earnest verbal requests 
to Humphrey snot to press upon him, as negotiations were going 
on for a surrender. Humphreys, under his orders, felt unable to 
comply, although the second request was very urgent. He sent 
word to Lee, who was in full sight on the road, within 100 yards 
of the head of the 2d corps, that he must withdraw at once. 

Lee then withdrew, and the 2d corps continued to advance, 
and deployed in front of Field's intrenchments, and the 6th 
corps also deployed, on the right of the 2d, ready to assault. 
At the critical moment when this assault was about to begin, it 
was suspended by the opportune arrival on the ground of Meade. 
Meade had read Lee's letter to Grant of that morning, and he 
took the responsibihty of sending Lee a letter granting a truce 
of one hour, in view of the negotiations for a surrender. This 
letter was delivered at Field's lines, and, Humphreys says, was 
received by Lee between eleven and twelve o'clock. This truce 
may have been prolonged, for it must have been as late as 1 p.m. 
before the message sent by Babcock from the front, to be pres- 
ently told of, could have been started. 

Meanwhile, during the morning, and before the first flag of 
truce was sent. Longs treet had directed me to form a line of 
battle on which all of our available force could be rallied for a 
last stand. I got up all the organized infantry and artillery in 
the column, and took up a fairly good position behind the North 
Fork of the Appomattox River. To our left the enemy was 
still extending his Unes, and some of my battery commanders 
were anxious to expend on them some of the ammunition they 
had hauled so far, for the firing had not yet ceased. But I knew 
that Lee would not approve an unnecessary shot, and not one 
was fired from our line.^ 

1 The last cannon shot was fired from Gordon' s lines under orders to cease 
firing, conveyed by Maj. W. W. Parker of Huger's battalion. It was fired 



THE FALL OF 1864 609 

When the truce in our rear was for the time arranged, Lee re- 
turned to our front and stopped in an apple orchard a hundred 
yards or so in advance of our hne where I had some fence rails 
piled under a tree to make him a seat/ Here Longs treet joined 
him, and they again discussed the chances of Grant's making 
some humiliating demands. Humphreys's refusal to recognize 
Lee's presence between the lines as constituting a truce, while 
awaiting the reply to Lee's proposal to surrender on Grant's 
terms, and the reluctantly allowed single hour of truce as the 
alternative of instant battle, naturally made them, perhaps, sus- 
picious. Few in either army yet knew of the Hberality with 
which Grant was prepared to treat us. The general temper had 
been illustrated in the fight at Sailor's Creek by the Chaffin's 
Bluff battalion, under Stiles, who tried to insist upon fighting to 
the last ditch. Even Lee and Longstreet, under the present cir- 
cumstances, could not feel confidence in their hope that he might 
not demand unconditional surrender. So as they sat together 
under the apple tree awaiting the coming of Grant's messenger 
to summon Lee to the conference, silence gradually fell be- 
tween them. The conversation dropped to broken sentences, 
and there were occasional long silences between them. The 
last thing said was by Longstreet to Lee, as Grant's messenger 
was seen approaching. It was : — 

"General, unless he offers us honorable terms, come back and let us 
fight it out." 

Grant's messenger was Col. Babcock of his staff, who had 
ridden ahead for eight miles with the reply to Lee's last note. 
Less formal than the previous correspondence had been, and 
using for the first time the customary terms of courtesy, it con- 
veyed assurance that no unpleasant surprises were to be ex- 
pected. It read : — 

by a section under command of Lt. Wright of Clutter's battery. The 
battery was one of Mcintosh's battaUon of the 3d corps and was com- 
manded by Lt. Mcintosh, a brother of Col. Mcintosh. 

* Within two days this tree was cut down for mementoes and relics and 
the roots dug up. This was begun by the Confederate soldiers and finished 
by the Federals. 



610 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

"April 9, 1865. 
"Gen. R. E. Lee, Commanding C.S.A: — ■ 

"Your note of this date is but this moment, 11.50 a.m., received. In 
consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg 
road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road I am at this writing about four- 
miles west of Walker's Church and will push forward for the purpose of 
meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview 
to take place will meet me. 

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"U.S. Grant, Lt.-Gen." 

After reading this note Lee said that he would ride forward 
to meet Gen. Grant, but that he was apprehensive lest hostilities 
might begin in the rear on the termination of Meade's truce. 
Babcock accordingly wrote requesting Meade to maintain the 
truce until orders from Grant could be received. To save time 
this was taken at once through our lines by Col. Forsyth of 
Sheridan's staff, who was accompanied by Col. Taylor, Lee's 
adjutant. 

The meeting, by strange coincidence, took place in the house 
of Maj. Wilmer McLean, who had owned the farm on Bull Run 
on which had occurred the first collision between the two armies 
at Blackburn's Ford on July 18, 1861, and who also owned the 
farm and house used for similar purposes to-day, as told in 
the account of that battle. Lee was accompanied to the 
meeting only by Col. Marshall, his military secretary, and a single 
courier, who held their horses during the two or three hours 
consumed. A quiet dignity characterized Lee's bearing through- 
out the scene, and on the part of all Federal officers present 
there an evident desire to show only the friendliest feelings. The 
formal proceedings were limited to an exchange of notes, Grant's 
note being as follows : — 

"Appomattox C. H., Va., 

"April 9, 1865. 
" General : In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 
8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern 
Virginia on the following terms, to wit : Rolls of all officers and men to be 
made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by 
me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may desig- 
nate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms 



THE FALL OF 1864 611 

against the government of the United States until properly exchanged, 
and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the 
men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be 
parked and stacked and turned over to the officers appointed by me to 
receive them. This will not embrace the side arms of the oflB.cers nor the 
private horses or baggage. 

"This done each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, 
not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe 
their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. 

"U.S. Grant, Lt.-Gen. 

" Gen. R. E. Lee." 

This was accepted by Lee in the following note : — 

"Headquarters Army of Northern Va., 
"April 9, 1865. 
" General : I received your note of this date containing the terms of the 
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they 
are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th, they 
are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the 
stipulation into effect. 

"R. E. Lee, Gen. 
"Lt.-Gen. U. S. Grant." 

Some conversation had accompanied the preparation of the 
letters in which Lee had explained that our cavalry had been 
required to furnish their own horses, and it was very desirable 
that they might be allowed to retain them, that the men might 
plant crops for the summer. Having been in public service they 
were legally captured property, but Grant cordially yielded the 
title, not making it part of his terms, but instructions were given 
all quartermasters to allow all claims of horses as private prop- 
erty without question. Gen. Lee expressed much pleasure at 
this concession, saying to Grant: — 

"This will have the best possible effect. It will be very gratifying 
and will do much toward the conciliation of our people." 

Grant's commissary was also ordered to immediately deliver to 
Lee 25,000 rations. The conference then terminated, and Lee 
rode back to his camp. As he was seen approaching the artil- 
lery commands were formed by the roadside with instructions to 
uncover in silence as he passed, but the line of battle which had 



612 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

been maintained all day, seeing the movement of the cannoneers, 
broke their ranks and overwhelmed all with a great crowd, 
wrought to a high pitch of emotional affection for its beloved 
leader of the cause now forever lost. With alternate cheers and 
tears they flocked around him so that his progress was obstructed, 
and he presently stopped and made a few remarks to the men, 
after which he was allowed to pass on to his camp. He told the 
men that in making the surrender he had made the best terms 
possible for them, and advised all to go to their homes, plant 
crops, repair the ravages of the war, and show themselves as 
good citizens as they had been good soldiers. This was but the 
second address which he ever made. On his way to Richmond 
at the beginning of the war, as his train passed Gordonsville, he 
was called upon for a speech and responded briefly, advising his 
hearers not to lounge about stations, but to be putting their affairs 
in order for a long and bloody war, which was sure to strain 
all their resources to support it. 

The firing of salutes was soon begun in the Federal camps and 
the playing of bands, but Grant requested that all such demon- 
strations be suppressed, which was quickly done. 

Without any further mention of the subject it was assumed as 
a matter of course, by Grant, that our paroles would protect 
every one who surrendered from political prosecutions, and he had 
it so arranged that each one was furnished with an official copy 
of Gen. Orders No. 43, issued from the headquarters of the 24th 
corps, which had a printing press along. It read as fol- 
lows : — 

"By agreement between the officers appointed by Generals Lee and 
Grant to carry out the stipulations of the surrender of the Army of North- 
ern Virignia, the evidence that an officer or enlisted man is a paroled 
prisoner of war is the fact of his possessing a printed certificate, certifying 
to the fact, dated at Appomattox C.H., April 10, 1865, and signed by his 
commanding officer or the staff-officer of the same. 

"All guards, patrols, officers, and soldiers of the United States forces 
will respect such certificates, allow free passage to the holders thereof, 
and observe, in good faith, the provisions of the surrender that the holders 
shall remain unmolested in every respect. 

"By command of Maj.-Gen. Gibbon, 

"Edwabd Moale, Lt.-Col. & A.A.G." 



THE FALL OF 1864 613 

Our paroles had printed across the ends "Paroled Prisoners' 
Pass" in some ornamental work between top and bottom lines, 
the paper being about three inches by eight. Mine read : — 

"Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander, chief of artillery, 1st corps A.N.V. of Ga., 
a paroled prisoner of the Army of Northern Virginia, has permission to go 
to his home and there remain undisturbed with four private horses. 

"W. N. Pendleton, Brig.-Gen. & Chief of Artillery." 

After the assassination of Lincoln, there came a wave of 
bloodthirsty resentment over the administration, which found 
victims both among the innocent and the guilty. Powerful in- 
fluences sought to involve Lee and others among his officers 
in the destruction they planned. They sought to read into the 
terms given by Grant a single word " military," that the immunity 
promised might read that paroled prisoners should not be dis- 
turbed by U. S, "military" authority so long as they obeyed the 
laws in force where they resided. Then they hoped that "the 
hanging might begin." Gen. Lee was already indicted for 
treason by a grand jury summoned in Norfolk, early in June, 
1865. Grant immediately notified President Johnson that no 
man protected by his parole could be interfered with, and this 
effectually stopped all such proceedings. 

The report of our ordnance officers on the morning of the 9th 
had shown only 7892 organized infantry with 75 rounds of am- 
munition and 63 guns with an average of 93 rounds. The infan- 
try were directed to march out and stack their arms and retire. 
The Federal officers then took possession. 

I was directed to form all the guns and caissons in single column 
along the road, that the Federal officers might then conduct it to 
their camps. The artillery horses had already been out of 
rations for some days. The Federal officers had reported their 
own supplies of forage exhausted. With a heart full of sym- 
pathy for the poor brutes, I formed the column on Tuesday, 
April 11, and left them standing in the road, which they filled 
for about a mile. The next morning I bade good-by to Appo- 
mattox, and as I rode off from the scene I saw the mournful 
column of artillery still standing in the road unattended, but with 
many of its poor horses now down in the mud and unable to rise. 



614 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

Grant had left Appomattox on the 10th, after a call of courtesy 
on Gen. Lee, in which he had suggested that Lee might serve 
the cause of peace by a visit to N.C, where he might see President" 
Davis and Gen. Johnston. But Lee felt that the surrender 
had made him but a private citizen and without authority, and 
he naturally avoided even the appearance of wishing to interfere, 
and declined to go. 

At that time Brazil was going to war with Paraguay, and, fear- 
ing that I might find difficulty in getting employment as a civilian 
and being already so far on my way, I determined, before return- 
ing to Ga., to go to Washington, D.C., and interview the Bra- 
zilian minister as to the chances of a position in the Brazilian 
army. So from Appomattox I started on April 12 for Washing- 
ton, sending my horses to Ga., by friends, and joining a mixed 
party of Federals and Confederates riding to Burkesville, where 
we could take a train. The party had an escort of cavalry, and 
included Hon. E. B. Washburne of 111., well known as the special 
friend of Gen. Grant, and Confederate Maj.-Gen. Wilcox of Ala. 
In the course of the ride Wilcox and I had a conversation with 
Mr. Washburne, which impressed us both deeply at the time, 
and which, I am sure, I can even now repeat without mate- 
rial variation. 

In common with all of Grant's army, the officers and soldiers 
of our escort and company treated the paroled Confederates 
with a marked kindness which indicated a universal desire to 
replace our former hostility with special friendship. All Fed- 
eral privates would salute our uniforms, horsemen and team- 
sters would give us the roads, and in all conversations with 
officers or men special care would be evident to avoid painful 
topics. At one time, when the three mentioned were riding 
together, Mr. Washburne asked us, — 

"What, in your opinion, will now be the course of your other armies? 
Will they seek to prolong the war, or will the surrender of Lee be accepted 
as ending it?" 

We both answered that we had no doubt of the latter course 
being followed by the remaining armies, nearly as fast as the 
news could reach them. And we then said to him : — 



THE FALL OF 1864 615 

"The question will not be what are we going to do, Mr. Washburne, 
but what is Mr. Lincoln going to do?" "Well,, gentlemen," said he, "let 
me tell you something. When the news came that Richmond had fallen, 
and that Grant's army was in a position to intercept Lee's retreat, I went 
up to the White House to congratulate Mr. Lincoln, and I had the oppor- 
tunity to have a talk with him on this very topic. Of course, it would not 
be proper for me to violate Mr. Lincoln's confidence by disclosing any de- 
tails of his plans for restoring the Union, but I am going to make you a 
prophecy. 

"His plan will not only astonish the South, but it will astonish Europe 
and foreign nations as well. And I will make you a prediction. Within a 
year Mr. Lincoln will be as popular with you of the South as he is now with 
the North." 

As soon as we were alone together, we compared notes as to 
what Washburne could have meant. In view of our poverty it 
could only have meant that in some way the South would receive 
money. In view of the lack of any other plausible excuse for 
paying it to us, and of the arguments used by him at the Fortress 
Monroe conference why the South should be compensated for the 
emancipation of the negro, I have ever since felt convinced that 
Lincoln, in that interview with Washburne, recurred to his well- 
known wish to do that act of justice to the South, and that Wash- 
burne believed that he would now be able to accomplish it with 
the prestige which success in the war would bring, and with 
the spread of the good feeling already inspired in the army 
by Grant's act of generosity. Unfortunately, and without fault 
of her own, the work of an assassin, only three days later, changed 
everything, converting into gall the very milk of human kind- 
ness in every breast, and blasting the South with a whirlwind of 
resentment, the effects of which will not disappear for generations. 
But one of its first effects was one for which I will ever remain 
grateful. It made it utterly impossible for me to go to Brazil. 
I called on the Brazilian minister in Washington on the 18th, 
while the President's body was lying in state in the White House, 
and the streets swarmed with angry crowds ready to mob any 
one known to be a Confederate. His Excellency kindly advised 
me to give up all ideas of Brazil, and to take myself out of 
Washington City with the least possible delay. This I was for- 
tunately able to do, with one narrow escape from a detective, 



616 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

who saw something suspicious in my five hundred dollar Confed- 
erate boots and blue soldier's overcoat dyed black. But I was 
able to elude him, and take a train to New York whence I 
sailed to Port Royal, S.C. Thence via Savannah and through 
the country ravaged by Sherman, with many delays and diffi- 
culties, I made my way to my boyhood's home at Washington, 
Ga., where my wife and family were. 

This place was now on the only route of travel possible between 
the eastern states of the Confederacy and the Gulf States. 
Through it passed, not only President Davis with his family, 
but the whole Confederate government, which here disbanded, 
and beyond this point became fugitives, and also the entire 
debris of all the eastern armies whose homes lay west of the 
Savannah River, I, therefore, anticipated that I would here 
meet Mr. Davis, and would be able to give him more news than 
had reached him by the land route he had travelled, on which 
there were but few and disjointed pieces of railroad in operation, 
and no through telegraph lines nor mail service. 

So not only was I full to overflowing with important infor- 
mation, but in my talk with Gen. Lee on the morning of the sur- 
render I had gotten to appreciate the spirit of dignified submis- 
sion in which he was meeting what had befallen him, and was 
advising the same course to all. As I recalled what he had said 
about my proposition to disperse the army in the woods and 
bushes, — 

"that the only dignified course open to him would be to go and sur- 
render himseK to Gen. Grant and take the consequences of his actions," 

I felt a passionate longing to repeat that conversation to Mr. 
Davis, and to beg him to take advantage of the oppor- 
tunity opened to him by the government's offer of a reward 
of $100,000 for his capture as concerned in the assassination 
of Lincoln. It seemed to me to offer the only dignified 
escape from his perilous and impossible position as a fugitive, 
that, with the example of Lee's approval of such a course before 
him, he would welcome the opportunity to go to the nearest 
Federal officer and surrender himself and demand a trial on the 
charge of complicity in the assassination. 



THE FALL OF 1864 



617 



But it was not to be. I am not sure whether or not the news 
of the rewards being offered for his apprehension ever reached 
Mr. Davis, before his capture on May 10 in Southwestern Ga. I 
had lost twenty-four hours in leaving Savannah by my horse 
shying at a dead mule by the roadside, and breaking my buggy, 
and that loss brought me to Washington, Ga., on May 5. 
Mr Davis had left Washington on May 4 with a small escort 
of friends, planning to make his way across the Mississippi 
and. to carry on the war with forces to be raised there. It 
was the disappointment of my life, even though in later years 
and after the death of Mr. Davis, Mrs. Davis has assured me 
that nothing could have ever induced him to thus abandon the 
cause of the Confederacy, 

But he would have seen before him the parting of the 
ways, and down the road of dignified submission even to 
injustice, wrong, and robbery, as we still conceive it, he 
would have seen the figure of Lee preceding him and calling 
upon all to follow. 

Who knows but what he might have been moved to do so ? 

The Federal casualties in the closing operations from March 
29 to April 9 are shown in the following table : — 



Corps 


Killed and Wounded 


Missing 


Total 


2d 

5th 

6th 

9th' 

24th 

Cavalry- 


1394 
1919 
1542 
1548 
714 
1151 


630 
546 

161 

339 


2024 
2465 
1542 
1709 
714 
1490 


Total 


8268 


1676 


9944 



The Confederate casualties, of course, can never be accurately 
known. In killed and wounded they were probably about the 
same as the Federal losses, but the captured or missing would be 
much greater. 

The following table gives the total numbers of officers and 
enlisted men paroled on April 9 : — 



618 



MILITARY MEMOIRS 





Officers 


Men 


Total 


Lee and Staff 


15 




15 


Longstreet's Corps 


1,521 


13,312 


14,833 


Gordon's Corps 


695 


6,505 


7,200 


Ewell's Corps 


19 


268 


287 


Cavalry Corps 


132 


1,654 


1,786 


Artillery Corps 


192 


2,394 


2,586 


Miscel. Detachments and Civil- 








ian Employees 


288 


1,361 


1,649 


Total 


2,862 


25,494 


28,356 



<jren. Humphreys states that of the troops surrendered only 
about 8000 had arms. The miscellaneous detachments included 
the remnants of the Naval and Heavy Artillery battalions, 
provost guards, departmental employees, and some odds and ends 
of troops. 

^' I cannot bring my narrative to a close without a brief summary 
of the record made by the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia 
in the two years, nine months, and nine days during which it was 
under the command of Gen. Robert E. Lee, from June 1, 1862, to 
April 9, 1865. In this brief period of a thousand days, with 
inferior numbers, poorly equipped and but badly supphed with 
food and clothing, it fought seven great campaigns, against 
six picked generals of the enemy, as follows : — 

1st against McClellan before Richmond. 

2d against Pope before Washington. 

3d against McClellan in Maryland. 

4th against Burnside before Fredericksburg. 

5th against Hooker on the Rappahannock. 

6th against Meade in Pennsylvania. 

7th against Grant before Richmond. 

This last campaign endured for eleven months, during which 
the guns were scarcely silent a single day. Lee's army at its 
greatest numbered less than 85,000 men. It put hors de 
combat more than 262,000 Federals within the period men- 
tioned. 

The following figures are from the official archives, in the War 



THE FALL OF 1864 



619 



Record Office in Washington, showing the Federal numbers 
killed, wounded, and missing in each campaign, with a deduc- 
tion of 2000 from the first for the casualties occurring before 
June 1, 1862. 



Campaigns 


Dates 


Aggregate Loss 


McClellan 

Pope 

McClellan 

Burnside 

Hooker 

Meade 

Grant 


June 1, 1862, to Aug. 8, 1862 
June 26, 1862, to Sept. 2, 1862 
Sept. 3, 1862, to Nov. 14, 1862 
Nov. 15, 1862, to Jan. 25, 1863 
Jan. 26, 1863, to Jan. 27, 1863 
June 28, 1863, to May 4, 1864 
May 4, 1864, to April 9, 1865 


22,448 
16,955 
28,577 
13,214 
25,027 
31,530 
124,390 




Aggregate 


262,141 



These figures include nothing for Longstreet's corps at Chicka- 
mauga and Knoxville, it having been detached from Lee from 
Sept. 1, 1863, to April 30, 1864. They would add many thousands 
to this list of casualties could they be included. 

Briefly it may be said that Lee, in a fight to a finish against 
heavy odds, prolonged the struggle for a thousand days, 
and put out of action, in the meantime, more than three of the 
enemy for every man in his own army at its maximum of strength. 
Scarcely in the history of Napoleon's twenty years in power can 
the record of such fighting as this be paralleled. 

The number of the enemy placed hors de combat, in the Grant 
campaign alone, are said to double the losses inflicted upon his 
opponents by the Duke of Wellington in all his battles in India, 
Spain, and at Waterloo. No modern European war has ap- 
proached this for carnage.^ Even in the recent conflict between 
Russia and Japan, where the armies were of immense size and 
the weapons of peculiar power, one is almost amazed after read- 

^ Grant's Casualties were subdivided as follows : 

Killed Wounded Missing Total 

15,139 77,748 31,403 124,390 

The losses of the Japanese in the Port Arthur Campaign, in killed and 
wounded only (excluding losses from sickness) as given by their chief medi- 
cal officer, were 65,000. Corroborative data from various sources confirm 
the figure. Losses of the Russians have not been published. 



620 MILITARY MEMOIRS 

ing the popular accounts to find the killed and wounded among 
the Japanese in the siege of Port Arthur largely exceeded by 
those of Grant in his last compaign. Bravery in battle is the 
religion of Japan, and the whole nation is a religious unit. It 
is encouraging to realize that the loyalty to his flag and country 
of the Anglo-Saxon has shown itself capable of enduring equal 
tests of devotion. 

It would be strange indeed if in critically reviewing the de- 
tails of Lee 's rapidly conducted campaigns we found no 
instances of grave errors of judgment when brought to the 
test of being viewed in retrospect. We do find them, and have 
not hesitated to note and to criticise them as frankly and freely 
as he himself would have done had he lived to write his own 
memoirs. No more intimate idea can be gained of his personal 
character than can be had from the study of his attitude upon 
such occasions. 

Knowing how quickly and clearly he must have recognized 
mistakes after making them, and how keenly he must have felt 
them, one can appreciate the greatness of mind with which he 
always assumed the entire responsibility ; either frankly saying 
to his men, as at Gettysburg, "It is all my fault," or, as at the 
''Crossing of the James," passing over whatever had happened in 
silence, without any attempt to impute blame elsewhere, or 
any apology, excuse, or even a spoken regret. 

This was equally the case when the fault was altogether that 
of others, as his official reports amply testify. The same mental 
poise which inspired the unparalleled audacity of his cam- 
paigns gave him the strength to bear, and to bear alone and un- 
flinching, even through the closing scenes of the surrender, the 
burden of his great responsibihty. Surely there never lived a 
man who could more truly say : — 



"I am the master of my fate, 
I am the captain of my soul." 



INDEX 



Abbot, Gen. H. L., art'y reg't of, 560. 

Abbott, Col., 428. 

Abercrombie, Gen., at Seven Pines, 86. 

Adams, Gen., 458. 

Alburtis, Capt., 36. 

Aldie, engagement at, 374. 

Alexander, Gen. E. P., at West Point, 
1 ; instructor in engineering, 3 ; 
marries, 4 ; resigns from U. S. Army, 
5; captain engineers C.S.A., 12; 
at Bull Run, 31, 44, 45; on Big 
Bethel, Va., 44; Chief of Ordnance, 
52; discussion of arms used, 53-54; 
of the campaigns against Richmond, 
60 et seq.; of Jackson's engagement 
at Kernstown, 62 ; of Williamsburg, 
66 et seq.; Chief of Ordnance, 109; 
duties during Seven Days' Campaign, 
172, 176; at Fredericksburg, bat- 
tahon of, 303, 309, 317, 318; at 
Chancellorsville, 324, 325, 342, 348, 
358, 359; artillery of, 371, 388; 
in charge of Longstreet's artillery, 
391, 392, 395, 398, 399; succeeded 
by Huger, 498, 557 ; conversation 
with Lawley, 564 ; starts for Spott- 
sylvania, 509, 518; beUef that Lee 
should have made J. E. B. Stuart 
successor of Stonewall Jackson, 532, 
534, 539; interview with Lee, 603, 
604, 605. 

Allabach, Col. P. F., at Fredericksburg, 
division of, 307, 309. 

Allen, Rev. L. W., 144, 156. 

Ames, Gen. Adelbert, brigade of,. 371, 
411. 

Anderson, Gen. G. T., 80; Wilderness, 
505. 

Anderson, Gen. J. R., at WilUamsburg, 
67 ; at Hanover Junction, 73. 

Anderson, G. B., Antietam, 260 ; killed, 
262, 264. 

Anderson, Patton, 479. 

Anderson, Major, 9. 

Anderson, Gen. R. H., at Seven Pines, 
82; Manassas, 195; Chancellors- 
ville, 324, 325, 329, 332, 348, 355, 356 ; 
at Gettysburg, 381 et seq.; brigade 



of, 202, 229, 231, 233, 254, 256, 260, 
262, 401, 402; Wilderness, 504, 506 
et seq.; succeeds Longstreet in 
command of 1st corps, 509 ; ordered 
to march for Spottsylvania, 509; 
march to Cold Harbor, 535. 

Andrews, Col. J. W., at Fredericksburg, 
302, 303. 

Antietam, map, 243 ; description, 246 ; 
Hunt's account of position of artil- 
lery, 246-247; D. H. Hill's report, 
247; Ropes 's comments, 247-248. 

Archer, Col. F. H., 550; at Chancellors- 
ville, brigade of, 331, 333, 335, 345 
et seq.; at Gettysburg, 383, 384. 

Archer, Gen. J. J., at Cedar Mountain, 
183; brigade at Antietam, 268, 295, 
298, 299. 

Armistead, Gen. L. A., 88; Malvern 
Hill, 160, 161 ; brigade at Antietam, 
256. 

Ashby, Col. Turner, Valley Campaign, 
99; killed, 103. 

Averill, Gen., 277. 

Ayres, Gen., at Gettysburg, 404, 405, 
407 ; Petersburg, 572. 

Bacon, Lt., report of, 238. 

Badham, Lt.-Col., killed at Williams- 
burg, 69. 

Baird, Gen., 455, 461. 

Baker, Gen. Ed. D., at Ball's Bluff, 57; 
killed, 58. 

Baldwin, Col. Briscoe G., appointed 
Chief of Ordinance, 281; Ball's 
Bluff, engagement at, 57-58 ; casual- 
ties at, 58. 

Banks, Gen. N. P., in command corps 
Army of Potomac, 59 ; engagement 
at Kernstown, 62; at Seven Pines, 
73, 74; Valley Campaign, 95, 97, 100, 
101 ; Cedar Moimtain, 177, 181, 182 ; 
at Manassas, 195, 216. 

Barksdale, Gen. Wm., 138, 234; An- 
tietam, 259 ; at Chancellorsville, 
324, 349, 351, 352, 356, 357 ; at Get- 
tysburg, 394 et seq.; killed, 399, 
400. 



621 



622 



INDEX 



Barlow, Gen. F. C, at Antietam, 261 ; 
at Chancellorsville, brigade of, 332; 
at Gettysburg, 384 ; Wilderness, 502, 
504, 514, 519 et seq.; at North Anna, 
529, 541 ; at Petersburg, 561. 

Barnard, Gen. J. C, 122. 

Barnes, Col. James, at Fredericksburg, 
brigade of, 305. 

Barnes, Gen., Gettysburg, 404. 

Barry, Major, at Bull Run, 40; at 
Chancellorsville, 341. 

Bartlett, Gen. J. J., brigade of, at 
Crampton's Gap, 234, 353, 354; at 
Petersburg, 572. 

Bartow, Col. F. S., at Bull Run, 19, 
27, 31, 32, 33, 34. 

Bate, Gen., 459. 

Battle, Gen. C. A., brigade of, 517. 

Baxter, brigade of, 501, 503 ; wounded, 
505. 

Baylor, Col. W. S. H., at Manassas, 199, 
200. 

Beauregard, Gen., at Bull Run, 14 et 
seq., 56 et seq.; transferred to West- 
ern Army, 58; Seven Days' Cam- 
paign, li4; Malvern Hill, 172; at 
Corinth, 221; Lee's plan to place 
him in command of a column, 366; 
battle of the Wilderness, 497, 530, 
547, 550 et seq.; Petersburg, 571. 

Beaver Dam Creek, Federal position at, 
73, 74. 

Beckham, Capt., at Bull Run, 40; at 
Seven Pines, 78. 

Bee, Gen. Barnard E., at Bull Rim, 19, 
27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. 

Bell, Capt., 83. 

Benjamin, Lt., 487, 488. 

Bennett, Col., 263. 

Benning, Gen. H. L., 202 ; Gettysburg, 
394, 396, 433, 462, 469, 471; 
Wilderness, 503 ; wounded, 504. 

Berry, Gen., at Chancellorsville, 337, 
346. 

Bethesda Church, attack at, 534. 

Big Bethel, Va., engagement at, 44. 

Binney, Lt., 236. 

Birney, Gen. David B., 293, 297, 331; 
division of, 343, 345 ; battle of the 
Wilderness, division of, 503, 505, 
514, 515 et seq. 

Blackburn's Ford, engagement at, 22. 

Blenker, Gen. Louis, reenforces Fremont, 
60. 

"Bloody Angle," 515, 521 et seq. 

Boggs, Dr., anecdote of Lee, 494. 

Bonham, Gen. M. L., at Bull Run, 22, 29, 
32, 35, 46 et seq. 

Boonsboro, 232-239. 



Bowen, Sergt., killed, 506. 

Boyce, Capt., 263. 

Brady, Capt., 90. 

Bragg, Gen. Braxton, 220, 364 ; Gettys- 
burg, 459, 461, 467, 472, 479, 480, 
489 ; part in connection with quarrel 
between Jefferson Davis and Gen. 
Johnston, 575 ; organization of army 
of, 450-451, 453, 454, 455, 457. 

Branch, Gen. Louis O'B., 73, 117, 118; 
at Cedar Mountain, 183; brigade of, 
205, 217; difference with Col. 
D'Utassy, 238; Antietam, 268; 
death, 268. 

Branch, Lt.-Col., 557. 

Brandy Station, cavalry battle at, 371. 

Bratton, Gen. John, 53 ; battle of Wilder- 
ness, commanding Jenkins's brigade, 
507, 523, 524. 

Breathed's horse art'y, 333. 

Breckenridge, Gen. J. J., 458; battle 
of the Wilderness, 497, 530, 538, 562. 

Brewster, Gen., Gettysburg, 406. 

Brockenbrough, Gen., 217, 268, 295. 

Brook, Gen., at Gettysburg, 404. 

Brooke, J. P., brigade at Crampton's 
Gap, 234; Antietam, 261. 

Brooks, General W. T. H., 316, 353, 
354. 

Brown, Col. H, W., 353, 354, 459. 

Brown, Col., Malvern Hill, 159; at 
Chancellorsville, 331. 

Brown, Lt., of Alexander's Battalion, 
350. 

Bryan, E. P., 55. 

Bryan, Gen. G., Chickamauga, 488, 503 ; 
Spottsylvania, 511. 

Buchanan, Gen. R. C, brigade at An- 
tietam, 264. 

Buchanan, President, 9, 11. 

Buckner, Gen. S. B., 364, 365, 456, 457. 

Buell, Gen. Don Carlos, 9. 

Buford, Gen. John, division of, 371, 375, 
380 et seq. 

Bull Run, battle of, 13 et seq.; map of, 
12; list of casualties, 50, 51. 

Bull Run Second (Second Manassas), 
203. 

Burbank, Gen., Gettysburg, 404. 

Burling, Col., Gettysburg, 406. 

Burnham, Gen. H., brigade of, 351. 

Burns, Gen. W. W., division of, at 
Fredericksburg, 304. 

Burnside, Gen. Ambrose E., at Bull Run, 
36; defeated at Fredericksburg, 60; 
at Gordonsville, 186; commands 
9th corps at Antietam. 250, 265, 266 ; 
succeeds McClellan as commander, 
282; his organization, 283; blunder 



INDEX 



623 



at opening of his campaign, 284; 
commences movement upon Freder- 
icksburg, 285, 286; Swinton's ac- 
count, 286, 288, 290, 293, 481, 489, 
490 ; casualties, 449, 492 ; at Freder- 
icksburg, 300, 301, 302, 304 et seq.; 
coimtermands order for attack, 311; 
withdraws in safety, 312 et seq.; 
relieved of command, 316; battle 
of the Wilderness, 501 ; at Spottsyl- 
vania, 513, 521, 530, 531 et seq. 

Buschbeck, Col. Adolph, at Chan- 
cellorsville, brigade of, 336. 

Butler, Gen. Benj. F., at Fortress Mon- 
roe, 14; at Big Bethel, 21, 44; in 
Wilderness campaign, 530, 534, 546, 
548, 549 et seq.; Petersburg, 566. 

Butterfield, Gen. Daniel, 327. 

Cabell, Col. H. C, 192, 353, 395, 498; 
Spottsylvania, 511, 524, 539. 

Caldwell, Gen. John C, at Antietam, 
261; at Fredericksburg, 302,304; at 
Gettysburg, 404. 

Campbell, Maj., at Gettysburg, 396. 

Candy, Col., at Gettysburg, 406. 

Carlton, Capt., at Antietam, 259. 

Carnot, quoted, 291. 

Carr, Gen. Jos. B., at Chancellorsville, 
339 ; at Gettysburg, 406. 

Carroll, Col. S, S., 103; at Fredericks- 
burg, 305, 306; at Chancellorsville, 
347; at Gettysburg, 411; Battle of 
Wilderness, 507; wounded, 509, 515. 

Carter, Col., at Chancellorsville, 348; at 
Gettysburg, 419. 

Casement's brigade, 53. 

Casey, Gen. Silas, 4 ; pursuit of Johnston, 
66, 76, 82. 

Casey, Lt. T. L., 4. 

Cashtown, 379. 

Cedar Mountain, battle at, 181 et seq. 

Cemetery Hill, 384, 385 et seq. 

Centreville, 203, 216, 217. 

Cesnola, Gen., 539. 

Chancellorsville, battle of, 317 et seq.; 
situation of, 325 ; Confederate casual- 
ties at, 360, 361 ; Federal casual- 
ties at, 362. 

Chase, Sec. S. P., 373. 

Cheatham, Gen., 457, 578, 579. 

Chickamauga, battle of, losses at, 359, 
463, 464. 

Chilton, Col. R. H., 109, 157. 

Chisholm, Col., 551. 

Christie, Col. D. H., 263. 

Clayton, Col., 459. 

Cleburne, Gen., 458, 474, 475, 478. 

Cobb, Gen. T. R. R., brigade of, at 



Malvern Hill, 162; Crampton's Gap, 
233, 234; Antietam, 259; killed, 
305. 

Cobb, Gen. Howell, at Yorktown, 65. 

Cobham, Col., Gettysburg, 406 ; Chicka- 
mauga, 471. 

Cochrane, Gen. John, 316. 

Cocke, Gen. Phihp St. C, at Bull Run, 
22, 23, 31, 32, 37, 50. 

Cold Harbor, battle at, 125; fighting 
at, 535. 

Cole, Gen., 109. 

Colquitt, Gen. A. H., 167; Antietam, 
254, 255, 260; at ChancellorsviUe, 
333, 335; Petersburg, 565. 

Colston, Capt. Fred M., anecdote of Lee, 
426. 

Colston, Gen. R. E., 78, 88, 324, 329, 333, 
336, 339, 342, 359, 426, 550. 

Connor, Gen., Petersburg, 566. 

Cooke, Gen., at Fredericksburg, brigade 
of, 303; wounded, 305. 

Cooke, Maj. Giles B., 552. 

Corbin's Bridge, 510. 

Corley, Jas. L., Lee's Qr. Mr., 109. 

Corse, Gen. M. D., brigade of, 366. 

Coster, Col. Charles R., brigade of, 
385. 

Couch, Gen. D. N., pursuit of Johnston, 
66 ; at Seven Pines, 82, 84, 86 ; bri- 
gade at Sharpsburg, 243; at Mary- 
land Heights (Antietam), 250, 270; 
at Fredericksburg, 304, 306, 309; 
at Chancellorsville, 327. 

Cox, Gen. J. D., 190, 265, 269. 

Crampton's Gap, 229-234. 

Crawford, Gen. S. W., at Cedar Moun- 
tain, 183, 405, 408, 407, 512, 515, 524. 

Crittenden, Gen., division of, 461, 521. 

Crook, George, 265, 266, 267; battle of 
the Wilderness, 496, 497. 

Cross, Col., Antietam, 261 ; killed at 
Gettysburg, 404. 

Croxton^ Col., 457. 

Cruft, Gen., 474. 

Crutchfield, Col. S., at Chancellorsville, 
340; wounded, 341. 

Culpeper, 180, 181. 

Gulp's Hill, 386 et seq. 

Gumming, Alfred, Governor of Utah, 1. 

Gumming Lt., Chickamauga, 488. 

Cummings, Col. A. C, 39. 

Custer, George A., 433, 607. 

Cutler, Gen. Lysander, at Gettysburg, 
383; battle of the Wilderness, com- 
manding Wadsworth's division, 512, 
515, 522 et seq., 531. 

Cutshaw's battalion, 518, 520. 

Cutts, Lt.-Col., Malvern Hill, 159, 351. 



G24 



INDEX 



Dahlgren, Capt. Ulric, 367. 

Dana, Gen., wounded at Antietam, 258. 

Dana, C. A., Assistant Sec. of War, 510, 
525. 

Daniel, Gen., killed, 525. 

Darbytown Road, engagements on, 53. 

Davidson, Capt., at Petersburg, 570. 

Davis's brigade, at Gettysburg, 383, 
384; battle of Wilderness, 505. 

Davis, Jefferson, 12 ; at Manassas, 41 
et seq., 49, 56 et seq. ; Seven Pines, 89, 
90, 91, 92; Seven Days' Campaign, 
118, 119, 140; calls for conscripts, 
175, 365; proposed to Lee for con- 
trol of troops, 366 ; despatch to 
Lee, 367 ; visit to Bragg, 472, 489 ; 
strained relations with Gen. John- 
ston, 575-576, 617. 

Davis, Col., 236. 

Day, Gen., Gettysburg, 404. 

Dearing, Col., Gettysburg, 415^ 550, 
553. 

Deas, Gen., 462, 479. 

Denison, Gen., brigade of, 524. 

Deshler, Gen., 458. 

Dickenson, Lt. George, battery of, at 
Fredericksburg, 304; killed, 305. 

Dickinson, Capt., 162. 

Doby, Capt., killed, 506. 

Doles, Gen. George, at Chancellorsville, 
332, 335; Wilderness, 516; killed, 
539. 

Doubledav, Gen. A., 199, 200, 201; at 
Antietam, 251, 252, 294, 296, 297; 
Gettysburg, 406. 

Douglas, Col., killed at Antietam, 252. 

Drayton's brigade, 215; at Antietam, 
267. 

Drury's Bluff, 71. 

Duane, Capt. James C, 1, 549. 

Duffy, Maj. George, 53. 

Dunker Church, contested portion of 
Antietam battle-field, 255, 257, 258. 

D'Utassy, Col., 238. 

Eariy, Gen. Jubal A., at Bull Run, 22, 
32, 35, 40 et seq.; demonstration of 
July, 1864, 59 ; at Williamsburg, 67 
et seq.; at Manassas, 190, 199, 200, 
204, 206, 209; Antietam, 253, 254, 
255, 258, 292, 295; at Chancellors- 
villa, 324, 352, 354, 356, 357; at 
Gettysburg, 371, 372, 376 et seq.; 
report, 410, 411, 412, 414, 497 (battle 
of the Wilderness), 562, 563; battle 
of Wilderness, 508; in command of 
Hill's corps, 512, 513, 518; succeeds 
to command of Ewell's corps, 534, 
539, 544. 



Edwards, Gen. Oliver, 47. 

Elliott, Gen., brigade of, 561; wounded at 
Petersburg, 569. 

Ellison's Mill, 125. 

Elzey, Gen. Arnold, at Bvdl Rim, 19, 40, 
45. 

Eshleman, Capt., 24; Antietam, 265; 
Gettysburg, 425. 

Eubank, Capt., at Antietam, 265. 

Evans, Gen. Nathan G., at Bull Run, 22, 
23, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35; at Ball's Bluff, 
57; brigade of, 210, 228; Antietam, 
251. 

Evans, Gen. Clement A., 530. 

Ewell, Gen. Benj. S., at Bull Run, 22, 27, 
29, 32, 46. 

Ewell, Gen. R. S., 95, 99, 104, 118, 214, 
129, 130, 133, 134 ; Malvern Hill, 157, 
167; Cedar Mountain, 181, 193; Sec- 
ond Manassas, 194, 197, 199, 200, 204; 
at Fredericksburg, 300 ; succeeds to 
command of Jackson's corps, 360, 
371, 372, 380 et seq.; Gettysburg, 
405, 406, 408, 409, 410, 412, 415, 418, 
439, 441, 498, 499; battle of the 
Wilderness, 500, 501, 502, 508, 515, 
517 et seq.; starts for Hanover Junc- 
tion, 529 ; surrenders command of 
his corps to Early, 534. 

Fairfax C. H., 216, 217. 

Fair Oaks Station, 86. 

Fairview, fighting at, 338 et seq. 

Falls, Major, Cedar Mountain, 184. 

Farnsworth, Gen. E. J., killed, 434. 

Featherstone, Gen. Wm. S., brigade of, 
214, 215; Antietam, 261, 264. 

Ferguson, Capt., 45. 

Ferrero, Col. Edward, 265, 267 ; Peters- 
burg, 568 ; at Fredericksburg, bri- 
gade of, 304, 305, 316. 

Fielding, Capt., at Gettysburg, battery 
of, 399. 

Field, Gen. C.W., 53, 154, 182; Wilder- 
ness, 503, 506 et seq. ; Spottsylvania, 
511, 515, 526, 550 et seq. 

Finnegan's brigade, 541, 542. 

Fisher, Col., Gettysburg, 405. 

Fitzhugh, Major, 187, 188. 

Fizer, Lt.-Col., Chickamauga, 489. 

Flournoy, Col., 97. 

Forno, Col. H., 199, 200, 204, 206. 

Forrest, Gen. N. B., 103, 456. 

Frank, brigade of, 504. 

Frank, Capt. John D., battery of, at 
Fredericksburg, 306. 

Frankhn, Gen. W. B., pursuit of Johns- 
ton, 66 ; Seven Davs' Campaign, 123, 
151; Malvern Hill, 170, 177; corps 



INDEX 



625 



of, 215, 216, 232-233 ; at Antietam, 
250, 259, 264; Ropes 's account of, 
270; 278, 284, 290, 293, 294, 297; 
at Fredericksburg, 300, 303, 304, 
311, 312, 313; Burnside's dissatis- 
faction with, 315, 316. 

Frazier, Gen., 449. 

Frazier's Farm, battle at, 153. 

Fredericksburg, battle of, 301 et seq. 

Fremont, Gen. J. C, 95, 102, 103, 104, 
107 ; retires from service, 177. 

French, Gen. S. G., 123, 130; in com- 
mand at Petersburg, 172. 

French, Gen. William H., division at 
Antietam, 257, 260, 261, 439; at 
Fredericksburg, 302, 377, 381. 

Fulton, Gen., 459, 462. 

Gaines Mill, battle at, 116. 

Gainesville, 207, 208. 

Garfield, Gen. J. A., 459. 

Garland, Gen. S., 80; Seven Days' 
Campaign, 130, 230 ; Antietam, 254, 
260. 

Garnett, Gen. R. B., 267, 424. 

Garnett, Gen. Robert S., 13; death of, 
14. 

Garnett, Lt.-Col. T. S., 182, 183. 

Garret, Capt., 263. 

Geary, Gen. JohnW., at Cedar Mountain, 
183; at Chancellorsville, 337; at 
Gettysburg, 389, 406 ; Chickamauga, 
469, 470, 471, 474. 

Getty, Gen. George W., at Fredericks- 
burg, division of, 304, 307, 309, 311 ; 
battle of the Wilderness, 501, 502, 
503 ; wounded, and division with- 
drawn, 504. 

Gettysburg, battle of, 363 et seq. ; second 
day, 390 et seq.; third day, 414 et 
seq.; casualty table, 443-446. 

Gibbes, Maj. H., Petersburg, 570. 

Gibbon, Gen. J., 199, 201, 294, 296, 
297, 298; at Fredericksburg, 300; 
at Chancellorsville, 350, 354, 356; 
at Spottsylvania, 514, 515, 519 et seq., 
543. 

Gibson, batterv, 271. 

Goff, Lt. I. M.^ 263. 

Gordon, Col., 83. 

Gordon, Gen. G. H., at Cedar Mountain, 
183. 

Gordon, Gen. J. B., brigade of, 352, 410 ; 
Wilderness, attack upon, 502, 507, 
508; Spottsylvania, 512, 520; pro- 
moted and assigned to Johnson's 
division, 530. 

Gordonsville, 183. 

Gorgas, Gen. Josiah, 54. 
2s 



Gracie, Gen A., 462, 484, 489 ; wounded, 
490 ; Petersburg, 457, 554, 565. 

Graham, Gen. C. K., at Chancellorsville, 
brigade of, 346. 

Graham, Capt., 419. 

Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., campaign against 
Richmond, 60, 172, 363; investing 
Vicksburg, 364, 474, 475, 477, 478, 
495, 496, 497, 498, 499 ; strategy at 
Petersburg, 557, 561, 562, 563, 582, 
583, 590, 602, 609 ; battle of the Wil- 
derness, 500, 501, 502, 505, 507 et seq. ; 
Spottsylvania, 509, 513, 515, 517, 
519 ef seq. ; famous despatch of, 526 
et seq. ; trap for Lee at North Anna, 
529, 530 ; moves toward the Pamun- 
key, 532 ; losses at North Anna, 532, 
534, 535 et seq. ; movement against 
Petersburg, 545, 546, 547 et seq. 

Greble, Lt.-Col. John F., at Bull Run, 44. 

Greene, Gen. Geo. S., Antietam, 255, 257, 
259, 263; Gettysburg, 406, 409; 
Chickamauga, 471. 

Gregg, Gen. D. McM., brigade of, 205; 
Antietam, 268; wounded, 295, 298, 
299 ; Gettysburg, 433, 459, 462. 

Gregg, Gen. Maxcy, at Bull Run, 21; 
death of, 53 ; 122 ; division of, 371, 
503, 504, 538. 

Griffin, Gen. Charles, at Bull Run, 39 
et seq.; at Fredericksburg, 302, 305, 
306; at Chancellorsville, 325, 326; 
Wilderness, 512, 522 ; at North Anna, 
531. 

Grigsby, Col., Antietam, 253, 258. 

Grover, Gen. C, brigade of, 205, 206. 

Groveton wood, 206. 

Guild, Dr. L., 109. 

Hagood, Gen., 550. 

Hairston, Lt.-Col., wounded at Williams- 
burg, 69. 

Hall, Col. Norman A., brigade of, at 
Fredericksburg, 304 ; Gettysburg, 
406. 

Halleck, Gen. H. W., 172; appointed 
commander-in-chief of all the armies 
of the U.S., 177, 178, 179, 185, 186, 
192 ; 225, 278, 282 ; (ordered to re- 
lieve McClellan), 286; 373, 377, 544, 
582. 

Hamilton, Capt., 294. 

Hampton, Gen. Wade, at Bull Run, 31, 
32, 35; at Seven Pines, 85, 86; 
Seven Days' Campaign, 148, 149, 
190 ; brigade of, 375, 378 ; at Spott- 
sylvania, 510, 534. 

Hampton, Gen., at Petersburg, 562. 

Hancock, Gen. W. S., at Williamsburg, 



626 



INDEX 



67 et seq.; brigade of, 263, 292; 
at Fredericksburg, 302, 304, 306; 
battle of the Wilderness, 500, 502, 
503, 504 et seq.; ordered to cross 
the Potomac, 513, 514, 515, 518; 
formation for charge, May 12, 1864, 
519 et seq.; at North Anna, 529, 530, 
548, 549, 553; Petersburg, 566. 

Hanover, skirmish at, 376. 

Hardee, Gen. W. J., 474, 577. 

Hardie, Gen. J. A., 378. 

Harland, Col. Edward, brigade of, at 
Fredericksburg, 309, 310, 311. 

Harper's Ferry (map), 222, 234-239; 
casualties, 239-240, 381. 

Harris, Gen. N. H., brigade of, 522. 

Harris, Col. D. B., 554. 

Harrison, a scout, 379. 

Harrow's brigade at Gettysburg, 406. 

Haskell, Maj ., 425, 429, 498 ; Petersburg, 
570, 571. 

Haskell, Col. J. C, battalion of, 511. 

Hatch, Gen. John P., 179, 180, 199; 
brigade of, 201. 

Hatton, Gen., at Seven Pines, 85; 
killed, 86. 

Hawkins, Col. R. C, brigade of, at 
Fredericksburg, 309, 310, 311. 

Hays, Gen. Alexander, brigade of, at 
Chancellorsville, 339, 346. 

Hays, Gen. H. T., brigade at Antietam, 
251, 252, 254; 349, 350, 352, 357; in 
Early's report at Gettysburg, 
410. 

Hazard, Capt. J. C, battery of, at 
Fredericksburg, 306. 

Hazel Grove, 342, 343 et seq. 

Hazen, Gen. W. B., 467. 

Heintzelman, Gen. S. P., at Bull Run, 
28; in command corps Army of 
Potomac, 59; Seven Days' Cam- 
paign, 123, 138, 177, 195. 

Helm, Gen., 458. 

Henry, Maj., battalion of, at Gettysburg, 
392, 395. 

Henry House, engagement at, 39. 

Herbert, Lt.-Col., at Chancellorsville, 
353. 

Heth, Gen. Henry, 333, 346, 355, 380, 
383 et seq. ; Gettysburg, 402 ; battle 
of the Wilderness, division of, 500, 
501 et seq., 514, 515, 521; Peters- 
burg, 441, 567, 590. 

Hill, Gen. A. P., 73, 74, 115, 118, 124, 
et seq., 134, 155 ; Malvern Hill, 167, 
170; Cedar Mountain, 180, 181, 182, 
197, 199; 209, 217, 228, 229, 230, 
231, 232, 235, 241 ; at Antietam, 251, 
' 266, 267, 268, 272, 294, 297, 298; 



at Fredericksburg, 300; at Chancel- 
lorsville, 324, 329, 335 et seq.; in 
command at Jackson's death, 341 ; 
wounded, Stuart succeeds, 341 ; di- 
vision of, 342, 346 ; at Gettysburg, 
in command 3d corps, 367, 371, 372 ; 
marches for Culpeper, 374; crosses 
Potomac, 377 et seq.; 500, 501, 502, 
521 ; at North Anna, 529, 531, 547, 
550; Petersburg, 561. 

Hill, Gen. D. H., on the defence of York- 
town, 64 ; at Williamsburg, 67 et seq. ; 
at Seven Pines, 74, 80 et seq.; "Hill's 
Battle, " WilUamsburg road, 82, 84, 
85, 89, 115, 118, 124, 130 et seq., 151 ; 
Malvern Hill, 156, 157 et seq., 190, 
194; Antietam, 249, 250, 252, 254, 
256, 258, 259; report, 260, 263, 
292, 366. 

Hill, Maj. R. C, at Bull Run, 49. 

Hindman, Gen., 454,. 457, 459, 460, 475. 

Hinks, Gen., division of, 548, 553. 

Hobson, Maj., at Antietam, 261, 263. 

Hoke, Gen. R. F., brigade of, 299, 352, 
357, 530, 535, 536 et seq., 549 et seq., 
556, 568, 570. 

Holmes, Gen. Theophilus, at Bull Run, 
27, 29, 32, 35, 46; at Acquia, 59; 
Seven Days' Campaign, 139, 140, 
141; Malvern Hill, 157, 162, 
167. 

Hood, Gen. J. B., at Seven Pines, 85, 86 ; 
Seven Days' Campaign, 131 ; ordered 
to Gordonsville, 183, 203; brigade 
of, 210, 232; Antietam, 250, 251, 
253, 254, 257, 294; at Chancellors- 
ville, 327, 364; at Gettysburg, 371, 
380 et seq.; severely wounded, 396; 
Gettysburg, 405, 407, 416, 433, 456, 
459, 460, 469, 480, 577, 578, 579. 

Hooker, Gen. Joseph, at Bull Run, 33; 
defeat at Chancellorsville, 60; pur- 
suit of Johnston, 66 ; at Seven Pines, 
82, 153, 194, 195; division at Centre- 
ville, 203 ; Antietam, commands first 
corps, 250, 251; report, 252, 254; 
wounded, 255 ; succeeds Porter, 282, 
284, 293, 467, 473, 474, 477; at 
Fredericksburg, 302, 306, 311, 312 
et seq.; sobriquet, 316; in command, 
316; at Chancellorsville, 319; his 
reorganization of army under his com- 
mand, 319, 320 et seq., 326, 327 et 
seq., 337, 338, 343, 344, 345, 347 et 
seq. ; despatch to Sedgwick, 355, 356, 
357, 358, 364, 371, 372, 373; resig- 
nation, 377. 

Howard, Gen. O. O., at Bull Run, 28, 
32, 35, 41; at Fredericksburg, 302, 



INDEX 



627 



304; at Chancellorsville, 332, 334, 
337 ; succeeds Reynolds, 384 ; report 
at Gettysburg, 411 ; acct., 427. 

Howe, Gen. A. P., at Chancellorsville, 
350, 351, 355. 

Huger, Col. Frank, succeeds to Alex- 
ander's battalion, 498; Petersburg, 
570. 

Huger, Gen., at Seven Pines, 74, 76, 79, 
93; Seven Davs' Campaign, 123, 137, 
139, 140; Malvern Hill, 157, 162 
et seq.; Spottsylvania, 511, 539, 
541. 

Humphreys, Gen. A. A., at Fredericks- 
• burg, 302, 306, 307 ; splendid charge 
of, 308^309 ; at Chancellorsville, 325, 
326, 541, 543, 547, 555 ; division at 
Sharpsburg, 243, 488 ; account of 
situation in August, 1864, 574; 
quoted, 585. 

Humphreys, Gen. B. C, 503, 524. 

Hunt, Gen. Henry J., 291, 359, 370, 406. 

Hunter, Gen. David, at Bull Run, 28, 
544, 562. 

Hunton, Gen. Eppa, brigade of, 538. 

Imboden, Gen. J. D., brigade of, 378, 
380 et seq.; 435; "Battles and 
Leaders" quoted, 436-437, 439. 

Irwin's brigade, 263. 

Irwin, Col. R. B., Anecdote of Lincoln, 
277-278. 

Iverson, Gen. Alfred, 263; brigade of, 
332, 335 ; at Gettysburg, 384. 

Ives, Col, Joseph C, 110. 

Jackson, Gen. C. F., 298. 

Jackson, Stonewall, at Bull Run, 19, 27, 
31, 32, 33; nicknamed "Stonewall," 
34, 35, 36 ; wounded, 42 ; his appre- 
ciation of the opportunity lost at 
Bull Run, 42 ; after Bull Run, 59 ; en- 
gagement at Kernstown, 62 ; at Seven 
Pines, 74; Valley Campaign, 94; 
Commander Valley District, 95, 97, 
98 et seq. ; his impatience, 106, 107; 
Seven Days 'Campaign, 111, 112, 115, 
116 et seq.; great military genius, 
128, 132, 134 et seq.; Lee's supreme 
confidence in, 143, 144, 145; inac- 
tion at White Oak Swamp, 152, 153 ; 
Malvern Hill, 161 et seq.; lack of 
initiative, 167, 169 ; protects against 
attack, 171 ; placed in command of 
Wing, 175, 176; excessive reticence, 
181; Cedar Mountain, 182, 183, 190; 
march to Manassas Junction, 191, 
192, 193, 194 ; destruction of Manas- 
sas, 195; masterpiece of strategy, 



197, 199, 200; attacked by Pope, 
203; joined by Lee, 203, 223, 229, 
235; at Antietam, 250, 272; made 
Lt.-Gen., 279, 287, 288, 294; at 
Fredericksburg, 300 ; headquarters 
at Moss Neck, 317 ; at Chancellors- 
ville, 322, 324 ; march through Wil- 
derness, 329, 330, 331, 332 et seq.; 
wounded, 341 ; last words, 341 ; 
death on May 10, 341. 

Jenifer, Col., at Ball's Bluff, 58. 

Jenkins, Gen. M., at Seven Pines, 82, 
153; at Fredericksburg, 306, 366; 
Chickamauga, 469, 470, 471, 489; 
Wilderness, 505; death of, 506. 

Johnson, Gen. Bushrod R., 550. 

Johnson, Col. B. T., 198, 199; brigade 
of, 206; Gettysburg, 406; report, 
409, 410, 411, 414, 415, 461, 484, 489, 
497; Petersburg, 456, 561, 568. 

Johnson, Gen. Ed., 95, 365, 371, 372, 381 
et seq.; at Spottsylvania, 508, 512, 
525, 554, 555. 

Johnston, Gen. Albert Sidney, service in 
Mormon War, 1 ; killed at Shiloh, 58. 

Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., battle of 
Seven Pines, 9; at Bull Run, 15 et 
seq., 56 ; organizes his army, 59 ; 
advises President Davis regarding 
the defence of Richmond, 63-64; 
sends reenforcements to Magruder, 
64 ; retires from Yorktown, 66 ; at 
Williamsburg, 67; at Seven Pines, 
71, 74, 75 et seq.; "Johnston's 
Battle," 84, 86, 87; wounded, 93; 
Antietam, 260 ; relations with Jeffer- 
son Davis, 575-576. 

Jones, Col., at Chancellorsville, 348. 

Jones, Gen., 544. 

Jones, Gen. D. R., at Bull Run, 22, 29, 
32, 35, 46 ; Seven Pines, 74 ; Seven 
Days' Campaign, 144, 202,210,215, 
228, 236; Antietam, 251, 254, 264, 
268. 

Jones, Gen. J. M., brigade of, 378; 
killed, 500. 

Jones, J. R., wounded at Antietam, 252. 

Jordan, Col., at Bull Run, 49. 

Jordan, Capt. Art'y, Alexander's Battn., 
325, 348, 399. 

Kautz, Gen. A. V., at Wilderness, 496; 
cavalry of, 548, 550, 553; Peters- 
burg, 561. 

Kearney, Gen. Philip, pursuit of John- 
ston, 66 ; at Seven Pines, 82, 89, 153 ; . 
division at Centreville, 203, 205, 208 ; 
death, 217, 218. 

Kelley, Gen., Gettysburg, 404, 462. 



628 



INDEX 



Kelton, Col., 223. 

Kemper, Gen. James L., at Bull Run, 
21, 35, 44 et seq.; at Seven Pines, 82, 
231; Antietam, 267. 

Kenly, Col., 97. 

Kennedy, Col. J. D., Wilderness, 503; 
Spottsylvania, 511. 

Kernstown, battle of, 62. 

Kershaw, Gen. Joseph B., at Bull Run, 
44 et seq.; at Williamsburg, 67; 
Seven Days' Campaign, 138; Mal- 
vern Hill, 164; brigade at Antietam, 
259, 292; at Fredericksburg, 305; 
at Chancellorsville, 332, 352 ; at 
Gettysburg, 394 et seq.; Chicka- 
mauga, 490; Wilderness, 503, 506, 
527, 536 et seq., 550, 551, 555; 
Petersburg, 566. 

Keyes, Gen. E. D., at Bull Run, 33 
et seq.; in command corps Army of 
Potomac, 59 ; at Seven Pines, 78, 
79; Seven Days ' Campaign, 123, 133. 

Kilpatrick, Gen. Judson, cavalry of, 376. 

Kimball, Gen. Nathan, brigade of, at 
Fredericksburg, 302; wounded, 303. 

King, Gen. Rufus, 198, 199, 201, 210. 

Kirbv, Capt., 90. 

Kirkiand, Gen. W. W., 542. 

Kirkpatrick's report, 433. 

Kitching, Col., brigade of, 524, 528. 

Knipe, Gen., brigade of, at Chancellors- 
ville, 343. 

KnoxviUe, map, 482. 

Lane, Gen. Jas. H., 295, 297, 298, 299, 
333, 340; brigade of, 343, 346, 359, 
521, 542. 

Lang, Gen., at Gettysburg, 400, 401 (re- 
port), 402. 

Latimer, "Boy Major," killed at Gettys- 
burg, 408. 

Law, Gen. E. M., Seven Days' Cam- 
paign, 131 ; Antietam, 253, 254, 
255, 256; brigade of, 380, 381 et 
seq.; succeeds to commands of 
Hood's division, 396 ; Gettysburg, 
462, 466, 469, 470, 471, 484; battle 
of the Wilderness, 503; wounded, 
542. 

Lawton, E. P. (Capt.), heroism men- 
tioned in Evans's report, 299; died 
of wound, 299, note. 

Lawton, Gen. A. R., Ill, 112; Seven 
Days' Campaign, 124, 129, 130; 
Second Manassas, 199, 200, 204, 
206, 209, 235, 244; Antietam, 251; 
wounded, 252, 253, 254, 299. 

Lay, Col. G. W., at Bull Run, 48. 

Leadbetter, Gen., 485, 486. 



Ledlie, Gen., 554; Petersburg, 568. 

Lee, Col. S. D., reenforces Jackson, 212; 
Antietam, 264, 269; promoted to 
Brig.-Gen., 281. 

Lee, Gen. Custis, report, 596. 

Lee, Gen. Fitzhugh, Second Manassas, 
187, 188; at Chancellorsville, 328, 
329, 330 ; brigade of, 232, 375 ; Spott- 
sylvania, 510, 511, 535, 538, 539; 
Petersburg, 562, 567. 

Lee, Gen. Robert E., drives Pope into 
Washington, 59 ; consents to advance 
on Richmond, 59 ; in command of 
the army, Seven Pines, 89, 91 ; 
Valley Campaign, 95; takes com- 
mand of army of Northern Virginia, 
109 ; estimate of Lee as commander, 
110, 111, 112, 113 et seq.; Seven 
Days' Campaign, the pursuit, 133, 
134, 136, 140; restraint in express- 
ing personal feeling, 155; Malvern 
Hill, 157, 160, 161, 167 et seq., 179, 
180, takes command at Gordonsville, 
183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 195 ; 
narrow escape from capture, 196, 201 ; 
joins Jackson, 203, 213, 214, 216, 
218, 220, 224, 225, 228, 232; orders 
McLaws's withdrawal from Mary- 
land Heights, 241 ; letters to Presi- 
dent Davis, 244; hopes at Antie- 
tam, 248-249, 250, 256; his 
thorough understanding of McClel- 
lan's character, 269; anecdote 
270; 271, 272, 281, 285, 286, 
287, 288, 290, 408, 410; report at 
Gettysburg, 414, 415; report, 416, 
425 ; anecdote of, 426 ; report, 431- 
432, 435; joined at Gordonsville, 
Va., by Longstreet, 491 ; holds 
review, 493; anecdote, 494; Peters- 
burg, 561 ; at Fredericksburg, 302, 
314 ; places army in winter quarters, 
317, 318, 319 ; strength of his army, 
March 21, 1863, 321, 322 ; at Chan- 
cellorsville, Lee's proposed campaign 
322, 323, 324, 328; decision to 
attack, 329 ; exchanges last words 
with Jackson, 329, 332, 342; meets 
Stuart at Chancellorsville, 349; Lee's 
entire command of army and of 
himself, 356, 358 ; appreciation of 
Jackson, 360 ; phenomenal prom- 
ise of Lee as leader, 364; decides 
upon invasion of Pennsylvania, 365, 
366, 370; leaves for Culpeper, 371, 
372, 373 et seq. ; the battle of Gettys- 
burg, 376, 377, 378, 391, 397, 439, 
440, 442, 446, 448 ; Wilderness, 503, 
506, 507 et seq.; Spottsylvania, 509, 



INDEX 



629 



511, 514, 518 et seq.; at North Anna, 
529, 630, 531, 532, 534; plans for 
attack at Cold Harbor, 535, 536 et 
seq., 546, 547, 549, 550 et seq.; mine 
at Petersburg, 565, 567, 571, 593, 
597, 600, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 608, 
,609, 610, 611. 

Lee, W. H. F., 189, 285, 375; Peters- 
burg, 562, 567. 

Leyden's battn. art'y, 480. 

Liddell, Col., mortally wounded at 
Antietam, 251. 

Lightfoot, Lt.-Col., 262. 

Lincoln, Abraham, loss of confidence in 
Gen. McClellan, 58; Valley Cam- 
paign, 101, 172, 175; unwise selec- 
tion of Pope as commander, 176 ; 
appoints Halleck commander-in- 
chief, 177 ; effect of Proclamation of 
■ Emancipation of Gen. McClellan, 
276 ; he visits the army, and his 
words to McClellan, 277 ; relations 
with McClellan, 278; disagreement 
with McClellan, 281 ; orders Halleck 
to relieve McClellan, places Burnside 
in command of the army, Porter 
relieved, succeeded by Hooker, 282, 
286, 314; relieves Burnside of com- 
mand and assigns it to Hooker, 316; 
373, 377, 577, 587. 

Local Reserves, 550. 

Lockwood's brigade at Gettysburg, 407. 

Long, Col. A. L., 108, 390; "Memoirs 
of Lee," quoted, 416. 

Longstreet, Gen. James, at Bull Run, 
22, 23, 24, 29, 32, 46 et seq.; in 
command of division of Johnston's 
army, 59 ; at Williamsburg, 67 et 
seq.; at Seven Pines, 74, 75, 76 et 
seq.; Seven Days' Campaign, 115, 
118 et seq., 134, 139; Malvern Hill, 
157, 160, 161 et seq.; in command of 
Wing, 175; made Lt.-Gen., 176; 
ordered to proceed to Gordonsville, 
183; Clark's Mountain, 187, 189, 
191, 195, 201; joins Jackson, 203, 
206, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 216, 220, 
228, 232 ; Antietam, 249, 251 ; mad- 
Lt.-Gen., 279, 281, 285, 286, 287; at 
Eiedericksburg, 302, 312; encamped 
above Fredericksburg, 317, 319; 
arrives in Petersburg on his way to 
rejoin Lee, 364, 365; at Cidpeper, 
372; leaves Culpeper, 374, 375, 377 
et seq.; at Gettysburg, second day, 
397 ; Gettysburg, 403, 404, 405, 407, 
411, 412, 415, 416; "Manassas to 
Appomattox," quoted, 416, 421, 423, 
424, 432, 460, 461, 466, 480, 481, 484, 



485, 486, 490, 491; casualties, 439, 
448, 547, 491, 492, 497, 498, 556, 593 ; 
battle of the Wilderness, 503, 504, 
505 ; wounded, 506, 523 et seq. ; at 
North Anna, 529, 530, 535 ; woimded, 
536, 547, 550. 

Magruder, Gen. Joseph B., at Bull Run, 
44, 48; at Yorktown, 63; defences 
at Wilhamsburg, 66 ; at Seven Pines, 
75, 76, 89; Seven Days' Campaign, 
123; the pursuit, 134, 135, 137, 138 
et seq. ; Malvern Hill, 157, 162 et seq. 

Mahone, Gen. Wm., 88, 162, 164; bri- 
gade of infantry at Crampton's Gap, 
233, 234 ; Antietam, 261 ; at Chan- 
cellorsville, 325, 352 ; Gettysburg, 
400, 401 ; battle of Wilderness, 505 ; 
Spottsylvania, 513, 514, 518, 538; 
Petersburg, 561, 568, 570, 571, 572. 

Malvern Hill, battle of, 156 et seq. 

Manassas Depot, destruction of, 195. 

Manassas Second (Second Bull Run), 
200 ; casualties, 201 ; arrangement 
of opposing armies, 203-204 ; casual- 
ties, 219. 

Manigault, Gen., 461, 462, 475 ; account, 
476-477, 478, 479. 

Mansfield, Gen. J. H. F., commands 
12th corps, Antietam, 250, 251 ; killed, 
255. 

Marshall, Maj., 109. 

Marye's Hill, assault of, 301, 302. 

Maryland Campaign, Table of Confed- 
erate Casualties, 273, 274; Federal, 
275. 

Maurin, battery of, at Fredericksburg, 
303. 

Mayne, Capt., at Bull Run, 24. 

McCall, Gen., 108, 153, 155. 

McCandless, Gen., at Gettysburg, 405, 
433. 

McClellan, Gen. Geo. B., in West Vir- 
ginia, 14; in Virginia, 55 et seq.; 
advance on Richmond, 59 ; defeat 
at Gaines Mill, 60 ; at Fortress Mon- 
roe, 63 ; Yorktown, 65 ; pursuit of 
Johnston, 66; McDowell's army 
assigned to, 71 et seq.; Valley Cam- 
paign, 97, 101 ; Seven Days' Cam- 
paign, 111, 112, 114, 123 et seq.; 
Seven Days' Campaign, the pursuit, 
133, 138 ; reason for severe criticism 
of, 139 ; Malvern Hill, 169, 170, 171 ; 
recalled to Washington, 172; lack 
of enterprise and audacity, 178 ; 
leaves Harrison's Landing, 185; 
assigned command of troops, 223— 
224, 229; at Sharpsburg, 243; ac- 



630 



INDEX 



count of Antietam, 248; pursuit of 
Lee, 249, 250, 251 ; report at Antie- 
tam, 255; error in generalship, 256, 
264, 265; orders advance of Burn- 
side, 266-267; Lee's knowledge 
of McClellan, 269 ; his plan at Antie- 
tam, 270; alienated from the ad- 
ministration, 276; Lincoln's visit to 
army, 276; his words to McClellan, 
277; growing dissatisfaction of gov- 
ernment with him, 277; relations 
with Lincoln, 278 ; disagreement with 
Lincoln, 281 ; relieved from com- 
mand by Lincoln, succeeded by 
Burnside," 282, 577. 

McCook, Gen., 453, 461. 

McDowell, Gen. Irvin, at Bull Rim, 14 
et seq.; in command of corps Army 
of Potomac, 59 ; defeat at Manassas, 
60; at Seven Pines, 73, 74 ef seq.; 
Valley Campaign, 100, 101, 108; 
Cedar Mountain, 177: Gainesville, 
195, 196, 197, 199, 202, 207. 

McElroy, Col., killed at Chickamauga, 
489. 

McGowan, Gen., at Chancellorsville, 
333, 343, 345 et seq.; battle of the 
Wilderness, 503; wounded, 522. 

McGregor's brigade at Chancellorsville, 
347. 

Mcintosh, Gen., Antietam, 268 ; at Chan- 
cellorsville, 348. 

McKinney, Col., at Yorktown, 65. 

McLaws, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette, 229, 233, 
241; Antietam, 251, 256, 257, 258; 
report of Antietam, 259, 286, 289; 
at Chancellorsville, 324, 325, 329, 
332, 348, 352, 353; at Gettys- 
burg, 371, 380 et seq.; Gettysburg, 
404, 405, 407, 416, 432, 433, 480. 

McLean's brigade at Chancellorsville, 334. 

McMaster, Col., Petersburg, 569, 570. 

McNair, Gen., 459, 462. 

McNeil, Col., mortally wounded at An- 
tietam, 251. 

McParlin, Surgeon Thomas A., 528. 

McPherson, Lt., 5 ; death of, 7. 

McRae, Col. D. K., commands Gar- 
land's brigade (Antietam), 254, 255, 
260 (wounded). 

Meade, Gen. George G., 48; campaign 
against Richmond, 60 ; at Antietam, 
251, 270, 294, 296, 297, 298; at 
Fredericksburg, 300 ; at Gettysburg, 
367 ; succeeds Hooker in command, 
377, 378, 379 et seq. ; his fine example 
of efficient command, 393; Gettys- 
burg, 404, 406, 407, 410; lost op- 
portunity, 432, 567 (Petersburg), 439, 



440, 442; ordered to Spottsylvania, 

509, 528, 541, 549, 555. 
Meagher, Gen. Thomas F., 123, 130; 

at Chancellorsville, 339. 
Mechanicsville, battle of, 120. 
Meredith, Gen. Solomon, at Gettysburg, 

brigade of, 383. 
Middleburg, engagement at, 374. 
Miles, Col. Dixon S., 225, 237. 
Miles, Col. Nelson A., at Chancellors- 
ville, 46, 332, 518. 
Milledge, Capt., 427. 
Milroy, Gen., 95. 
Milroy, Gen. R. H., brigade of, 203, 204,- 

205, 371. 
Mitchell's Ford, engagement at, 23, 34 

et seq. 
Moody, Capt. Geo. V., battery of, 399. 
Morel], Gen. G. W., 73 ; division, 208, 272. 
Morgan, Gen., 103. 
Mormon War, The, 1-3. 
Mosby, a scout, 379. 
Mott's brigade at Chancellorsville, 339 ; 

at battle of the Wilderness, 503, 507, 

517 et seq.; Petersburg, 561. 
Moultrie, Fort, 9, 11. 
Munford, Gen. T. T., cavalry of, at 

Crampton's Gap, 148, 233, 599. 
Myer, Assistant-Surgeon A. J., 3. 

Nagle, Col. James, brigade of, at Fred- 
ericksburg, 265, 267, 305. 

Naglee, Gen., 153. 

Negley, Gen., 461. 

Nelson, WilUam, Gettysburg, 418; re- 
port, 427. 

Newton, Gen. John, 69; brigade at 
Crampton's Gap, 234, 297; at 
Fredericksburg, 316; at Chancel- 
lorsville, 351, 352, 353. 

Nichols, Gen., at Chancellorsville, 333, 
335. 

Norris, Col. WilUam, 52. 

North Anna, The, 529 et seq. 

Northern Virginia, Aimy of, reorganiza- 
tion of, 367, 368. 

Oak Grove, skirmish 1 15. 

Gates, Col. Wm. C, at Gettysburg, 396, 

404. 
O'Neal, Col. Ed. A., at Chancellorsville, 

332. 
Ord, Gen., Vallev Campaign, 102. 
Orr, Col., 299. 
Osterhaus, Gen., 474. 
Ox Hill, 217, 218. 
Owen, brigade of, at Fredericksburg, 304. 

Page's battalion, 518, 520. 



INDEX 



631 



Palmer, Gen., at Fredericksburg, 302, 
303, 455, 461. 

Parham, Gen., commanding at Cramp- 
ton's Gap, 233. 

Parker, Capt. W. W., battery of, at Fred- 
ericksburg,303, 309, 484, 485, 486, 490. 

Patrick, Gen., 199; brigade of, 201. 

Patterson, Gen. Robert, at Bull Run, 14, 
16, 20, 26, 32. 

Patton, Gen., 105, 107. 

Paxton, brigade of, 330, 335, 347 ; killed, 
347. 

Peach Orchard, 392, 394 et seq. 

Pearce, Lt. Isaac E., 263. 

Peck, Gen., at Seven Pines, 82. 

Pegram, Gen., 182; wounded, 509, 528. 

Pegram, Maj. W. P., at Chancellors ville, 
348, 561. 

Pelham, Maj. John, 168; raid, 277; "the 
gallant Pelham," 296, 297. 

Pemberton, Gen., 364. 

Pender, Gen. W. D., 205; Antietam, 
268, 295; at Chancellorsville, 333, 
359, 380 et seq. 

Pendleton, Gen. W. N., at Bull Run, 36 ; 
Malvern Hill, 158, 171, 271, 272, 281, 
285, 297, 370 ; Gettysburg, 418, 420 ; 
600, 601. 

Pendleton, Maj., 100; at Chancellors- 
ville, 324. 

Perry, Gen. E. A., brigade of, at Chan- 
cellorsville, 325, 355, ; Gettysburg, 
400, 401, 405; Wilderness, wounded 
at, 509 ; killed, 522. 

Petersburg, movement against, 545 et 
seq.; casualties at, 559, 572, 573. 

Pettigrew, Gen., at Seven Pines, 85, 86, 
375, 380; killed at Gettysburg, 441. 

Peyton's report, 429-431. 

Philip's legion, at Fredericksburg, 303. 

Pickett, Gen., at Seven Pines, 85, 88, 175. 

Pickett, Gen. George E., 231 ; division 
of, 364, 380, 381 et seq.; Gettysburg, 
402, 415, 418, 420, 422, 423, 424; 
unjust report, 429; battle of the 
Wilderness, 497, 530, 537, 550, 551. 

Pleasonton, Gen. Alfred, 264, 271, 277; 
at Chancellorsville, 332. 

Pleasants, Lt.-Col., mine at Petersburg, 
564. 

Poague, Maj. W. T., 501, 503. 

Polk, Gen. 456, 457, 458, 459. 

Pollard, editor of Richmond Examiner, 
110. 

Pope, Gen. John, 60; in command of 
the new army, 108 ; arrival at Wash- 
ington, reputation, 176, 177, 180, 187 ; 
plan to cross the Rapidan forbidden 
by Halleck, 185 ; marches to the Rap- 



pahannock, ISq, 190, 192, 193, 194, 
195 ; march upon Manassas, 196, 198 ; 
attacks Jackson, 203, 208; prefers 
charges against Porter, 208, 210, 211, 
216; relieved from command, 223. 

Porter, Gen. F. J., 73, 74, 112, 122, 123 
et seq., 133, 141 ; Malvern Hill, 160, 
162, 163; Cedar Mountain, 177; 
Second Manassas, 195, 207, 208; 
accused by Pope, 208 ; dismissed 
from army, 208; investigation and 
remission of sentence, 208; 5th 
corps of, at Antietam, 250, 264, 271, 
272; relieved from command and 
succeeded by Hooker, 282. 

Posey, Gen. C, brigade of, at Chancel- 
lorsville, 325-332, 355; Gettysburg, 
400, 401. 

Potomac, Army of the, June 30, '63, 369 ; 
organization, 494. 

Potter, Gen. R. B., division of, 502, 504, 
521, 554. 

Potts, Capt., killed, 511. 

Preston, Gen., 459. 

Prince, Gen. H., at Cedar Mountain, 183. 

Pryor, Gen. R. A., at Williamsburg, 67 ; 
Williamsburg road, 83 ; Seven Pines, 
88 ; brigade of, 214, 215 ; Antietam, 
261, 264. 

Rains, Gen., at Williamsburg, 68; at 
Seven Pines, 80, 81. 

Ramsay, Lt., at Bull Run, 40. 

Ramseur, Gen. S. D., at Chancellorsville, 
brigade of, 333, 335; Wilderness, 
520; wounded, 525, 528; succeeds 
Early, 534. 

Randol, Capt., 154. 

Ransom, Gen. Robert, 157, 162, 167; at 
Antietam, 259 ; at Fredericksburg, 
303, 305 ; Chickamauga, 490 ; Peters- 
burg, 570. 

Read, Capt., Antietam, 259. 

Reno, Gen. J. L., division at Centreville, 
203, 205, 208, 217. 

Revere, Gen. J. W., at Chancellorsville, 
329 

Reynolds, Gen. J. F., 190, 105, 196; 
Pennsylvania Reserves, 203, 204, 209, 
294; at Chancellorsville, 329, 382; 
killed, 383 ; Gettysburg, 460, 461, 455. 

Rice, Col., 428. 

Rice, Gen., mortally wounded, 515. 

Richardson, Gen. Israel B., at Bull 
Run, 23, 86, 153; division at 
Antietam, 257, 260; mortally 
wounded, 262, 263, 265; 420. 

Richmond, McClellan's advance on, 59; 
seven campaigns against, 60, 62. 



632 



INDEX 



Ricketts, Gen. James B., 39; captured, 
40, 182, 199, 202 ; bliinder, 206, 207 ; 
at Antietam, 251, 563 ; division of, 
522. 

Ripley, Gen. R. S., 119, 130, 167; bri- 
gade of (Antietam), 254, 255, 260. 

Robertson's battery, 271 ; Gettysburg, 
462, 469, 484. 

Robertson, Gen. J. B., brigade of, 378, 
380 et seq. 

Robinson, Gen. John C, division of, at 
Gettysburg, 383, 406 ; Spottsylvania, 
wounded, 511. 

Rodes, Gen. R. E., at Seven Pines, 76, 
78, 79 et seq.; official report, Will- 
iamsburg road, 83; Seven Days' 
Campaign, 130; Malvern Hill, 167, 
231 ; Antietam, 261 (report), 262 ; 
at Chancellorsville, 324, 329, 330, 
332, 333, 334 et seq.; consents to 
Stuart's taking command at Jack- 
son's death, 341 ; brilliant career, 
342 ; division of, 342, 371 ; reaches 
Williamsport, 372, 381 et seq.; in 
Early's report at Gettysburg, 410, 
411; report, 412, 414, 441, 442; at 
Spottsylvania, 512. 

Rodman's division at Antietam, 265, 266, 
268. 

Roman, Col. Alfred, 552. 

Rosecrans, Gen. Wm. S., 364, 365, 460, 
465, 466, 467 ; army of, 452, 453, 454, 
455; superseded, 473. 

Rosser, Gen. T. L., brigade of, 511. 

Rowlev, Gen. Thos. A., division of, 383. 

Ruff, Col., Chickamauga, 488; killed, 
489. 

Ruger, Gen. Thomas H., at Chancellors- 
ville, 343 ; at Gettysburg, 408. 

Russell's brigade, 371. 

Scammon, Gen., 267. 

Schenck, Gen., at Bull Run, 21,' 37; 
Valley Campaign, 95. 

Schofield, Gen., 578, 579. 

Schurz, Maj. Gen. Carl, at Chancellors- 
ville, 335, 336 ; at Gettysburg, 384 ; 
411. 

Second Manassas, 185 et seq. 

Seddon, Secretary, 365. 

Sedgwick, Gen. John, at Seven Pines, 
86, 153 ; division at Antietam, 257, 
258, 259, 262; at Chancellorsville, 
323, 324 ; Hooker's orders to, 344 ; 
inability to reach Chancellorsville, 
345 ; venture against Lee's rear, 349, 
350, 352 et seq.; attack upon Sedg- 
wick, 355, 356 et seq.; battle of the 
Wilderness, 502, 504; at Spottsyl- 



vania, ordered to reenforce Warren 
and attack, 512; killed at Spottsyl- 
vania, 513. 

Sellers, Major, 263. 

Seminary Ridge, 390. 

Semmes, Gen. P. J., at Williamsburg, 
66 et seq.; Seven Days' Campaign, 
138; at Malvern Hill, 162, 164; 
brigade at Crampton's Gap, 233, 234 ; 
Antietam, 259 ; at Chancellorsville, 
326, 332, 352, 354; at Gettysburg, 
394 et seq.; mortally wounded, 399. 

Seven Days' Campaign, 109 et seq. 

Seven Pines, battle of, 9, 71, 72, 73 et 
seq., 81 ; total casualties at, 89. 

Seymour, brigade of, 508. 

Shackelford, Gen., Chickamauga, 490. 

Shaler's brigade, 508. 

Sharpsburg, map, 243. 

Sheridan, Maj. Gen. Philip H., 504, 511, 
513 ; returns from expedition to the 
James, 532; Petersburg, 566, 567. 

Sherman, Gen. Wm. T., at Bull Run, 33 
et seq.; report, 474, 477, 478, 490, 
577, 581, 588. 

Shields, Gen., 73, 97, 101, 102, 103, 105. 

Sickles, Gen. D. E., 11; at Fredericks- 
burg, 293; at Chancellorsville, 331, 
332, 337 et seq.; ordered to attack, 
343 ; recalled by Hooker, 345 ; asks 
for reinforcements, 348; at Gettys- 
burg, 392, 405. 

Sigel, Gen. F., 182, 195. 196, 197; corps 
of, 203-204, 284 ; at Fredericksburg, 
314 ; Wilderness, 496, 497, 530. 

Slaughter, Maj., 287. 

Slocum, Gen. Henry W., 69, 123, 153; 
division at Crampton's Gap, 234, 
284; at Chancellorsville, 325, 326. 

Smith, Gen. E. Kirby, at Bull Run, 19, 
27, 36; wounded, 40; in command 
one division of Johnston's army, 59; 
220. 

Smith, Gen. G. W., 57; in command one 
division of Johnston's army, 59; 
Seven Pines, 75, 76, 77 et seq.; 
succeeds Johnston in command 
"Smith's Battle," 87, 88, 93, 153; 
Fredericksburg, 316. 

Smith, Gen. M. L., Lee's chief engineer, 
504 ; appreciation of, 505, 506. 

Smith, Gen. W. F., at Yorktown, 65; 
note, 466 ; at Petersburg, 548, 549. 

Smith, W. H., 535, 537, 538. 

Smith, Gen. W. S., brigade of, 352. 

Sorrel, Col. G. M., Longstreet's Adjt.- 
Gen., 505, 506. 

Spottsylvania, 509 et seq. 

Squires, Capt., 24. 



INDEX 



633 



Stafford, Col. L. A., 182 ; Antietam, 253, 
258; killed at Wilderness, 500. 

Stanton, Edwin M., Secretary of War, 
114, 373, 377. 

Stannard, Gen., Gettysburg, 407. 

Starke, Gen. W. E., 199, 204, 206; 
killed at Antietam, 252. 

Steinwehr, Gen. A. von, at Gettysburg, 
division of, 384. 

Steuart, Gen. George H., 99, 100, 371 ; 
Gettysburg, 409 ; captured, 520. 

Stevens, Maj., at Bui] Run, 34. 

Stevenson, Maj. -Gen. C. L., division of, 
474, 502, 504. 

Stevenson, Gen. Thomas C., killed, 517. 

Stockton, Col. T. B. W., brigade of, at 
Fredericksburg, 305, 306. 

Stone Bridge, engagement at, 29. 

Stone, Gen. C. P., at Ball's Bluff, 57. 

Stoneman, cavalry of, at Chancellors- 
ville, 322, 323. 

Stonewall brigade, 371. 

Stovall, Gen., 458. 

Stringfellow, a scout, 379. 

Stuart, Col., afterward Gen. J. E. B., at 
Bull Run, 39 et seq. ; Seven Days' 
Campaign, 113, 114, 117 et seq., 133; 
Malvern Hill, 168, 169, 170; Rac- 
coon Ford, 187, 188, 189, 190 ; joins 
Jackson at Gainesville, 193, 197, 207, 
216, 230 ; Antietam, 250, 253 ; raid, 
277, 285, 294, 297; at Chancellors- 
ville, selected by A. P. Hill to suc- 
ceed Jackson, 341, 342 ; orders attack, 
345, 347 ; personal conduct, 347, 359; 
energy and eflaciency of, 360 ; loss 
at Brandy Station, 371 ; unwise 
proposition to Lee, 374 et seq.; 
Gettysburg, 433, 442; Wilderness, 
604; killed at Yellow Tavern on 
May 11, 532. 

Sturgis, Gen. S. D., 190, 265, 267, 268; 
at Fredericksburg, 304, 305, 316. 

Sudley, engagement at, 32. 

Sully, Gen. Alfred, bHgade of, at Freder- 
icksburg, 304. 

Sumner, Gen. E. V., in command corps 
Army of Potomac, 59; at Seven 
Pines, 84, 86, 87; Seven Days' 
Campaign, 123, 138; Malvern Hill, 
160, 162, 216; at Antietam, 250, 
251, 256; testimony in regard to 
Antietam, 257, 259, 260, 262, 263, 
264, 284, 285, 286, 287, 293, 294 ; at 
Fredericksburg, 301, 302, 311. 

Sumter, Fort, firing on, 9-11. 

Sweitzer, Col. J. B., brigade of, at Fred- 
ericksburg, 305, 306 ; at Gettysburg, 
404. 



Swinton, William, description of con- 
flict at Antietam, 261 ; account of 
Burnside, 286 ; at Fredericksburg, 
315; at Gettysburg, 396, 541, 546; 
quoted, 575. 

Sykes, Gen. George, 272 ; at Fredericks- 
burg, 302, 306, 311, 312; at Chancel- 
lorsville, 325-326; Gettysburg, 405. 

Talcott, Maj. T. M. R., 109. 

Taliaferro, A. G., brigade, 200; report 
of, 200; brigade commanded by 
Starke, 204, 295. 

Taliaferro, Gen. W. B., at Cedar Moun- 
tain, 175 ; second Manassas, 183, 
194, 197, 199. 

Taylor, Col. W. H. (Adjt.-Gen.), ac- 
count, 244, 385; quoted, 585, 586. 

Taylor, Gen. G. W., killed at Manassas, 
194. 

Taylor, Maj., 109, 144. 

Terry, Col., wounded at Williamsburg, 
69. 

Thomas, Brig. Gen., Chancellorsville, 347. 

Thomas, Col., killed at Chickamauga, 
489. 

Thomas, Col. E. L., brigade of, 205; 
242, 295, 298, 299, 477, 478; at 
Chancellorsville, 331, 333, 335. 

Thompson, Capt., at Antietam, 260. 

Thoroughfare Gap, 201, 202. 

Tidball's battery, 271. 

Tilton, Gen., Gettysburg, 404. 

Toombs, Gen. R., Malvern Hill, 166; 
Raccoon Ford, 188, 265, 266, 268. 

Torbert, Gen. Alfred T. A., brigade at 
Crampton's Gap, 234; brigade of, 
at Chancellorsville, 353, 535. 

Trigg, Gen., 462. 

Trimble, Gen. I. R., Valley Campaign, 
105, 107; Seven Days' Campaign, 
117, 131 ; volunteers to capture 
Manassas, 194, 199 ; brigade '■ " 
200, 204; Antietam, 251, 252, '^ . 

Turner's Gap, 228, 229, 230. 

Tyler, Col. R. O., 104; division of, 528. 

Tyler, Gen. Daniel, at Bull Run, 22, 
23, 25. 27, 29, 31, 33, 237, 238, 307, 
308, 309. 

Upperville, engagement at, 374. 
Upton, Col. E., 516, 517, 518. 

Valley Campaign, 94 et seq.; total 

casualties, 107. 
Valley of Virginia, 94. 
Van Cleve, Gen. H. P., 461. 
Van Dorn, Gen. Earl, in command 

one division Johnston's army, 59. 



634 



INDEX 



Venable, Col. C. S., 109, 494, 603. 

Verdiersville, 187, 188. 

Vienna, Va., engagement at, 21. 

"Vincent, Col. S., brigade of, at Gettys- 
burg, 396; killed, 396. 

Vincent, Gen., Gettysburg, 404. 

Von Borcke, Maj., 295. 

Von Gilsa, Col. Leopold, at Chan- 
cellorsville, 334. 

"Wadsworth, Gen. James S., at Gettys- 
burg, 383, 386 ; battle of the Wilder- 
ness, 501, 503; killed, 505. 

Walker, Col. J. A., 190, 229; Loudon 
Heights, 235, 241 ; wounded at 
Antietam commanding Trimble's 
brigade, 253, 258, 260, 267; his 
anecdote of Gen. Lee, 270, 419, 458, 
524. 

Walker, Gen. H. H., wounded, 514. 

Walker, Hon. L. P., Sec. of War, C.S.A., 
8, 35. 

Wallace, Gen. Lewis, 563. 

Walton, Col. J. B., at Fredericksburg, 
303. 

Ward's brigade, 507. 

Warren Col., E. T. H., 73; at Chan- 
cellorsville, brigade of, 333, 335. 

Warren, Gen. G. K., Hooker's chief 
engineer, at Chancellorsville, 345; 
at Gettysburg, 396; battle of the 
Wilderness, 501, 502, 504, 511, 512, 
515, 523 et seq.; at North Anna, 531, 
539, 548, 549. 

Warren, Lt., 78. 

Warrenton pike, engagement on, 35. 

Washington Artillery, 371, 388, 395. 

Washington, defence of, 59-60. 

Wauhatchie, map, 468; battle of, 542. 

Webb, Gen. A. S., brigade of, 515. 

Weber, Maj., 441. 

Weed, Gen., Gettysburg, 404. 

Weisiger, Col., brigade of, 521, 571. 

Wheat, Maj. Robert, at Bull Rim, 25, 31, 
33, note, 34. 

Wheeler, Gen., 456, 457, 480. 

White, Gen. O. B., letter to Tyler, 237- 
238. 

Whiting, Major, at Bull Run, 48. 

Whiting, General, 69, 74, 76, 77, 78, 85, 
86, 88 ; Seven Days' Campaign, 111, 
112, 124, 130; Malvern Hill, 157, 
159, 161 et seq.; 232. 

Whipple, Gen. A. W., at Fredericks- 
burg, 302, 305; at Chancellorsville, 
332, 345. 



Wiedrich, Capt., in Howard's report, 
411. 

Wilboum, Capt., at Chancellorsville, 
341. 

WHcox, Gen. C. M., 82, 83, 84, 88, 154; 
at Fredericksburg, 304; at Chan- 
cellorsville, 325, 329, 350, 352, 353, 
354; at Gettysburg, 392 et seq.; 
brigade of, 203, 210, 214, 215, 234, 
261, 264, 267; Gettysburg, 400 
(report), 401, 405, 418, 425, 432; 
Wilderness, 500, 501 et seq., 518; 
division of, 502, 504, 529, 538; 
Petersburg, 561, 566, 590. 

Wilder, Gen., 461. 

Wilderness, battle of the, 500 et seq. 

Willard, Gen., killed at Gettysburg, 406. 

Willcox, Gen. O. B., division of, 268, 
269, 521. 

Williams, Gen. A. S., Antietam, 255, 
256; Gettysburg, 406; at Chan- 
cellorsville, ^332, 346; at Gettysbvu-g, 
division of, 389. 

Williamsburg, engagement at, 66 et seq. ; 
casualties, 69. 

Williamsburg road, battle of, 76, 82; 
casualties, "Hill's Battle," 83, 85. 

WilUs, Gen. Edward, killed, 534. 

Wilson, Gen. James A., cavalry division 
of, 511, 539, 549, 561; quoted, 583. 

Winder, Gen., Valley Campaign, 106; 
Seven Days' Campaign, 129, 130; 
Cedar Mountain, 181 ; death of, 182. 

Wise, Gen., 550. 555, 556 ; at Petersbm-g, 
570; quoted, 598-599. 

Wofford, Col. W. T., Antietam, 254, 255, 
256; brigade of, at Chancellorsville, 
352 ; at Gettysburg, 394, 395 et seq. ; 
Chickamauga, 488 ; battle of Wilder- 
ness, 505; Spottsylvania, 511. 

Wood, Gen., 458, 459, 460. 

Woolfolk, Capt. P., 396. 

Wright, Gen. A. R., 142, 162, 163; at 
Chancellorsville, 325, 355. 

Wright, Gen. H. G., Antietam, 261; 
Gettysburg, 400, 401 ; report, 402- 
403, 405, 421, 432, 570, 572; suc- 
ceeds to command of 6th corps, 
513, 527. 

Yorktown, defence of, 63 et seq. 
Young, Brigham, 2. 
Young, John Russell; 11. 

Zook, Gen. S. K., at Fredericksburg, 302, 
304 ; killed at Gettysburg, 404. 




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